New Europe College Yearbook 2010-2011

IONUŢ FLORIN BILIUŢĂ
DUNYA DENIZ CAKIR
ANA-MARIA GOILAV
MARIANA GOINA
SILVIU-RADIAN HARITON
SUSAN MBULA KILONZO
CRISTIAN NAE
THEODOR-CRISTIAN POPESCU
COSMIN GABRIEL RADU
KONRAD SIEKIERSKI
ANDREEA ŞTEFAN

New Europe College
Yearbook 2010-2011

Editor: Irina Vainovski-Mihai

New Europe College Yearbook 2010-2011

IONUŢ FLORIN BILIUŢĂ
DUNYA DENIZ CAKIR
ANA-MARIA GOILAV
MARIANA GOINA
SILVIU-RADIAN HARITON
SUSAN MBULA KILONZO
CRISTIAN NAE
THEODOR-CRISTIAN POPESCU
COSMIN GABRIEL RADU
KONRAD SIEKIERSKI
ANDREEA ŞTEFAN

CONTENTS

NEW EUROPE FOUNDATION
NEW EUROPE COLLEGE

Institute for Advanced Study

New Europe College (NEC) is an independent Romanian institute for advanced study in the humanities and social sciences founded in 1994 by Professor Andrei Pleșu (philosopher, art historian, writer, Romanian Minister of Culture, 1990–1991, Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1997-1999) within the framework of the *New Europe Foundation*, established in 1994 as a private foundation subject to Romanian law.

Its impetus was the *New Europe Prize for Higher Education and Research*, awarded in 1993 to Professor Pleșu by a group of six institutes for advanced study (the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, the National Humanities Center, Research Triangle Park, the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in Humanities and Social Sciences, Wassenaar, the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Uppsala, and the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin).

Since 1994, the NEC community of fellows and *alumni* has enlarged to over 500 members. In 1998 New Europe College was awarded the prestigious *Hannah Arendt Prize* for its achievements in setting new standards in research and higher education. New Europe College is officially recognized by the Romanian Ministry of Education and Research as an institutional structure for postgraduate studies in the humanities and social sciences, at the level of advanced studies.

Focused primarily on individual research at an advanced level, NEC offers to young Romanian scholars and academics in the fields of humanities and social sciences, and to the foreign scholars invited as fellows appropriate working conditions, and provides an institutional framework with strong

international links, acting as a stimulating environment for interdisciplinary dialogue and critical debates. The academic programs NEC coordinates, and the events it organizes aim at strengthening research in the humanities and social sciences and at promoting contacts between Romanian scholars and their peers worldwide.

Academic programs currently organized and coordinated by NEC:

- *NEC Fellowships (since 1994)*
  Each year, up to ten NEC Fellowships open both to Romanian and international outstanding young scholars in the humanities and social sciences are publicly announced. The Fellows are chosen by the NEC international Academic Advisory Board for the duration of one academic year, or one term. They gather for weekly seminars to discuss the progress of their research, and participate in all the scientific events organized by NEC. The Fellows receive a monthly stipend, and are given the opportunity of a research trip abroad, at a university or research institute of their choice. At the end of their stay, the Fellows submit papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the New Europe College Yearbooks.

- *Ştefan Odobleja Fellowships (since October 2008)*
  The fellowships given in this program are supported by the National Council of Scientific Research, and are meant to complement and enlarge the core fellowship program. The definition of these fellowships, targeting young Romanian researchers, is identical with those in the NEC Program, in which the Odobleja Fellowships are integrated.

- *The GE-NEC III Fellowships Program (since October 2009)*
  This program, supported by the Getty Foundation, started in 2009. It proposes a research on, and a reassessment of Romanian art during the interval 1945 – 2000, that is, since the onset of the Communist regime in Romania up to recent times, through contributions coming

from young scholars attached to the New Europe College as Fellows. As in the previous programs supported by the Getty Foundation at the NEC, this program also includes a number of invited guest lecturers, whose presence is meant to ensure a comparative dimension, and to strengthen the methodological underpinnings of the research conducted by the Fellows.

- **The Black Sea Link (since October 2010)**
  This Fellowship Program, sponsored by the VolkswagenStiftung, invites young researchers from Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as from other countries within the Black Sea region, for a stay of one or two terms at the New Europe College, during which they have the opportunity to work on projects of their choice. The program welcomes a wide variety of disciplines in the fields of humanities and social sciences. Besides hosting a number of Fellows, the College organizes within this program workshops and symposia on topics relevant to the history, present, and prospects of the Black Sea region.

Other fellowship programs organized since the founding of New Europe College:

- **RELINK Fellowships (1996–2002)**
  The RELINK Program targeted highly qualified young Romanian scholars returning from studies or research stays abroad. Ten RELINK Fellows were selected each year through an open competition; in order to facilitate their reintegration in the local scholarly milieu and to improve their working conditions, a support lasting three years was offered, consisting of: funds for acquiring scholarly literature, an annual allowance enabling the recipients to make a one–month research trip to a foreign institute of their choice in order to sustain existing scholarly contacts and forge new ones, and the use of a laptop computer and printer. Besides their individual research projects, the RELINK fellows of the last series were also required to organize outreach actives involving their universities, for which they received a monthly stipend. NEC published several volumes comprising individual or group research works of the RELINK Fellows.

- **_The NEC–LINK Program (2003 - 2009)_**
  Drawing on the experience of its NEC and RELINK Programs in connecting with the Romanian academic milieu, NEC initiated in 2003, with support from HESP, a program that aimed to contribute more consistently to the advancement of higher education in major Romanian academic centers (Bucharest, Cluj–Napoca, Iași, Timișoara). Teams consisting of two academics from different universities in Romania, assisted by a PhD student, offered joint courses for the duration of one semester in a discipline within the fields of humanities and social sciences. The program supported innovative courses, conceived so as to meet the needs of the host universities. The grantees participating in the Program received monthly stipends, a substantial support for ordering literature relevant to their courses, as well as funding for inviting guest lecturers from abroad and for organizing local scientific events.

- **_The GE–NEC I and II Programs (2000 – 2004, and 2004 – 2007)_**
  New Europe College organized and coordinated two cycles in a program financially supported by the Getty Foundation. Its aim was to strengthen research and education in fields related to visual culture, by inviting leading specialists from all over the world to give lectures and hold seminars for the benefit of Romanian undergraduate and graduate students, young academics and researchers. This program also included 10–month fellowships for Romanian scholars, chosen through the same selection procedures as the NEC Fellows (see above). The GE–NEC Fellows were fully integrated in the life of the College, received a monthly stipend, and were given the opportunity of spending one month abroad on a research trip. At the end of the academic year the Fellows submitted papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the GE–NEC Yearbooks series.

- **_NEC Regional Fellowships (2001 - 2006)_**
  In 2001 New Europe College introduced a regional dimension to its programs (hitherto dedicated solely to Romanian scholars), by offering fellowships to academics and researchers from South–Eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, and Turkey). This program aimed at

integrating into the international academic network scholars from a region whose scientific resources are as yet insufficiently known, and to stimulate and strengthen the intellectual dialogue at a regional level. Regional Fellows received a monthly stipend and were given the opportunity of a one–month research trip abroad. At the end of the grant period, the Fellows were expected to submit papers representing the results of their research, published in the NEC Regional Program Yearbooks series.

• **The Britannia–NEC Fellowship (2004 - 2007)**
This fellowship (1 opening per academic year) was offered by a private anonymous donor from the U.K. It was in all respects identical to a NEC Fellowship. The contributions of Fellows in this program were included in the NEC Yearbooks.

• **The Petre Ţuţea Fellowships (2006 – 2008, 2009 - 2010)**
In 2006 NEC was offered the opportunity of opening a fellowships program financed the Romanian Government though its Department for Relations with the Romanians Living Abroad. Fellowships are granted to researchers of Romanian descent based abroad, as well as to Romanian researchers, to work on projects that address the cultural heritage of the Romanian *diaspora*. Fellows in this program are fully integrated in the College's community. At the end of the year they submit papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the bilingual series of the *Petre Ţuţea* Program publications.

• **Europa Fellowships (2006 - 2010)**
This fellowship program, financed by the VolkswagenStiftung, proposes to respond, at a different level, to some of the concerns that had inspired our *Regional Program*. Under the general title *Traditions of the New Europe. A Prehistory of European Integration in South-Eastern Europe*, Fellows work on case studies that attempt to recapture the earlier history of the European integration, as it has been taking shape over the centuries in South–Eastern Europe, thus offering the communitarian Europe some valuable vestiges of its less known past.

- **Robert Bosch Fellowships (2007 - 2009)**
  This fellowship program, funded by the Robert Bosch Foundation, supported young scholars and academics from Western Balkan countries, offering them the opportunity to spend a term at the New Europe College and devote to their research work. Fellows in this program received a monthly stipend, and funds for a one-month study trip to a university/research center in Germany.

New Europe College has been hosting over the years an ongoing series of lectures given by prominent foreign and Romanian scholars, for the benefit of academics, researchers and students, as well as a wider public. The College also organizes international and national events (seminars, workshops, colloquia, symposia, book launches, etc.).

An important component of NEC is its library, consisting of reference works, books and periodicals in the humanities, social and economic sciences. The library holds, in addition, several thousands of books and documents resulting from private donations. It is first and foremost destined to service the fellows, but it is also open to students, academics and researchers from Bucharest and from outside it.

<div align="center">***</div>

Beside the above–described programs, New Europe Foundation and the College expanded their activities over the last years by administering, or by being involved in the following major projects:

In the past:

- **The Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Religious Studies towards the EU Integration (2001–2005)**
  Funding from the Austrian Ludwig Boltzmann Gesellschaft enabled us to select during this interval a number of associate researchers, whose work focused on the sensitive issue of religion related problems in the Balkans, approached from the viewpoint of the EU integration. Through its activities the institute fostered the dialogue between distinct religious cultures (Christianity, Islam, Judaism), and between different confessions

within the same religion, attempting to investigate the sources of antagonisms and to work towards a common ground of tolerance and cooperation. The institute hosted international scholarly events, issued a number of publications, and enlarged its library with publications meant to facilitate informed and up-to-date approaches in this field.

- ***The Septuagint Translation Project (2002 - 2011)***
  This project aims at achieving a scientifically reliable translation of the Septuagint into Romanian by a group of very gifted, mostly young, Romanian scholars, attached to the NEC. The financial support is granted by the Romanian foundation *Anonimul.* Seven of the planned nine volumes have already been published by the Polirom Publishing House in Iași.

- ***The Excellency Network Germany – South–Eastern Europe Program (2005 - 2008)***
  The aim of this program, financed by the Hertie Foundation, has been to establish and foster contacts between scholars and academics, as well as higher education entities from Germany and South–Eastern Europe, in view of developing a regional scholarly network; it focused preeminently on questions touching upon European integration, such as transnational governance and citizenship. The main activities of the program consisted of hosting at the New Europe College scholars coming from Germany, invited to give lectures at the College and at universities throughout Romania, and organizing international scientific events with German participation.

- ***The ethnoArc Project–Linked European Archives for Ethnomusicological Research***
  *An European Research Project in the 6th Framework Programme: Information Society Technologies–Access to and Preservation of Cultural and Scientific Resources **(2006-2008)***
  The goal of the *ethnoArc* project (which started in 2005 under the title *From Wax Cylinder to Digital Storage* with funding from the Ernst von Siemens Music Foundation and the Federal Ministry for Education and Research in Germany) was to contribute to the preservation, accessibility, connectedness and exploitation of some of the most prestigious ethno-musicological archives in Europe (Bucharest,

Budapest, Berlin, and Geneva), by providing a linked archive for field collections from different sources, thus enabling access to cultural content for various application and research purposes. The project was run by an international network, which included: the "Constantin Brăiloiu" Institute for Ethnography and Folklore, Bucharest; Archives Internationales de Musique Populaire, Geneva; the Ethno-musicological Department of the Ethnologic Museum Berlin (Phonogramm Archiv), Berlin; the Institute of Musicology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest; Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin (Coordinator), Berlin; New Europe College, Bucharest; FOKUS Fraunhofer Institute for Open Communication Systems, Berlin.

- *DOCSOC, Excellency, Innovation and Interdisciplinarity in doctoral and postdoctoral studies in sociology* (A project in the Development of Human Resources, under the aegis of the National Council of Scientific Research) – in cooperation with the University of Bucharest (starting July 2010)

- *UEFISCCDI – CNCS (PD – Projects): Federalism or Intergovernmentalism? Normative Perspectives on the Democratic Model of the European Union (Dr. Dan LAZEA); The Political Radicalization of the Kantian Idea of Philosophy in a Cosmopolitan Sense (Dr. Áron TELEGDI-CSETRI),* Timeframe: August 1, 2010 – July 31, 2012 (2 Years)

Ongoing projects:

The Medicine of the Mind and Natural Philosophy in Early Modern England: A new Interpretation of Francis Bacon (A project under the aegis of the European Research Council (ERC) Starting Grants Scheme) – In cooperation with the Warburg Institute, School of Advanced Study, London (since December 2009)

Business Elites in Romania: Their Social and Educational Determinants and their Impact on Economic Performances. This is the Romanian contribution to a joint project with the University of Sankt Gallen, entitled *Markets for Executives and Non-Executives in Western and eastern Europe*, and financed by the National Swiss Fund for the Development of Scientific Research (SCOPES) (since December 2009)

Civilization. Identity. Globalism. Social and Human Studies in the Context of European Development (A project in the Development of Human Resources, under the aegis of the National Council of Scientific Research) – in cooperation with the Romanian Academy (starting October 2010)

The EURIAS Fellowship Programme, a project initiated by NetIAS (Network of European Institutes for Advanced Study), coordinated by the RFIEA (Network of French Institutes for Advanced Study), and co-sponsored by the European Commission's 7th Framework Programme - COFUND action. It is an international researcher mobility programme in collaboration with 14 participating Institutes of Advanced Study in Berlin, Bologna, Brussels, Bucharest, Budapest, Cambridge, Helsinki, Jerusalem, Lyons, Nantes, Paris, Uppsala, Vienna, Wassenaar. The College will host the second *EURIAS* Fellow in October 2012.

UEFISCDI – CNCS (TE – Project): Critical Foundations of Contemporary Cosmopolitanism (Dr. Tamara CĂRĂUŞ)**,** Timeframe: October 5, 2011 – October 5, 2014 (3 years)

UEFISCDI – CNCS (IDEI-Project): Models of Producing and Disseminating Knowledge in Early Modern Europe: The Cartesian Framework (Dr. Vlad ALEXANDRESCU),
Timeframe: January 1, 2012 – December 31, 2014 (3 years)

Other projects are in the making, often as a result of initiatives coming from fellows and *alumni* of the NEC.

Present Financial Support

The State Secretariat for Education and Research of Switzerland (Center for Governance and Culture in Europe, University of St. Gallen)

The Federal Ministry for Education and Research of Germany

The Federal Ministry for Education, Science and Culture of Austria

Le Ministère Français des Affaires Etrangères – Ambassade de France en Roumanie

The Ministry of Education, Research and Innovation – the Executive Agency for Higher Education and Research Funding, Romania

Landis & Gyr Stiftung, Zug, Switzerland

Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft (DaimlerChrysler–Fonds, Marga und Kurt Möllgaard–Stiftung), Essen, Germany

A Private Foundation based in the Netherlands

VolkswagenStiftung, Hanover, Germany

The Getty Foundation, Los Angeles, USA

The Swiss National Science Foundation, Bern, Switzerland

Seventh Framework Programme of the European Communities, ERC Executive Agency

Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, Köln, Germany

Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, The Swedish Foundation for Humanities and Social Sciences, Stockholm, Sweden

New Europe College -- Directorate

Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Andrei PLEŞU, Rector
Professor of Philosophy of Religion, Bucharest; former Minister of Culture and former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania

Marina HASNAŞ, Executive Director

Dr. Anca OROVEANU, Academic Director
Professor of Art History, National University of Arts, Bucharest

Dr. Valentina SANDU-DEDIU, Deputy Rector
Professor of Musicology, National University of Music, Bucharest

Administrative Board

Dr. Katharina BIEGGER, Head of Admissions Office, Deputy Secretary, Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin

Mag. Heribert BUCHBAUER, Director Department for International Research Cooperation, Austrian Federal Ministry of Science and Research, Vienna

Andrea FISCHER, Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft, Essen

Regula KOCH, Director, Landis & Gyr Stiftung, Zug; President, Wissenschafts- und Kulturzentrum NEC Bukarest-Zug

Dr. Dirk LEHMKUHL, Chair for European Politics, University of St. Gallen; Director of Programmes International Affairs & Governance; Center for Governance and Culture in Europe, University of St. Gallen

Dr. Florin POGONARU, President, Business People Association, Bucharest

Dr. Cristian POPA, Deputy Governor, Romanian National Bank, Bucharest

MinR'in Dr. Erika ROST, Federal Ministry of Education and Research, Bonn

Dr. Heinz–Rudi SPIEGEL, Formerly Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft, Essen

Academic Advisory Board

Dr. Horst BREDEKAMP, Professor of Art History, Humboldt University, Berlin

Dr. Edhem ELDEM, Professor of History, School of Arts and Sciences, Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, Turkey

Dr. Luca GIULIANI, Rector, Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, Professor of Archaeology, Humboldt University, Berlin

Dr. Dieter GRIMM, Professor (emer.) of Law, Humboldt University, Berlin

Dr. Ivan KRASTEV, Director, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia

Dr. Vintilă MIHAILESCU, Professor of Anthropology, National School of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest

Dr. Ioan PÂNZARU, Professor, Department of French Language and Literature; Former Rector of the University of Bucharest

Dr. Ulrich SCHMID, Professor for the Culture and Society of Russia, University of St. Gallen; Head of the Center for Governance and Culture in Europe, University of St. Gallen

Dr. Victor I. STOICHIȚĂ, Professor of Art History, University of Fribourg

Dr. Alain SUPIOT, Director, Permanent Fellow, Institut d'Etudes Avancées de Nantes; Chair, Collège de France

17

IONUȚ FLORIN BILIUȚĂ

Born in 1980, in Focșani, Romania

Ph.D. Candidate in History, Central European University, Budapest
Thesis: *The Archangel's Consacrated Servants. An Inquiry in the Relationship between the Orthodox Church and the Iron Guard in Interwar Romania and Beyond*

2006 (May), Two Years Research Scholarship in Systematic Theology received from Diakonisches Werk – EKD, Germany;

2007 (June), Ratiu Family Foundation's research scholarship for a Ph.D. in History;

2008 (April), Ph.D. scholarship in Theology granted by Leuven University (Belgium);

2008 (May), Rațiu Foundation Scholarship for a Ph.D. in History at Oxford Brookes (UK);

2011 (May-June), Visiting Junior Research Fellow, Modern European History Research Center, Faculty of History, University of Oxford (Oxford, UK);

2011-2012- Junior Research Fellowship awarded by Institute for European History (Mainz, Germany).

Conferences attended in Switzerland, USA, Canada, Austria, Germany, Hungary, Romania.

Articles on Intellectual History of Romanian Nationalism, History of the Orthodox Church, Romanian fascism, Phenomenology, Patristics, Bzyantium.

Projects: Eastern Europe (SCOPES), Eastern Christianity in Post-Imperial Societies.

SECULAR VERSUS RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM IN 19TH-20TH CENTURY ROMANIA. STIRRING THE DEBATING ABOUT THE ESSENCE OF ROMANIAN NATIONALISM

Introduction

Between 1920 and 1940 the relationship between culture and ethnicity constituted one of the most dominant political themes in Eastern Europe. The cultural, historical, anthropological debates shaped national identity in every country in the region. After 1918 the building of the national state in East Central Europe had as a principal consequence a quest to define the nation. The political regimes engaged in an official sponsored project to define nationhood. The main reasons behind this political attitude were the inhomogeneous population inside their borderlands or the menacing strong neighbors. In the same time revisionism, political conservatism, artistic avant-garde, anti-modernism and fascism joined hands with the same purpose: to provide a right-wing definition of the nation where racial nationalistic grounds were the backbone for an exclusivist and anti-Semite ideology which eventually led to an explosive state of facts.

The rise of Soviet Russia on the one hand and fascist Italy and Germany on the other hand had a tremendous effect on Eastern Europe: in the conflict between the god of the Nation and the idol of the class, the countries from the Eastern Europe attempted to avoid a political partnership with the revolutionary states and involved in different regional and international alliances. But these political alliances could not put an end to the appeal of the fascist states: it seemed that by the end of the 1930s, under the influence of the economical crises, the god of the Nation ruled over Eastern Europe, as well. This balancing situation is also true in Romania's case. Around this confrontation in creating the national identity I construct my paper. The "geo-cultural bovarism" (Sorin Antohi)

21

of the countries in the region is the main metaphor which describes the permutations of different categories, including nation and religion.[1]

The literature on the Romanian case is poor. Although in interwar Romanian there was a hotly debate over the nation between the traditionalists and modernizers, there are still unclear aspects about it and its connection with the emergence of the fascist movement of the Iron Guard in the mid 1930s. A historiographical overview concerning this issue should begin with Keith Hitchins. In the context of the debates over the role played by the centre on the periphery in economic development, Romanian started to play a major role and to interest the specialists. It is in this context that the first volume in which one of Keith Hitchins's first texts regarding the traditionalist group of *Gîndirea* was published.[2] Hitchins continued to express his insights on the interwar debate regarding the Romanian character in a new monograph which framed the whole traditionalist camp into a historical context lacking from the previous text.

Another scholar who published in the same period was Sorin Alexandrescu, a Romanian scholar. First in an article[3] and then in a book, entitled "The Romanian paradox"[4] he had one of the first attempts to reconstruct the Romanian debates and to critically analyze the context in which they took place. Zigu Ornea produced the first synthesis which attempted to integrate the traditionalist camp of Nichifor Crainic and the generation led by Nae Ionescu within the intellectual and political trends already present in interwar Romania with the emerging Iron Guard.[5] When it has been published, Ornea's book provided the clearest comparative framework for the traditionalist movement in the field and intended to be the first monograph on the Romanian interwar period which integrated Nichifor Crainic and Nae Ionescu, the main actors of this thesis in a broader cultural context in which the influences coming from other intellectuals and the relevance of the political factor counted, as well. Mac Linscott Rickets[6] proved that Eliade's Romanian roots were more complicated as believed before. He was one of the first exegetes who underlined the capital presence of Nae Ionescu's in the future intellectual development of Mircea Eliade.

The 1990s brought about a socio-historical approach of the Romanian interwar in general and of Romanian nationalism in particular. Irina Livezeanu was the first scholar in the field which in her book concerning the emergence of Romanian nationalism took into account the fact that nationalism came as a reaction to different problems to which the Romanian state came across after the unification of 1918.[7] Compact

ethnic minorities, the heterogeneous distribution of the wealth between different Romanian provinces, diverse systems of schooling, dissimilar policies applied by the Romanian state through its administration to homogenize the Romanian population became problems for a Romanian state wanting to achieve ethnic homogenization. The autochtonist replica was a complementary solution to the problems to which Romania struggle. Leon Volovici's book is important for the present research because it showed the connection between the nationalist ideology of Orthodoxism and its exclusive character exercised mainly on the Jews.[8]

Although a reputed specialist on Romanian Communism, Katherine Verdery remained faithful to this sociological, anthropological approach of the Romanian interwar. Writing about the traditionalist camp and, especially, about Nichifor Crainic she noticed that the Romanian discourse about national identity in an Orthodox key had two other reasons: on the one hand a reply to a historical theory which considered that Romanian people as a Latin people had to adjust its civilization according to other state from Europe (namely, France) and on the other hand that Church tried to re-enter the political game in the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s.

Other important contributions are authored by Alexandra Laignel-Lavastine[9] and Marta Petreu.[10] Both books show the way in which the nationalist project of the traditionalists ended up in becoming just a puppet-tool for the Romanian fascist movement. People like Mircea Eliade who wrote texts like "Why do I believe in the final victory of the Legionary movement?" or Emil Cioran, the author of "Transfiguration of Romania", a book heavy loaded with the fascist ideology of the Iron Guard, joined the movement in the late 30s. They were the most prestigious intellectuals coming from the nationalist circle of Nae Ionescu and with access to Crainic's writings. The reason why the second generation of Romanian traditionalists chose to enroll in the Iron Guard, but failed to continue the "ethnic ontology" of Nae Ionescu in its confessional aspect, or the Orthodoxist project of Nichifor Crainic, remains a topic untackled by these two books.

In 2000 a wave of revisionism was felt in the historiography on the related topic. The monograph of Florin Ţurcanu on Mircea Eliade's early years eased up the accusations of anti-Semitism and fascism against him and demonstrated that Eliade was very much influenced by an intellectual and political context to which only Zigu Ornea made a fragmentary reference.[11] Ţurcanu's contribution for my topic is that he

proved without doubt that Eliade was supporting a nationalist spiritual revolution embodied in the Iron Guard, but this revolution was not a Christian, Orthodox revolution. The latest relevant monograph, written by Philip Vanhaelemeersch,[12] attempts a comparison between the two debates to see the connections and the differences between them. Starting from the intellectuals from "Gîndirea" journal, Philip Vanhaelemeersch draws a comparison of different traditionalist currents and establishes the origins of this movement: after the war, there was a certain interest towards establishing a national definition, but this definition was build according to Western rules. Crainic and Blaga tried to offer an alternative by building an autochtonist perspective in which the nation should have been depicted by starting from the social realities of the Romanian state. The peasantry and the village, Orthodoxy and the Christian tradition became the main categories of Crainic's followers, starving for a national ideal uncorrupted by the decadent West.

Sorin Antohi is another important scholar that devoted time to this particular issue. "Civitas imaginalis"[13] is one of the most daring attempts to establish the roots of Romanian ethnical ontology. Starting from the Romanian revolution of 1848, Sorin Antohi suggests that any nationalist project had a utopian feature, namely, no connection with the surrounding reality. Furthermore, these nationalist projects were meaningless because they had no applicability in the Romanian social environment. In the interwar this utopian characteristic determined the traditionalists to embrace a fascist project of "a beautiful Romania as the sun in the sky" in which no minority had a place and a political alliance with fascist Italy and Germany was compulsory.

The importance of the present topic has been partially emphasized by all the aforementioned scholars. The aim of my thesis is to shed light on why Orthodoxy served as a source of inspiration for the Romanian nationalists especially for Nichifor Crainic and Nae Ionescu in the debate about the character of the Romanian ethnicity. Another fundament issue on the agenda of this paper is to answer what was Orthodoxy for Nichifor Crainic and Nae Ionescu. Although the relationship between Orthodoxy and national identity has been the subject of the abovementioned historiography on the subject, the connection between Orthodoxy and the rebirth of the Romanian nation has been insufficiently discussed. Even though all these scholars focused on building the Romanian concept of ethnicity, the present paper brings new input to the historiographical debate. In fact, it can explain the relevance of Orthodox spirituality

and tradition for the building of Romanian ethnicity. The presents thesis propose an innovative angle of analysis, namely not just a secular project of defining Romanian ethnicity, but rather a definition which also took into account categories borrowed from the vocabulary of the Orthodox church and spirituality.

The main focus of my research is to explain the relationship between Orthodoxy and nationalism as studied and expressed in the works of the 19th and 20th century intellectuals, with a special emphasis on the Conservative and interwar Orthodoxist capms. More precisely, my paper intends to show the way in which Orthodoxy served or not as the conceptual basis for the construction of the Romanian concept of ethnicity in the 19th century and the inter-war period. After stating that Orthodoxy for Nichifor Crainic and Nae Ionescu is synonym not with the Romanian Orthodox Church as an institution, but with a spiritual, confessional and doctrinal concepts used by the Orthodox Church, I will attempt to see how the concept of Orthodoxy was used by the traditionalist camp in their attempt to build an ethnic definition grounded in this concept. The analysis will focus on Nae Ionescu and Nichifor Crainic because one represented the traditionalist side of the debate and the other a radicalization of the traditionalist definition. Also, the choice fell on them because of their view which connected Orthodoxy with Romanianness had a career which went after the 1940s. Nae Ionescu and especially Nichifor Crainic were used by both fascist and communist ideologies in their attempts to shape a nationalist ideology. I consider this *longue durée* of intermingle between Orthodoxy and nationalism throughout the 20th century to be the most important reason for considering not just the ecclesiastical, but also the secular origins of this quest for ethnicity. I am also interested what were the source and the entanglement between the first attempt to define the Romanian nation through culture and the focus on Orthodoxy as the main ideological and intellectual category defining the Romanian nation. I chose mostly Nichifor Crainic as the main actor of the thesis because he had excellent theological expertise and made a conscious link between Orthodox spirituality and the concept of Romanian ethnicity. Also, his contribution was more consistent on this topic than Ionescu's.

On the other hand, Nae Ionescu metamorphosed the traditionalist nationalist project from the status of a cultural language to an ethnic ontology and this transforms him into an important actor in my story. Philosopher and professor at the University of Bucharest, he was interested in developing an ontological racial concept of Romanian ethnicity by

using a philosophical method which was absent in Crainic's case. For the present thesis, the two case studies are important because they show the way in which the debate about Romanian ethnicity was shaped from two different perspectives, that of the theologian and that of the philosopher. Furthermore, their insights are bound up with the idea of Orthodoxy which creates a persuasive context.

The text will use a one-fold methodology. I will analyze the discourse of the two thinkers as expressed in their books, speeches, letters and articles. Their writings are imbued with references about the importance of Orthodox spirituality in defining Romanian ethnicity. Their mutual interest in Byzantine ecclesiastical art, in church architecture, their bitter critique of the "liberalization of the Church" (Nae Ionescu), the common perceptions regarding European history, will be duly subjected to close scrutiny. The thesis will attempt to establish a comparative approach of the two case studies. I shall explore the similarities and differences between 19th century and the interwar Orthodoxist approaches and influence. Subsequently, an intellectual comparison between the two case studies will also be very useful. Different approaches from intellectual history (Fritz Stern, Roger Woods, Jeffrey Herf, Zygmunt Bauman) and nationalist studies dealing with the relation between intellectuals and nationalism (George L. Mosse, Alastair Hamilton, Richard Steigmann-Gall, Brian Porter, Iván T. Berend, etc.) will be used to integrate the two Romanian intellectuals into a much larger framework than the Romanian case. The case study will also be placed in a larger framework through comparison with the Balkan countries in the same period.

The text has several chapters. The first describes the 19th and inter-war historical and cultural background of the intellectual debates concerning the idea of ethnicity. Beginning with Titu Maiorescu (1840–1917) and reaching Nichifor Crainic (1889–1972), this particular part intends to provide the reader with a summary of the cultural trends involved in the debate. More precisely, in the 19th century the *Junimea* society tried to define the Romanian nation in relation with the village and the traditional values described by Orthodox spirituality. Against the Liberal opponents who attempted to build a Romanian civilization based on Western values, the Conservatives from the *Junimea* society undermined the importance of the Western urban civilization. Maiorescu and his followers believed that the Romanian ethnicity should be constructed starting from a national culture inspired by the Romanian village. After 1900, the debate fades away. Although Nicolae Iorga and Constantin Rădulescu-Motru developed

Maiorescu's idea in a new direction, the Liberals became more important in Romanian culture.

After 1918 when Greater Romania was formed, the problems concerning the definition of the nature of around Romanian ethnicity began to emerge. In the newly formed state almost 30% of the population were ethnic minorities. The official Liberal ideology advocated an integrationist policy inspired by the Western paradigm. The reaction of the traditionalists was voiced mainly by Nae Ionescu and Nichifor Crainic. Also, from 1927 the Iron Guard movement started to gain public support using a similar ideology as the aforementioned intellectuals. Accordingly, the chapter is built around two main statements. On the one hand, any debate concerning the Romanian view about ethnicity was asserted in a cultural framework. On the other hand, I will try to point out the political agenda behind these cultural debates.

It seems the interwar nationalism managed to cross the hard winter of the first years of Communist Romania only to find its mutations all over the years of Ceausescu's regime. Also, Orthodoxy and nationalism joined hands once more to sustain a totalitarian regime in its bid for total control over the Romanian society. After 1990, this mechanism was put again into practice. Nevertheless, different Romanian thinkers and theologians like Răzvan Codrescu and others cultivated the nationalist ideology of the interwar period in a strong connection with Romanian Orthodoxy.[14] Accordingly, inside the Romanian 20th century history an organic continuity was established, despite a stumbling capacity of adaptation to different political contexts. Diagnosing accurately the mutations of this flagellum named nationalism mixed with religion is the last instance of my academic undertaking.

Defining Romanianness in the 19th century Romania. Europeanists fighting each other

The cultural debate on the Romanian ethnicity was one of the most interesting and puzzling cultural events from the Romanian history. After four centuries of Ottoman dominations, the Romanian principalities became aware of their own ethnical identity. After the 1859 unification, a quest for a Romanian understanding of ethnicity and quality of being Romanian started to animate the spirits of the Romanian intellectuals. As the Russian Slavophil movement, the 19th century Romanian intellectuals

began their ethnical adventure by improvising a cultural identity of their own people.[15]

The cultural debate on the Romanian ethnicity was one of the most interesting and puzzling cultural events in Romanian history. After four centuries of Ottoman dominations, the Romanian principalities became aware of their own ethnical identity. After the 1859 unification, a quest for a Romanian understanding of ethnicity and the quality of being Romanian started to animate the spirits of the Romanian intellectuals. As the Russian Slavophil movement, the 19th century Romanian intellectuals began their ethnical adventure by improvising/ inventing a cultural identity of their own people.

The present chapter has two aims. First I will show that between the 19th century and interwar stage of crystallization of the Romanian ethnic definition canon there is certain continuity. The debate regarding the Romanian ethnicity and its character from the interwar was directly connected with the efforts of the "Junimea" members in the 19th century. The emphasis on the importance of 'organic' character was stressed by both the 19th century conservatives and traditionalists in the interwar period. Another aim of the chapter is to show that there was a constant debate in modern Romania regarding the Romanian character. Connected with a cultural and economic development, the definition of Romanian identity troubled both the Liberal and the autochtonist orientations in Romanian culture and politics. I will always point out that cultural debates regarding Romanian ethnicity were always backed by a strong political agenda.

The text will be divided in two parts. In the first part I will deal with the early definition over Romanian ethnicity from the 19th century. The efforts of the "Junimea" society to build up a Romanian culture starting from the social realities of the Romanian village and their contempt towards the Liberal generation of 1848 who believed that importing different institutions and cultural trends was the solution to alleviate Romanian cultural and economical backwardness. Titu Maiorescu (1840-1917) and the *Junimea* circle attempted first to create a Romanian national culture and to define what meant to be Romanian. The positivist legacy of Maiorescu and his followers was continued by Nicolae Iorga and reached a peak at the beginning of the 20th century. I will argue that, although the first wave of Romanian modern understanding of nationalism was secular, the interwar view was much more religious Orthodox-based.[16] How this transition was possible and what were the conditions

The second part investigates the traditionalist camp after the reunification of 1918. After shaping the framework of the debate between the Westernizers and the traditionalists, this part of the chapter will focus on the traditionalists, mainly on Nichifor Crainic (1889-1972) and his counterpart Nae Ionescu (1890-1940). At this point I will suggest some possible answers on why Orthodoxy began to play such a major role for Nichifor Crainic's definition of what it meant to be a Romanian. The fact that Nichifor Crainic was a theologian, the expressed need of the Church to come back into the political life, the fascination exercised in that particular age by a certain stream of archaism, all these factors contributed to the emergence of Orthodoxy as the link between Romanianness and the Romanian culture as expressed in the villages. The importance of the village will also be questioned, almost all the major traditionalists coming from villages. Secondly, the village became important because it represented the missing link between the "Junimea" and the interwar nationalists. I will also point out the possible implication of the Church and of different political agendas in the debate regarding Romanian ethnicity. The preliminary conclusions will be provided to put the whole debate into a larger framework in order to better understand the implications and connections of the Romanian nationalist environment with other historical contexts and definitions of the nation.

After 1856, young Romania faced the terrible fate of any youthful state in the Balkans: after several centuries of foreign oppression, it had to define an ethnic identity of its own in order to sustain its claims for political legitimacy. Nevertheless, the post 1848 Romantic atmosphere with its highlight on nationality and enlightenment for the ordinary people the main statements was speculated also by the Romanian intellectuals who wanted to define a perspective on the Romanian ethnicity.[17] No less important was the birth of a Romanian cultural canon; although Nicolae Bălcescu in "Romînii supt Mihai Voievod Viteazu" tried to idealize the Romanian past because the present was too dark, in the absence of a glorious Romanian history, after 1866 the Romanian intellectuals started to build their national canon on cultural grounds.[18]

The most important movement which created the canon was *Junimea* from Iași.[19] Created by some Romanian students returning from different corners of Europe, for the Romanian culture *Junimea* society represented the first conscious intellectual movement attempting to create an intellectual concept of Romanianness. In order to understand properly the impact of the *Junimea* movement there are two aspects on which the analysis must focus. First of all, *Junimea* had a specific intellectual

background which needs to be explained. Created especially by students who studied in Germany, the intellectual profile of the movement was rather conservative and anti-liberal.[20]

Against the 1848 liberal spirit, the *Junimea* movement was preoccupied not with the import of different customs and civilization from the West. Rather, they tried to discover a genuine Romanian culture and to build the Romanian view about ethnicity on it. The intellectual sources of this bitter critique against 1848's cultural imports from the West are multiple. From a sociological and philosophical perspective, the representatives of this circle were influenced by Herbert Spencer who advocated for a gradual, "organic" development of any society.[21] Accordingly, any development of the Romanian society based on these imports was considered to be a foreign interference in the Romanian path in history. Historically, the most important source quoted by the *Junimea* intellectual was Henry Buckle, the English historian, who criticized firmly the French Revolution and its influence on the European states.[22] Another important source was Schopenhauer and his pessimistic view over reality; Schopenhauer's disagreement with the present reality was used by the Junimist thinkers to address a critique towards Romania's liberal institutions depicted as imports without a specific social and cultural background.[23]

These sources were used especially by Titu Maiorescu to criticize the 1848 moment in Romanian culture and history. The leading intellectual figure of the *Junimea* movement, Maiorescu developed an interesting theory of the Romanian path in history (a critical *Sonderweg*?) by suggesting that all the political and cultural imports after 1848 were alien to the Romanian spirit. He used to call them "forms without content" because, in his opinion, the Romanian people were not prepared for them. In one of his renowned texts "În contra direcţiunii de astăzi a culturei române" [Against today's direction in the Romanian culture] he says:

> Before we had a political party which has need for an organ of its own and a public longing for science, who needs different readings, we created political journals and literary reviews and we have falsified and we despised journalism as such. Before we had a culture to burst over the school's bench, we have built Romanian athenees and cultural societies and we have despised the spirit of the literary societies. Before we had even a single shadow of scientific activity we have created the Romanian Academic Society… and we falsified the Academy's ideas. Before we had even required artists, we have create the Conservatoire of Music; before we had even a talented painter, we have created the School of Arts; before we had a single

valuable dramatic play, we have founded the Romanian National Theatre and we have despised and falsified all these forms of culture.[24]

Maiorescu's critique is aimed against a direction of the Romanian culture which after the Peace treaty from Adrianople (1829) attempted to build a Romanian culture. Ioan Heliade-Rădulescu and his intellectual circle intended to develop this canon from shaping a Romanian literature by simply translating different literary works from foreign literature. "It does not matter how bad you write, just write!" was the slogan of this intellectual circle. They were facing a delicate dilemma: although they were all convinced liberals and wanted to implement liberal political values in the Romanian political environments, the cultural and political tradition behind such a bold attempt was missing. Therefore, Heliade-Rădulescu and his followers tried to borrow the institutions and the main cultural and political trends from the West in order to surpass the political backwardness of the Romanian society. These intellectuals were involved in the revolutionary events from 1848 and, in Maiorescu's view they were responsible for the irrational cultural imports from the West.[25]

In order to challenge Heliade-Rădulescu's initiative for building a Romanian canon based on imports, but also Simion Bărnuțiu's school of Latinists, Maiorescu chose to start from an autochtonist perspective which had to take into account the social realities of Romania. To see the way in which Maiorescu intended to build the Romanian culture there are two statements to be made. On the one hand, despite his 1840's Liberal forerunners, Maiorescu proposed an esthetic alternative for writing original literature. Inspiring himself from German aesthetics and western literature, but adapting these theoretical concepts to Romanian realities, Maiorescu borrowed only the esthetic principles of writing literature in order to produce an original literature. Translation from another language was no longer good enough for giving birth to a national literature and this had been already seen by the 1848 generation in the articles "Dacia literară" [Literary Dacia] journal.[26] In this context, Titu Maiorescu was the first to understand the need for a Romanian understanding of literature and he started to act as a literary critic who offered his generation a theoretical guide for writing original pieces of literature. For example, when he spoke about writing poetry, he stressed that for certain poetry to be important, this must have two conditions: the material and the ideal.[27] For the material condition of the poetry to be perfect, the poet had to comply with two requirements: to choose the less abstract words in order to convey the

poetic message, to use epithets in order to enrich the poetical and linguistic style, to use personifications and the correct use of literary comparison.

The ideal condition of the poetry can be reduced to three main principles to which the poet has to achieve an original poetry:

> 1. A great speed in imagination of the poetical ideas. 2. An exaggeration or at least a highlight and a new view of the things under the impression of feeling and passion. 3. O fast growing development towards a final happy end or towards a catastrophe".[28]

But writing an original poetry did not mean that Junimist poets were writing a Romanian poetry. As Zigu Ornea pointed out, Maiorescu was playing a dangerous game: although he was a positivist thinker who wanted to establish a new aesthetics based on reason and against Romantic values of feeling and the historical past, Maiorescu had to cut a deal with the Romantic tradition represented by Dimitrie Bolintineanu and Vasile Alecsandri. This compromise was embodied in his direct encouragement towards the Romanian writers to discover Romanian folklore and to excavate the vestiges of the Romanian historical past.[29] Accordingly, *Junimea* was found as a literary circle which had as an intricate task to promote an authentic Romanian literature on Maiorescu's theoretical bases. As Alex Drace-Francis pointed out, "art and learning were for Maiorescu to be judged against Europeans norms: national character does not represent for him, at least at this stage, the principle criterion determining aesthetic judgment. In fact the reverse could be said to be true: only the impartial application of the aesthetic principles will allow the national character to flourish".[30]

Titu Maiorescu sought to establish a Romanian cultural canon by promoting different writers and poets on the Romanian market and in the school's curricula. Mihai Eminescu (1850–1889), Ion Creangă (d. in 1889), Alexandru Odobescu (1834-1895) were only few of the writers who started to publish in "Convorbiri literare" [Literary talks], the journal of *Junimea*. For example, when it comes to Eminescu, one can understand that Maiorescu's project was heterogeneous: although Eminescu was labeled as the last Romantic poet, his interest in folklore and ancient Romanian literature was praised even by Titu Maiorescu.[31] The most interesting of his poetries is *Scrisoarea I* [Letter I] in which he became the spokesman of the Romanian ethnicity against foreigners who were depicted as a parasite category and against the decadence of the Romanian nation.

In "Ai noștri tineri la Paris învață", Eminescu addressed a sharp critique to the Romanian youth who preferred to spend their lives in decadence and so-called erudition forgetting the place from where they have left. The bravest attempt of Eminescu was the novel "Geniu pustiu" [Empty genius]. As G. Călinescu used to say, the hero of this novel, although a character taken from a utopia,[32] Toma Nour is a complex character in which Eminescu depicted a man who lost his roots because of the French Revolution, has discovered the primary force of reason and the struggle for the national ideal.[33] What has to be added to Titu Maiorescu's attempt to build the Romanian literary canon is the political background behind it. As Ioan Stanomir has accurately showed in his monograph dedicated to Mihai Eminescu, Romanian literary canon has behind a strong political canon, the Conservative canon. Buckles, Spencer, Tönnies or Edmund Burke were nothing more than the main spokesmen of Conservative party all across Europe and they were the sources of inspiration for Eminescu and Maiorescu.[34]

As Titu Maiorescu, who together with Petre Carp became after 1866 one of the young leaders of the Romanian Conservative Party, Mihai Eminescu was against a Liberal "contractual state" which followed Jean–Jacques Rousseau's famous idea.[35] The Romanian conservatives advocated publically for a "natural" or an "organic" state, capable to develop itself by accustoming with the present social realities from the young Romanian state. This is one more reason in favor of a bitter assessment of the Romanian conservatives represented by Maiorescu and Eminescu against the 1848 spirit which was considered the incarnation of their most dangerous enemy: the Romanian Liberal Party which was depicted as the incarnation of the disruptive spirit of the French Revolution.[36]

This is one of the most interesting particularities of the Romanian case: the cultural canon is conditioned directly by a political canon. Although Alex Drace-Francis seems to disagree with this political influence over the nationalist project of Maiorescu and his companions,[37] the 19th century "Junimea" members "acted both politically and culturally to impose their own view".[38] The Conservatives built their own ethnical canon by starting to understand and use a Romanian culture (a rural one) in order to maintain in culture the same continuity as in politics. Although they were discontented with the Western cultural and political imports, the Liberals considered that an adequate Romanian culture behind the concept of Romanian ethnicity must be helped by borrowing institutions and concepts from the West in order to overlap the social and political

backwardness of the Romanian society. Although the goal of the two parties was the same, the origins and the means through which they understood to create it were different.

The interwar period: "the great debate" over Romanian ethnicity. Liberalism and nationalism in interwar Romania

After 1918, the things started to change in what was then Greater Romania. The unification with the Romanian provinces in the Russian and Austrian empires brought a sense of fulfillment to the Romanian nationalist elites. But it also questioned the sense of Romanianness: the price Romania had to pay was high and the new state had to confront with social realities that were not at all encouraging.[39] Around 30 % of the Romanian population was represented by different ethnic minorities (Hungarians, Germans, Jews, Ukrainians, Gypsies, etc.) and the State had to come to terms with this complicated situation. One can argue whether it was possible to speak about Romanian ethnicity when this was contested in its own country given the fact that in the new provinces the economical and cultural elite was not Romanian.[40]

The Romanian State engaged in a process of unification of the new provinces into a centralized mechanism and to Romanianize the ethnic minorities from the new provinces. Certain laws concerning public education and homogeneous administration were introduced to achieve these goals, although sometimes these harsh measures were received squarely by the inhabitants of the new united provinces.[41] Together with the electoral and land reforms from 1921, all these political initiatives targeted the unification on a social and ethnical scale of the Romanian population. Nevertheless, these initiatives coming from the centre were not always welcomed. For example, people like Onisifor Ghibu in Bessarabia protested against the primary school's unification put into practice by the Romanian State.[42]

The Romanian State embarked also into a large campaign of cultural and historical justification of the Romanian claims over the new acquired territories. Accordingly, large archaeological campaigns were initiated in all the Romanian provinces in order to prove the archaeological homogeny of the Romanian people all across the country. Vasile Pîrvan became the most know Romanian archaeologist and his book named "Getika" (1925) was the direct result of this archaeological excavations. As Philip

Vanhaelemeersch has pointed out, archaeology was the most accessible way through which the Romanian state wanted to began a new ethnical cultural canon. Starting from archaeological evidences, the Romanian state was able to encourage the building of a definition of the Romanian ethnicity.[43]

At this point a certain remark must be made. Unlike the period before 1918, when the Romanianness was defined only in cultural terms, in interwar Romania there is a constant renegotiation of the ethnic understanding and building at least at three fundamental dimensions: political, cultural and historical. From a political perspective, the ethnical building process was considered a finished business after the triumph of 1918. However, the State and the main political parties enflamed a different nationalist discourse which had direct consequences in the cultural and historical sphere. Because the state financed different nationalist projects, some intellectuals decided to join hands with the State and to subordinate their academic expertise to the nationalist project patronized by the National Liberal Party or the Royal House.

In the interwar period there were two main understandings of Romanianness. On the one hand, the thinkers inspired by the Western like Mircea Lovinescu[44] and Ștefan Zeletin[45] considered that Romanian cultural and social destiny had to be fulfilled by borrowing and adapting the institutions and customs from the West. They were the continuators of both the 1848 generation and of the *Junimists* from Iași. As Keith Hitchins argued, the sympathizers of this trend "treated Romania as a part of Europe and insisted that she had no choice but to follow the path of economic and social development already taken by the urbanized and industrialized West".[46] It is interesting to question why this path towards the West was adopted by a large number of Romanian intellectuals. Although there are several explanations behind this cultural polarization I think that the first explanation was related to the fact that when Lovinescu and Zeletin started to publish their main works the Romanian Liberal Party, the main advocate of tiding up the relationship with the West, was in power (1923-1928).

Furthermore, their goal was to establish a nationalist cultural which will be the expression of the bourgeois city and industrial and financial development of the Romania embodied in the political ideology of the National Liberal Party. As Thomas J. Kiel noticed "the National Liberal Party looked towards building a state stimulated, state organized, and state protected capitalism under the leadership of a Romanian bourgeoisie to carry out its economic modernization agenda. The National Liberal

Party realized that its own political success depended on it being actively engaged in building a larger bourgeoisie in Romania. Despite the economic growth of the late 19th century and early 20th century, the Romanian bourgeoisie remained small, especially that portion of the of the bourgeoisie who were "Romanian" by ethnicity".[47]

Eugen Lovinescu (1881-1943) was the most influential literary critic of his time. After 1918, he became one of the first intellectuals supporting the official nationalist ideology of the Romanian Liberal government. Lovinescu's theory about the synchronism between Romanian and Western culture[48] suggested that Romanianness had to be constructed from Western models and the Romanian society was called to adjust itself according to Western customs,[49] but, despite the 19th century Europeanists, this process had to be carried on according to the needs of the Romanian society. He believed that after the assimilation period from the 1848 until 1918 had to be followed by a certain period of integration of different borrowings coming from the West.[50]

Lovinescu was convinced that the after the unification from 1918 the time came to be developed a genuine Romanian culture which was supposed to define the Romanian character. Behind this intellectual project of building the nationalist canon there is also a political project namely the Romanian Liberal Party. Lovinescu and Zeletin's ideas were developed during the hegemony of the Romanian Liberal Party (1922–1928) and these ideas echoed a political ideology that wanted to adjust Romania to Western standards. Privileging the modern Romanian town, the capital of the heavy industry, good schools and the political parties was the main social concern of the Europeanists. Accordingly, the Romanian character had to be build starting from these Western values in order to overlap the social and political backwardness of the young Romanian State.

Nationalism in religious garments. The autochtonist understanding of Romanianness

The autochtonists tried to respond to this attempt of building the Romanian national canon by shifting their views in the opposite direction from the pro-Liberal intellectuals. If the Europeanists wanted to define the Romanian character starting from Western borrowings, they preferred to search for the premises of the national canon at home. Mixing together avant-gardism with its emphasize on archaic culture with a Romantic

Volkgeist already present in the Romanian culture, the traditionalists began to focus on the Romanian village and the spirituality encapsulated in it.[51] The Romanian village with its culture and folklore became the place from which they wanted to start building the real Romanian cultural canon. Despite Liberal thinkers like Lovinescu, the Romanian traditionalists did not have a clear agenda on their minds. Their efforts transcended the cultural, political or economical compounds of the Romanian national character.

One has to question why in the interwar Romania nationalism emerged in an Orthodox key and was embraced by such a large number of intellectuals. Although it is obvious that in the interwar Romania an "integral nationalism" (Irina Livezeanu) was developed in order to achieve a certain ethnical homogenization of the minorities living in the new acquired provinces, Irina Livezeanu's explanation of the direct allegiance between Orthodoxy and nationalism in the Romanian traditionalism against a strong Jewish minority is misleading.[52] Orthodox Christianity depicted and forged as a genuine cure against the Jew minority has been also described extensively by Leon Volovici.[53] When he speaks about Crainic, he states that "his first objective was the 'de-Judaization' of Jesus and the Bible itself".[54] However, the text quoted by Leon Volovici is rather a later text of Nichifor Crainic, one from his fascist period. At the beginning of his career, Crainic dismissed anti-Semitism as an incoherent ideology of nationalism. Stating that Crainic intended to eradicate the Jewish background of the Christian Bible in order to frame a nationalist Orthodoxy is contradicted by one of Crainic's most poignant texts. Arguing against the Aryan theology of the Third Reich which tended to exclude any Jewish influence from Christian theology and Bible,[55] Crainic wrote a text called "Race and Religion" in which he claimed that Christianity cannot be labeled as a Jewish religion because its founder was both human and divine.[56] Crainic's bitter attack on Alfred Rosenberg's Germanic ideology which was both anti-Semite and anti-Christian demonstrates quite accurately that Romanian nationalism used Orthodoxy for other purposes rather than just tackling a Jewish minority.[57] Rather, against both Livezeanu and Volovici, one has to argue as Thomas J. Kiel truthfully noticed that "Anti-Semitism was not a creation of nationalism. Rather, it was assimilated into Romanian nationalism as one of its key elements. The modern Romanian nationalist project struggled with the 'origins' of and the identity appropriate to the Romanian people".[58]

Another question arises: why Orthodoxy and spirituality became such crucial concepts in the interwar period for the nationalist discourse? The explanatory reasons are be manifold. From a political perspective, given the fact that Liberals were mostly atheist and the National Peasant Party was mainly formed by Transylvanian Greek-Catholics the Orthodox stream which seems to characterize the writings of the Romanian autochtonists can be labeled as an Orthodox political and cultural reaction to the exclusion from the public sphere of the most important Christian denomination in Romania.[59] Culturally, in order to sustain their claims for an organic development of the Romanian state and nation, they had to identify an uninterrupted development in the Romanian history. They have identified this organic continuity in the Romanian history with the tradition of the Orthodox Church, an idea also popular among legionary youth.[60]

On the other hand, the connection between confession and nationality was nothing new in the 19th century Balkan region, especially for the peoples subjected to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and Ottoman monarchies.[61] In the case of Romanian Orthodoxy, not just the intellectuals tried to define the Romanian nation according to the principles of Eastern Christianity, but also the Orthodox Church itself became an important actor on the scene of national building process and attempted to institutionalize its own project of building the Romanian nation.[62] It is known that after 1918 the Church wanted to play a major role in the main scene of the political debate by defining itself as the "national church" of the Romanian people, especially after 1925 when the Romanian Patriarchate was proclaimed and, therefore, the Romanian Orthodox Church became completely independent from the Patriarchate in Constantinople. Through its clerical and schools apparatus the Church became one of the most supportive actors of the State nationalist propaganda.[63]

However, the Church chose to play a double role: on the one hand, the Church embraced the nationalist discourse of the State but on the other hand the Church started to develop its own nationalist speech. The case of Fr. Dumitru Stăniloae's inflammatory articles developing a direct interdependence between Orthodoxy and nationalism published in *Gîndirea* conducted by Nichifor Crainic is another proof of the fact that there was a mutual dialogue between the traditionalist intellectuals and the Romanian Orthodox Church.[64] The association between nationality and confession in the Romanian case became also manifest in 1927 on the occasion of the promulgation of the concordat between the Romanian State and the Vatican.[65] Because of the large amounts of land properties

and financial subventions granted to the Roman Catholic Church by the Liberal government, the Orthodox Church responded in the Romanian Parliament through the voice of the Metropolite Nicolae Bălan who in a speech entitled "The national Church and its Rights" defined Orthodoxy as the only church able to contribute to the development of the Romanian nation.[66] Although the Orthodox Church protested vehemently against the concordat, this was adopted by the Parliament and left the Church with the feeling of a wounded pride. The disappointment relating to the approval of the Concordat and the dissolution of the Romanian character of the Greek-Catholics who considered the promulgation of it as a personal triumph can be seen with a clear eye in Nichifor Crainic's and Nae Ionescu's articles and there is a direct consequence of their support for the Church.[67]

Why intellectuals like Nichifor Crainic and Nae Ionescu started their claims for building a national creed inspired by a traditionalist key remains the issue at stake. One of the explanations for this kind of attitude was provided by the intellectual cultural context in which they have developed their insights about tradition and spirituality. Living in an age in which the pessimism of Oswald Spengler's statements towards the Western culture[68] and the death of any spirituality in front of the mechanized industrial environment from the bourgeois city, the focus on the Freudian unconsciousness and on Heidegger's existentialism, these major changes in the European culture were deeply influential for the Romanian intellectuals:

> In their search for new values they [the traditionalists] eagerly embraced all things Eastern. A veritable wave of irrationalism and mystical ideas seemed to break across Rumanian intellectual life. They came from Asia, especially India, but from Europe, too. Alongside Buddhism and Yoga, Christian and mystical philosophy, as expounded by the Fathers of the Church, Kierkeegard and Berdyaev exercised a profound influence on Romanian thought.[69]

Furthermore, another important factor which led the traditionalists to assimilate in their cultural discourse the village depicted as the matrix of the Romanian spirituality was a sociological reality: 72% of Romanian population lived in rural areas[70] and the peasant problem was one of the most problematic issues of the modern Romanian state.[71] After 1918 the peasant problem caught the attention of different Romanian parties and

governments and especially to this electorate the nationalist building project was directed.[72] The Western minded intellectuals considered that Romanian village had to be mechanized and the illiterate peasants had educated in order to relieve the peasantry from its backwardness which assured to Romania the status of an undeveloped country.[73] Nevertheless, between 1923 and 1928 the Liberal government had not succeeded to encourage an economical revival of the Romanian peasantry which turned eventually its hopes in Maniu's National Peasants Party.[74] Alongside the nationalist discourse of the State, the most important representatives the traditionalist camp originated from the villages and they wanted to offer a cultural discourse which reflected the majority of the Romanian population in the absence of a political party which defended their national identity.[75]

I will have to argue that coming from a rural environment and criticizing vehemently the positivist and mechanized West, the traditionalists embraced paradoxically the 19th century Junimist idea of an "organic" development of the Romanian state and national building project which considered that imports from the West had to be rejected and future Romania and Romanian ethnicity had to be shaped according to the social and cultural realities of the majority of the Romanian population meaning the peasantry. A deep impact on both the Junimists and the autochtonists had the book written by Ferdinand Tönnies named *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (1887) which emphasized the importance of the community described as a spiritual relationship and tradition between all the inhabitants of a certain village over the mechanized society of the big city. The conflict between the two terms was based on an economical reality which was a paradoxically consequence of the Romanian society. As Andrew C. Janos has pointed out,

> In the West, social mobilization implied the rising public awareness of masses who had been already detached from the norms of the traditional Gemeinschaft by the experience of the market economy. There the 'masses' were wage earners and small producers who had learned to live in a world of give-and-take and to fend for themselves without the emotional support of the kinship groups, communities, and extended families. In other words, the masses had been rationalized before being mobilized; they have been acculturated to the impersonal norms of the modern Gesellschaft before entering onto the political stage… In Romania, the acculturating experience of the market had largely been lacking. The images of the modern world had been transmitted through the medium of education, and hence had been reduced to a form of vicarious experience. Thus while the lower classes

of the West were modern both socially and politically, those of Romania became modern politically (in that they could formulate and articulate demands) but not socially (for they continued to look for the moral and emotional support of kinship, household, and community).[76]

The difference between the 19th century intellectuals and the 20th century traditionalists lays in the fact that Titu Maiorescu and his followers wanted to engineer a Romanian culture which would have fitted perfectly in the universal culture of his time. By advocating the importance of the Romanian traditional village and the historical past as continuous, organic category of the present The village was downplayed not as a mark of Romanian spirituality or ethnicity, but as a basic social reality from which the Romanian ethnicity had to be built organically. For the traditionalists the village was the nexus between an unaltered Romanian spirituality which was in the same time the intersection between Romanian character and Orthodoxy as a guarantee of the Romanian spirituality.

Final remarks

The Romanian debates over the understandings of Romanian ethnical canon can be considered to be the one of the most important historical phenomenon in the Balkan's history. First of all, I will have to conclude that between traditionalists from the 19th and 20th century cannot be traced a direct connection. Representing a social class namely the Romanian landowners, the Conservatives of Titu Maiorescu were defending their own social and political capital by generating a national canon under their signature. The great differences between 19th and 20th century traditionalist intellectuals are the fact that in the 20th century Nae Ionescu and Nichifor Crainic were not representatives of a Conservative political canon because the Conservative Party disappeared after the land reforms from 1920's. Secondly, although is obvious that both canons are based on the concept of tradition and the importance of the Romanian village is a common feature, the 19th century intellectuals were secularized thinkers. In the interwar period, the interest towards building the national canon from Orthodoxy and Christian spirituality as it was represented in the Romanian village is a certain feature of the second Romanian debate over ethnicity.

In the Balkan's context the closest case study to the Romanian debates about ethnicity is the 19th century Russian case. As the Romanian Junimists,

41

the Russian Slavophiles were Germany trained intellectuals who attempted to define Russianness by building a national canon based on the Russian spirituality and Russian village.[77] The difference between the Romanian case and the Russian case was the fact that there was a great emphasis on Orthodox spirituality which was never present in the minds of the Romanian Conservatives. The struggle for the Romanian national canon from a cultural perspective was a phenomenon disseminated across the Balkans. As in the Serbian case, the 20th century Romanian traditionalists became deeply involved in different fascist movements. After 1933, Nae Ionescu became the Iron Guard's main ideologue and many Romanian intellectuals joined this fascist movement because of his influence.

From a personal point of view, the topic in itself is paradoxical. The Liberals who always tended to be more constant than the nationalists; the traditionalists issued two different expressions of the Romanian ethnicity and the interwar discourse about the Romanian ethnic canon cannot be considered definitive. Some further investigations regarding the building of the Romanian ethnic definition in the traditionalist manner are necessary. Again, the distinction between the secular and religious approach of the Romanian definition of ethnicity needs some further scrutiny. Christianity was depicted in a mythical manner and was deprived of any concrete connection with the city. For them, only rural Christianity matters not in itself, but because it was connected with a village's tradition which was used as the perfect enemy against the Liberal town-based cultural discourse.

I have to agree with Umut Korkuk that Christianity and Orthodoxy represented for the traditionalists their ideological foundation which was later transformed into an efficient political weapon against the their Liberal and against any other right-wing claim for defining the Romanian ethnicity.[78] Although Nae Ionescu and Nichifor Crainic were the spearheads of the traditionalist movement which started to radicalize and became the fifth column of the Iron Guard, there must be stressed out the fact that traditionalists were not always committed Christian believers. Lucian Blaga is only one example that crosses the minds of those who are focused on this issue. Again, what would be very useful to point out is the fact that this traditionalist attempt to offer a Christian grounded definition of the Romanian ethnicity ended up as a source of inspiration for the right-wing radical movements from Romania, namely the Iron Guard and the Romanian Fascia. Also, this traditional approach of the reality began to be critically approached especially by Mircea Eliade who

developed their ethnical ontology into a much Christian "indigenization of the universalities" (Sorin Antohi) through which any category of being had to be Romanian and had to be Christian.

As a final remark, I would like to say that the cultural process of constructing a definition to the Romanian ethnicity was never fully finished. After 1927, the traditionalist speech was borrowed by the Iron Guard and some of the leaders of the traditionalist movement started to collaborate directly with the Romanian fascist movement because they thought that this was the direct political incarnation of their nationalist creed. This marriage between has led eventually to a total failure of the initial goal of the nationalist creed. Instead of defining the Romanian ethnicity, the traditionalist produced an exclusivist autochthonous view regarding the Romanian ethnicity which brought only derision towards the other minorities and violent radicalization of the terms used for defining Romanianness, but not a mutual accepted definition.

NOTES

1   "Romania and the Balkans From geo-cultural bovarism to ethnic ontology", *Tr@nsit online*, Nr. 21/2002, Internet accessed June 1st, 2011.

2   Hitchins, K., "Gîndirea: Nationalism in a Spiritual Guise" in Kenneth Jowitt (ed.), *Social Change in Romania 1860–1940. A Debate on Development in a European Nation*, Institute of International Studies, Berkeley, 1978.

3   Alexandrescu, S., "Junimea: discours politique et discours culturel" in I. P. Coulianu (ed.), *Libra: Études roumaines offerts à Willem Noomen*, Groningen, 1983

4   Alexandrescu, S., *Paradoxul român* [The Romanian Paradox], Univers, Bucharest, 1998.

5   Ornea, Z., *The Romanian Extreme Right. The Nineteen Thirties*, East European Monographs, Boulder, 1999).

6   Ricketts, M., L., *Mircea Eliade. The Romanian Roots*, I-II, East European Monographs, Boulder, 1988.

7   Livezeanu, I., *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania. Regionalism, Nation Building, & Ethnic Struggle, 1918–1930*, Cornell University Press, New York, 1995.

8   Volovici, L., *National Ideology&Antisemitism. The Case of Romanian Intellectuals in the 1930s*, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1991.

9   Alexandra Laignel-Lavastine, *Cioran, Eliade, Ionescu. L'oubli du fascisme*, (Paris: PUF, 2002).

10 Petreu, M., *An Infamous Past. Emil Cioran and the Rise of Fascism in Romania*, Ivan. Dee, Chicago, 1999.

11 Țurcanu, F., *Mircea Eliade. Le Prisonnier du l'Histoire*, Editions la Decouverte, Paris, 2003.

12 Vanhaelemeersch, P., *A generation "without Beliefs" and the Idea of Experience in Romania (1927 - 1934)*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2006.

13 Antohi, S., *Civitas imaginalis. Istorie și utopie în cultura română* [Civitas imaginalis. History and utopia in the Romanian culture], Polirom, Iași, 1999.

14 Răzvan Codrescu, *În căutarea Legiunii pierdute* [Seeking the lost Legion] (Bucharest: Vremea, 2001), p. 121-142.

15 Walicki, A., "Russian Social Thought: An Introduction to the Intellectual History of 19th Century Russia", *Russian Review*, Vol. 36, No. 1, 1977, p. 1-20.

16 A common situation was in Poland. Please see Porter, B., *When Nationalism Began to Hate: Imagining Politics in Nineteenth Century Poland*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, p. 15.

17 Hitchins, K., *Rumania 1866–1947*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994); Romanian translation, Humanitas, Bucharest, 1994, p. 68.

18 Iván T. Berend, *History derailed: Central and Eastern Europe in the long nineteenth century*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2003, p.44.

[19] For Junimea, please see Ornea, Z., *Junimea și junimismul* [Junimea and the Junimism], Eminescu, Bucharest, 1978; but also Hitchins, K., *Rumania*, p. 6-99.

[20] For the impact of the German influenced elites on the Romanian intellectual life in general and about Junimea in particular, please see Zeletin, Ș., "Romantismul german și cultura critică română" [The German Romanticism and the Critic Romanian Culture] in *Minerva*, 1/3, 1929, p. 63-83; Vianu, T., *Influența lui Hegel în cultura română* [Hegel's influence in Romanian culture] (Bucharest: Editura Casei Școalelor, 1933).

[21] For Herbert Spencer and Junimea, please see Zub, A., *De la istorie critică la criticism. Istoriografia română sub semnul modernității* [From Critic History to Criticism. The Romanian Historiography under the Sign of Modernity], Enciclopedică, Bucharest, 2002, p. 76.

[22] Hitchins, K., *Rumania,* p. 70.

[23] Hitchins, K., *Rumania,* p. 71

[24] Maiorescu, T., "În contra direcțiunii de astăzi a culturei române", p. 133-134 in Maiorescu, T., *Critice I* [Critical Essays], Minerva, Bucharest, 1978.

[25] For 1848 generation in the Romanian culture and the critique of Maiorescu, please see Drace-Francis, A., *The Making of Modern Romanian Culture. Literacy and the Development of a National Identity*, Tauris Academic Studies, London, 2006, p. 135-142; 176-195.

[26] For the impact of these articles please see Vîrgolici, T., *Începuturile romanului românesc* [The Beginnings of the Romanian Novel], Minerva, Bucharest, 1962, p. 12-41.

[27] Maiorescu, T., "Poezia română. Cercetare critică" [Romanian poetry. Critical survey] in *Critice I*, p. 17.

[28] Maiorescu, T., "Poezia română. Cercetare critică" in *Critice I*, p. 39.

[29] Ornea, Z., *Junimea* , p. 26.

[30] Francis-Drace, A., *The Making of Modern Romanian Culture*, p. 178.

[31] Ornea, Z., *Junimea și junimismul*, p. 479.

[32] For this utopic character of Eminescu's hero, please see Antohi, S., *Imaginaire culturel et réalité politique dans la Roumanie moderne. Le Stigmate et l'utopie*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 1999, p. 111.

[33] *Opera lui Mihai Eminescu 1*, Minerva, Bucharest, 1976, p. 252-256.

[34] Stanomir, I., *Reacțiune și conservatorism. Eseu asupra imaginarului politic eminescian* [Reactionarism and Conservatorism. Essay on Eminescu's political Imaginary] Nemira, Bucharest, 2000, p. 17-53. Please also see Ivan T. Berend, *History Derailed: Central and Eastern Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2003, p. 41-48, 61-68.

[35] Hitchins, K., *Rumania*, p. 263.

[36] The most interesting and paradoxical aspect of the debate was related with the fact that "Junimea" society represented a modernizing direction, already moving away and against the medieval outlook of the Romanian 19th century.

The most interesting aspect was related with its emphasis on complete independence from Constantinople's mirage. To see how this independence was shaped in ecclesiastical terms, please see Paschalis Kitromilides, "The Ecumenical Patriarchate and the national centre" in Paschalis Kitromilides, *An Orthodox Commonwealth: Symbolic Legacies and Cultural Encounters in Southeastern Europe*, Ashgate, Londra, 2007, p. 359-369.

[37] Drace-Francis, A., *The Making of Modern Romanian Culture*, p. 180.

[38] Alexandrescu, S., "Junimea: discours politique et discours culturel" in I. P. Coulianu (ed.), *Libra: Études roumaines offerts à Willem Noomen*, Groningen, 1983, p.48.

[39] For the historical context after 1918, please see Hitchins, K., *Rumania*, p. 320-332 and Livezeanu, I., *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania. Regionalism, Nation Building, & Ethnic Struggle, 1918 – 1930*, Cornell University Press, New York, 1995, p. 29-48.

[40] Please see Fischer-Galați, S., "The interwar period: Greater Romania", p. 293-295 in Giurescu, D., and Fischer–Galați, S., (eds.), *Romania. A Historical Perspective*, East European Monographs, Boulder, 1998.

[41] Livezeanu, I., Cultural Politics in Greater Romania, p. 92.

[42] Ghibu, O., Considerații, p. 4 in Livezeanu, I., Cultural Politics in Greater Romania, p. 55.

[43] Vanhaelemeersch, P., A generation "without Beliefs" and the Idea of Experience in Romania (1927 - 1934), Columbia University Press, New York, 2006, p. 23.

[44] Please see Lovinescu, E., Istoria civilizației române moderne [The History of the Romanian Modern Civilazation], Institutul Cultural Român, Iași, 1998.

[45] *Burghezia română: Originea și rolul ei istoric* [The Romanian Bourgeoisie: Its origins and historical role], Nemira, Bucharest, 2005. For Ștefan Zeletin please see Trencsènyi, B., "The 'Münchansenian Moment': Modernity, Liberalism, and Nationalism in the Thought of Ștefan Zeletin" in Trencsènyi, B., Petrescu, D., Petrescu, C., Iordachi, C., Kántor, Z., (eds.), *Nation-Building and Contested Identities. Romanian and Hungarian Case Studies*, Polirom, Iași, 2001, p. 61-80.

[46] Hitchins, K., *Rumania 1866–1947*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, p. 292.

[47] Kiel, T., *Romania's Tortured Road towards Modernity*, East European Monographs, Boulder, 2006, p. 113

[48] For the best description of this concept in the Romanian culture and its relation with building the national canon, please see Nemoianu, V., "Variable Socio-political Functions of Aesthetic Doctrine: Lovinescu vs. Western Aestheticism" in Kenneth Jowitt, (ed.), *Social Change in Romania, 1860-1940: A Debate on Development in a European Nation,* Institute of International Studies, Berkeley, 1978, p. 174-207.

[49] For a short usage's description of the Lovinescu's *synchronism* in Romanian society, please see Hitchins, K., *Rumania*, p. 334-335.

50 Hitchins, K., *Rumania*, p. 336.

51 For avant-garde, please see Bandier, N., "Avant-gardes in the First Half of the Twentieth Century: New Perspectives", *Contemporary European History* 14/3 (2005), p. 393.

52 Irina Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania*, p. 12-13.

53 Volovici, L., *National Ideology and &Antisemitism. The Case of Romanian Intellectuals in the 1930s*, (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1991), p. 97-98:"Nichifor Crainic found in Christian theology his main argument for advocating the fight against Judaism and elimination of Jews from Romania's social and intellectual life. His arguments were not new by any means; what was new was his polemical aggressiveness, unprecedented in Romanian theological exegesis."

54 Volovici, L., *National Ideology and &Antisemitism*, p. 98.

55 For the de-Judazation of the Bible/ Christ in the Third Reich done by the Nazi *Landskirche* and the contribution of Dietrich Eckart, please see Steigmann-Gall, R., *The Holy Reich. Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919 – 1945*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 13 and passim.

56 Nichifor Crainic, "Rasă și Religiune" [Race and Religion] in Răzvan Condrescu (ed.), *"Fiecare în rândul cetei sale." Pentru o teologie a neamului* ["Everyone in his own troop." For a theology of the people] (Bucharest: Christiana, 2003), p. 48-66.

57 Leuștean, L., "For the Glory of Romanians": Orthodoxy and Nationalism in Greater Romania, 1918-45', *Nationalities Papers*, 2007, 35 (3), pp. 721.

58 Kiel, T., *Romania's Tortured Road towards Modernity*, p. 127.

59 The same degree of desconsideration was also enjoyed by other minorities such as the Jews. Please see Lya Benjamin, "Antisemitismul codrenist" [Codreanu's Antisemitism] in Lya Benjamin, *Prigoană și rezistență în istoria evreilor din România, 1940-1944. Studii* [Persecution and resistance in the history of the Jews in Romania. Studies] (Bucharest: Hasefer, 2001), p. 13-27.

60 Paul A. Shapiro "Faith, Murder, Resurrection: The Iron Guard and the Orthodox Church" in Kevin P. Spicer (ed.), *Antisemitism, Christian Ambivalence, and the Holocaust* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2007), p. 136.

61 Please see Turczysky, E., *Konfession und Nation. Zur Frühgeschichte der serbischen rumänischen Nationsbildung* (Dusseldorf: Schwamm, 1976), p. 7 and passim but also Sugar, P., "Nationalism and Religion in the Balkans since the 19th Century", p. 11 in Sugar, P., *East European Nationalism, Politics and Religion* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999).

62 Verdery, K., "National Ideology and National Character in interwar in Romania", p. 105 in Banac, I., &Verdery, K., (eds.), *National Character and National Ideology in Interwar Eastern Europe*, Yale Center for International and Area Studies, New Haven, 1995.

63   Mirel Bănică, *Biserica Ortodoxă Română, stat și societate în anii '30* [The Romanian Orthodox Church, State and Society in the '30s] (Iași: Polirom, 2007), p. 14.

64   Most interesting are "Ortodoxie și națiune" [Orthodoxy and the Nation] in *Gîndirea* XIV/2 (1935), p. 76-84 and "Românism și Ortodoxie" [Romanianness and Orthodoxy] in *Gîndirea* XV/8 (1936), p. 400-409.

65   Fr.Moraru, A., *Biserica Ortodoxă Română intre anii 1885 și 2000. Biserică, Națiune, Cultură* [The Romanian Orthodox Church between 1885 and 2000. Church, Nation, Culture] Vol. 3, I, IBMBOR, Bucharest, 2006, p. 92.

66   Fore more details about this struggle please see Fr. Păcurariu, M., *Istoria Bisericii Ortodoxe Române* [The History of the Romanian Orthodox Church] Vol. 3, IBMBOR, Bucharest, 1981, p. 401-405.

67   Ornea, Z., *The Romanian Extreme Right. The Nineteen Thirties*, East European Monographs, Boulder, 1999, p. 79.

68   or Oswald Spengler's critique of modernity, please see Herf, J., *Reactionary modernism. Technology, culture, and politics in Weimar and the Third Reich*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 49.

69   Hitchins, K., *Rumania*, p. 299.

70   For a complete statistic, please see Livezeanu, I., *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania*, p. 36.

71   Roberts, H. L., *Rumania. Political Problems of an Agrarian State*, Anchor Books, Yale, 1969, p. 89.

72   Please see Lampe, R., J., *Balkans into Southeastern Europe. A Century of War and Transition,* Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006, p. 91: "Article 1 [of the Romanian Liberal Constitution from 1923] proclaimed Romania to be a 'unified and indivisible national state'. At least it spoke of the population as individual citizens rather than ethnic Romanians."

73   For Romania backwardness, please see Hitchins, K., *Rumania*, p. 342.

74   Henry L. Roberts, Rumania. Political Problems of an Agrarian State, p. 108.

75   For example, Crainic came from a small village called Bulbucata (Vlașca county); for this please see Crainic, N., *Zile albe. Zile negre* [Good days. Bad days], Gîndirea, Bucharest, 1991, p. 1. Also, Lucian Blaga was the son of an Orthodox priest from the village Lancrăm (Alba county).

76   On the economical consequences of this attitude please see Janos, A. C., "Modernization and Decay in Historical Perspective: The Case of Romania" in Jowitt, K., (ed.), *Social Change in Romania, 1860-1940: A Debate on Development in a European Nation,* Institute of International Studies, 1978, p. 100-101.

77   Lavrin, L., "Kiriensky and the Problem of Culture", *Russian Review*, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1961, p. 112.

78   Korkut, U., "Nationalism versus Internationalism: The Roles of Political and Cultural Elites in interwar and Communist Romania" in *Nationalities Papers 34*, No. 2, 2006, p. 135.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alexandrescu, S., "Junimea: discours politique et discours culturel" in I. P. Coulianu, Ed. *Libra: Études roumaines offerts à Willem Noomen*, Groningen, 1983

_____. *Paradoxul român* [The Romanian Paradox],Univers, Bucharest, 1998.

Antohi, S., *Imaginaire culturel et réalité politique dans la Roumanie moderne. Le Stigmate et l'utopie*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 1999.

_____. "Romania and the Balkans From geo - cultural bovarism to ethnic ontology", *Tr@nsit online*, Nr. 21/2002, Internet accessed June 1st, 2011.

Bănică, M., *Biserica Ortodoxă Romană. Stat și societate în anii '30* [The Romanian Orthodox Church. State and Society in the '30s], Polirom, Iași, 2007.

Boia, L., *Istorie și mit în conștiința românească* [History and Myth in Romanian Conscience], Humanitas, Bucharest, 1997.

Chirot, D., *Social Change in a Peripheral society: The Formation of a Balkan Colony*, Academic Press, New York, 1976.

Drace-Francis, A., *The Making of Modern Romanian Culture. Literacy and the Development of a National Identity*. Tauris Academic Studies, London, 2006.

Giurescu, D., C., & Fischer-Galați, S., (eds.), *Romania. A Historical Perspective*, East European Monographs, Boulder, 1998.

Glenny, M., *Balkans. Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers*, Granta Books, London, 1999.

Herf, J., *Reactionary modernism. Technology, culture, and politics in Weimar and the Third Reich*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996.

Hitchins, K., *Rumania 1866–1947*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994; Romanian translation Humanitas, Bucharest, 1994.

_____. "Gîndirea: Nationalism in a Spiritual Guise" in Jowitt, K., Ed. *Social Change in Romania 1860–1940. A Debate on Development in a European Nation*, Institute of International Studies, Berkeley, 1978.

_____. "Orthodoxism: Polemics over Ethnicity and Religion in interwar Romania" in Banac, I., & Verdery, K., *National Character and National Ideology in Interwar Eastern Europe*, Yale Center for International and Area Studies, New Haven, 1995.

Janos, A., C., "Modernization and Decay in Historical Perspective: The Case of Romania" in Jowitt, K., (ed.), *Social Change in Romania, 1860-1940: A Debate on Development in a European Nation,* Institute of International Studies, Berkeley, 1978.

Kiel, T., J., *Romania's Tortured Road towards Modernity*, East European Monographs, Boulder, 2006.

Korkut, U., "Nationalism versus Internationalism: The Roles of Political and Cultural Elites in interwar and Communist Romania" in *Nationalities Papers 34*, No. 2, 2006.

Lampe, J., R., *Balkans into Southeastern Europe. A Century of War and Transition* New Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006.

Lavrin, J. "Kiriensky and the Problem of Culture" in *Russian Review*, Vol. 20, No. 2, (1961)

Laignel-Lavastine, A., *Cioran, Eliade, Ionescu. L'oubli du fascisme*, PUF, Paris, 2002.

Livezeanu, Irina. *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania. Regionalism, Nation Building, & Ethnic Struggle, 1918 – 1930.* New York: Cornell University Press, 1995.

Micu, D. *Gîndirea și gîndirismul*, Minerva, Bucharest, 1975.

Moraru, A., Fr. *Biserica Ortodoxă Română intre anii 1885 și 2000. Biserică, Națiune, Cultură* [The Romanian Orthodox Church between 1885 and 2000. Church, Nation, Culture] Vol. 3, I, IBMBOR, Bucharest, 2006.

Nemoianu, V., "Variable Socio-political Functions of Aesthetic Doctrine: Lovinescu vs. Western Aestheticism" in Jowitt, K., Ed. *Social Change in Romania, 1860-1940: A Debate on Development in a European Nation,* Institute of International Studies, Berkeley, 1978.

Ornea, Zigu. *Junimea și junimismul* [Junimea and the Junimism]. Bucharest: Eminescu, 1978.

Păcurariu, M., Fr., *Istoria Bisericii Ortodoxe Române* [The History of the Romanian Orthodox Church] Vol. 3, IBMBOR, Bucharest, 1981.

Petreu, M., *An Infamous Past. Emil Cioran and the Rise of Fascism in Romania*, Ivan. Dee, Chicago, 1999.

Ricketts, M., L., *Mircea Eliade. The Romanian Roots*, I, East European Monographs, Boulder, 1988.

Roberts, H., L., *Rumania. Political Problems of an Agrarian State*, Anchor Books, New York, 1969.

Sălcudeanu, N. "Present Day Reverberations of the Traditionalist–Nationalism–Orthodoxism Sythesis professed by *Gîndirea* Magazine" in Crăciun, M., & Ghitta, O., *Ethnicity and Religion in Central and Eastern Europe*, Cluj University Press, Cluj-Napoca, 1995.

Schmitter, P., C., "Reflections on Mihail Manoilescu and the political consequences of the Delayed–Dependent Development on the Periphery of Western Europe" in Jowith, K., (ed.), *Social Change in Romania, 1860-1940: A Debate on Development in a European Nation,* Institute of International Studies, Berkeley, 1978.

Stanomir, I. *Reacțiune și conservatorism. Eseu asupra imaginarului politic eminescian* [Reactionarism and Conservatorism. Essay on Eminescu's political Imaginary], Nemira, Bucharest, 2000.

Steigmann-Gall, R., *The Holy Reich. Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919–1945.* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003.

Stern, F. *Politics of Cultural Despair. A Study in the Rise of the Germanic Ideology*, Anchor Books, New York, 1965.

Sugar, P., F., "Nationalism and Religion in the Balkans since the 19th Century" in Peter F. Sugar, *East European Nationalism, Politics and Religion*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 1999.

Trencsènyi, B., "The 'Münchansenian Moment': Modernity, Liberalism, and Nationalism in the Thought of Ștefan Zeletin" in Trencsènyi, B., Petrescu, D., Petrescu, C., Iordachi, C., Kántor, Z., (eds.), *Nation–Building and Contested Identities. Romanian and Hungarian Case Studies*, Polirom, Iași, 2001.

Turczysky, E., *Konfession und Nation. Zur Frühgeschichte der serbischen rumänischen Nationsbildung*, Schwamm, Dusserldorf, 1976.

Țurcanu, F., *Mircea Eliade. Le Prisonnier du l'Histoire*, Editions la Decouverte, Paris, 2003.

Vanhaelemeersch, P., *A generation "without Beliefs" and the Idea of Experience in Romania (1927 - 1934)*. Columbia University Press, New York, 2006.

Verdery, K., *National Ideology under Socialism. Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceausescu's Romania*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1990.

_____. "Beyond the Nation in Eastern Europe" in *Social Text*, No. 38 (1994), pp. 1-19.

_____. "National Ideology and National Character in interwar in Romania" in Banac, I., & Verdery K., Eds. *National Character and National Ideology in Interwar Eastern Europe*, Yale Center for International and Area Studies, New Haven, 1995.

Volovici, Leon. *National Ideology & Antisemitism. The Case of Romanian Intellectuals in the 1930s*. Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1991.

Woods, Roger. *The Conservative Revolution in the Weimar Republic*. London: Macmillan, 1996.

Walicki, Andrezj. "Russian Social Thought: An Introduction to the Intellectual History of 19th Century Russia", in *Russian Review*, Vol. 36, No. 1, (1977).

Zub, Alexandru. *De la istorie critică la criticism. Istoriografia română sub semnul modernității* [From Critic History to Criticism. The Romanian Historiography under the Sign of Modernity], Enciclopedică, Bucharest, 2002.

_____. *Junimea: Implicații istoriografice* [Junimea: Historiographical implications]. Junimea, Iași, 1976.

DUNYA DENIZ CAKIR

Born in 1982, in Istanbul
Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 2012

Teaching and Research Assistant, University of Massachusetts, Department of Political Science (Fall 2005-Fall 2009)
Teaching Associate (Instructor) for Polisci 111 Introduction to Comparative Politics, University of Massachusetts, Department of Political Science (Spring 2010)
Visiting Assistant Professor in the Politics Department, Scripps College, Claremont, California, USA (2012-2013)
Postdoctoral Fellow in the Political Science Department, National University of Singapore, NUS (2013-2015)

Dissertation Research Grant, *Middle East Research Competition* (MERC), Centre d'etudes et de recherches sociales et economiques and Ford Foundation (September 2010-August 2011)
Dissertation Proposal Development Fellowship, Social Science Research Council (2008), Department of Political Science *Graduate Fellowship and Assistantship*, University of Massachusetts Amherst (2005-2009)
High Honors Degree, Bogazici University (2005)

Highest grade point average in the Political Science Department, Bogazici University (2005)

Superior Achievement Fellowship, Bogazici University Alumni Association (2001-2005)

Numerous presentations at conferences (Boston, Philadelphia, New Orleans, Los Angeles, Chicago, Barcelona, Prague, Montreal)

Fields of Interest:

Contemporary political theory: democratic theory, critical theory, theories of ideology and discourse, poststructuralism, theories of the public sphere, Muslim political thought, Foucauldian studies of governmentality

Comparative politics: democratization and civil society in the Middle East, Islamism and secularism, social movements, post-colonialism

THE ART OF NOT BEING GOVERNED: FROM ISLAMIST JOURNALS TO ISLAMIC CRITICAL THEORY?

"Critique, whether immanent, transcendent, genealogical, or in yet some other form, is always a rereading and as such a reaffirmation of that which it engages. It does not, it cannot, reject or demean its object. Rather, as an act of reclamation, critique takes over the object for a different project than that to which it's currently tethered".

Wendy Brown[1]

"I have always sensed that the writings of the freedom-loving fighters do not go in vain, mainly because they [writings] awaken the sleepy, inflame the senses of the half-hearted, and lay the ground for a mass-oriented trend following a specific goal…Something must be happening under the influence of writing".

Sayyid Qutb[2]

"Global imperialism complements naked violence with an epistemic apparatus (employing at times intellectuals, academics and theologians who proclaim themselves Muslim), categorizing Islam and Muslims as moderate and radical, while singlehandedly cherishing the former denomination. The same social scientists and local/foreign orientalists still haven't grown tired of using extensive information technologies at their disposal to advance/repeat theses announcing the end of "political Islam", each time, as the conclusion of latest research."

Mehmet Pamak[3]

The last two decades of the twentieth century have witnessed the growing salience of two related phenomena in the Islamic world: religious resurgence and democratization.[4] Scholarly attention to the phenomenon of Islamist activism has generated analyses which consider such development as emblematic of a new round of Islamic modernism, reminiscent of its nineteenth century examples such as Muhammad Abduh and Jamaladdin al-Afghani, which aim to elevate the Islamic heritage to the level of contemporaneity and provide a viable socio-political alternative to Western models of governance. In this extensive literature addressing

the recent wave of Islamic revivalism, some scholars have drawn upon the "alternative" status of Islamic practices and subjectivities to counter the normative foundations of liberal political culture and questioned scholars' uncritical use of concepts from liberal traditions (such as autonomy, resistance and critique) in the study of allegedly nonliberal Islamic movements.[5] Others have contested this portrayal of Islam's alternative relationship to political modernity by bringing in historical cases from within the Muslim majority world which help to "nuance" the notion that Islamic traditions stand in a "counter" relation to liberal politics. A quintessential scholarly reference, in that regard, has been Turkey's experience with modernity, stretching to Ottoman reform movements.[6]

In addition to genealogies of modernity, Turkey has also featured in ethnographies of modernity.[7] Since the 1990s as the Islamist parties began sweeping many municipal elections and even national ones, there have been numerous studies on the role of Islam in democratic politics in Turkey. Many have revealed a surging pattern of self-limiting radicalism, a moderate/normalized Muslim subjectivity in analyses of the "Islamist party" (Welfare Party, Virtue Party and the AK Party, in chronological order) and its activist constituency. In particular, subsequent to the AK Party's victory in the 2002 parliamentary elections, studies of Islam in Turkey have predominantly pursued the question of the successful accommodation of former Islamists with the democratic, neo-liberal exigencies of globalization and the concomitant doctrinal transformations in the Islamists' outlook.[8] The Gülen movement, in its symbiotic relationship to the AK Party cadres, has constituted the second major target of scholarly attention.[9] Sufi brotherhoods such as the Naqshbandi order have also been the subject of recent anthropological work.[10]

Against this background, this paper will examine the discursive field of Islamic critical thought developed by a group of Muslim activist intellectuals in Turkey who work in collaoration with the Islamist NGOs. This paper demonstrates that the public discourse of these religiously committed individuals constitutes an immanent criticism, produced by a group of "organic" Muslim intellectuals, of the governing paradigms of a liberal-democratic (post)modernity. Studies of Islamic intellectual discourses have been on the rise in the last decade both among political scientists and Middle East scholars.[11] In addition to the scholarly focus on the organizational, economic, and psychological dimensions of Islamic activism qua social movements, the study of the discursive and theoretical dimensions of contemporary Islamism provides a fundamental contribution to our

understanding of the doctrinal substance of Islamic activism. Going beyond the early framing of Islamic politics as faith-based, theologically driven phenomena, comparative theoretical inquiries promise to shed light to the philosophical substance of Islamic discourses, read in juxtaposition to trends in western political thought. This paper is written with a similar motivation to extricate questions about political agency, ontological presumptions founding normative theorizing, limits of liberal cosmology, the status of ethics and locality in political philosophy, etc. from the ethnographic and textual study of contemporary Turkish Muslim intellectuals' *tabligh* (invitation to an Islamic worldview, delivered in text and/or activist praxis). The analysis of published works, seminar lectures, panel presentations and personal interview with the authors provides the backbone of the paper, and is discussed in relation to the philosophical tradition of western critical theory. Firstly, the paper will begin with an intellectual genealogy of the term "intellectual", its relationship to politics, and its recent referential use to denote Muslim thinkers, activists and ideologues. The second section will explore the historical role of Islamist journals and publishing houses in the process of Islamic revivalism in Turkey and the privileged status enjoyed by the Egyptian Muslim thinker Sayyid Qutb among Muslim intellectual circles in Turkey. Far from constituting a homogenous group, let it suffice to say that the activist intellectuals referenced here still compose a cohesive collectivity revolving around the utopia of the "unique Qur'anic Generation" first elaborated by Qutb in his *Milestones*. In the third section, I bring general insights from western critical theory to propose an alternative theoretical framework for comprehending Muslim activist intellectuals' critical and post-liberal engagement with the *present* (practices and ways of thinking to which we are presently subject).

The objective of this analysis is not only to shed light to the intellectual infrastructure of Islamist acitivism in Turkey, but also to extrapolate from the intellectuals' immanent critique of a postmodern, liberal politics of de-politicization of Islam, a semantic deviation from the term "radical" as a qualifier to Islamist activism to "radical" as a qualifier of critique. While the former denotation has equated the term 'radical' with a tendency to resort to violence to achieve political ends (especially for Islamist groups), the latter usage aims to disrupt the normalization of the radical-moderate Muslim dichotomy and re-place the term in the philosophical terrain of "transformative, emancipatory, revolutionary, world-disclosing" politics, following the tradition of critical theory. This last note presents one major implication of the "political theory" approach to Islamism, adopted in this project.

Intellectuals: Bridging Thought and Praxis

Scholars have argued that the temporal origins of the word *intellectual* in Western European usage can be traced to the late nineteenth century: accordingly, as a noun to refer to a person, *intellectual* made its first appearance with the Dreyfus Affair in France. The particular connotation that the word took on stemmed from the active intervention of writers such as Emile Zola, André Gide, Marcel Proust, Anatole France, "in the public sphere of politics to protest in the name of Justice in order to secure the release of the innocent Captain Alfred Dreyfus". For Jennings and Kemp-Welch, it was "the action of intervening in politics by intellectuals" which defined the essence of the noun.[12] In that sense, active political intervention, reminiscent of the Schmittian sovereign intervention in times of crisis, has marked the noun "intellectual" from its inception.

Some sociologists have later defined the term through the labor it rests upon, and argued that what makes intellectual knowledge qualitatively distinct from other forms of knowledge consists "in the fact that it is concerned with the values which a society accepts as part of its culture."[13] Understood in this fashion, intellectual knowledge has both a regulative and orientational function over the behavior of the members of the society, hence implicated in normative, teleological questions. For Konrad and Szelenyi, intellectual knowledge must also have cross-contextual significance, that is, an ability to offer conceptual models which are applicable in different contexts, different social milieus, transcending the boundaries of an individual situation in importance. Leaving aside sociological definitions of the term which usually refer to those who by profession or occupation engage in intellectual rather than physical labor, I will here focus on some of the major perspectives from modern political and social thought, concerning the ends of intellectual production and its relationship to everyday politics.

In his Reith Lectures in 1993 on the "role of the intellectual", Edward Said states:

> The intellectual is an individual endowed with a faculty for representing, embodying, articulating a message, a view, an attitude, philosophy or opinion to, as well as for, a public, in public. And this role has an edge to it, and cannot be played without a sense of being someone whose place it is to raise embarrassing questions, to confront orthodoxy and dogma (rather than to produce them), to be someone who cannot easily be co-opted by governments or corporations, and whose raison d'être is to represent

all those people and issues who are routinely forgotten or swept under the rug...Intellectuals are representative, not just of some subterranean or large social movement, but of a quite peculiar, even abrasive, style of life and social performance that is uniquely theirs... Intellectuals are of their time, herded along by the mass politics of representations embodied by the information or media industry, capable of resisting those only by disputing the images, official narratives, justifications of power circulated by an increasingly powerful media - and not only media, but whole trends of thought that maintain the status quo, keep things within an acceptable and sanctioned perspective on actuality.[14]

Extrapolating from this, it is noteworthy that Said's definition of the intellectual rests upon an in-public and for-a-public articulation of a specific message, countering the orthodoxies of one's spatial and temporal inhabiting. Intellectual work, by definition, challenges the dogmas of status quo, always keeping a healthy distance from corporate institutions and representations serving the ends of dominant social groups and/or modern Princes. Julien Benda, the French philosopher renowned for his *The Treason of the Intellectuals*, similarly defines an intellectual through a permanent state of opposition to the status quo: "a being set apart, someone able to speak the truth to power, a crusty, eloquent, fantastically courageous and angry individual for whom no worldly power is too big and imposing to be criticized and pointedly taken to task."[15] Said and Brenda not only concur on the social role of the intellectual as a public figure who is always on the side of the un(der)represented, the dispossessed, and the oppressed, but also on the appropriate existential mode of intellectual labor, which is social detachment. For Said, this takes the form of exilic displacement, as the intellectual constantly inhabits the liminal space of migration (between a lost homeland and the provisionality of new contexts) because of her refusal to be integrated to the vast institutional apparatus of her country.

The American sociologist C. Wright Mills shares the conception of the intellectual's responsibility to reveal "truth". He states in *Power, Politics, and People*:

The independent artist and intellectual are among the few remaining personalities equipped to resist and to fight the stereotyping and consequent death of genuinely living things. Fresh perception now involves the capacity to continually unmask and to smash the stereotypes of vision and intellect with which modern communications (that is, modern systems of representation) swamp us. These worlds of mass-art and mass-thought are

increasingly geared to the demands of politics. That is why it is in politics that intellectual solidarity and effort must be centered. If the thinker does not relate himself to the value of truth in political struggle, he cannot responsibly cope with the whole of live experience.[16]

In his *Prison Notebooks*, the Italian Marxist political philosopher, activist, journalist, Antonio Gramsci, defines the intellectual in the following fashion: "all men are intellectuals, one could say, but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals."[17] Those who have that function belong to one of the two categories: traditional intellectuals such as teachers, priests and administrators, and organic intellectuals, directly connected to a class to organize and further its interests. In clear contrast to the independent, socially detached intellectual of Said, Brenda and Mill (who has left the "cave", contemplating critically on mass politics), the Gramscian organic intellectual is a person embedded in social structures, fulfilling a set of functions from within her position in society. Traditional intellectuals are those who adopt a "transcendent", "speculative", or "metaphysical" point of view detached from their social milieu as opposed to the historically subjective mode of criticism among organic intellectuals who remain engaged with their community. Organic intellectuals translate this phenomenology of engagement into "immanent criticism" grounded in the thoughts and everyday experience of common people. Forming no special cadre, "they can be found amongst all social groups, and seek to give them homogeneity and an awareness of their function in the social and economic system."[18] Gramsci also believed in the possibility for certain organic intellectuals "to represent the interests of oppressed groups and encourage them to liberate themselves by developing a critical consciousness of their situation from within their own current forms of thinking and acting".[19] With the exception of Gramsci, those who regard the fundamental mission of the intellectual as the responsibility to truth appear to concur, including Benda and Edward Said, on the fact that this mission can be effectively carried out only if the intellectual stands detached from his society. This exterior positionality secures an intellectual vantage point which remains outside the mainstream, hence unaccommodated, uncoopted, and resistant. Said deploys the model of "self-imposed exile" for the public intellectual, maintaining that "truth inevitably lies at the margins of society."[20]

The co-optation and institutionalization of intellectual labor has been a prevalent topic of concern for scholars who have, since the 1980s, pointed

to an emerging historical pattern of the eclipse of intellectuals through mass media and professionalization.[21] The result has been perceived as "a considerable degradation of the intellectual function". According to Russell Jacoby, the generation of 1900, the classical American intellectuals "lived their lives by way of books, reviews and journalism" whereas with the generation of 1940, the forces of academization destroyed "the intellectuals' commitment to a public world and a public language (the vernacular)".[22] Scholars such as Bruce Robbins have later commented on the idealization of the autonomous intellectual, independent from the institutional strains of academia by arguing that the consequences of professionalization have not been as dire as described.[23] Against this background, I suggest that the commitment to a world beyond the private, professional domain as one phenomenological dimension (among many) of the public intellectual is of particular theoretical relevance in understanding Muslim activist intellectuals whose texts and speeches will be explored here. My use of the term is also informed by Michael Walzer who proposes a similar portrayal of the intellectual in his *Company of Critics.* He argues that the mark of the intellectual is not his autonomy from the world he inhabits; au contraire, "he is not an inhabitant of a separate world, the knower of esoteric truths, but a fellow member of this world who devotes himself, but with a passion, to truths we all know".[24] In a Gramscian framework, Walzer depicts the essence of intellectual labor as the exposition of hypocrisies and injustices from *within.* The intellectual, for Walzer, is a social critic who promotes "a collective reflection upon the conditions of collective life" through his interaction with other members of the community.[25] He fulfills the mission of social criticism by "holding up a mirror to a society as a whole", by "enquiring whether the values which give them their self-respect are hypocritically held, or ineffectively endorsed by the powers that be."[26] Like Gramsci, Walzer believes that the dangers of Olympian detachment on the one hand, rule by an intellectual elite on the other, can best be avoided through a form of immanent critique that "evolves out of the prevailing views and practices of ordinary people."[27] From the perspective of Gramsci's philosophy of praxis, criticism and reality are always embedded in a historical subjectivity, in a particular historical consciousness.

In the context of Turkey, the term "Muslim intellectuals" as an analytical referent has been deployed since the 1990s to refer to the emerging Islamic-educated intelligentsia distinguished by their Islamist stance and public rhetoric from the Kemalist, secular or leftist intellectual elite. The

sociological literature on the rising Muslim intelligentsia predominantly captured the anti-modernist, anti-Western agenda promoted by the intellectuals in their quest for an "alternative social discourse".[28] Others have recently challenged the validity of this representation in the light of contemporary changes that Muslim intelligentsia has undergone in the last decade. Ihsan Dagi, in his analysis of a new brand of Islamism named post-Islamism in effect since the AK Party's electoral victory in 2002, maintains that some Muslim intellectuals "appear to have abandoned the ideas for the construction of an alternative social and political order that in effect enabled them to seek a rapprochement with the West, Western ideas and institutions".[29] Other scholars such as Karasipahi continue to depict contemporary Muslim intellectuals through "their overall negation of Western civilization".[30] In her explanation of contemporary Islamist discourse since the 1980s, Karasipahi unquestioningly accepts the representation of Islamist revivalism in Turkey as the product of the contradictions of the Kemalist modernization process. Despite diachronic and synchronic variations among scholars in their description of Turkish Muslim intellectuals' political agenda and orientation, there seems to be a rough consensus on the individual constituents of Turkish Muslim intelligentsia as most of this literature cites such figures as Ismet Özel, Ali Bulaç, Ersin Gürdoğan, Abdurrahman Dilipak who are well known among "secular" circles. The group of Muslim activist intellectuals examined in this project is comparatively less popular outside their own "neighborhood": to give an example, a prominent figure in these circles, Hamza Türkmen, is a best-selling Islamist author in the pious district of Fatih, but is rarely recognized by the secular intelligentsia in Turkey.

The *philosophes* were a "cohesive group with a coherent character and purpose, a self-conscious vanguard of the French Enlightenment".[31] The relatively less well-known substratum of Muslim intellectual life analyzed in this study, is akin to the *philosophes* in that they compose an organic epistemic community dedicated to construct *a sociology of Qur'anic Generation* grounded in everyday life (which translates an Islamic ontology and epistemology into a counter-hegemonic, post-liberal philosophy of praxis). These intellectual-activists, Hamza Türkmen, Abdurrahman Arslan, Rıdvan Kaya, Atasoy Müftüoğlu, Mehmet Pamak among others, are affiliated collectively with Islamist civil society, embedded in networks of intellectual activism enabled by the Islamist NGOs (particularly, the Özgür-Der). The "Islam" practiced and professed by these intellectuals is not a religion disengaged from life's struggles, and the pressing matters

of the present. In that sense, they bear testimony to Martin Luther King's insightful remark, stating that "any religion that professes to be concerned about the souls of men and is not concerned about the slums that damn them, the economic conditions that strangle them and the social conditions that cripple them is a spiritually moribund religion awaiting burial."[32]

To conclude this section, I maintain that both Gramsci and Walzer present a more elucidating theoretical framework to capture a mode of intellectual activism intent on bridging thought and praxis, ontology and politics, the private and the public. Pace Gramsci, however, the civil society activism of Muslim intellectuals in Turkey elucidate the ways in which metaphysical systems of thought can, and do indeed, coexist with immanent modes of everyday life, thought and practice. In doing this, their work attests to the fact that modernist and poststructuralist aversion to religion as a fixed ideal should be revised before problematically lending itself to the conclusion that religion fosters "absolutes" that "demand a total and uncompromising change that can only prove destructive."[33] Religious experience and subjectivities, in other words, are not simple dictates of theological dogma; they are formed and performed in the immanence of a critical philosophy (of emancipatory praxis embedded in the idea of *shahadat*). Literally meaning the act of witnessing, *shahadat* is a central component of Muslim activist intellectuals' discourse and philosophy of praxis as an epistemological bridge (from within the Islamic tradition) between Qur'anic exegesis/ontology and politics. As such, *shahadat* evokes the idea of self-governance through embodying a sacred utopia. Another integral component of this philosophy is a "nativist" search for authenticity, not rooted in cultural particularism, but in the totalizing truth of Islam. The quest for an authentic being in opposition to the identitarian eclecticism of postmodern pluralism and the rootless cosmopolitanism is reminiscent of Heidegger, as some scholars point out. Subtracting from Heidegger's authenticity the ontological privileging of "cultural particularism" as "the primordial phenomenon of truth", we are left with a philosophical position which is based on a totalizing truth claim as a hidden "authentic" ground accessible only by way of "revelation" and not reasoned argument. In a similar vein, Muslim intellectuals' exegesis/ philosophy of praxis reclaims Qur'anic revelation as the means to reach a state of authenticity in piety and exemplary social being, under conditions of late modernity.

Islamist Journals, Publishing Houses and Sayyid Qutb in the Process of *Tawhidi* Awakening in Turkey

A broad consensus is noticeable among Muslim activist intellectuals regarding the significance of journal publishing which, as a modern means of narration and communication, is considered an integral part of the process of Islamist re-awakening and struggle. Hamza Turkmen, in his article "Can there be effective dialogue and development without journal readership?" published in the Islamist journal *Haksöz,* traces back the educational significance of journal publishing to the *Muvahhid* movement founded by Ibn Tumart (D. 1130) which ruled much of the Maghrib for over a century until 1269. In its systematic and pervasive educational thrust, the *Muvahhid* movement relied upon the dissemination of studies of Qur'an, *tafsir* and *fiqh* copied in handwriting and declarations of the *shura* council propagated in the form of bulletins to the subunits and educational institutions of the *Muwahhid* state. This didactic effort, for Türkmen, constitutes the prototypical forms of Islamic publishing in the history of Islamic revivalism.

According to Türkmen's genealogy of printed Islamist *tabligh* (the dissemination of a message), the educational legacy of the *Muwahhid* movement has later been furthered by *Urwah al-Wuthqa*, the very first Islamist journal published under the aegis of Jamaladdin al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh. The contemporary significance of the *Urwah* is based on the fact that "it legitimized the widespread use of a modern means of mass communication (the journal) deemed today as the most significant means of *tabligh*, intra-Muslim solidarity and dialogue."[34] Notwithstanding its short lifespan, *Urwah al-Wuthqa* has pioneered in providing a *wahy* (revelation)-centered analysis of the use of tools/means of non-*wahyi* systems. While intending to raise Muslims' awareness of the Qur'an and accurate *sunna*, clarify their concepts and identities, and socialize them into the idea of resistance and *Ittihad-i Islam* (Islamic union) against both tyranny and colonialism, Afghani and Abduh put forward the principles of employing a systemic tool from the hegemonic *jahili* system, as a strategic part of their efforts to generate *islah* (reform) in the Muslim world. This early example of the *Urwah* was later followed by the journal *Menar*, first published in Egypt under the editorship of M. Rashid Rida in 1898, *Sirat-I Mustakim* published in 1908 in Istanbul, and *Tercumanu'l-Qur'an* published in India in 1927. These three journals, according to Türkmen, constituted the major periodic publications, used as an example and

benchmark by the Islamist movement journals in the process of Islamist awakening since the first quarter of the twentieth century.

As an illuminating side note annexed to the history of Islamist journals, let me mention in passing Türkmen's comments regarding "other" accounts of the process of Islamist revival and the role of journals therein. Türkmen notes a tendency, that is well known to scholars of "political Islam", "among traditional and national/pious circles as well as academics to consistently depict and ostracize the *ittihad-i Islam* and *islah* efforts as modernist, recent (*nevzuhur*) and mimetic." He stresses that the Islamist efforts at *islah* and acumen (*dirayet*) encapsulated in the publishing of *Urwah al-Wuthqa* and the medium of journal they used have been labeled, by the aforementioned parties, "a product of the modern world" or "manifestations of a defeatist psychology influenced by orientalism and rooted in Europe-emanated political longings." He maintains, however, that equating the presentation of Islamist *tabligh* via a technological medium of mass communication implicated in Western modernity, with "modernism" per se is "fundamentally flawed". Such a representation is nevertheless "pleasing to the imperialists by virtue of keeping a rival potentiality under allegation." Türkmen criticizes the anti-modernist sensitivity of those refusing to use such "infidels' inventions" as cameras and televisions, while he acknowledges the controlling power and the civilizational imprint in each medium of non-*wahyi* systems. Yet, he concludes that such *sufi* and *salafi* reactions to modern media should not be confused as a genuine *tawhidi* stance. The *Urwah al-Wuthqa* practice, accordingly, has demonstrated the applied illustration of how to use, when necessary, convenient systemic media to rally Muslims living under *jahili* systems around the ideal of a society of *wahy* (revelation).

In Turkey, the first periodic journal following the footprints of *Urwah al-Wuthqa* was *Sirat-i Mustakim* initially published in 1908. The journal, according to Macide Türkmen, was characterized by "an inability to sufficiently purge itself of Ottomanism or the burgeoning Turkish nationalism."[35] A similar ideological orientation could be found later in the journal *Hilal* which began its career in the 1960s. By virtue of incorporating rightist and conservative traits into its general approach, *Hilal* has oftentimes been categorized within the "rightist-Islamist" genre. For Macide Türkmen, even though the period of transition to multi-party system benefited the Muslims in Turkey with increased relative freedoms (of expression), the bourgeoning Islamic journals have largely remained within the parameters of the regime-dictated Turkish identity. The author

refers to the right-wing Islamism characteristic of the era as "pragmatic Islamism" which remained "un-critical of the democracy game by actively supporting political parties that opposed the Kemalist legacy of the CHP (Republican People's Party)."[36]

Against the historical background of a right-wing attitude marking the mid-twentieth century articulations of Islamism in Turkey, many among Muslim activist intellectuals trace their lineage to the journal *Düşünce* which began its publication in the 1970s. Since then, the most significant Islamist monthly or weekly journals in chronological order have been: (1970s) *Kriter, Talebe, Islami Hareket, Tevhid, Aylik Dergi, Hicret*; (1980s) *Iktibas, Insan, Girişim, Kelime, Kalem*; (1990s) *Tevhid, Yeryüzü, Haksöz, Umran, Değişim, Genç Birikim*. Today, four major Islamist journals have carried their existence to the twenty-first century: *Iktibas, Haksöz, Umran, Genç Birikim*. Regarding the contemporary significance of journal publishing (*dergicilik*) for Islamic revival, Hamza Türkmen stated in an interview that the medium of journal accomplishes something valuable, genuine, continuous and productive for the Muslims by virtue of forming an "école" and a "den/meeting center" (*ocak*). In the last analysis, the journal demonstrates the sustained consistency of the *tawhidi* content despite changing forms and names in which Islamist journals have been published. He explains the idea of being a "den/nest" through "the ability to keep the fountains of our thought clean, pure and lucid in this defunct age of global capitalist hegemony and against the molestations of comprador regimes".[37] As a result, the primary condition for becoming a den of purification against global-scale contamination of minds is to "develop the networks of relationship, solidarity and collective *shahadat* (witnessing, epitomizing an ideal) warranted for an efficacious, Qur'an-derived *usul* (method) and perspective as well as for the upbringing of cadres which embody that efficacy, and firmly resist the individualizing momentum of the liberal policies penetrating the entire publishing sector in Turkey." The extent of functionality of such missionary journals, he points out, cannot be evaluated via quantitative measures as total circulation as it solely rests on "the creation of a participant, active and productive man of *da'wa* (cause) by way of the journal's *tabligh*, instruction, dialogue and *shahadat* efforts." In other words, journal publishing is legitimized among Muslim intellectuals through the equation of the use of such modern medium with "the worship (*ibadet*) of forming a social nucleus of *da'wa* adherents, riveting a jurisprudence of brotherhood in faith and concerted action." The functionality of journals is, in brief, in their

potential to represent a means of Islamic *tabligh*, and consequently a collective performance of piety. According to the editor of *Haksöz*, Bahadır Kurbanoğlu, the journals *Düşünce*, *Iktibas* and *Haksöz* have been the primary technological vehicles of the thirty, thirty-five years long process of Islamist purification, intellectual development and struggle in Turkey.[38] Resulting from a collective endeavor, journals have in time occupied a prominent place between books and newspapers in terms of both form and content. According to Hamza Er, Islamist journals could be seen:

> [...] as a means of propaganda, as the *shahadat* of the Qur'anic duty/ exhortation to 'command the good, and forbid the evil' (*amr bi'l-ma'ruf wa nahy an'al-munkar*), especially in a conjuncture where our concepts have been mitigated through doctrinal and practical deviations (*bid'ad*: innovations that deviate from religion), a conjuncture marked by the total siege of society by a modern lifestyle, the acceleration of the imperialist efforts to distort Islamic values which are deemed the sole obstacle to a smoother exploitation of the globe, the isolation of those brave souls fighting against occupation in the path of God, and the outdating/obsoleting of such concepts as *shahadat* and *jihad* erased from debates and writings.[39]

Understood in this fashion, journals, as endemic parts of social movements, record the *shahadat* of a generation in concerted action bequeathed to the future. Historically, the didactic dimension of journals have been complemented by other milieus of *tawhidi* educational efforts such as *Hizbu't Tahrir* (cell-type reading/working group of 3-7 people analyzing the texts of the *Hizb,* the international Sunni pan-Islamic movement), *Mücadele Birliği* (the Struggle Union), *MTTB* (National Turkish Student Association), the "seminar-conference" medium brought to the forefront by the *Düşünce, Islami Hareket, Aylık Dergi* journals, and the platforms of club, dervish lodge (*dergah*), and mosque meetings where training in sermon and conversation (the Sufi concept of *sohbet*) was conducted in the 1970s.[40] However, in the post-1980 period, the Islamist groups with a *tawhidi* orientation have begun to sever their ties to the Sufi lodges (*dergah*) based on intellectual objections and to the mosques due to methodological disputes.[41] The safest substitute for educational sites later became the houses. Increasingly in the 1990s, the representative agency for the educational endeavors at homes has been transferred to the publishing houses and journal bureaus instrumentalized for the goal of generating a dense, pious reading public which participates in the seminars and workshops organized by the journals in collaboration with

Islamic NGOs. Today, the workshop/seminar programs of Islamic civil society attract a large number of young Muslims (the female majority been unable to get higher education due to the headscarf ban) drawn in the project/process of building an Islamic community (*jamaat*). A major example of such class-seminar form of Islamist curricular training into the *tawhidi* hermeneutics of modern life and an accurate insight into the Qur'an has been instituted in 2001 by the Islamic NGO, Özgür-Der, under the banner of "Alternative Education Seminars".

Haksöz, as an Islamic journal in circulation for two decades, has also instituted a *Haksöz* school (*Haksöz Okulu*) which grew out of "an expression of belonging conferred by Muslims who have perceived *Haksöz* as more than a journal in-between two covers, and instead as a line of comprehension, collective expression of a lifestyle, an aura of unity and association".[42] Among the initial undertakings of *Haksöz* School, one finds the publication of a compiled edited volume on the pioneering figures of the Islamic struggle, bringing together biographical articles and commentaries published in the *Haksöz* and *Dünya ve Islam* journals in the last two decades. This endeavor, coupled with the educational seminars on the historical intellectual vanguard of Islamic thought, manifests the objective to introduce contemporary Muslims to "the seven centuries-long line of heritage comprising intellectual practitioners of *islah*, *ihya* and *tajdid* in their contributions to the Islamic struggle."[43] For didactic purposes, the school compiles Muslim thinkers and activists, chronologically stretching from Ibn Taymiyya to Ali Shari'ati, who, despite their doctrinal and methodological variations, are presented as integral components of a single, continuous, and unitary tradition of Islamic thought and political struggle. Among these figures, Sayyid Qutb stands as a particularly influential and frequently referenced Muslim thinker, executed by the Gamal Abd al-Nasser regime in Egypt on August 29, 1966 as part of its crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood opposition.[44] The anniversary of Qutb's "martyrdom" (*shahadat*) is commemorated each year through public events organized by Özgür-der. In the 2009 reunion which I attended, the event started with Qur'anic recitation, followed by a panel discussion among leading Muslim activist intellectuals (Hamza Türkmen, Beşir Eryarsoy, and Mehmet Pamak) on the nature and contemporary significance of Qutb's legacy for the Islamic resistance. The event lasting over three hours also included the screening of a brief documentary on Qutb's life followed by a guest lecture from a Hamas activist from Palestine, and concluded with a brief concert by the Islamic band "Grup

Yürüyüş". Aside from being the most intense experience of the fieldwork, this commemoration hosting around 400 participants transformed a modest, regular conference hall located in the outskirts of Istanbul into a disruptive event of the being-in-common (as the event of community), to borrow from Jean-Luc Nancy. In individuals' synchronous affirmation and assertion of a pious collectivity, the room appeared less to envelop the sort of interactions which resemble free exchange of opinion between moral equals within a public sphere. Instead, that overcrowded room seemed to contain the opening of a space, construed in post-foundational thought as the very moment of the political.[45] What exactly could Badiou be doing in that conference hall? As troubling as it is, in the most unlikely of places, the "event" seemed to unfold in a manner vaguely reminiscent of the "subjectivizing truth-processes of militants".[46] But how did we get here? The story of Qutbianism among Turkish Muslims began with an Islamic journal in the year 1965.

Flyer for the 2009 Commemoration of "Shaheed" Sayyid Qutb

The news of Sayyid Qutb's "shahadat" in the hands of the Nasser regime reached the Muslims in Turkey through the Islamic journal *Hilal*. In an article entitled "Understanding and Developing Sayyid Qutb's Message", Hamza Türkmen mentions the very first appearance of Sayyid Qutb in Turkish language to be found in February 1965 issue of *Hilal,* in an article titled "The Genuine Muslim: Sayyid Qutb", written by Ismail Kazdal. Even though the piece includes insufficient biographical data, Türkmen argues, the article effectively summarizes those works of Qutb such as "Social Justice in Islam" and "This Religion is Islam" which have been translated in Turkish before his execution. The news of his death in *Hilal* was accompanied with the announcement of the publication of Qutb's *Milestones,* publicized as "the book which brought execution". *Milestones* was published with the translation of Abdülkadir Şener only two months after being announced in *Hilal*.[47] The journal's 56th and 64th volumes carried Sayyid Qutb to the cover and contributed to his growing familiarity among Turkish Muslims.

During the 1970s which saw the burgeoning of Islamic revivalism in Turkey, Türkmen notes that Qutb's works, especially after the translation of his *Fi Zilali'l Qur'an*[48] in Turkish, were heavily criticized by traditionalist, right-wing Muslim intellectuals of the time such as Sezai Karakoç and Necip Fazıl Kısakürek whose perspective, according to Türkmen, has not yet reached a state of catharsis from "the diseases of sectarianism, mysticism, rightism, statism, and nationalism."[49] Such doctrinal purification, for Türkmen, is imperative to genuinely comprehend the teachings and the *shahadat* (manifestations in deed of an exemplary living, being the living example of a sublime idea) of Sayyid Qutb. The early reaction of the conservative Islamic sector notwithstanding, Qutb's books continued to be translated in Turkish by the "International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations" in Kuwait and local publishers alike. The major conceptual contributions of Qutb have been discussed since then with reference to his ideas of *tawhid* (the rule of divine sovereignty), correct method, *jahiliyyah*[50] (ignorance of divine law), *umma* (Islamic community), and *jihad* among others. For Türkmen, the thirty-five years of Islamic revivalism in Turkey received its initial sparks from Qutb's *Milestones* which asserted the pressing need to re-generate an authentic *umma*, exemplary in piety: "It is necessary to revive that Muslim community which is buried under the debris of wrong notions and man-made values and traditions of many generations, and which is

covered under the crushing weight of false laws and constitutions which have not even the remotest connection with Islam, and its Way of Life."[51]

Today, one could still trace the imprint of Qutb's approach in *Milestones* in the work of contemporary Muslim activist intellectuals in Turkey along two major lines of influence: methodological and normative/theoretical. Concerning intellectual method, Muslim intellectuals derived from *Milestones* the centrality of self-criticism (that is, internal criticism of earlier phases in the process of Islamic struggle) to the development of Islamic thought, and the need to formulate a consistent analysis of history, society and the global system. They have also retained the normative framework of the Qutbian approach to Islamic revival: the supreme end of the process of Qur'an-centered revival is the formation of the nucleus of a Qur'anic Generation freed from the shackles of modern j*ahiliyyah*, rather than the hasty establishment of an Islamic state. *Milestones* underscored first and foremost the need for detachment on the plane of "consciousness" and "identity" from the local *jahili* structures integrated in the global system. Qutb's introduction in *Milestones* opens with a powerful diagnosis of the contemporary wretchedness of humanity:

> Today mankind stands at the brink of a precipice, not because the danger of total extinction is hovering over its head -for this being only an apparent symptom not the real disease- but because today humanity is bereft of those values of life, which are not only instrumental to its healthy growth but also to its real evolution…If we look at the sources and foundations of modern modes of living, it becomes clear that the whole world is steeped in *jahiliyya . . .* based on rebellion against the sovereignty of God on earth. It attempts to transfer to man one of the greatest attributes of God, namely sovereignty, by making some men lords over others . . . in the more subtle form of claiming that the right to create values, to legislate rules of collective behavior, and to choose a way of life rests with men, without regard to what God has prescribed.[52]

His prognosis for the contemporary erosion of "values" pointed to an identitarian "*hijra* to Islam" (turn to Islam) from the *jahili* societies inhabited by Muslims, towards the goal of re-building the Qur'anic Generation. Composed of the companions of the Prophet, the Qur'anic Generation is represented by Qutb as a unique and unmatched organization in Islamic history "for the sole reason that it imbibed the understanding of religion and training direct from one single source (the Qur'an)."[53] As a guiding light, this exemplary generation today imbues contemporary methods

and rhetoric of inviting and teaching Muslims the message of the Qur'an. The centrality of a generational utopia to Islamic *tabligh* can be traced to the "Unique Qur'anic Generation" chapter in *Milestones*, where Qutb extrapolates and elaborates an ontology of total renunciation of the *jahili* environment with its customs, usages, ideas, concepts, for a return to that pure source of guidance which has bred the unique generation.

> After taking refuge under the shadow of Islam, a Muslim's life witnessed complete segregation between his past life of ignorance and the new Islamic life. This severance would be effected with full consciousness and under a thought-out decision. As a result, his collective relationship with the surrounding society of Jahiliyyah would get snapped up arid burning his boats, he would completely identify himself with Islam. Although he may be having trade and daily commercial dealings with the polytheists, it made no difference as relationship of feelings and understanding and business connection were two different and divergent things.[54]

More than a guiding utopia, the Qur'anic Generation is seen by Muslim activist intellectuals in Turkey as the concrete embodiment of the primacy of a vanguard, exemplary collectivity formed in Islamic *shahadat* and resistance to the tentacles of the *jahili* society. Its formulation as a vanguard force follows the Qutbian dictum.

> How should the task of reviving *Deen* (Islam) begin? It is necessary that initially a vanguard should come into existence which should set out with a firm determination to perform this tremendous task, making incessant strides towards the goal, marching through the vast ocean of jahiliyyah, which has encircled the entire world.[55]

In the absence of that foundational nucleus of Islamic revival, "no socio-political project can hope to be advanced."[56] For Andrew March, scholar of Muslim political thought, Qutb's account of the unique Qur'anic Generation "neither suggests religious nostalgia for a unique sacred moment nor reveals an epistemic commitment to closing the books of interpretation with the death of those who had unmediated access to the Prophet".[57] Instead, he reads Qutb's recurrent discussions of the *salaf* (first generations of Muslims) in the context of a genealogical account of the political origins of vice in human society. The idea encapsulated in the "unique Qur'anic Generation", however, suggests more than a descriptive, diagnostic account of the origins of modern *jahiliyyah*. For practitioners

of a Qutbian worldview, the activist intellectuals under analysis here, this generational utopia points to a philosophy of praxis which fruitfully conflates, following the role model of the first Muslim generation, the performance of piety with public epitomization (*shahadat*) and *tabligh* of Islamic resistance.

The significance of Qutb for Islamic social movements, according to Türkmen, is derived from his original revision of previous methods for a Qur'an-centered project of *islah* –and an epistemology of emancipation- which dictated the need for re-organization, purification and self-criticism in the Islamic struggle. His political manifesto, *Milestones*, does not include a theory of state, unlike his *Social Justice in Islam* which was written in the early phase of his intellectual trajectory. The mature Qutb held that institutionalizing faith and *jamaat* is a *jahili* tactic which threatens to jeopardize the essential applicability/practicality of the Islamic worldview. His refusal to provide a blueprint for the institutions of an Islamic state, as underlined by Roxanne Euben, is based upon his "unwillingness to play an intellectual game whose rules are determined by the enemy."[58] For Rıdvan Kaya, Qutb provides a "model" identity by incorporating the integrity of *iman* (faith) and *amel* (deed) in the ways in which he personally exemplified a life of *shahadat* to the revelatory truth.[59] In that respect, Qutb reverses the fundamental rupture between abstract thought and practice powerfully noted in Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach.

A most consequential component of Qutb's political thought as reflected in the perspective of Muslim activist intellectuals in Turkey is the theological framework he provides for the organic bond between politics and morality (how a daily practice of Islamic ethics implicates the Muslim in politics). To grasp Qutb's interpretation of the enmeshed nature of politics and Islamic morality, one needs to go beyond the more obvious ideas that Islamism is a modern critique of secularism and rationalism and seeks to unite "religion and state."[60] To that end, recent scholarly exegesis of Qutb's work has addressed the question of what is political about "political Islam", of which Qutb is considered one of the most influential twentieth century ideologues. Limited to a textual analysis of Qutb's political theory, such studies have produced a juridical account of the place of politics –understood as a particular socio-political order- in the attainment of moral excellence. In this literature, March (2010) provides an excellent illustration of the limitations of a textual commentary of Qutb's political thought on the basis of his postulate of *shari'at-fitra* harmony (between Islamic law and human nature). Even though his

insights are illuminating in the sense of providing a (or confirming a Rousseauvian) conception of politics as collective submission to a common, all-embracing Law, the overemphasis on the comprehensiveness of Islamic law overshadows what Qutbian lay Muslims, such as Muslim intellectuals examined here, understand as the main implication of Qutb's political thought: the interdependence of *amel* and *iman*, of deed and faith. From their standpoint, what is political about "Islam" (and not political Islam) in its Qutbian articulation is that embedded philosophy of praxis rooted in the integrity of faith and deed. Where morality meets politics constitutes the moment of daily socialization with others, which actively seeks to create a collectivity in exemplary servitude to God and in fullest conformity with one's innate nature (*fitra*).

> For in Islam, politics, like life in general, had always been the expression of those moral feelings that lie deep within life and that are rooted in its very nature. The existence of those feelings was a natural consequence of that constant watchfulness that Islam enjoined upon the individual conscience and of that keen moral perception that it awakens in the souls of its adherents.[61]

For Türkmen, Qutb's message has not been sufficiently understood and furthered, his project of *islah* not been socialized in a concrete and didactic manner among the Muslims in Turkey.[62] Citing a prominent Muslim intellectual, Ali Bulaç, on his reading of Qutb, Türkmen illustrates the misunderstandings which still pervade among Muslims with respect to Qutb's political thought. Bulaç, in his "Terror and the Trajectory of the Islamic Movement", accuses second-generation Islamists such as Qutb and Mawdudi for the heavy emphasis they placed upon a state-centered "formal Islam" (*resmi* Islam) instead of the "civil Islam".[63] This reading, for Türkmen, fails to grasp the intellectual evolution of Qutb's thought and contradicts his objective to resuscitate the Qur'anic Generation, which, "can only be explained with reference to such concepts of the Islamic literature as *islah* and *sunnetullah*,[64] instead of the sociological constructs/ referents of civil versus formal Islam." Such predominant misreadings, accordingly, stem from the relative shortage of efforts to disseminate Qutb's message. Public events such as panels and symposiums which address the topic have been limited to two panels organized by IDKAM (Islamic World Cultural Center) on August 26, 1995 and August 24, 1996 entitled "Sayyid Qutb and the Qur'anic Generation", followed by the "Sayyid Qutb

Symposium" organized by Irfan Vakfi (Irfan Association) on December 21-22, 1996 on the 30th anniversary of Qutb's *shadahat*. Similarly, the 35th and 40th anniversaries of his execution have been commemorated by panels organized by Islamic associations; Ozgür-Der in 2001 and Medeniyet Derneği in 2006. Since 2009 to the present, Özgür-Der organized public events commemorating Qutb's *shadahat* every year.

In the 2001 symposium entitled "The Duty to Build the Qur'anic Generation", organized by Özgür-Der to commemorate the 35th anniversary of Qutb's *shahadat*, the theologian and jurist Mustafa Islamoğlu discusses "revelation" in the context of a divine project of construction on the basis of the human *fitra*.[65] Accordingly, revelation as the event of divine dialogue has the sole purpose of reminding men his sublime responsibility in building a life in full conformity with his innate nature. It is for this reason that man is created "responsible", and not "sinful". Islamoğlu explains the divinely ordained purpose of man as God's vicegerent on earth through a two-fold scheme: the pursuit of the divine responsibility of human self-fulfillment in a life which is harmonious with his nature requires both an infrastructure and a superstructure, which implies the need to conceive man both as a constructing subject and an object to construct. The ontological infrastructure of human existence, that is the divine "format" of *fitra*, renders man malleable for construction, and is referred in the Islamic epistemology as *huduri* (a priori) knowledge. The superstructure, on the other hand, corresponds to the act of envisioning, reasoning and developing a character/self, and is named on the grounds of its acquired nature, *husuli* (a posteriori) knowledge.[66] Alienation of man, from himself, his fellow men, his environment, and God takes place precisely at the moment of detachment from one's *fitra* when the correspondence of *husuli* and *huduri* knowledge is broken. Going back to the status of "revelation", Islamoğlu describes this divine intervention into human lifeworld as a mode of subjectification, through which man as a producing subject is produced as a subject. Central to this "mode d'assujetissement" is the initial creation of *taqwa* (fear of God), a consciousness of responsibility, by the divine message of *wahy* (revelation). This responsibility to God, built into the human *fitra*, lies at the heart of Islamoğlu's reading of Qutb and his call to rejuvenate the Qur'anic Generation in *Milestones*.

In addition to the reinstitution of the Qur'an at the center of the Islamic struggle as its fundamental source of reference, Qutb's *Milestones* provoked the shattering of traditional attitudes among the Muslims of Turkey. Rıdvan Kaya particularly stresses the guidance provided by this

work in the course of developing an Islamic identity which takes up "the call to question traditional frames of religiosity grown in the shadow of *jahili* mindsets and practices."[67] Qutb's emphasis on faith as the sole legitimate marker of solidarity among Muslims (thus, negating other non-Qur'anic bases of social identification as territory, patria, history, race) has fundamentally disrupted the intellectual universe of Muslims in Turkey who have inherited a "traditional, national, and conservative" legacy of Islamic thought. Especially in the light of the present conjunctural changes amongst the Islamic social sectors, Kaya asserts the ever-present relevance of Qutb's analysis of modern *jahilliyah* to understand the epistemic pollution created by a hybrid, eclectic conception of religion. The Qutbian emphasis on doctrinal purification resonates with Mawdudi who famously stated: "If I could secure one square mile of territory in which none other than God would reign supreme, I would value every speck of its dust more than the entirety of India."[68] Qutb's radical condemnation of imperialist efforts at distorting the Qur'anic message –as manifested in his renunciation of "American Islam"[69] promoted in the context of the Cold War to annex Muslims to the political agenda of the "Free World"- is still illuminating, according to Kaya, for Muslims who half a century later find themselves besieged by such projects as the Greater Middle East Project and its derivatives.[70]

In his *tabligh* presented at the 2001 Symposium on the Qur'anic Generation, Islamoğlu differentiates between *akl* (wisdom, intelligence) constructed by and upon revelation on the one hand, and the *akl* of *jahili* Mecca and modern West, on the other. Firstly, revelatory *akl* is defined as *tawhidi*, that is, it seeks to discover the existential interrelationships between everything that is created and God, as opposed to the reductionist reason which dissects rather than connects. In the *surat ar-Ra'd*, the Qur'an states: "And those who unite the bonds God has commanded to be joined, and stand in awe of their Lord and fearful of facing the most evil reckoning." (13.21) The bonds that are commanded to be generated, according to Islamoğlu, provide the coordinates of a pious *akl* in full conformity with the human *fitra* and the *hakika* (truth) and include the unification of God-man, life-afterlife, matter-spirit, soul-corpse, religion-world etc. Secondly, revelatory *akl* is bound to be *adil* (just). In lieu of the oppressive reason which dislocates matter and intervenes in its nature in a way which defies divine wisdom, the Qur'an regulates the human-matter, and human-human zone of interaction through the principle of justice. To illustrate this *wahyi* wisdom, Islamoğlu references the *surat al-Ma'un* which is composed of

two parts: the first three verses organize the man-man relationship on the basis of almsgiving, the second organizes man-God relationship on the basis of worship. The *sura* connects the thematic division through the conjunctive *fa* (and then) in Arabic, which Islamoğlu argues, points to the indivisible integrity of *deen* (religion) and *dunya* (world), of man's duties towards fellow men and those towards God, of help and prayer. Thirdly, the revelation constructs an emancipated/free and reliable *akl,* which has secured its independence from instincts, vices and desires through faith, juxtaposed against an enslaved and shadow *akl* under the reign of the ego. The following verse warns against those who have been enslaved by their fancies: "Do you ever consider him who has taken his lusts and fancies for his deity!" (45.23)[71] Kürşat Atalar, Islamist writer at *Iktibas* and discussant in the 2001 Symposium, objects to Islamoğlu's use of the words "özgür" (free) to qualify revelatory wisdom on the grounds that the definition is not Islamic. Özgürlük (freedom), as the Turkish translation of the Arabic word *hurriya*, corresponds etymologically to the "strengthening of the self/ego" which can be situated within the humanist philosophy, and not in the Islamic tradition.

Extrapolating from Qutb's account of the degeneration of Islamic perception and consciousness after the unique Qur'anic Generation, Islamoğlu describes a process wherein *wahy* (revelation) has been transformed from an agent constructive of life (subject) into a sacred object. First came the reduction of revelation to utterance and meaning by way of neglecting its macro component, i.e. its *maqsad* (purpose) which is the referee/arbiter for both utterance and meaning. Setting aside the purpose of revelation in exegetical efforts accordingly resulted in glossing over the constructivity-productivity of revelation. Then came the further reduction of revelation to simple utterance, wherein its interlocutors began to memorize/recite (*hatm*) the utterances of revelation, instead of reading it through a dialogical contemplation, and communicating with its *maqsad*. Concomitant with the equation of revelation with utterance, the Qur'an has been reduced to a manuscript bound between two boards (*mus'haf*). Instead of exalting its interlocutors, the Qur'an has begun to be exalted by them (whereas, as an already sublime entity, revelation only needed to be comprehended and lived). Contemporary implications of this historical break in modes of apprehending the Qur'an include the morphosis of the salvation project of revelation-as-subject (which is the building of a new society by changing individuals one by one) into an imaginary of personal salvation through objectified revelation. In a

world modeled to a large extent after the historical outcome of Western modernity, Islamoğlu asserts the accuracy of Qutb's *Fi Zilal al-Qur'an* in calling for the building of "a life centered on man, a man centered on faith, faith centered on knowledge, knowledge centered on truth (which is in turn centered on God)."[72] Türkmen echoes Islamoğlu in underlining the duty to exist as a *jamaat* which enjoins the right and forbids the wrong as the fundamental instance of *shahadat.* It is in reviving and reminding Muslims of this duty to re-build life in its entirety and resuscitate the unique Qur'anic Generation under the shadow of the Qur'an that Türkmen locates the essence of Qutb's teachings.[73] Concerning the primacy of the project of building the Qur'anic Generation as the foundation for the re-construction of the *umma*[74], the symposium reflects a consensus among the participants including predominant Muslim intellectuals such as Kürşat Atalar, Atasoy Müftüoğlu, Mehmet Pamak, Hamza Türkmen among others. As emphasized by Qutb in *Milestones*, what is to be done first is to disseminate an exegesis of praxis, a reading of the Qur'an with a practical orientation to live its maxims, which is the distinguishing mark of the first generation. In comparison, many among the panelists lament the fact that contemporary intellectual and academic circles oftentimes approach the Qur'an as a research field whereby gaining Qur'anic knowledge corresponds to the fulfillment of a professional requirement. For Mehmet Pamak, the first leg of Islamic struggle must be the targeting of the oppressive system of *shirk* (polytheism oftentimes used interchangeably with modern *jahiliyya*) while at the same time working to rectify (*islah*) the faith of the oppressed masses and to extricate them from the system of *shirk* towards which they must be endowed with an oppositional attitude. Antagonism must be structured as a disciplined, principled, sincere struggle of *islah* against "primarily the degeneration taking place at an intellectual, academic plane, through the production of reconciliatory, liberal ideas annexing Islam to modernity, which, in fact, only work to dilute the revivalist potential of Islam."[75]

> To be able to this, we must seek to disseminate a consciousness of jamaat and the totality of *iman* and *amel* (faith and deed) which will be brought about through putting *tawhid* into practice while working to arrest the process of individualization stimulated by modernity and postmodernity… We must insistently seek to socialize our authentic concepts and principles as an alternative to the impositions of modernity, and provide complete dissociation from, rather than accommodation with, modernism on every plane and platform…Islamic identity cannot be built upon the modern

paradigm (individualism, nationalism, democracy, market economy, relativist faith in the absence of absolute truths, rationalism, humanism etc). An identity predicated upon constituents of modern culture does not carry any meaning beyond the vesting of modern jahili identity with Islamic attire. Islamic identity can only be founded on our authentic/unique paradigm constituted of original references to the Qur'an and the example of the Prophet.[76]

In a similar vein with Türkmen, Pamak warns against the mistake of downplaying the primary struggle along the axis of *tawhid* and *shirk* for a conception of *da'wa* (cause) which remains restricted to the resolution of societal problems. Those who have committed that mistake, Pamak adds, have in due course skidded towards reconciliatory, democratic, even secular tracks while pursuing the fabrication and defense of projects which, using discourses of legal pluralism, multiculturalism and tolerance, address the question of peaceful co-existence with the "Other" within the social status quo.[77] His criticism here concerns those who (from within Muslim circles such as Ali Bulaç) have taken "a democratic pledge" to adapt the Compact of Medina for pluralist, multicultural projects of social co-existence among different constituencies, while resigning from the call to transform the society in all its registers. Another manifestation of that reformist logic intent on solving societal problems, for Pamak, has been the *Adil Düzen* (Just Order) project promoted by the Islamist Welfare Party in the 1990s, which "synthesized the normative benchmarks of global imperialism and modernity with Islamic motifs." Moreover, he also accuses the Islamic NGO, Mazlum-Der which he himself founded in 1991, for deviating in time into a "democratic human rights" struggle abstracted from the Qur'anic determination of concepts, references and guiding principles. Last but not the least, another mentioned example of doctrinal drift among Muslims committed to solve social ills caused by the *jahili* system is the Abant Councils[78] which have popularized "reconciliation based upon tolerance" as another version of projects of co-existence. These meetings, for Pamak, are venues opened up by the Gülenist Muslims in Turkey to undertake intellectual efforts which seek to accommodate the Qur'an with secularism and democracy.

A significant amount of Pamak's *tabligh* in the 2001 Symposium on the Qur'anic Generation revolves around the risks involved in "subduing Qur'anic knowledge to the yoke of academic specialization" which contributes to the process of drifting apart from the *practice* of *tawhidi*

shahadat (*vita activa* which consists of witnessing, embodying divine revelation).

> There have recently been an increase in the number of those who seek to impede the realization of a shared Qur'anic conception (as a common denominator) through claims of relativism concerning even the definite provisions of the Qur'an, and those who seek to hinder the Qur'an from intervening into the present by burying it in history through claims of scientificity such as historicism, and relativism…As an example, the "historicity of the Qur'an" could be cited as one of the distorting theories advanced for the purpose of diluting a Qur'anic conception which welcomes the every day intervention of the Book into contemporary society and history. Among the representatives of such theses used, supported, and sponsored by western imperialism, we can mention Fazlur Rahman, Hasan Hanafi, and Sayyid Hussein Nasr (he adds Rene Guenon and Mohammad Arkoun to the list of those orientalists who try to popularize such theses among Muslims).[79]

Paradoxically, for Ali Mirsepassi, scholar of Muslim political thought, these same contemporary Islamic thinkers such as Fazlur Rahman, and Sayyid Hussein Nasr represent a seismic epistemic rupture from the earlier "reformist apologetics" of Al-Afghani and Abduh. Mirsepassi sees these thinkers as inaugurating projects of "radical hermeneutics" in their engagement with the Islamic tradition of thought. Pamak, on the other hand, sees a new round of reformist apologetics in the modernist exegesis of contemporary scholars such as Rahman and Hanafi, which institutes an equivalence between Islamic jurisdiction and positive, secular law. He argues that previous emphasis on rationalist, positivist hermeneutics of the Qur'an is today being replaced with postmodern techniques of subjectifying (in the sense of rendering subjective, relativising) Qur'anic meaning.

From Islamic Ontology to Islamist Critical Theory?: Questioning the Hegemonic Discourses Which Justify the World[80]

In *Edgework*, Wendy Brown provides an illuminating discussion of the relationship between political time, timeliness and untimeliness on the one hand, and critique on the other. The sense of timeliness "as

temperateness about when, how and where one raises certain issues or mentions certain problems"[81] is of particular theoretical import for the purposes of this paper because such a reflection helps us contemplate on the ways in which discourses function in a specific relationship to the political time in which and against which they are operationalized. In the same vein, criticism, as a discourse endowed with a diagnostic and restorative quality, is uttered in a particular matrix of political time, claims of timeliness, and accusations of untimeliness. In the sense elaborated by Brown, critique is always untimely qua intemperate. In its particular articulation presented here, the "immanent critique" of "organic" Muslim intellectuals in Turkey which is rooted in an Islamic ethics of *shahadat* is primarily a critique of (de-politicized) temperateness, of a political time marked by temperateness in critique.

I argue in this section that disrupting the fixity of time, to borrow from Brown, opening fissures in an otherwise relatively temperate and conservative present despite charges of radicalism, extremity etc. brings this Muslim activist intellectual discourse closer to the philosophical territory of critical political theory. Un-settling prescriptions about and depictions of what constitute ideal political subjectivities in/and ideal political communities is what I see as the major theoretical implication of my informants' critical discourse, despite charges of (illiberal) radicalism. The risk of beholding critique (expressed by the collaborators/informants and myself) is to let the grand prescriptions, political imaginaries of our time, the postulate that liberal democracies founded on moderate political subjectivities make the good life possible, close in on us. Refraining from a discussion of whether the abovementioned statement is true, my aim is solely to let "local narratives and critique" interrupt a present that imagines itself as continuous and total. Against this background of the totality of liberal time, the critic is the one who dynamites the "present's overvaluation of itself", to borrow from Nietzsche,[82] the one who tears the totality of liberal time open. In one of its most powerful articulations, the critique for Nietzsche is "an arrow shot into the age randomly and without guaranteed effect."[83] Where critical theory meets the "dangerous insights" from Nietzsche, critique becomes the pursuit of alternative possibilities and perspectives in a seemingly closed political and epistemological universe; it becomes "a nonviolent mode of exploding the present."[84] At that same meeting point, critical theory also offers useful insights in highlighting certain aspects of the public discourse of Muslim activist intellectuals in Turkey.

Islamic civil society, as the field of an ethico-political (counter) hegemony in the Gramscian sense, is born out of and sustained by an open, diversified, creative and immanent intellectual and political will to forge a sphere of emancipation anchored to a critique of liberal-democratic modernity. Despite being grounded in different ontological terrains, Muslim activists' intellectual discourse shares with the critical theory tradition a similar thrust in providing a social-philosophical diagnosis of modern society and a concomitant critique of ideology. Akin to the historical-philosophical framework of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, the burgeoning intellectual products of Islamist political critique function as "a disclosing critique of society that attempts to change our value beliefs by evoking new ways of seeing."[85] Muslim activist intellectuals' attempt at instituting an idea of "good life" predicated upon Islamic ethics and a disavowal of modernist reason denotatively resonates with the tendency of the Frankfurt school to accept the predominance of instrumental reason over other forms of action and knowledge as the decisive "disorder" of modern societies. Moreover, extrapolating from the historical experience of the Frankfurt School, one could arrive at a broader conceptual understanding of "the idea of a critical theory." According to Geuss, critical theories aim at producing enlightenment in the agents who hold them (versus self-imposed coercion, self-delusion), are inherently emancipatory, have cognitive content (they are forms of knowledge), and are reflective (rather than objectifying such as theories in natural sciences).[86] Against this background, I frame this section broadly as a question, rather than an answer: to the extent that Muslim intellectuals' discourse presented here shares with critical theory the "aim at being the self-consciousness of a particular group of agents in a particular society in a process of successful emancipation",[87] can it be regarded as an immanent Islamist critical theory?

Criticizing the unquestioned internalization of the paradigms of western social scientific enterprise by some Islamist intellectuals trained in the disciplines of philosophy and sociology, Ismail Aksu maintains that Muslim intellectuals are required to undertake a profound questioning, a critical interrogation of western thought. This exercise of critical epistemological distancing should accordingly employ "their own standpoint, concepts and languages instead of the input from modern sociology or economics."[88] Here, I shall sketch the contours of an ongoing debate among Muslim activist intellectuals in Turkey regarding the conceptual infrastructure of a global liberal-democratic normativity.

In the account of Ismail Aksu, Islamist writer at *Dunya ve Islam Dergisi*, civil society, juxtaposed against political society, is understood "as the realm beyond the intervention of the state, of self-orienting/directing individuals", and for those who advocate this notion, it has come to refer to "the platform of democratic structures and democratic struggle." In the post-1980 conjuncture in Turkey, the term civil society has reached Islamist intellectual circles as a result of an anti-coup platform of dialogue with the leftist intelligentsia. For Aksu, such dialogue resulted in "a liberal drifting through the importation of certain elements of modern Judeo-Christian narratives (*Isra'iliyat*) to the Muslim segments of the society."[89] The sociologist Abdurrahman Arslan similarly maintains that "a civil society culture contains the premise/recognition of the relativity of all truth claims for the purpose of instituting a common ground of compromise, thereby denying acceptance to absolute truths…it is for this reason that a conception of 'good' and 'freedom' predicated upon 'civility', upon the recognition of the sovereignty of reason cannot be made compatible with values defined by the religion."[90] Arslan adds:

Vesting the civil culture with Islamic attire, propagated by the modernist imaginary under the banner of *cultural Islam*, amounts to mistaking an institution (civil society) for the *jamaat* and thus failing to transcend the drafting impetus of the supreme horizon of the metropole.[91]

Accordingly, civil society as the institutional milieu designed to restrain the governance and surveillance of the public sphere by political power, is founded and operates upon the conviction that the political/social community rendering the "good life" possible is a democratic state. Ergo, for Arslan, the *foreignness* of civil society to Islam, is essentially made up of its negligence/disregard for that dimension of daily life pertaining to *ghayb* (hidden, invisible/unknowable, impermeable to reason or feelings) and *reza* (consent, assent) of God as well as its divergence from the Prophet's example according to which social relations must be built on justice, rather than equality/equalization. In that sense, Islam, objecting to civility's conceptualization of man (*ensan*) as individual, rather envisages a *mu'min* (pious) subject in its place, and a *jamaat* in the place of society or civil society. For the *mu'min* and the *jamaat*, there is only one relevant milieu/institution; the mosque.[92]

Elsewhere, Arslan provides an illuminating account of civil society and Muslims' political predicament in the context of the postmodern present. He depicts postmodernity as marking the human quandary in late modernity with its nihilist culture divested of every certainty.[93] In contrast

to positivist, rationalist assumptions of linear progress associated with modernity, postmodernity reveals the emancipatory forces in fragmentation, indeterminacy, heterogeneity and diversity. From this vantage point, identity acquires a fluid dimension, perceived as a continuous process of formation marked with an impossibility of final fixation due to its own historicity. For Arslan, despite the clear epistemological rupture between modernity and postmodernity, both paradigms manifest themselves as emancipatory projects. While modernity claimed to emancipate man from the church through its logocentrism, postmodernity seeks to emancipate man from modernity and homogenization by decentring 'reason'.

> Classical liberal doctrine has promised to free man from the constraints of religion and tradition thanks to civic culture; today's neoliberal civic culture, however, promises emancipation from the repression of reason, science and state. Historically, what distinguishes these consequent manifestations of civic culture is the detachment of liberalism from its Enlightenment roots (in positivist epistemology) and the teleological transformation undergone by modern liberalism. Classical civic culture discussed the legitimacy of founding social norms such as "common good", while neoliberal civility reduced to absurdity all future projections about that social existence grounded in progress which we call society.[94]

The fragmentation endemic to the postmodern condition, according to Arslan, brings us in contact with two phenomena in social life: civil society and multiculturalism. Yesterday's monolithic social imaginary depended upon an understanding of society composed of classes engaged in a dialectical relationship which in turn sustained the interoperability and dynamism of the society. Today, Arslan maintains, this social imaginary is being replaced with a novel, fragmented, temporary, dis-organized (as a structural requirement) modality of human association (coming-together) which we call "civil society". A characteristic feature of this new mode of sociality is the absence of any substantive future design, projection or goal inscribed into it. This structural component of civil society, for Arslan, is today being discarded by Muslims who believe that they have successfully detached themselves from this foundational quality of civil society by deploying the latter for organizing around ideals they have prescribed to themselves. In the postmodern conception, Arslan adds, every belief and/ or idea which carries the objective of building its own future according to predetermined projections is delineated as totalitarian.

The principle of "fragmentation" which is assigned a foundational role by postmodernity radically revised the substantive meanings associated with the narratives, practices, and social relationships embedded in modernity. Among these, particularly important for Arslan is the postmodern representation of civil society, qualified with the participatory democratic ideal, as the antidote to all worldviews categorized totalitarian by virtue of falling outside the territory of neo-liberalism. What form of human solidarity and collectivity is contained in the idea of civil society, what sort of moral universe does civil society represent? For Arslan, civil society reflects the relativist, democratic foundation of a social structure, the ontological domain of which has assumed a fragmented condition, following the postmodern turn.

> It is for this reason that in postmodern culture, the term civil society expresses a modality of human solidarity which refuses to be fixed through foundationalist projections. In this modality of being-together, priority is accorded to the individual use of reason, downplaying "public reason" and accusing every political/social thought and order based on a holistic ideology, of being totalitarian. Therefore, the characteristic aspect of civil society is not solely its foundation in voluntarism but also its dimension of temporariness/ephemerality…as a platform for ends-oriented voluntary coming-together of people (until the ends sought are obtained), civil society is a state of social "ebb and flow" (*med-cezir*).[95]

Arslan's commentaries on the postmodern character of civil society provide illuminating insights into our political present. In an eloquent philosophical discussion of the "neo-liberal civic culture" of postmodern politics, he underlines the ontological and moral infrastructure of such founding concepts of contemporary politics as civil society. Present liberal enthusiasm around the term oftentimes inhibit creative and radical philosophical theses on civil society: it is in that context that Arslan's ontological reading of the civic culture of postmodernity offers a critical angle. Arslan describes civil society today as representing the new participatory, democratic possibility of postmodern politics, constituting the social (*toplumsal*) ontology of democracy. In this vein, concomitant with postmodernity, "contemporary democracy is evolving away from an 'absolutist-secular' property into a relativist ontology which we can call 'neo-secular'."[96]

What are the risks involved for Muslims getting drawn into networks of civil society? Arslan answers this question in the following manner: when a concept which has a foundational property is transplanted into the intellectual imagination (*muhayyila*) of another worldview, it does not always go through a loss of meaning and context as posited by some Islamist intellectuals. Moreover, semantic intervention is not a solution either; at times, it is possible for the alien concept to create a semantic and contextual rupture on an intellectual plane within the worldview to which it is annexed. Arslan is aware of the increasing appeal of the idea of civil society for Muslims who seek public expression within the institutional context of civil society. He points out that civil society today endows Muslims with practical opportunities which guarantee their presence in the public sphere, as the concrete condition of possibility of a Muslim identity. Nevertheless, he warns against the intellectual transformation concomitant with Muslims' "instrumentalist" use of the communicative sphere of civil society. His *tabligh*, in that respect, calls for a critical rethinking of the kinds of social "forms", outside the ones proposed by the modern world, "in which Muslims shall carry to the future solidarity venues, personal lives, and upcoming generations."[97]

In its classical definition in the West, civility expresses a social structure autonomous from the sphere of influence of the cleric, the feudal prince or the absolutist political order; more importantly, it refers to a mode of thought and reasoning sublimated from religion. The question then arises: is it possible to consider "civil" a mode of thought predicated upon Islam, and a *jamaat* built on religious foundations part of "civil society"? Arslan addresses the question of equivalence by proposing to analyze these social entities on the basis of the ontologies upon which they are constructed. What sorts of a priori projections regarding man does civil society presuppose or envision? Arslan begins his response by underlining the two-fold imaginary concerning man in the western tradition of thought: the "theological" definition which originated in the Judeo-Christian tradition, and the "rationalist" definition rooted in the ancient tradition of thought. The "individual" is the human model predicated upon the rationalist paradigm, idealized by secular Enlightenment as an isolated moral geometer. As such, Arslan defines the individual "the man who promulgates his own laws, and who achieved complete autonomy from god, nature and society." In contrast, the subject juxtaposed to the state, in the Islamic thought, is the j*amaat* which precedes the individual. For this reason, in opposition to the modern conception, Islam primarily seeks

to organize the collectivity of *mu'min* (the pious), rather than the state. As a counterpart to "the individual" which composes the smallest unit of modern society, *jamaat* denotes the smallest unit of human association or collectivity. Civil society, on the other hand, enunciates a social existence which contains the emancipation from *jamaat*-based social relationships. In the current conjuncture, civic culture compels Muslims to engage in unfruitful comparisons between civil and Islamic values, between the call for being a citizen and for being a *mu'min*.

For Arslan, civil society takes the meaning of "transparent society" in postmodern philosophy founded on the principle of social fragmentation. Transparent society refers to a society in a constant state of hysteria of deliberation/discussion of its shared problems, in the acknowledged absence of an exogenous (and homogenous) source of social reference. It is for this reason that today, for Arslan, being the democratic citizen of contemporary postmodern civil society refers to being the unique representative of an idiosyncratic lifeworld, independent from a "common good". Accordingly, the actual addressee of our neoliberal civic culture is the desires of the individual, the satisfaction and emancipation of which relies on the relativisation of the general will.

> The emancipation of individual desires is encapsulated as an end in the idea of civil society which allows the individual-qua-citizen to pursue socialization and emancipation from within his own world (as opposed to a totalizing worldview and lifestyle). This should not lead anyone to conclude that neoliberal civic culture is not in a relationship of vital dependence on religion to revise and repair its content. Cognizant of the capacity of religion in providing novel possibilities for civil politics, neoliberal civility benefits from religion only by filtering it through its relativising rationale.[98] Islam, however, is a religion which totalizes, not thought, life or human practice, but the common good.[99]

Concerning the conjunctural relationship of postmodernity to religion, Arslan maintains that postmodernity on the one hand generates the illusion of freeing "religious life" by ruling out obstacles rooted in modernity, and on the other hand, simultaneously denies religion the possibility of establishing an ontological field sui generis. In other words, the political culture of neoliberalism provides the "opportunity structures" for Muslims to build a milieu of criticism with the dissolution of the staunch norms and rules of laïcité. Founded on (the foundation-less ground of) fragmentation,

postmodernity, at the same time, disrupts the status of religion as a source of reference in human imagination and life. Arslan draws upon the example of compassion to illustrate this point: neoliberalism accordingly deprives Muslim politics of the element of compassion (*merhamet*) by transforming it from a *political* to a *personal* event/matter. By diluting the essentiality of compassion to social morality, it renders meaningless the public inspection/governance of deed (*amel*), and facilitates the transparency of the civilized Muslim imaginary. Not restricted to economic matters, neoliberal culture disseminates in the realm of governance a politics of cruelty paradoxically implemented under the banner of freedom. The reflection of this novel mentality among the civil society actors, for Arslan, is the reduction of compassion, abstracted from politics and economics, to charity in the social universe of capitalist relationships. In a revealing portrayal of the preponderance of charity efforts in Islamic civil society, he ironically states: "Like the white man's safari, the good-hearted Muslim is sent to chase poverty in Africa."

As to the concept of pluralism, Ismail Aksu describes the term as "another Judeo-Christian virus infecting Islamist intellectual circles" as a result of the "growing realization of the need to dispense with the revolutionary attitude and to accept the existence of the myriad segments composing society."[100] The pluralism debates among some Islamist intellectuals, according to Aksu, contain such apologetic arguments as "the best democracy is Islamic democracy", "the greatest pluralism is in Islam" which oftentimes draw upon the Compact of Medina as a historical repository of an Islamic pluralism. On the contrary, Aksu states, "the Muslims, the radicals, prioritize politics" and "stand in no need to take lectures of pluralist tolerance from the West and its liberal appendixes, nor do they benefit from debates of 'real pluralism is in Islam' sort."[101] In a similar vein, tolerance is deemed a Western invention resulting from a religious and historical experience that belongs 'essentially to the West'. For Arslan, the concept of tolerance relies upon a particular conception of alterity in the "modern democratic tradition which, by virtue of its Cartesian nature, is still not wholly open to the 'other', except in offering the option of either assimilation or elimination."[102] The "other" in Islam, on the other hand, is not an absolute other since it is also the witness (*shahid*) of the subject in the other world. Thus, the relationship between the self and the other in the Islamic tradition is marked by this transcendental condition of mutual *shahadat*. From the standpoint of Muslim activist intellectuals in Turkey, other Islamists' embrace of liberal pluralism,

post-modernism, and civil society appear to reflect a de-politicizing tendency in the sense of taking the critical edge away from the Islamist struggle otherwise responsible for critically inquiring into the agendas and paradigms disseminated by the global system. Accordingly, a Muslim intellectual cannot afford to remain outside the sphere of the political by virtue of the incontestably political nature of the project of transforming the society which, as Muslims, they cannot refrain from.

Against the background of a perceived siege of the Islamist struggle by global paradigms and concepts, Abdurrahman Arslan defines Islamism primarily as an *episteme*, a modality of knowledge-production enmeshed in a "*tabligh* to re-discover the authentic meaning of Islam to the same extent that it constitutes a response to the threat of modernity and to the liberal world order deprived of justice and morality."[103] In the current era, he asserts that it is becoming increasingly noticeable that "although we thought we were engaged in a profound interrogation of the values of the modern period, we were still thinking through concepts the substantive meanings of which were sutured by modernity." Indeed, he denotes as "raced" or "contender/competitor" (*yarıştırılan*) Islam, the struggle through the modus operandi of the opponent, under the circumstances and on the grounds chosen and defined by the opponent. The reformist line of heritage in Islamic political thought, according to Arslan, subjects the "substance" to perpetual re-definition such that "While yesterday there was civilization, science, liberty and republic in Islam; there is today democracy, women's rights, profit, consumption, fashion, and no wonder, civil society."[104] The "raced Islam", as the critical discourse produced from within the context of modernity, constitutes a dependent opposition deprived of an emancipatory momentum against powers outside of Islam.

In response to Arslan's use of "emancipation" in his *tabligh*, Yildiz Ramazanoglu argues that the concept of emancipation, presently equated with democratization, does not correspond to an Islamic understanding of liberty. She proposes, as an alternative to the liberal conception carrying an earthly and material emphasis, a definition of emancipation which refers to "the struggle to internally evade the siege of our appetites and desires (*heva* and *havas*) and externally evade all forms of siege claiming to tie us to a particular temporality/age."[105] Understood in this fashion, emancipation corresponds to a process of attaining ontological indifference from the self and the dictates of the temporality one inhabits. Concerning emancipation, Türkmen maintains that the concepts and instruments of the global system besieging us could be seen as an opportunity to break out of

the epistemic siege. The institutions of the *jahili* system such as journals, associations, foundations could indeed be occasionally and expediently used as is done by Ikhwan-i Muslimin, Jamaat-i Islami, Hezbollah, Hamas and Nahda. The crucial difference lies in the use versus internalization of the instruments: in other words, "concepts such as human rights and democracy did not emerge within the Islamic culture, yet profiting from the possibilities opened up by their use within the global prison should not amount to according them legitimacy on ontological and epistemological grounds."[106] Despite minor divergences among Muslim activist intellectuals' approach to the "use of *jahili* media" in Islamist struggle, there is an unwavering accord between their articulations of an effective response to global siege: the re-vivification of the exemplary Qur'anic Generation as the foundation of a global counter-alternative.

Conclusion: Qur'anic Generation and Post-Liberal Subjectivities

In the *surah al-Maidah*, the Qur'an mentions the story of Adam's two sons, Habil and Qabil, to describe the evil consequences of envy, and injustice: Qabil fights and kills Habil out of envy for the bounty God provided Habil with, and because Habil's sincere sacrifice was accepted by God.

> So the *Nafs* (self) of the other encouraged him and made fair-seeming to him the murder of his brother; he murdered him and became one of the losers. (5: 30)

The murdered brother earns divine forgiveness and is admitted to the paradise while the murderer suffers evil consequences in both lives.

> O Muhammad recite to them the story of the two sons of Adam [Habil (Abel) and Qabil (Cain)] in truth; when each offered a sacrifice (to Allah), it was accepted from the one but not from the other. The latter said to the former: "I will surely kill you." The former said: "Verily, Allah accepts only from those who are *Al-Muttaqun* (the pious, those who fear Allah). (5:27)

Habil, out of *taqwa* (fear of God) and piety, tells his brother who threatened to kill him without justification: "If you do stretch your hand against me to kill me, I shall never stretch my hand against you to kill you, for I fear Allah, the Lord of all that exists. (5:28)

In his "Marginal Notes on Liberalism", Bahadır Kurbanoğlu, the editor of Ekin publishing, argues that totalitarianism does not recede in social structures composed of individuals who submit to the authority of their *nafs* (ego). Drawing upon the Habil-Qabil story in the last revelation which outlines the attributes of the human *fitra* and differentiates between those which need to be encouraged versus those in need of discipline, Kurbanoğlu argues that liberalism sanctions the properties of Kabil. Personal gain, inclination towards pleasure and happiness, aversion to pain etc. are placed at the foundation of the moral equipment of the individual as the prominent features of human nature. In the process, certain attributes of Habil such as *isar* (altruism) and *ihsan* (engaging in good deeds with others without expectations of reciprocity) have faced oblivion and extinction, if not considered as obstacles to the individual's self-realization and freedom. In his own words:

> As the strongest sect of the religion of rationality, liberalism is founded on the de-linking of man from all its surrounding bonds...Even though rationalism tries to invade the field emptied with the expulsion of religion from "life", this endeavor itself is no different than what previous religions have hitherto undertaken. The clergy of this religion believe they are moving forward, following the myth of progress, in the direction of the truest, the best, the rightest, and in doing this, present a new metaphysical orientation to humanity. Humanity has thus been exposed to the *tabligh* of a religion which is progressive and rationalist in its approach to man, history, and future, its definition and production of knowledge, and its conception of morality.[107]

Revealing the theology inherent in liberal cosmology accomplishes a useful, strategic goal in "bracketing" its natural teleology, and in "provincializing" the liberal tradition by unveiling its own metaphysics. By dethroning liberalism from its a-temporal position and subjecting its ontology to Islamic criticism, Muslim activist intellectuals in Turkey examined here, open up a space for alternative, post-liberal articulations of subjectivity in late modernity. To illustrate one such articulation, Muslim activist intellectuals have incorporated the Qutbian utopia of resurrecting the Qur'anic Generation into their revivalist discourse. As such, the Qur'anic Generation points to the ontological foundation of contemporary intellectual efforts which appropriate the Islamic identity as a "basis of resistance and a conscious existence through resistance to the processes of hybridization, identitarian eclecticism and postmodern pluralism."[108]

In that sense, the Qur'anic Generation principally represents, for the activists, an attempt at the purification and authentication of the Islamic identity deemed under risk of erosion by syncretistic and compromising attitudes and practices as well as "modern diversions" through affiliation with laicism, nationalism, and democracy. For scholars, it is an invitation to think local narratives, texts and practices in the terms of their practitioners, and from within the traditions of thought in which they are immersed.

Saba Mahmood aptly notes that the question of politics can most adequately be addressed at the level of the architecture of the self.[109] Extrapolating from this, I proposed in this paper to look at Qur'anic Generation –the focal utopia around which intellectuals' efforts revolve- as a matrix of texts and practices through which an Islamic collective agency is conceptualized, articulated and reproduced in the faced of a pervasive universal will to moderate and de-politicize piety. This Islamist intellectual endeavor is forged by modern technologies for the propagation of a pious political self (a *shahid* or a *mu'min*) in a conscious effort to contest the universal telos of liberal democratic subjectivity and to transcend the terms of the liberal discourse on political agency and its concomitant ethic of moderation. Seen under that light, Muslim intellectuals evoke Foucault's "plebs" in the sense of representing "the underside of power relations, a centrifugal movement, an inverse energy resisting every new advance of power"[110] or Badiou's "reinvention of militant politics", with either term, signalling the opening up of a space of the political as a space of counter-Discourse, a space founding both a *mu'min* and a *jamaat*.

NOTES

[1]   Wendy Brown, *Edgework: Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 16.

[2]   Sayyid Qutb, *Dirasat Islamiyyah* [Islamic Studies], cited in Lamia Rustum Shehadeh ed., *The Idea of Women Under Fundamentalist Islam* (University Press of Florida, 2003).

[3]   Mehmet Pamak, "Kur'an Nesli Insasi, Toplum ve Sorunlarimiz" (The Building of the Qur'anic Generation, Society, and Problems We Face) in *Kur'an Neslini Insa Sorumlulugu: Sempozyum* (the edited collection of the paper presentations in the 2001 Symposium to commemorate the 35th anniversary of Sayyid Qutb's martyrdom, organized by the Islamist NGO, Özgür-Der), (Istanbul: Ekin Yayinlari, 2009), p. 122.

[4]   John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, *Islam and Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 11.

[5]   See Talal Asad, "The Limits of Religious Criticism in the Middle East" in *Genealogies of Religion. Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); Charles Hirschkind, *The Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic Counterpublics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006); Saba Mahmood, *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005) among others.

[6]   Brian Silverstein, "Islam and Modernity in Turkey: Power, Tradition, and Historicity in the European Provinces of the Muslim World", *Anthropological Quarterly* 76 (3): 497-517; Brian Silverstein, *Islam and Modernity in Turkey* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Michael Meeker, *A Nation of Empire: The Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity* (Berkeley: University of Califronia Press, 2002); Serif Mardin, *Religion, Society, and Modernity in Turkey* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006).

[7]   For examples of the "Alternative/Multiple Modernities" literature which, in the case of Turkey, highlights the emergence of an "Islamic modernity", see Nilüfer Göle, "Snapshots of Islamic Modernities", *Daedalus*, Vol. 129, No. 1 (Winter 2000): 91-117; Kimberly Hart, "Performing Piety and Islamic Modernity in a Turkish Village", *Ethnology*, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Fall 2007): 289-304; E. Fuat Keyman and Berrin Koyuncu, "Globalization, Alternative Modernities and the Political Economy of Turkey", *Review of International Political Economy*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (February 2005): 105-128; Masoud Kamali, *Multiple Modernities, Civil Society and Islam: The Case of Iran and Turkey* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2006); Ibrahim Kaya, *Social Theory and Later Modernities: The Turkish Experience* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2004).

[8]   Among scholarly analyses of the AK Party's experience with democracy and neo-liberalism, see Hakan M. Yavuz, *The Emergence of a New Turkey:*

Democracy and the AK Parti (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006); William Hale and Ergun Ozbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP* (New York: Routledge, 2010); Berna Turam, *Between Islam and the State: The Politics of Engagement* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007); Yildiz Atasoy, *Turkey, Islamists and Democracy: Transition and Globalization in a Muslim State* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005); Yildiz Atasoy, *Islam's Marriage with Neoliberalism: State Transformation in Turkey* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Cihan Tugal, *Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009); R. Quinn Mecham, "From the Ashes of Virtue, A Promise of Light: The Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2004): 339-358.

[9]   Studies of the Gülen movement and its liberal Islam model include Hakan M. Yavuz and John L. Esposito, *Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gülen Movement* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2003); Hakan M. Yavuz, "Towards an Islamic Liberalism?: The Nurcu Movement and Fethullah Gülen", *Middle East Journal,* Vol. 53, No. 4 (Autumn 1999): 584-605; Hakan M. Yavuz and John L. Esposito eds., *Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Global Impact of Fethullah Gülen Nur Movement* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2003); Berna Turam, *Between Islam and the State: The Politics of Engagement* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007); Helen Rose Ebaugh, *The Gülen Movement: A Sociological Analysis of a Civic Movement Rooted in Moderate Islam* (London: Springer, 2010); John Esposito And Ihsan Yilmaz eds., *Islam and Peacebuilding: Gülen Movement Initiatives* (New York, NY: Blue Dome Press, 2010).

[10]   Brian Silverstein, "Disciplines of Presence in Modern Turkey: Discourse, Companionship, and the Mass Mediation of Islamic Practice", *Cultural Anthropology* Vol. 23, No. 1 (February, 2008): 118-153; Hakan M. Yavuz, "The Matrix of Modern Turkish Islamic Movements: The Naqshbandi Sufi Order", in *Naqshbandis in Western and Central Asia*, ed. Elizabeth Ozdalga (Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute, 1999); Catharina Raudvere, *The Book and the Roses: Sufi Women, Visibility, and Zikir in Contemporary Istanbul* (Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute, 2003); Kimberly Hart, "The Orthodoxization of Ritual Practice in Western Anatolia", *American Ethnologist*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (November 2009): 735-749. For similar ethnographic analyses of British Sufi publics, see Pnina Werbner, "Stamping the Earth with the Name of Allah: Zikr and the Sacralizing of Space among British Muslims", *Cultural Anthropology*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (August 1996): 309-338; Tayfun Atay, *A Muslim Mystic Community in Britain: Meaning in the West and for the West*, Studies in Comparative Social Pedagogies and International Social Work and Social Policy, Vol. XVII (Bremen, Germany: EHV, 2012). For the history of the Naqshbandi order in Turkey and the Ottoman Empire, see Serif Mardin, "The Naqshbandi Order in Turkish

History" in *Religion in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State*, ed. Richard Tapper (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991); Dina LeGall, *A Culture of Sufism: Naqshbandis in the Ottoman world, 1450-1700* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005).

11 In addition to the seminal works on Islamic political thought such as Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939* (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1983); *Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), there have been a recent growth in the scholarly literature on contemporary Islamic political thought and intellectual discourses, including Michaelle Browers, *Democracy and Civil Society in Arab Political Thought: Transcultural Possibilities* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2006); Elizabeth Suzanne Kassab, *Contemporary Arab Thought: Cultural Critique in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); Sena Karasipahi, *Muslims in Modern Turkey: Kemalism, Modernism, and the Revolt of the Islamic Intellectuals* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009); Ali Mirsepassi, *Political Islam, Iran, and the Enlightenment: Philosophies of Hope and Despair* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Carool Kersten, *Cosmopolitans and Heretics: New Muslim Intellectuals and the Study of Islam* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011) among others.

12 Jeremy Jennings and Tony Kemp-Welch, "The Century of the Intellectual: From the Dreyfus Affair to Salman Rushdie", in Jennings and Kemp-Welch eds., *Intellectuals in Politics: From the Dreyfus Affair to Salman Rushdie* (New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 7.

13 George Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi, *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, trans. Andrew Arato and Richard E. Allen (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc., 1979), p. 30.

14 The whole text of Said's Reith Lectures can be found in the *Independent*, 24 June, 1, 8, 15, 22, 29 July 1993.

15 Julien Benda, *The Treason of the Intellectuals*, trans. Richard Aldington (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 8.

16 C. Wright Mills, *The Politics of Truth: Selected Writings of C. Wright Mills*, introduced by John H. Summers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 19.

17 Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, eds. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 2005), p. 9.

18 Antonio Gramsci (2005), p. 5.

19 Richard Bellamy (1997), p. 35.

20 Edward Said, the Reith Lectures, "Intellectual Exile: Expatriates and Marginals, What is the Proper Role of the Intellectual in Today's World?". This third lecture of the series is available online at http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/the-reith-lectures.html.

[21] Among the most illustrating examples of this literature, one finds Russell Jacoby, *The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in the Age of Innocence* (New York: Basic Books 1987); Regis Debray, *Teachers, Writers, Celebrities: The Intellectuals of Modern France* (London: Verso, 1981).

[22] Russell Jacoby (1987), p. 17-19.

[23] See Bruce Robbins ed*., Intellectuals: Aesthetics, Politics, Academics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990) and *Secular Vocations: Intellectuals, Professionalism, Culture* (London and New York: Verso, 1993).

[24] Michael Walzer, *Company of Critics: Social Criticism and Political Commitment in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), p. 42.

[25] Michael Walzer, *Interpretation and Social Criticism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 32.

[26] Michael Walzer, "Maximalism and the Social Critic" in *Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), p. 42-43.

[27] Richard Bellamy, "The Intellectual as Social Critic: Antonio Gramsci and Michael Walzer", in Jeremy Jennings and Anthony Kemp-Welch eds., *Intellectuals in Politics: From the Dreyfus Affair to Salman Rushdie* (New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 26.

[28] Michael Meeker, "The New Muslim Intellectuals in the Republic of Turkey", in R. Tapper (ed.), Islam *in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State* (London: I. B.Tauris, 1994), p.196. Other examples of the social scientific literature on "Muslim intellectuals" in Turkey in the 1990s are, Haldun Gulalp, "Globalizing Postmodernism: Islamist and Western Social Theory", *Economy and Society*, Vol. 26, No.3, 1997, pp. 419-433; Ayse Gunes-Ayata, "Islamism versus Authoritarianism: Political Ideas in Two Islamic Publications", in R. Tapper (ed.), *Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State* (London: I. B.Tauris, 1994), pp. 254-279; Binnaz Toprak, "Islamist Intellectuals: Revolt against Industry and Technology" in M. Heper, A. Oncu and H. Kramer (eds.), *Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993); Nilufer Gole, "Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter-Elites", *Middle East Journal*, Vol.51, No.1 (Winter 1997), pp.53-54; Binnaz Toprak, "Islamist Intellectuals of the 1980s in Turkey",*Current Turkish Thought*, No. 62, (Spring 1987), pp. 2-19.

[29] Ihsan Dagi, "Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy, and the West: Post-Islamist Intellectuals in Turkey", *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies* (Summer 2004), 13(2), pp. 135-151; p. 136.

[30] Sena Karasipahi, *Muslims in Modern Turkey: Kemalism, Modernism, and the Revolt of the Islamic Intellectuals* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), p. 2.

[31] Gertrude Himmelfarb, *The Roads to Modernity: the British, French and American Enlightenments* (New York: Knopf, 2004), p. 33.

32   Martin Luther King, Jr., *A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings and Speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr.* (New York: HarperOne, 1990), p. 38.

33   Ali Mirsepassi, *Political Islam, Iran, and The Enlightenment: Philosophies of Hope and Despair* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 149.

34   Hamza Türkmen, "Dergi Okumadan Yeterli bir Diyalog ve Gelisim Imkani Olur mu?" *Haksöz,* Sayi: 220 (Temmuz 2009): 18-24, p. 19.

35   Macide Göç Türkmen, "Cok Partili Sisteme Gecerken Islamci Dergiler-3" *Haksöz*, Sayi: 28 (Temmuz 1993): 23-27, p. 25.

36   Ibid., p. 26.

37   Interview with Hamza Türkmen, November 18, 2009, Istanbul (Findikzade).

38   Interview with Bahadir Kurbanoğlu, August 21, 2009, Istanbul (Fatih).

39   Hamza Er, "Dergilerin Etkisi Hareketin Gucuyle Orantilidir", *Haksöz*, Sayi 223 (Ekim 2009): 16-21, p. 18.

40   Hamza Türkmen, "Dergi Okumadan Yeterli bir Diyalog ve Gelisim Imkani Olur mu?" *Haksöz,* Sayi: 220 (Temmuz 2009): 18-24, p. 22.

41   Ibid., p. 23.

42   *Islami Mucadelede Oncu Sahsiyetler*, (Pioneering Figures of the Islamic Struggle) Haksoz Okulu Serisi-1 (Istanbul: Ekin Yayinlari, 2009), p. 6.

43   Interview with Bahadır Kurbanoğlu, October 13, 2009, Istanbul (Fatih). Islah, ihya and tajdid (reform, revival, and renovation) refer to the building blocks of the Islamic tradition of thought, and has been understood by Muslim intellectuals as the shared doctrinal essence of tawhidi Islamist struggle, in the past and the present.

44   Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

45   This opening of a space, for Jean-Luc Nancy, takes place in an ontological plane. In that respect, it is different from the public sphere understood in the ontic sense. For Nancy, the political primarily consists in the opening of a space by freedom. This ontological opening is the condition of possibility of the ontic public sphere. For details, see Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Experience of Freedom*, trans. Bridget McDonald (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 78.

46   Alain Badiou, *Metapolitics*, trans. Jason Barker (London: Verso, 2005), p. 20.

47   Soon after its publication, Milestones was on trial under Article 163 of Turkish Penal Code which penalized *irtica* (political reactionism). The copies of the book were seized by the authorities, and the translator Abdulkadir Şener received a prison sentence.

48   Fi Zilal al-Quran (in the shadow of the Qur'an) was written in the period between 1951 and 1965 by Sayyid Qutb. It contains a comprehensive exegesis and textual commentary (*tafsir*) of the 114 surahs of the Qur'an.

49   Hamza Türkmen, "Seyyid Kutub'un Mesajini Anlamak ve Gelistirebilmek" (Understanding and Developing the Message of Sayyid Qutb), in *Islami Mucadelede Oncu Sahsiyetler* (Istanbul: Ekin Yayinlari, 2009), p. 239.

50   Qutb's work presents one of the first scholarly contributions to a novel understanding of the term "jahiliyyah" which was first used and defined by the Prophet with reference to his experience in Mecca. Traditionally, the term refers to the pre-Islamic era of the pagan ignorance of God. Qutb, as well as Mawdudi, used the concept to refer to everything (land, ideas, persons, institutions) in the world that was un-Islamic or impurely Islamic. "When we speak of a *jahili* society, we are not referring to conditions that might have prevailed during a particular period of history. *Jahili* is every society in which humans are subjugated by others", writes Qutb in, Sayyid Qutb, *In the Shade of the Qur'an*, (18 Vol) trans. Adil Salahi and A. Shamis (Leicester, UK: The Islamic Foundation, 2002-9) Vol. III, 5. With this definition of jahilliyah, Türkmen argues that Qutb criticized the strategic goals of the Ikhwan-i Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood) and proposed an alternative line of struggle, a program of action, and education based on the primacy of a revolution of minds over the struggle for political power. For Qutb, the revelatory belief in "La Ilaha Illallah" preceded in importance both the evaluation of organizational details and the construction of an Islamic community.

51   Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones*, trans. S. Badrul Hasan (Karachi, Pakistan: International Islamic Publishers, 1981), p. 47.

52   Ibid., p. 44-49.

53   Ibid., p. 56.

54   Ibid., p. 60.

55   Ibid., p. 51.

56   Hamza Türkmen, "Seyyid Kutub'un Mesajini Anlamak ve Gelistirebilmek" (Understanding and Developing the Message of Sayyid Qutb), in *Islami Mucadelede Oncu Sahsiyetler* (Istanbul: Ekin Yayinlari, 2009), p. 248.

57   Andrew F. March, "Taking People as They Are: Islam as a 'Realistic Utopia' in the Political Theory of Sayyid Qutb", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 104, No. 1 (February 2010), p. 193.

58   Roxanne Euben, "Comparative Political Theory: An Islamic Fundamentalist Critique of Rationalism", *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 59, No. 1 (February 1997): 28-55, p. 46.

59   Rıdvan Kaya, "Seyyid Kutub ve Mucadele Ornekligi", in *Islami Mucadelede Oncu Sahsiyetler* (Istanbul: Ekin Yayinlari, 2009), p. 264.

60   Roxanne Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 191.

61   Sayyid Qutb, *Social Justice in Islam*, trans. John B. Hardie and Hamid Algar (Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International), p. 215.

62 The author mentions western exegeses of Qutb among which he cites "the young orientalist" Roxanne L. Euben's analysis of Qutb's anti-modernist discourse as integral to the broader trend of romantic reaction to the Enlightenment, and laments the relative lack of understanding of Qutb's message among Turkey's Muslims, in comparison to such western scholars as Euben.

63 Ali Bulaç, "Teror ve Islami Hareketin Seyri", *Zaman*, November 15, 2001.

64 The word literally means the custom or the way of God. The Book states the term in the context of the unchanging universal laws of divine origin which men have to observe.

65 Mustafa Islamoğlu, "Kur'an Algisinda Tarihi Kirilma" (Historical Rupture in Qur'anic Understanding), in *Kur'an Neslini Insa Sorumlulugu: Sempozyum* (Istanbul: Ekin Yayinlari, 2001), p. 15-33.

66 The constructive work of revelation can be understood as unfolding on four fields: the construction of *tasavvur* (thinking) through the revelation's re-definition of concepts and terms upon which human understanding is built, such as *akbar-asgar* (big-small), *maruf-munkar* (good-bad), *hasanat-sayyiat* (virtues-vices), *fawz-husran* (gain-loss), *a'la-adna* (worthy-valueless), *ilm-jahl* (knowledge-ignorance), *karib-ba'id* (near-far); the construction of *akl* (wisdom) through the provisions and statements included in the revelation such as "Let there be no hostility, except to those who practice oppression" (2.193), "God has prescribed mercy for Himself" (6.12), "Does man think that he will be left aimless" (75.36); the construction of *shahsiya* (personality) through the revelation's description of exemplary personalities such as the prophets; the construction of *hayat* (life) via a holistic reading and profound contemplation of the spirit and purpose of the revelation. Islamoğlu maintains that the first Generation, who has comprehended the purpose of revelation as a constructive agent, has gone through all the four stages described above.

67 Rıdvan Kaya, "Seyyid Kutub ve Mucadele Ornekligi" (Sayyid Qutb and His Exemplary Struggle), in *Islami Mucadelede Oncu Sahsiyetler* (Istanbul: Ekin Yayinlari, 2009), p. 267.

68 Quote taken from Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: the Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994), p. 107.

69 Sayyid Qutb, "Islam Amrikani", *al-Risala*, no. 991(1952), 713-15. Railing at the instrumentalist use of Islam, Qutb noted in 1952: "The Islam that America and its allies desire in the Middle East does not resist colonialism and tyranny, but rather resists Communism only. They do not want Islam to govern and cannot abide it to rule because when Islam governs it will raise a different breed of humans and will teach people that it is their duty to develop their power and expel the colonialists". The historian John Calvert maintains that Qutb sees "an agenda of depoliticization of a holistic religion" at the heart of what he defined as American Islam: "Like the expressions of

Christianity Qutb witnessed during his stay in the United States, 'American Islam' emphasized piety and ritual at the expense of social and political activism." For more details on Qutb's "Islam Amrikani", see John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), p. 166-7.

70   Rıdvan Kaya (2009), p. 269.

71   This translated passage is from Mustafa Islamoğlu, "Kur'an Algisinda Tarihi Kirilma: Hayati Insa Eden Oznesen Kutsal Nesneye", (Historical Break in Perceptions of Qur'an: From the Life-Constructing Subject to Sacred Object) in *Kur'an Neslini Insa Sorumlulugu: Sempozyum* (Istanbul: Ekin Yayinlari, 2001), p. 23-25.

72   Ibid., p. 31.

73   Hamza Türkmen, "Kur'an Nesli ve Tarih Perspektifi" (The Qur'anic Generation and Perspective on History) in *Kur'an Neslinin Insa Sorumlulugu: Sempozyum* (Istanbul: Ekin Yayinlari, 2001), p. 34.

74   The Qur'anic Generation project, for Türkmen, precedes in importance every other socio-political project addressing the economy, education, charity, or objectives including capturing political power, founding a state, civil society building, national reconciliation, formation of international pacts, joining transnational alliances etc. Prioritizing such goals and projects, accordingly, amounts to contemplating the interior design of a building which does not yet have a base.

75   Mehmet Pamak, "Kur'an Nesli Insasi, Toplum ve Sorunlarimiz" (The Building of the Qur'anic Generation, Society and Problems We Face), in *Kur'an Neslinin Insa Sorumlulugu: Sempozyum* (Istanbul: Ekin Yayinlari, 2001), p. 94.

76   Ibid., p. 95.

77   Ibid., p. 111.

78   Organized by the Abant Platform, Abant Councils refer to the regular panel and roundtable discussions first held in Lake Abant in the city of Bolu. The honorary president of the think tank sponsoring the Councils, the Abant Platform, is Fethullah Gülen. Pamak's critical reference to the "Abant Councils" for that reason implies a broader criticism targeting the Gülen community and its modernist hermeneutics of the Islamic tradition in conformity with the "official ideology".

79   Ibid., p. 142-144.

80   Susan Buck-Morss, *Thinking Past Terror: Islamism and Critical Theory on the Left* (London; New York: Verso, 2003), p. 42.

81   Wendy Brown, "Untimeliness and Punctuality: Critical Theory in Dark Times", in *Edgework: Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 4

82   Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, in *The Portable Nietzsche*, trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1968), p. 387.

[83]   Ibid., p. 217.

[84]   Wendy Brown, "Untimeliness and Punctuality: Critical Theory in Dark Times", in *Edgework: Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 14

[85]   Axel Honneth, *Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2007), p. 57.

[86]   Raymond Geuss, *The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 76.

[87]   Ibid., p. 63.

[88]   Ismail Aksu, "Sosyal Bilimler, Bilim Felsefesi, Sivil Toplum ve Cogulculuk Tartismalari", *Dünya ve Islam Dergisi*, Sayi: 12 (Guz 1992): 18-24, p. 19.

[89]   Ibid., p. 22.

[90]   Abdurrahman Arslan, *Modern Dunyada Muslumanlar* (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2004), p. 78-80.

[91]   Abdurrahman Arslan, *Modern Dunyada Muslumanlar* (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2004), p. 264.

[92]   Ibid., p. 266-268.

[93]   Abdurrahman Arslan, "Sivil Akil, Sivil Toplum, Sivil Musluman" (Civic Reason, Civil Society, Civil Muslim) in *Sabra Davet Eden Hakikat* (Truth Inviting to Patience) (Istanbul: Pinar Yayinlari, 2009), p. 148.

[94]   Ibid., p. 153.

[95]   Ibid., p. 150-151.

[96]   Ibid., p. 154.

[97]   Ibid., p. 179.

[98]   Arslan also refers to this process whereby the eternal truths of religions are relativised through historicism, as the "re-invention of religion".

[99]   This, for Arslan, refers to the a-temporal and a-spatial nature of Islam's social reality. Passage taken from Arslan (2009), p. 187-189.

[100]   Ismail Aksu, Sosyal Bilimler, Bilim Felsefesi, Sivil Toplum ve Cogulculuk Tartismalari", *Dünya ve Islam Dergisi*, Sayi: 12 (Guz 1992): 18-24, p. 23.

[101]   Ibid., p. 21.

[102]   Abdurrahman Arslan, "Bir Muhalefet ve Butunlesme Aracı Olarak Ozgurluk" (Freedom as a Medium of Opposition and Unification) in *Kuresel Sistem ve Kavramlari: Muzakereli Seminerler* (Global System and Its Concepts: Seminars with Discussions) (Istanbul: Ozgur-Der Yayinlari, 2004), p. 38.

[103]   Abdurrahman Arslan, *Modern Dunyada Muslumanlar* (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2004), p. 24.

[104]   Ibid,, p. 32.

[105]   Yildiz Ramazanoglu, discussant to Abdurrahman Arslan "Bir Muhalafet ve Butunlesme Araci olarak Ozgurluk", in *Kuresel Sistem ve Kavramlari: Ozgur-der Muzakereli Seminerler*, (Istanbul: Ozgur-Der Yayinlari, 2004), p. 45.

[106] Hamza Türkmen, "Kuresel Sistemin Kavramlarina Yaklasimda Usul" (Methods in Approaching the Concepts of the Global System), in *Kuresel Sistem ve Kavramlari: Ozgur-der Muzakereli Seminerler* (Istanbul: Ozgur-Der Yayinlari, 2004), p. 22.

[107] Bahadır Kurbanoğlu, "Liberalizme Dair Kenar Notlari-III: Rasyonalite Dininin En Guclu Mezhebi: Liberalizm" (The Strongest Sect of the Religion of Rationality: Liberalism), *Haksöz*, Sayi: 231 (Haziran 2010): 34-41, p. 37-38.

[108] Hamza Türkmen, *Turkiye'de Islamcilik ve Ozelestiri* (Islamism and Self-Critique in Turkey) (Istanbul: Ekin Yayinlari, 2008), p. 34.

[109] Saba Mahmood, "Secularism, Hermeneutics, and Empire: The Politics of Islamic Reformation," *Public Culture* 18 (2) (Spring 2006): 323-347.

[110] Michel Foucault, "Power and Strategies" in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1979*, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), pp. 134-146.

ANA-MARIA GOILAV

born in 1976, in Sibiu

Ph.D., University of Architecture and Urbanism *Ion Mincu*, Bucharest (2011)
Dissertation: *The Central Sanctuary in Early Christianity. A Hierotopic Investigation*

Lecturer, University of Architecture and Urbanism *Ion Mincu*, Bucharest

Research scholarships in Armenia, September 2002 – February 2003 and
Rome, October 2008 – July 2010
2008, co-founder of the *School of Bunești*, Argeș (with Petre Guran)

selected projects:
"St. Panteleimon and St. Filofteia" church, Hospital of Psychiatry Voila, Brașov
"St. Maximus the Confessor" parish church in Copou, Iași

selected article:
"Proposal for the reconstruction of the Golden Octagon", in *Les sources
de l'histoire du paysage urbain d'Antioche sur l'Oronte*, Université Paris8
Vincennes-Saint-Denis, pp.159-179,
http://www.bibliotheque-numerique-paris8.fr

THE GOLDEN OCTAGON OF ANTIOCH[1]

The Oriental Constantinian Cathedral, as the monument seems to be lost without a trace, remains one of the most beautiful and attractive topics of the world of Late Antiquity. Although it was written much about it, little can be known with certainty and, in the light of analysis undertaken in recent years, sources proved to be less than first thought.[2]

Following the scientific adventure occasioned by the loss of this great sanctuary, revisiting primary sources and directions opened by the research so far, the present study proposes a double reconstruction, as an alternative investigation method: the reconstruction of the architectural programme and the reconstruction of the architectural form.

1. Golden Octagon's place in the study of Early Christian architecture

Antioch - Theopolis and "the third nation"

Capital of the Seleucid Empire, Antioch is part of the foundations of King Seleucus I Nicator, in 300 B.C., with Apamea, Seleucia Pieria and Laodicea.[3] During the Roman era it was the capital of the province of Syria and the most important city in the Levant. At the end of the third century and during the fourth century it hosted the imperial residence several times and during the absence of the King it held the chair of the Prefect of the Orient. The title of apostolic see and, consequently, the title of patriarchal residence were added to all these titles. The city lost importance during the Arab domination since 638, but it regained part of its prestige during the Byzantine reconquest (969-1078) and the Crusades (from 1098 to 1268).

In the ecclesiastical tradition, Antioch-*Theopolis* underpins the Byzantine model, standing out in contrast to the "emperor city", *Constantinople*, and in contrast to Rome[4] according to the tradition of the

two chairs of Saint Peter. Unfortunately, when its authority most needed, from the Council of Nicaea in A.D. 325 by the end of the fourth century, the Church of Antioch crossed the worst period of its time, being in full Christological schism, divided into two or even three factors. Additionally, at that time, the bishop did not enjoy the same status with the counterparts of Alexandria and Rome, his rights being not clearly defined at Nicaea. With all the more reason it surprises and requires recognition of its position as leader of the Eastern liturgical world. Antiochene theologians are the authors of the prayer that, as in Jerusalem, replete with poetic Hymnology (antiphonal Psalms) and symbolism, of the extensive anaphora of Hellenistic influence and especially of the unique explicit epiclesis. It is therefore fair to ask ourselves to what extent they were involved in the Christian mystagogical project, regarding the affiliation of architecture to the world of symbolic thinking centered on the Eucharistic liturgy. Both the Great Octagonal Church and the *martyrium* of Saint Babylas at Kaoussie date from the fourth century (381).

After the Church's detach from its birthplace, Jerusalem, during the destruction of the Temple, Antioch becomes the "capital" of its missionary expansion and Peter founds his first chair.[5] Paul was many times here in his long expeditions. Episcopal organization was first formulated in Antioch, attested to its monarchical form in the letters of Saint Ignatius.

Here was probably written also the first of the Synoptic Gospels, *the Gospel of Matthew*, most "Jewish" of all. However, its great diffusion and acceptance was due to Antioch. It is also thought that the distinguishing feature of Early Christian Antioch is in the living and permanent contact with Judaism. Antiochene theologians and exegetes of Jewish orientation - Paul of Samosata, Lucian the Martyr, Diodorus, Theodore of Mopsuestia and John Chrysostom - are followers of biblical literalism. Their homilies enjoy the central place in Church life – symbolically, as well as literally, because Paul of Samosata raises "a throne and a *bema*"[6] in the middle of the old cathedral of Antioch, *Palaia*, and Saint John Chrysostom preaches from the central pulpit and not from the *kathedra* of the presbytery apse. As the first centrally-planned *martyria* of the Holy Land represented the place to confess the divinity of Christ, Antioch indicated in the center the Christ-*Logos*, the Word of Truth and the Wisdom of Solomon[7] as "a catechetical city-school", "an agora-church" where everyone discussed theological issues. The Eucharistic Shrine remains "the Eastern Place" where the Holy Spirit descends during the climax of the liturgy of the faithful and "burns" the Gifts (according to the words of Saint John

Chrysostom), turning Them into visible manifestation of invisible bread of immortality (according to Theodore of Mopsuestia).[8]

The movement started in Judea and Galilee became a new conscious religion in Antioch and it received the name of Christianity. An apology from the early second century, probably written in Antioch, reads as follows:

> This God worship ye, not after the manner of the Greeks, … neither worship ye Him as do the Jews … but worship God in a new way through Christ. … For the ways of the Greeks and the Jews are old, but we are they who worship Him in a new way, as a third people, namely Christians.[9]

Capital of the Church and cultural metropolis of the Orient between the two cultural "old" worlds, Judaism and Hellenism, Antioch conferred the "new world" that was needed for achieving one of the first Christian architectural programmes. Jewish tradition of "holy places" faced Hellenistic and Roman traditions (sacred funeral and imperial architecture) from a fresh, Christian perspective that gave a new meaning to the local phenomena. Should it be sought herein the explanation about the first central cathedral, what seems mostly to be the Golden Octagon?

The Golden Octagon: complex status of uniqueness

The Golden Octagon ranges between imperial foundations designed by Constantine and Empress Helena as *martyria* of the new faith agreed by the empire, either funeral projects (exclusively "theophanic *martyria*"[10] dedicated particularly to Christ in the Holy Land and Christian dynastic imperial mausoleums, like the mausoleum-*Apostoleion* of Constantinople) or cathedrals of major cities (*Basilica Salvatoris* in Rome, the cathedral of Nicomedia, the cathedral of Tyre). Among all these, the Golden Octagon awards its unique position according to the testimony of Eusebius,[11] being a gorgeous exceptional design, not only by size and beauty but also through its shape. The octagonal building had a circular colonnade inside and outside was surrounded by annexes, which formed an enclosure like a high walled *temenos*. David Woods indirectly disqualifies the uniqueness of the Octagon in a linguistic study dedicated to a remark in Libanius' *Autobiography*. He founds no solid reason to believe that the Octagon impressed more than any other major architectural project of that time, palace or church of the imperial capitals, and he places its exceptional character on Eusebius' encomiastic celebrative rhetoric.[12] The present

study does not support this view, on the contrary, it considers that the Octagon has been designed and built as an ideal classical specimen of architecture (in the precise sense of the Renaissance rediscovery), engaging harmony and symbolic geometry principles in full decline of Antiquity. The Octagon architecture must have been radically different from the current, social and functional architecture of the first Christian basilicas. We certainly are in another province of the "ideal" than the one that began to be standardized by the liturgical documents of that time, *Didascalia Apostolorum, Apostolic Constitutions* or *Testamentum Domini.* The fact that Eusebius and, after him, several literary sources refer to this building by its particular shape is a sufficient indication of that the Octagon is ideologically and functionally separated from the category of basilicas (formally unconditioned public spaces). From the battle against Maxentius (312) until year 326, Constantine resided more in the West, especially in Rome and Thessalonica. The foundations of the Antiochian Cathedral were put in 327. Was this one of the last reflections of Classical Roman architecture? Was it modeled on something that particularly impressed the emperor in Rome? What was the relationship of the Christian emperor with the "City of God"? All these are questions to which we return.

Deichmann predicts the privileged place of the Octagon in the history of the Christian architectural shapes and their symbolic significance. If we manage to prove with certainty that the sanctuary was not a palatine chapel or an imperial *heroon*, but the city cathedral, it is the first known example of central church for a normal liturgical community, he wrote in 1972. [13] Krautheimer suspected the Octagon of being the ideological prototype of the cathedral, the main royal city church, the ancestor of several churches similar in shape, function and location, from those already discussed in the previous chapter, continuing with those of the Justinian's time (Saints Sergius and Bacchus, Hagia Sophia in Constantinople, San Vitale in Ravenna) and later (Aix-la-Chapelle of Charles the Great). He does not exclude a direct link to Justinian's Hagia Sophia.[14]

This study is a continuation of the challenge launched by Ćurčić when identifying a possible monotheistic iconographic model of the Late Antiquity and, in particular, of the fourth century, in the architectural design of the centrally-planned buildings located in the middle of open air precincts.[15]

2. History

History of the Octagon, as opposed to its location, is relatively well known. The sanctuary had a short life, less than 300 years, being knocked down by successive earthquakes. The works started in 327,[16] two years after the Council of Nicaea, under the authority of Bishop Eustatius and were completed only after 14 years, under the authority of bishop Flaccillus. The consecration took place on January 6th 341, date associated with the Epiphany Day of our Savior by the Syrian chronicle *Liber Chaliforum* (or *Chronicle 724*, a compilation of the eighth century, deriving from an Arian source of the fourth century, therefore credible), in the presence of Emperor Constantius II and a council convened at Antioch, which took the name of the event, being known as the "Dedication Council" (*Encaenia*).[17] The problem of accurate dating of the construction period, raised by the hesitation of sources, suggests possible delays and interruptions because of the preparation of Constantinople, the new capital of the empire, inaugurated in 330, while the Octagon is still under construction.

We know that Saint John Chrysostom[18] preached in this cathedral of the cultural capital of Asia Minor before becoming bishop of Constantinople. In the first decades of the sixth century, the city was rocked by a series of natural disasters, severe earthquakes plus Persian invasion under Chosroes I in 540. The earthquake from 526 destroyed it almost completely, but patriarch Ephraim rebuilt and inaugurated it in 537, all in the presence of a council. This latest revival was due most to the prestige that the cathedral still enjoyed in the first half of the sixth century. Justinian started a wide campaign of reconstruction (which included the construction of the tetraconch church of Seleucia-Pieria) and he implemented an urban redefinition plan of the city.[19] The island in the Orontes was excluded from the mural perimeter of the new project[20] and the Octagon ceased to be the representative Christian building of Antioch. Its role has been since that time played by the church dedicated to Virgin Mary - *Theotokos* – in the *Epiphania* district. The abandon of the great cathedral is called by some researchers directly related to the earthquake of 588, which would have given it the deathblow. According to another opinion, the Octagon was left behind, together with other public buildings on the island (the palace and the hippodrome), once Antioch ceased to be the occasional capital of the empire.[21]

3. Studies

3.1 Architectural programme: shape, function, relationship with the dedication and the site

3.1.1 Site

Virtually nothing is known about the location of the sanctuary but so far, research directions can be drawn from a common premise: the Octagon must be somewhere in the New Town, on the island in the Orontes.

The Octagon in the New Town. Sources: description of the island

"New Town" is the name of the island in the north of Antioch, arranged for the first time during the reign of Antiochus III the Great (223-187 B.C.), who installed his military veterans here, the majority coming from Aetolia, Crete and Euboea. It seems that the royal residence is also on the island since this period. In 67 B.C. the Roman governor of Cilicia, Q. Marcius Rex, rebuilt the palace and the hippodrome and, during the third century, the island in the Orontes was completely renovated under the reign of Diocletian: the Imperial Palace was fully restored and enhanced; the hippodrome was rehabilitated and bathrooms were built. It is possible for the meaning of the name to refer not only to the chronology of foundation of this district, but also to its quality to be restored, renewed, because during the era of these imperial interventions the island gets the name "New Town". The Old Town, on the other side, on the left bank of the Orontes, is called *Palaia* in literary sources and the old cathedral which was here, *Palaia Ekklesia*.[22] Both cities had their own system of fortifications. Although the island had all the qualities of a true fortress by its strategic location, testimonies of chroniclers say that it became the most vulnerable to strong and repeated earthquakes that, in addition to direct damage to the buildings, caused the suspension of water supply by destroying aqueducts.

High seismic activity in the region makes the reconstruction theme to be in the forefront in the prosaic, cultural and spiritual life of Antioch. For example, its allegorical representations are very numerous - *Ananeosis* – in the pavement mosaics. *Megalopsychia* composition of a sumptuous villa in Daphné, which will be analyzed below, might be closely related to all these.[23]

Partial recovery of the topography of the island was made in parallel with the archaeological campaign of 1932-1935, based on literary

testimonies of Late Antiquity: centuries IV (Libanius 356-360), V (Theodoret of Cyrrhus[24]) and VI (Evagrius Scholasticus[25] and Malalas). Libanius is providing descriptions of the real city. He acquaints us that the New Town is on the island, that "the island was round, its walls forming a crown".[26] Four main streets cardinally oriented and bordered by porticos were intersecting at the center of the island, in a round market, and the place was marked by a *tetrapylon*. West, south and eastern arms had equal lengths, while the northern arm, shorter and more decorated, made *propylaea* of the Imperial Palace, occupying about a quarter of the island. Its main entrance was near the *tetrapylon* site. The palace had the north facade turned to the Orontes, the fortification wall was provided with a colonnade or gallery of the palace, overlooking the water and the periphery.[27] The palace consisted of several parts (*oikos*).[28] There were several bathrooms and a hippodrome in the New Town, whose entrance was marked by two towers and with porticoes along the palace. The island communicated with the city by five bridges. The streets running west, south and east led to three of these bridges. A sixth bridge was connected with the military gymnasium located in the north part.[29] Theophanes is mentioning a bridge, whose location is unknown to us, about the Gate where the way to the Taurus Mountains started. [30] Evagrius writes that the river was in the north side of the palace, while in the south side "there was a large two-level porch that reached the city walls, which had two high towers. A public road connected the city with the suburbs between the palace and the river."

The Octagon near/ in the palace

In 1839 C.O. Müller drew the first plan of the island, strictly based on literary descriptions.[31] Afterwards, J. Weulersse and J. Sauvaget[32] made studies of topography consisting of analysis of aerial photos, cadastral plans and modern urban fabric and Princeton University finally led the first excavations. Archaeological explorations have found no traces of the imperial palace (which we know with certainty that it was in the New Town), nor of any cathedral, but brought to light the hippodrome and numerous bathrooms. Moreover, no major landmarks of the Old Town, as the *omphalos* or forum of Valens, were found. Linking all information collected has not yet led to a schematic separation of the possible location of the Octagon, if it were located on the island. Discovering the hippodrome was the only valid reference point for locating the New City.

During the earthquake in 115, Trajan, who was in the palace, managed to escape hurt and took refuge in the racecourse,[33] which may suggest a possible jointment between the two buildings.

Gregoire Poccardi's recent study[34] critically follows the chronology of the island plans and proposes an improvement of the variant that enjoyed the consensus of the scientific world, consisting of a redrawing of the major axis whose intersection was solemnly materialized in a *tetrapylon*, marking the geometric center of the New Town. His investigation also proposes a new interpretation of the perception of the cardinal setting, appropriate to the inhabitants of Antioch in Late Antiquity, which comes in agreement with literary descriptions but which does not correspond entirely to the standard system of cardinal axes. The "literary north", as shown in the descriptions of Libanius, corresponds to the northwest direction in our cardinal system; the Orontes marked the east-west axis of the city for Antiochian people of the fourth century. This mismatch may explain to some extent perpetuated errors in the attempts to restore the topography of the island.

The Octagon was seated for a long time, under a *communis opinion,* on the island of the New Town and appeared directly related to the Imperial Palace. While the literary sources keep silent, an important role played in this location the discovery of a mosaic in 1932 in Yakto (Daphné, the pleasures district near Antioch), entitled *Megalopsychia,* dating from around 470. Jean Lassus published it for the first time. Its border is "a documentary",[35] directing a descriptive route of surroundings in a "cinematographic"[36] manner that Lassus interpreted it in the meaning of topographic location of the Octagon in the New Town. The required height of the decorative band leads to a kind of "isocephaly"[37] characters-buildings that makes the task of interpreting the latter's identity more difficult. Thus, the cathedral would appear as a polyhedral building, with portico and white dome, flanked by an orant, irrefutable sign of religious identity of the building. Although all toponymic indications are missing from the mosaic, around the year 470 there was only one monument of its kind in Antioch. Near-by, the Imperial Palace could appear, recognizable by the water-oriented gallery and a definite intention of monumentalisation, by connecting volumes through continuous roofs on a length of more than one meter. The Octagon would be in the background of a vast space, bounded by additional buildings and that would open on the opposite side through a monumental gate. In the center of this area a column would raise, possibly having placed on it the heroic statue of an emperor.[38]

"Byzantine" stadium and the so-called "bathroom C" on the Princeton excavations plan seem to correspond fully to the images commented by Jean Lassus. Additionally, Gregoire Poccardi recognizes the great central intersection within the white portion that emerges from the longitudinal axis of the street, despite the fact that the *tetrapylon* is not figured, as one would expect.[39] Doro Levi, as a mandatory research part, does not believe that the mosaic border would represent Daphné-Antioch route, but rather requires that all buildings that appear here were located in Daphne.[40] Moreover, neither he nor Glanville Downey finds any evidence in favor of the Palace in the mosaic, although the latter recognizes in the mosaic, also without evidence, Libanius' *Praise of Antioch.*

Relationship Cathedral - Palace

The attempts to rebuild the Antiochian imperial palace have as models the homologous assemblies from Spalato and Thessalonica. Grabar takes Eltester's hypothesis and amplifies it, assuming that the Octagon was no longer "next" but "in" the palace, which actually occupied the whole extent of the island, according to the model in Spalato as described by Libanius. The "quarter" he is talking about is narrowly associated to the private area, the imperial apartments. Moreover, Grabar believes that the two assemblies were made in the same period.[41]

The palatine complex at Spalato took the form of a military garrison, consisting of a rectangular chamber divided into four compartments by four porticated interior streets. A gallery was opened upstairs, on the seaward side. An octagonal monument, identified as a mausoleum, was inside the palace in front of the temple of Jupiter.

A monumental building of octagonal plan was inside the palace of Galerius in Thessaloniki as well - different from the rotunda that became the church of Saint George - which due to its outdoor location communicated with the palatine chamber through a large porticated street.[42]

Lately, the Antiochian palace was rather akin to those in Nicomedia, Thessalonica, Milan or Constantinople, Spalato being a private imperial residence unlike Antioch, where public functions of the space cannot be neglected.[43] All these complexes have in common the vicinity of the *heroon*-like structure with the palace. Grabar built by analogy the possibility of a similar building in Antioch, believing that all palatine circular buildings served the imperial cult and they were dedicated to gods or heroes embodied by the emperors. Diocletian embodied

Jupiter, Galerius embodied Hercules and Constantine represented Christ. In Antioch, thus, we might talk about an imperial *heroon* eventually transformed into a church, a building rebuilt on circular foundations or an existing building adapted to Christian worship.

Removing a theory that made a career at the time, Noël Duval notes that we cannot speak about a palatine scheme of Late Antiquity, but rather about unique particular solutions that meet some particular conditions.[44] It is most likely the case of Antioch, although some ideological relations (such as temple – imperial *heroon* or mausoleum) can be retained. Instead, Poccardi postulates the existence of a distinct category of central monuments erected in relation to the imperial residences during the period 300-350 – of pagan nature during Tetrarchia and of Christian nature with the reign of Constantine - and the Golden Octagon's belonging to this last category.[45]

The only clues of the Octagon's location are found in the writings of Malalas (which is not mentioned by Grabar, Krautheimer and Dynes) and in the writings of Anthony, the monk who recorded the life of Saint Simeon the Stylite. None of them makes any reference to the imperial palace. In the sixth century, taking information from another written source, Malalas recorded that the Octagon was built on the site of a ruined public bath of King Philip, demolished by Constantine. Philip was identified with either one of the two Seleucid rulers of the first century B.C.[46] or the emperor Philip the Arab (244-249), who passed in the consciousness of the historical chronicles as philo-Christian.

> On his return, he (Constantine) came to Antioch the Great and built there the Great Church, a very large undertaking, after demolishing the public bath known as that of the emperor Philip, for the bath was old and ruined by time and unfit for bathing.[47]

However, building a monument on the site of a bath does not limit the location possibilities, nor favors the New Town, where excavations have brought to light many such structures. But was the bathroom next to palace? Malalas says nothing about possible vicinity.

The monk-disciple Anthony refers to the Octagon with the expression μετάνοια εις τὸν μόσχον[48] in the Greek Biography of Saint Simeon the Stylite, written in 459. After publication of Yakto mosaic, Eltester uses the popular name of the Octagon – "from calf" - to identify the statue that Lietzmann already alleged in the vicinity[49] with the bronze statue

dedicated to Antiochus IV Epiphanes (mocked by the Greeks, dubbing him "Epimanes" meaning "crazy" instead of "Theos Epiphanes" – "god that is shown king"), described by Libanius in the *Praise of Antioch* of 356.[50] The bullfighting statuary group celebrated the pacification made by the king among the tribes of the Taurus Mountains (allegorically transposed in bull) that was in the New Town on the island. Eltester believes that the gate next to the bridge over the Orontes river has borrowed its name from the statue – "Tauriana" - and he proposes in its restitution the interpretation of incomplete PIANA mosaic inscription as a particle of TAURIANA Latin word in Greek transcription.[51] Downey associates this name to an entire district of the island.[52] The mosaic garden and the discovered bath that Libanius speaks about determine Eltester to believe that the palace was close, based on the analogy with the structure of Constantinople. In conclusion, Constantine would have used the same scheme in Antioch and Constantinople: the main church near the palace, for which scheme, as already noted, one can find several examples of early Christian architecture. But, in addition, Eltester tried to translate this site ideologically favored, by the symbolic link between throne and altar, with wider consequences than those on the case of the Octagon.

An argument that makes weak the hypothesis of sanctuary location in the New Town is that, although describing the island thoroughly, nor Theodoret neither Libanius make any reference to the presence of the Constantinian foundation.

The Octagon was not necessarily located near the palace

The latest trend is to defuse the fixed scheme palace-cathedral-gate-statue-bridge for Antioch, simply because evidence situating the Octagon on the island, apart from having old bibliography, is in itself insufficient. Catherine Saliou notes that investigations involve so far only foundation of assumptions over other previous assumptions that are consequences of maintenance of scientific prejudices, partly already terminated (the case of the palatine complex of the Late Antiquity, Duval 1987).[53] The methodological route proposed by Saliou moves the statue of Antiochus Epiphanes in the centre of searches - instead of the Octagon - and it seeks "real details" officiating arguments of Eltester and Downey on the archaeological and literary commentary provided by Libanius in *Antiochikos*. The first thing to be demonstrated with linguistic arguments is that the adjective ταυριανός, associated with a gate of the city by

Theophanes, should not necessarily indicate a statue, but it can be as good - or better - a toponym related to the direction of Taurus Mountains or it can refer to a proper name. Therefore, the "taurian" bridge-gate and the bronze bullfighting, both attested in Antioch, are released from the forced relationship placed by Eltester. The interpretation of Eltester regarding the gate location on the left or right side of the Orontes River, in the New Town or the Old Town, hangs on a verbal particle as well. The only thing we can say for now is that an urban gate bearing the name "Taurus" that connected the island with the Old Town may be inappropriate for geographic reasons. As regards the connotative field of the key term ταύρεος (used by Libanius in a letter about a bridge), Saliou offers two different alternatives of the statue of Antiochus: an effigy of Seleucus I, where he is represented bearing the divine signs, the bull horns, and Poseidon, one of his epiclesis being ταύρεος. This episode is associated immediately with the god statue discovered during construction of the Octagon and *xenodochium* attached, from Malalas' writings. The latter bridge ταύρεος, although it could be close to the Octagon, it is not necessarily need to coincide with Taurian Gate Bridge. The latest criticism focuses on the topographic border of the *Megalopsychia* mosaic. According to Saliou, the two bridges do not necessarily isolate the Orontes Island and the architectures schematically represented serve with plenty of indulgence palatine destinations that have been assigned by the predecessors. On the other hand, the Great Church was certainly not even in the mosaic of Yakto near the Taurian Gate if the rest of PIANA marked the end of another toponym, such as a district built by Valerian, which would give the Latin word VARIANA in Greek transcription.

We must take into account that the silence of the sources does not mean rejection of the classical hypothesis. In spite of the hypothetical constructions not using so far sufficient valid evidence, we should not rush to definitively evacuate the Octagon from the vicinity of the palace or from the island.

A new approach

What do we finally know about the site? The only valid location is that one given by the popular name "near the calf", plus Philip's reserved indication about the bath place (because Malalas, although a native of Antioch, is often imprecise in his chronicle). The Octagon's vicinity to the palace has not been yet demonstrated. In terms of the urban report between

the palace and the island, I think that a first observation is required. As already noted, there are some common features to Antioch and Spalato which can hardly pass as accidental.[54] One of these is the quarter part of the island occupied by the palace. If the Spalato complex is a city in miniature, with fortified walls and facades and inner porticated streets, it makes sense for private apartments to represent the palace itself. On the contrary, imitation at the scale of a city (the island on the Orontes had the appearance and extent of a real town) after the model of a palace that has a city as a model makes no sense. In other words, the palace in Antioch could not occupy the entire island but literally a quarter of it. Furthermore, sources are explicit when they show that the imperial residence extends to the middle of the island close to the *Tetrapylon of the Elephants.* Grabar's thesis is thus unfounded. Therefore, nor even the presumption of the Octagon placed in the palace as a strictly imperial property has any support. Its status should have been another one. A temperate approach to presumptions made so far can at least suggest the urban setting of the site. To this end, the following remarks can be made.

1. The imperial ideological program - involving the series of buildings where the Octagon is part of - assumes a deferential relationship of the Christian sanctuary to the palace. The first half of the fourth century is a period when Christianity enjoys a legal status equal to that of other religions, plus additional quality of the "court" religion, but not yet the "official" religion. The hypothesis of the cathedral adjacency to the palace, its placement in a private but also sacred area of the imperial residence, a kind of "protective" beneficial area can be consolidated on this argument. One must also understand the similarity of the Antioch situation in the Late Antiquity with the situation of the Pagan Rome, how unwise it could have been for the emperor protecting the new religion to interfere by the amplitude of his constructive program right in the heart of the city. For an Antioch more Christian than Rome, the urban center - and generally the already defined urban center of any capital of the empire – oversaturated with temples and public buildings, may make other problems, not necessarily religious in nature, such as the lack of constructible land for a representative complex of wide scope or the legal status of the land. In such fabric the natural method of intervention would have been the conversion (and given the indication of Malalas, we are exactly in a position to have a bath replaced by a church). Besides the essentially pagan centre, which were the hot spots of Antioch?

2. We know that one of the favorite sites of Christian sanctuaries was near the city gates, in a first phase *extra muros*, then *intra muros* as well. Initially conditioned not so much by the status of Christianity as the Roman law and the cult of saints - a cult of the necropolis, this preferential site gets a powerful impact on the perception of the city. It is the case of the cimiterial basilicas around Rome and the sanctuary dedicated to Saint Babylas in the north of Antioch, beyond the island, highlighted in a recent article by Wendy Mayer.[55] This huge *martyrion* met his travelers as a different gate, in a different city and it could not be ignored by the emperor's eyes from the gallery overlooking the river. It could be otherwise the ideal location of the unknown Golden Octagon, if the sanctuary of Saint Babylas was not already settled here. However, the cathedral location near one of the city gates (why not the Tauriana?) should not be excluded on principle.

3. In the first years of *Pax Ecclesia*, during Constantine's reign, the *martyrium* and the cathedral arise in a sacred protected area – either of the necropolis (in the West) or the Imperial Palace (in the East). Later, the Episcopal palace becomes contiguous to the cathedral.

4. Referring to the palaces of Late Antiquity, but finding an alternative issue for discussion in their relationship with the city, Ćurčić tempers by arguments the systematic reluctance of Duval.[56] Without seeking a fixed scheme (as otherwise rarely exists within any other architecture or urban planning program,) Ćurčić rather suggests the acceptance of certain "dialogue zones" between the sacred area of the imperial residence and the city, usually along the major axes.

5. We do not know if the whole island on the Orontes River was occupied by the New Town, namely the fortified, intramural part. If they do not overlap perfectly, did Libanius have in mind in his descriptions the island as a geographical unit or the New Town as a fortified settlement?

In conclusion, putting together the above remarks, we can say that the Octagon was probably found in the New Town, in the adjacent area of the palace, in connection with the Old Town rather than the peripheries of the right bank of Orontes River, placed strategically at the same time near one of the gates. The Great Church would be in one of the four compartments that are formed along the axes in the map redrawn by Poccardi, who moves the axes of south-west to north-east of the island. Maybe facing the temple near the hippodrome, brought to light by archaeological excavations?

3.1.2 Function. Shape and function relationship

Architectural program: is there a direct link between shape and function or not?

Deichmann believed that both the longitudinal basilica (Lateran 313) and the central plan (Antioch 327) served the same purpose to Constantine: they were equally Episcopal and community churches. The emperor and his spiritual advisers did not believe that there was a special significance of the architectural shape or a special relationship with its function. Consequently, there would be no strict relationship between the architectural shape and the liturgical destination (community-church, *martyrium* or palatine chapel) in Early Christian architecture.[57] Accepting this thesis, we must ask, however, if things stayed the same for Christians. Did they perceive to the same extent the basilical space, the central space of the imperial cosmic dome, as well as the central area of the tombs of saints as *aulae* of the new Christocentric world? If Krautheimer notes that after the year 500 the Octagon passes from the *martyria* buildings area to the community-liturgical space, Deichmann corrects him showing that actually we cannot speak of a revolution around the year 500, but of a previous status in which the specialization of the liturgical space shape in liturgical and community spaces and *martyria* buildings is missing. The boundaries of architectural types would not have existed from the beginning and spatial shapes would have been independent variables, as generally in the Roman architecture of Late Antiquity, where shape and function were independent.

Grabar does not share the same view. He formulates the ideological significance of the Octagon by inspiration from the imperial cult, explaining the exceptional choice of the octagonal plan for the sanctuary in the capital of the East - a favorite shape of *martyria* buildings and baptisteries – through the theme of regaining the lost unity, for which the empire is the expression of the whole creation restored from sin. Constantine dedicates the sanctuary as a *heroon* to Christ the Hero. The relationship between the church raising and the victory against Licinius, equivalent to unification of the empire under one leader, is the same with the relationship between heavenly and earthly monarchy, expressed in the central plan inherent to this unique building of triumphal nature, image of both the emperor and Christ. The shape is then placed in direct connection with the dedication and the significance of the building. Grabar concludes that the choice of basilical or central shape of churches is not within the fantasy of manufacturer or builder, but the Octagon confirms

that the direct link between destination and shape of the building follows a tradition prior to Late Antiquity. Eltester's strong influence is felt throughout this plea, as he was capable to see, as we have already shown, a strong ideological alliance between throne and altar.

E.H. Kantorowicz confirms Grabar's thesis, focusing on the Byzantine wedding rings octagon-shaped, bearing *homonoia* inscription.[58]

The Octagon's destination

Although the monumental monograph of Grabar described the Octagon as a *martyrium*,[59] no evidence was discovered so far that this sanctuary would have housed relics ever, except its occasional funeral function related to bringing the body of Saint Simeon Stylite in the city.

Palatine church and/ or cathedral of Antioch?

Researchers focus thereby on two possible interpretations of the building destination: palatine church and the cathedral of the city. Krautheimer, as we said, considers that the Octagon fulfills both functions.[60] The central palatine church appears as a new topic to house royal liturgy, which explains further options for the identity symbolic shape of Justinian's Saint Sophia and Aachen. Palatine churches were those privileged sanctuaries in which ceremonies were brought as dedications of the emperor to God. Therefore, it should not surprise us that the royal liturgy borrowed the reception rooms near the entry (*salutatoria*), the audience halls, the sacred throne rooms and the divine banquet salons (*coenatio Jovis - triclinia*) from the palatine architectural register. It is the central interior of the Roman palace, which implies the idea of heavenly dome, such as those from Spalato or Nero's Golden House in Rome. Between 310 and 320, the representative construction type is the so-called temple of Minerva Medica in Rome, in reality a rotunda of Licinius' gardens. The functions of these rooms were mixed, as the very nature of the emperor - both secular and divine. *Chrysotriklinos,* the golden *triclinium* of the Great Palace of Constantinople, was functioning as an audience hall and imperial chapel in the late sixth century.

In conclusion, based on the formal tradition of palatine rooms, Krautheimer considers that the Octagon acts as the prototype for the church in general and in particular for the church on Mount Gerizim and for Saints Sergius and Bacchus at Constantinople.

It was already noted that, usually, palatine churches are identified by the central plan. Particularly it seems that the Episcopal palaces are in the vicinity of tetraconch cathedrals, "double shell" structures that migrate from the baths and the imperial gardens of the second century to the ecclesiastical buildings of the fourth century. Numerous examples of Late Antiquity and Early Middle Ages can be brought to support this observation: San Lorenzo in Milan or Bosra, Resafa and other Syrian churches of the Patriarchate of Antioch - as shown by Kleinbauer[61] - are near the Episcopal palaces; Zvartnots in the seventh century is adjacent to the patriarchal palace. On octagonal layout, San Vitale and Saints Sergius and Bacchus belong to the imperial ambiance. The most elaborate structure of this family is Justinian's Saint Sophia, in the same time the city's cathedral and palatine church, as was the case most likely of the Antiochian Octagon. The main objection made at this point regards the fact that in Constantinople, Hagia Sophia and Saint Irene, although forming an ecclesiastical area close to the palace, operated autonomously, without depending on the palace; moreover, it was part of another territorial-administrative unit.[62] An Episcopal residence was interposed between the two churches and the *Augusteion*'s porticated market was placed between the palace and Hagia Sophia. Had therefore the palace its own chapel? With the objection of later sources, the registration of a palatine chapel next to the Chalke gate, where coronations took place and a piece of the Cross was kept, dedicated by Constantine to Christ (*naos tou Kiriou*)[63] is of great interest. Furthermore, Saint Stephen's Church, attributed to Constantine, but probably built by Pulcheria in 429, was a palatine *martyrion*, embedded in the body of the palace, where the hand of Saint Stephen was kept and coronations and marriages took place. The *Pharos* chapel dedicated to Our Lady (Θεοτόκος τοῦ Φάρου) was arranged inside the palace in the fifth century.

Before continuing, a brief *memento* is necessary. Although the "imperial church" formula is widely accepted, one should not forget that the relationship of Constantine with the church and his presence in the Eucharistic liturgy space were certainly conditioned by the personal baptism delay. Instead, this restriction seems to grow by compensation "churches" and "home", private liturgies of the non-baptized emperor (the Sessorian chapel in Rome for example).[64]

According to Dynes, octagonal plans of the churches of San Vitale in Ravenna and Saints Sergius and Bacchus of Constantinople, both palatine churches, are deliberate allusions to the Golden Octagon. The

first type of palatine church would be a conscious creation of the age of Justinian. Historically speaking, the foundation of Charlemagne in Aachen, Aix-la-Chapelle, represents the design of this constructive type for the first time north of the Alps.[65] In turn, Downey took the mechanical idea that the Octagon is a specimen of the palatine architecture, by the hypothesis of its location on the island, near the palace.

Cathedral of Antioch

In relation to the Imperial Palace or not, most investigations lead to the scenario that the Octagon was the cathedral of Antioch from the beginning. If the thesis is proven, we are once again in the presence of a prototype: the first major community liturgical space in a central plan.

Many fifth-century Greek sources called the Octagon *Megale Ekklesia*, the "Great Church", expression to describe the cathedral dedicated to the city. To strengthen this status since the fourth century, a certain Latin source, the chronicle of Ammianus Marcellinus, an eyewitness of the events he describes, may be quoted.[66] In October 22nd 362 the temple of Apollo in Daphné is on fire and Christians are severely punished by Julian the Apostate by closing the Octagon – "*Maior Ecclesia* of Antioch" - and confiscation of liturgical vessels. It makes sense that the revenge of the pagan emperor considered the cathedral and not a palatine chapel. At 21 years of dedication, the Octagon is known by this name, attesting its cathedral status and between 341-360 is very unlikely to become a cathedral from a chapel: from the winter of 337-8, Constantius is repeatedly resident in Antioch and between 350-354 Gallus Caesar and Costanza were established here; fervent Christians, they would not alienate at any cost the church of the palace.[67] Malalas provides an additional argument, noting that the Octagon had a kitchen for the poor and a house for foreigners, unusual annexes for a palatine chapel. Personally, from the typological definition of the two architectural programs, primarily different in size and destination, I think it is impossible to convert the chapel into a cathedral.

Finally, the demonstration may include the reference to *Palaia Ekklesia*, the old cathedral and the Episcopal office, located in the old town. It was the Apostolic Church of Antioch, which according to tradition it was founded in the first century, representing the witness of the connection with the primitive Church for the local Christian community. Demolished during the reign of Diocletian, it was rebuilt in 313 by Bishop Vitalius. The name that is mentioned in chronicles implies the existence of a "New Church",

confirmed by another appellation of the Octagon: *Nea Ekklesia*.[68] The two churches, with their opposable names, confirm the same function. From the fifth century *Palaia* is no longer mentioned. Saint John Chrysostom served in both churches, as a deacon in 381 and between 386-397 as a priest, with the same clergy attached.[69]

We can ask ourselves whether this juxtaposition of two Episcopal churches is unusual for that time or it can be found elsewhere. In Constantinople, Constantine raised martyrs' memorials, above all the Church of the Apostles,[70] but there is no mention of the capital cathedral. It remains to ask whether the *Apostoleion* mausoleum was designed to incorporate the function of the cathedral as well in the ideal center of the city founded by the Emperor. Hagia Sophia was inaugurated on February 15th 360 by Constantius and started by the same emperor not earlier than 340. Saint Irene was called *Palaia Ekklesia* (or *Ecclesia Antigua* in the *Notitia Dignitatum*), the antinomy of *Nea Ekklesia* - Saint Sophia. Because it was small, Constantine rebuilt it and gave it the title of *Eirene*. In 337 there is anointed Bishop Paul the Confessor, which certifies its role as cathedral, taken also between 404 and 415, when the burned Saint Sophia was rebuilt. In conclusion, Antioch and Constantinople used the same scheme: two contemporary cathedrals, distinguished by the appellation "Old" and "New Church", of reversible status.[71]

3.1.3 *Tituli* of the Octagon

Tituli of the Great Church - *Domus Aurea, Dominicum Aureum, Mega Ekklesia, Ecclesia Maior, Nea Ekklesia*, μετάνοια εις τὸν μόσχον or "the Octagon" - have provoked much discussion.[72]

What periods and geographical areas are specific for the symbolic names of theological nature of churches? Are these churches in a special category? During the reign of Saint Augustine, the Episcopal church of Hippo was known as the *Basilica Pacis*. In the early fifth century the Donatist cathedral, *Theoprepia* and a Catholic Church, *Restituta* were also mentioned here. In the same century, *Irene* church, built probably at the end of the fourth century, was placed in Gaza of Bishop Porphyry, near the bishop's residence. In 431, the Council of Ephesus meets at "the Great Church of Holy Mary". Constantinople provides the richest file with well-known *Irene* churches (first Constantinian, the second post-Constantinian), *Sophia* church (founded by Constantius II), *Anastasia* (the main church of the Novatians during the reign of Julian and then

the Nicene, in the period of Saint Gregory of Nazianzus), *Homonoia* and probably *Dynamis*, predecessor of "Holy Dynamis" of the medieval Byzantine period. Two main themes can be identified: Peace (with the corollary Concordia and Blessing at Arsinoé), and Regeneration/ Rebirth (Illumination or *Fotine* and the Life-Giver of Hermopolis, *Metanoia* at Antioch, *Anastasia* or *Restituta*), plus avatars of the sovereignty (Wisdom, Power). It seems therefore that we are always near the cathedrals - the main "catholic" churches for general worship, "great churches" - in remote places of the empire,[73] from the fourth century and not exceeding the fifth century. No commemorative building (*martyrion* or Christian mausoleum, pilgrimage sanctuary) candidates for such an appellation. This can be an additional argument for establishing the position of cathedral of Antioch Octagon. Eponyms do not coincide with the dedication of the church, Christ Himself in general, but they are external names of popular nature, versions of old Hellenistic *signa* associated to buildings of profane nature in many cases. Nor they are always attributed to the sanctuary along with its dedication, but they occur over time, as is the case of *Hagia Sophia* in *Constantinople* and the Antiochian *Concordia-Metanoia*, which requires caution to avoid at any cost search for a possible symbolic kinship between the Octagonal plan and its theological appellations. The Octagon was known as the "Great Church" during its construction period.

3.1.4 The dedication of the Octagon: *metanoia* or *concordia-homonoia*?

Between the two terms used in literary sources on the dedication of the church, μετάνοια (repentance) and ὁμόνοια (concordia), Grabar prefers the latter because of its frequency in the symbols of imperial power. In addition, when the first is almost impossible to explain according to its founder's vision, the other embodies the perfect monarch, superimposed image of the emperor and of Christ. In 327, when Constantine sets the foundations of the Octagon, just two years away from the Council of Nicaea, he defeats Licinius and manages to reunify the Roman Empire; Rome and the Orient are together again, for the first time of Christian nature.

During the life of Saint Simeon the Stylite, as already mentioned, Anthony says that the Octagon, when housing the body of the saint in 459, receives the name of μετάνοια εἰς τὸν μόσχον ("repentance from calf"). Although *homonoia-concordia* postulated by Grabar is recognized by Downey and Krautheimer, none of the nine Greek manuscripts on

the life of Saint Simeon the Stylite mentions the word *homonoia*, but the word *metanoia*, while there is no title in Latin translation. Another series of Latin manuscripts mention the variants *penitentia, penitentia* replaced by *concordia, Concordia poenitentiae, concordia poenitentialis* or just *concordia.* Therefore, Eltester believes that there was a "missing link", a Greek variant with the title *homonoia,* which would give *concordia* in Latin manuscripts. In front of the incorrect collocation *concordia-poenitentia*, Grabar believes simply that there may be a mistake of the transcriber, who transforms from a hand movement the word *metanoia* in *homonoia.* Instead, Deichmann explains the hesitation of the Latin chroniclers by a cultural reality: *metanoia* did not exist in spirit in the West, it was an empty term, where the translation of the meaning: *metanoia-homonoia = concordia.* Therefore, it is possible that the Octagon may have never been dedicated to the Harmony and the *concordia* could have been an exclusively Western interpretation of the Oriental *metanoia.* Eltester wonders whether the dedication day of the Harmony-*homonoia* is somewhat prior to the "repentance from calf", being received at the Joy Feast with the unification of Paulinus' community with the Church, during the reign of Bishop Alexander in 415. The event was marked by a solemn urban procession - probably the only attested in Antioch, powerful evocation of the river of torches of Chrysostom in Constantinople of 398 – who crossed the entire city, in hymns and psalms and ended in the Golden Octagon that became place of peace and reunification of Christians: "a stream of thinking living beings like the Orontes in its course, coming from the western gate to the great church and filling the whole forum."[74]

A dedicatory inscription?

A dedicatory inscription chronicled by Malalas, analyzed and emended by Müller,[75] sometimes served as an argument to show that nor *homonoia* or *metanoia* – absent terms – belonged to the initial Constantinian dedication, and therefore listening to the imperial customary law of the great foundations, the Octagon was worshipped directly by Constantine to Christ.[76]

> Constantine [Constantius] consecrated a house to God, worthy to be praised, shining as the heavenly dome.
> Constantius made himself a servant of God,
> Gorgonius *comes* acomplished the work of the servant.[77]

A recent plausible study shows that Malalas does not have actually the dedicatory inscription of the Great Church of Antioch and, therefore, the text emendation is not necessary ("Constantine" instead of "Constantius" in the first line).[78] The text belongs to another era and another building and the three names mentioned by the chronicler would not refer to Constantine I, Constantius II and Gorgonius, charged with overseeing the work of the Octagon, but to Constantius II, Gallus (officially called Constantius) and the homonym Gorgonius, the "building supervisor" who was most likely familiar to the court of Caesar Gallus. The inscription, of great modesty, moreover, was not seen *in situ* by Malalas, but taken from another source and interpreted it with reference to the Octagon. Woods thinks it is a testimony of a secondary order – not even the inscription of any church - that could accompany a donation made eventually to the *martyrion* in Daphné built during the reign of Gallus to house relics of Saint Babylas.

3.2 Architectural shape. Reconstruction scenarios

"One has found no trace of the Octagon of Antioch. (…) discussions around this lost monument are endless and controversies increase rather than decrease, due to the more methodical research", wrote Jean Lassus in 1966.[79] The situation has not changed significantly since then. Although in the absence of archaeological evidence, reconstruction studies may be criticized that they remain pure speculative exercises and they cannot be objectively evaluated, Deichmann does not consider them totally meaningless, but he believes that their dynamics is due to the advanced research, animated by the clear-cut distinction premise to Lateran.

If the Yakto mosaic can be interpreted with reservations in terms of recovery of the Octagon's location, its use for formal reconstruction is almost impossible. First of all, the type of representation is proper to the schematic decorative language of mosaic. Secondly, the picture is incomplete and largely devoid of context.

The theoretical reconstruction proposed by Krautheimer says that the prototype Cathedral is a volume of eight facades, preceded by a *narthex* on two levels and has gilded roof. Inside, above the octagonal central core, stands a pyramidal roof or a wooden dome. The nucleus is surrounded by annexes, as described by Eusebius: *oikoi* - lateral aisles on two levels (ambulatory and gallery), separated by colonnades of the central area - and *exedrae* or niches. In formal terms, this scheme can evolve in two directions: 1. ambulatory and the gallery communicate directly with the core, while

the niches (*exedrae*) open to the outside (a vague resemblance to the plan of the *Theotokos* Church on Mount Gerizim, 484; the solution proposed by Birnbaum is an illustration of this choice[80]); 2. the central core expands forming the niches - *exedrae* ("double shell" plan,[81] which predicts the plan of Saints Sergius and Bacchus at Constantinople by 200 years and that of San Vitale in Ravenna; the variant is found in the solution proposed by Dynes[82]). Krautheimer rejects instead the vision built by Kleinbauer as a complex historical demonstration, who concludes that the Octagon of Antioch was actually built on a tetraconch plan.[83] We will analyze below the main trends in the interpretation of the architectural shape.

A. Birnbaum, 1913 and B. Smith, 1950

The analysis proposed is essentially a linguistic one, a bend on the meaning of terms used by literary sources. Its product is a circular three-aisle basilica or, in other words, three octagonal concentric basilicas, under a wooden roof. Of all restaurateurs, A. Birnbaum and B. Smith have the merit - or the sin - to be the only designers. Concerned only about the issue of the dome symbolism, Smith overlooks the plan solving and criticizes conical or pyramidal wooden roofs, proposing a gilded wooden dome that must have served as a prototype to the Islamic sacred architecture of the formal family of the variant proposed by Professor Krencker for the hypothetical restoration of the Octagon from Qalat Seman a century later.[84] The Holy Sepulcher would have had also a similar timber dome from the beginning, as an alternative to a stone dome considered unlikely. Smith is the guardian of faith in a Syro-Palestinian tradition of wooden gilded domes, the solar domes loaded with ancestral symbolism evoked by the *Marneion* in Gaza (also in the variant of its own restitution as long as there is no historical witness) or the Syrian fire temples. All these would have become signs of an ideology of Early Christianity. Wooden domes did not need to obey the hemispheric section, the semicircular shape being a conquest of Greek mathematics and Roman mechanics and a result of Roman standardization of masonry domes. At this point, the scientific argumentation adequately enters the technological field, showing how the masonry domes are largely indistinguishable from the outside due to constructive reasons, according to the Roman tradition. In Late Antiquity, the masonry dome becomes a sign of imperial and divine power, mentality that will gradually affect the imperial Christian foundations and big churches in general. Justinian's Saint Sophia can be seen from the perspective of this demonstration as an

introverted "inner dome". The Golden Octagon seems to have been both an inner and outer dome and implicitly the bearer of a complex ideology, according to the allusions of Saint John Chrysostom. So Smith believes that the wooden dome is the major distinguishing feature of the external physiognomy of the building, wherefrom the exaggeration of its convex or conical shape in Syria of the Early Christianity.[85] The main reason lies in that there is no masonry dome kept before the sixth century, except the tomb of Bizzos at Ruweha of the fifth century. In addition, Smith seems to distinguish an innovation in the Syriac hymn dedicated to the cathedral of Edessa rebuilt during the reign of Justinian: "there is no wood in its ceiling, made entirely of stone".[86] The lack of the typical structural conditionality for the masonry dome makes indeed regardless of age that working with wood can produce specific calligraphy of ritual canopies, "flamboyant" figures of domes. These "double shell" structures in Bosra, Jerusalem and Damascus could be achieved through experience and sophisticated technology of the shipbuilders.[87] Why shouldn't be possible for the symbolic shapes to evolve in monumental architectural shapes, by canceling the size and the constructive limitations of masonry? Was this vernacular tradition of the golden masonry dome that dictated the octagonal plan? This question finds two solutions in principle for the plan restitution: 1) the plan is a projection of the dome or 2) the plan is possibly designed as a symbolic key, irrespective of coverage. The vision of the Syrian domes, golden ships sailing in the sky, would only need the building material or according to the testimony of Procopius, there was wood at least in northern Syria, until the sixth century. However, the adverse reality is kept according to Saint Gregory of Nyssa letter to Amphilochius, bishop of Iconium, written between 379 and 394. The Saint requires sending those builders who know how to build stone vaults without scaffolding, which he heard that they are stronger than those raised on wooden boarding. And he adds: "the lack of wood forces us to this choice to cover the whole area with stone, because the place does not provide any wood backup board for coverage."[88] Besides the symbolic meaning argument, the intense and frequent earthquakes could be another strong reason for using the wooden dome in Syria.

In the absence of the archaeological evidence, no possible link can be verified between the solar dome and the first Constantinian theophanic *martyria* in the Holy Land. Theologically speaking, it remains to guess the movement of the golden dome - dome-dwelling (of the Latin word *doma* - house, dwelling, roof) from the Syro-Palestinian tradition to Early Christianity. *Domus Dei*, the new House of God, replaces fast enough the

temple in Jerusalem and passes across the Middle Ages and the Renaissance to the cathedral dome in the today West with all the opposition of the Christian apologists. The mystagogy of the seventh century is found in the germs of the Syrian theology of the fourth century: we are under the first cosmic domes identifying for the first time with God-Christ. The church circumscribes the comprehensible universe.

G. Rivoira, 1918

The major difference to the reconstruction of his predecessor, A. Birnbaum, lies in solving the core of the outer octagon not to resume the polyhedron theme, but as an alternation of rectangular and semicircular niches.[89] The Golden Octagon would be seeded in the chronological line of these structures. Analyzing the passage of Eusebius from *Vita Constantini* (3.50) and the diaries, including iconographic ones of the Marquis de Vogüé,[90] Rivoira has concluded that the Octagon had a flat roof.

E. Kleinbauer, 1973

Through a historical retrospective approach, where he makes use of the spatial typological analysis tools, Kleinbauer studies the tetraconch churches of Antioch Patriarchate from the late fourth to early sixth century. He aims to show that their complex affinities are possible to define a local family which requires a regional concept identified in the Constantinian cathedral of Antioch, the Golden Octagon. This hypothesis says that the so-called Octagon has actually a tetraconch plan, reconstruction scenario rejected by Krautheimer.

4 Another reconstruction attempt

4.1 Architectural program

In general, the architectural shape recovery begins with understanding the design theme. The intentions behind the whole design should be questioned before treating specific issues related to the construction size, spaces and their functions, the principles of the overall composition. Currently, in the absence of information to serve as a foothold, we chose to delimit the subject - or issues raised by it - through a series of interrogations starting from the hypothesis cathedral-Octagon. Literally, the cathedral

is the throne room (unlike the tomb room). It is tempting to believe that it has its own genealogy, a history parallel to the regular churches, that it has its sources and the privileged world of architectural shapes. Grabar's poetic idea, which makes the *martyrium* the saint "dwelling" borrowed to God on earth, as the believers make their house available in the position *domus ecclesiae* or *titulus*, inspires us to believe that the cathedral is simply "the emperor's dwelling" where he receives God. As some dwellings, holy graves and imperial halls become churches. The congregation (*ecclesia*) host is a good Christian, a saint or the emperor, who prepares the most beautiful room. Basilicas are a kind of imperial donation made to Christ.

What therefore represent the Octagon to Constantine and the court exegetes? And accordingly, what is the relation between the tradition, craftsmen and the materials needed to build the cathedral?

- An ideal church, after Roman classical tradition, possible built with craftsmen from Rome and local materials (probably *spoliae*)? In any case, one should not neglect the proximity of the Roman imperial model because, while the Octagon is under construction, is prepared the opening of Constantinople, the new capital inspired by the fascination of Rome. Did Constantine consider a structure in Rome that he wanted to rebuild as the cathedral of Antioch? What would have impressed him so much that he chose a particular shape of the Octagon for the main community liturgical building of the Eastern capital? In 326, when Constantine leaves Rome, begin the works on the Holy Sepulcher of Jerusalem and in following year on the Golden Octagon. Other Rotundas follow in chronological order: *Apostoleion* of Constantinople, the Nativity Octagon in Bethlehem and the Octagon of Ascension on the Mount of Olives. Only the memorial of Bethlehem was certainly able to recover the Constantinian plan. The impression that creates the chronological ordering of the Christian imperial foundations is that, after fourteen years impregnated with Roman fascination, the Emperor focuses on a different building campaign looking to the East - where he decided to move the capital – and where the octagonal plan option does not seem an accident. In Rome, the only octagon that it might be due to Constantine is the baptistery of the Lateran cathedral, *Basilica Salvatoris*. It would be natural for it to resume the theme of Roman *nymphaea* octagons.

- An "isapostolic" cathedral, heiress of Nero's dome figured as *kosmokrator*? Is the Great Church or the Royal Church the place where the religion-politics equality is visibly showed? If so, the cathedral would be seen as a *sacred throne* in a *naos*-city. What was Constantine's true

status and what did he think when he called himself the "bishop of those outside"?[91] Did he consider himself the thirteenth apostle or the symbolism of the twelve columns of the Holy Sepulcher and of the *Apostoleion* cenotaphs was rather "an accident of architecture", according to Woods,[92] or was it a gesture deliberately ambiguous, typically Constantinian, Christian and pagan at the same time, suggesting the twelve signs with the Sun in the center? Does it make sense to look for the *omphalos*-hill in Antioch, as in Constantinople, or rather we must believe that the Octagon's location was a new graft in an old urban fabric and the *temenos* was just a cut-built site under the pressure of the existing built area?

- An ecumenical cathedral, "Mother" of all churches according to the model of Zion, along with other mother churches, the Holy Sepulcher and the *Basilica Salvatoris* in Rome? Was it a central extraordinary structure to subordinate all the other "canonical" gathering spaces, considered churches by affiliation to it?

- A baptismal cathedral, because it was placed on the island in the midst of the "living" waters of baptism or for having a golden dome - variant of Enlightenment (another name of Baptism in Early Christianity)? Because, as epiclesis, Baptism meant the act of the Holy Spirit coming down, the same act of birth of the Church itself? Does the eagle above the Roman mausoleum become the pigeon above the baptistery? Does the choice of the Epiphany feast as consecration day belong to Constantius or is it part of Constantine's project?

- (Another) *martyrium*-cathedral, similar to the five-aisled basilica next to the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem? If *martyria* were "necropolis cathedrals" or *dormitoria*-cathedrals, through the intervention of the imperial ideology the octagonal cathedral of Antioch could be the first *martyrium* dedicated to Christ, due not to sheltering relicts or commemorating facts, but to its exclusively symbolic shape. Christ, the new *Sol Invictus,* "the light of the world" is "confessed" by the golden dome. Justinian's Saint Sophia was also inspired by the luminous experience of God's vicinity, when being conceived as a huge concave mirror (Antemios was one of the renowned specialists in optics at that time) to capture and increase light by reflection, indefinitely. In Early Christianity, the luminous dome was the expression of Resurrection and eternal life, associated to myriads of *martyria*, "another heaven on earth", described with the same fascination by all chroniclers, from Eusebius and Choricius during the fourth and fifth centuries, to Procopius and Arculf in sixth and seventh centuries. Was then the Golden Octagon the first conscious specimen of a mystagogical

architecture of concave mirrors, the first container of light designed for the entire liturgical community and not only for the saint, emperor or clergy marching on the "royal path"?

4.2. Architectural shape. Reconstruction

In this case, the intention is also to proceed from what we know to what we do not know. The method consists of an iconographic investigation - not univocally, mostly analyzing the pieces of architecture (plans, facades, axonometric views), hypothetical reconstructions as well – but as a critical approach of sources by hand drawing. The exercise assumes that the Octagon is an assembly of spaces and not an isolated building (although the sculptural free-standing building is closer to the classical sense of the monument).

The size of the Octagon

In determining the size of the building, a first impression can be created by placing it in context. We know that the palatine complex occupied a quarter of the island and the racecourse - one of the largest in the Roman world - had 500x70-75m.[93] Its capacity is estimated to 80,000 people. Bath C, the largest of those recovered, rebuilt and completely restored after its destruction in the earthquake of 115, fitted into a rectangle of 80X53m[94] in the fourth century. If we add the dimensions of the largest central sanctuaries of the Early Christianity to this information, including the Octagon at Hierapolis with the opening of the central nucleus of 20m and the angle of the whole assembly around 50m, we have an indication of the Octagon's size. One should take into account the perceptual factor of great importance for the laudatory descriptions of Eusebius, which express one of the virtues of the central shape. It owes its grandeur not so much to its top dimensions as to its specific shape, the proportions between the subassemblies and how is sitting in space: an isolated rotunda in the middle of a court.

Sources: linguistic and typological analysis

If history of the Octagon is relatively well documented, regarding the architectural shape, only two descriptions of Eusebius are kept. Until recently, Libanius provided another foothold about an imperial foundation, by the malicious comment to a panegyric of his opponent, Bemarchius -

the most famous teacher of rhetoric in Constantinople around 340-342. For a long time, it was considered that the subject of this mysterious *basilikos logos*, "as long as the Nile",[95] is the Great Church of Antioch. Recent research studies, however, provide valid reasons (primarily the anachronism of the idea that just the most famous pagan rhetor is responsible for the propaganda of an imperial Christian building) that show that behind the concise description is not the Golden Octagon but the dynastic mausoleum built by Constantine in the center of the new capital of the Christian empire, which weakens even more the consistency of sources where the Octagon architecture can be contemplated.[96]

Eusebius, *De laudibus Constantini* 9.8-14[97]

A short passage of the court chronicler's speech of the year 335 is dedicated to the Octagon, on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of Constantine as emperor. 335 is also the year in which Theophanes places the initiation of works, hypothesis that if accepted, compels us to see the project in its first version and not the construction or the project execution plan. In the same year he proclaims his three sons emperors and he celebrates the consecration of the Holy Sepulcher.[98]

> Two locations in the East he singled out from all others – one in the Palestinian nation, inasmuch as in that place as from a fount gushed forth the life-bearing stream to all, the other in the Eastern metropolis which glorifies the name of Antiochus which it bears. In the latter, since it is the capital of the whole region, he dedicated a certain structure marvelous and unique for its size and beauty. **On the outside surrounding the whole temple (naos) with long walls, inside he raised the sanctuary (to anaktoron) to an extraordinary height and diversified it with an eight-walled plan. Encircling this (en kyklo) with numerous aisles (oikois) and niches (exedrai), he crowned it with a variety of decorations.**[99]

Eusebius, *Vita Constantini* 3.50[100]

A parallel passage in which appear some additional details was preserved in the *Vita Constantini*, encomium biography attributed to Eusebius:

> He also decorated the principal cities of the other provinces with sacred edifices of great beauty; as, for example, in the case of that metropolis of the East which derived its name from Antiochus, in which, as the head of that portion of the empire, he consecrated to the service of God a church of unparalleled size and beauty. **The entire building (neon) was encompassed by an enclosure (peribolos) of great extent, within which the church itself**

(eukterios oikos) rose to a vast elevation, being of an octagonal form, and surrouded on all sides (en kyklo) by many chambers (horemata), courts and upper (yperoon) and lower (katagheion) apartments; the whole richly adorned with a profusion of gold, brass and other materials of the most costly kind.[101]

If we refer to Eusebius speeches not as rhetorical mere descriptions of sacred architecture, but as true Christian theology treaties that make any presentation of an architectural object to end in the middle of the theological and Christological issues, they can be us helpful.[102] What do we learn from Eusebius' speeches and may be useful in understanding the architectural program and imagine the Octagon's architecture? For specific architectural details, a thorough linguistic analysis out of the parameters of this study, would sit in the mirror the terms used by Eusebius in describing the Octagon with those used in other descriptions of him - for example, the description of the Holy Sepulcher - and descriptions of other authors of the same period – the letter of Saint Gregory of Nyssa to Amphilochius, archbishop of Iconium, or the *ekphrasis* dedicated to the octagonal *martyrium* at Nazianzus before 374.

1. The Octagon is one of the two private foundations built in the East, with the Holy Sepulcher. The text may suggest that in one case we have a spiritual theophanic theme (Jerusalem), while in the other case we have more of a political and cultural project ("the East metropolis", "the capital of the entire region"). Two capitals are located in the same rank: one major of the Christian world, the other one of the entire Eastern, with complex authority, crowned by the apostolic see.

2. The sanctuary fitted Antioch, "the head of all the peoples", μονογενές τί χρημα - unique, unparalleled - for its size and beauty. It is a great temptation to foresee here a copy - unique at that time - of classical architecture, called to compete with all other gifts with which Roman emperors adorned Antioch. Who (rather than "what") was Antioch when the Octagon's foundations were set down? Before being one of the apostolic capitals of the Church, it is one of Europe's cultural capitals of Late Antiquity, with Alexandria, Ephesus or Athens and one of the most beautiful cities in the world. Before receiving the name of *Theopolis*, it was called the "Golden City", "Pearl of the Orient", "Antioch the Beautiful", "Voluptuous Antioch", "Antioch of pleasure" or "Sensual Antioch". Caesar visited it in 47 B.C. Octavian, Tiberius, Trajan, Hadrian spent some time in it and have embellished it building monuments. Titus adorned the gate

of the south, connecting Daphné to Antioch, with seraphim of the temple in Jerusalem, brought as war booty.[103] Emperor Commodus wanted the Olympics to be held at Antioch (in fact in Daphné, where the Olympic stadium is). Herod, king of the Jews, made two porticoes and a marble paving as a gift to it. Diocletian rebuilt the palace on the island – according to the words of Libanius, so rich and great that it alone could give the status of a city to any settlement where could be found. All Antioch was a grand imperial memorial, where Constantine had to have his Christian effigy: the golden sanctuary in the city of gold. The Octagon was therefore part of an imposed value class by its "imperial gift" status – of the ideal world of ancient classicism, imbued with the sensuality of the East. The Christian ideological context is doubled by the cultural and political context. Unlike Antioch, Constantine builds "unprecedentedly" and acts promptly in the Holy Land, moving between the theophanic stations of an eminently Christian topography.

3. Long walls surrounded the whole *temple;* inside, the sanctuary raised to a great height and it was embellished by a wall in eight sides. Hence, the *temple* (the building complex) is different from the *sanctuary* according to the pagan tradition of the sacred *temenos.* The Octagon could be located in the center of an enclosure (presumably square-shaped) or on one short side of a rectangular enclosure, as the traditional model of Roman imperial *mausolea.* It is possible that the enclosure - *peribolos* - has been made of "high walls" or refer to a *qvadriporticus.*

4. The sanctuary ("octagonal tower") was surrounded by many niches and exedrae (*oikoi* and *exedrai*) and it was highly decorated. This passage appears to provide the internal organization key of the plan. *Oikoi* and *exedrai* are terms returning to *ekphrasis* typical of Early Christianity, with reference to distinct spaces between them, ranked and possibly alternated. *Exedrai* are the arms that start from the core of the sanctuary from Kaoussie, according to inscriptions found in the *in situ* mosaic. In general, they seem to refer to an amplification of a major space, communicating with along the entire length of an aperture. *Oikos* is an amorphous designation apparently subordinate, designating a "room", a "chamber", a bounded and autonomous space in which the access is usually through an opening with a strictly functional significance, a gate or a door. However, it is hard to imagine the concentric octagons plan proposed by Birnbaum in the wording of Eusebius. This expression construction sooner sends to the family of radial octagons, which recalls Kleinbauer's thesis, the prototype of tetraconch Syrian liturgical space, so vehemently rejected by Krautheimer.

Is a wooden dome a paradox?

The wooden dome of the sixth century, rebuilt by the Patriarch Ephraim of Antioch was certainly not a paradox. But was it the faithful formal and structural answer of the original coating solution? Did the Antiochian people have a constructive tradition of the masonry dome, accustomed from the Romans? An affirmative answer is suggested by the very large number of baths of the sensual metropolis, of all types and all sizes (private, semi-public and public - *dêmosion).* If the *frigidarium* (otherwise the great hall of the *thermae,* with the largest openings) might be covered with wood framing, the *caldarium* requires a wall vaulting. So such a constructive variant was widespread, but most likely within some modest structural openings. Daphné mosaic border offers the drawing model of the bath of Ardabur, the prefect of the Orient (identified according to the preserved inscription: *pribaton Ardaburiu*), where two cupolas can be seen in the background.

Evagrius directly mentions the wooden dome built by Ephrem by his earthquake story of 588:

> ...most buildings fell down when their very foundations were churned up: as a result, everything around the most holy church was brought to the ground, with only the dome being preserved.(HE, 6.8) This had been fashioned by Ephrem out of timbers from Daphne, after it suffered in the earthquakes under Justin: as a result of the subsequent quakes this had tilted towards its northern part so that timbers were inserted to exert counterpressure, but these indeed fell down in this violent quake when the dome returned to its position and, as if under some law, reoccupied its proper place.[104]

The Golden dome of the Octagon could remind the *Marneion* in Gaza, described by Mark Deacon in the *Life of Porphyry.* Burned in 402, the famous pagan sanctuary had in its center a dome with a svelte silhouette elevated to a great height.[105] Bishop Porphyry built and finished *Basilica Eudoxiana,* cruciform in plan, above the foundations of the *Marneion* in 407, together with Rufinus, an Antiochian architect, "a man of faith and a good professional",[106] who certainly knew well the Kaoussie *martyrion* (381). Perhaps a wooden dome was at the intersection of the cross' arms.

Strong elements that define the Octagon listed so far are found in a brief but revealing typological study of Slobodan Ćurčić, about the family of central buildings placed in the middle of certain enclosures.[107] Christians would have practiced this sacred enclosure model (common in paganism)

in the fourth century, thus before the fashion of converting the pagan temple into church, typical for the next century, because they have already had a prototype in the mausoleum of Constantine in Constantinople. Late Antiquity visual sources are given for understanding the significance of the central scheme, with reference to the heavenly Jerusalem: Wisdom sitting in the middle of a *cvadriporticus,* the legendary "portico of Solomon", a large enclosure on the Holy Temple Mount.

The increasingly influence of the pre-Christian monotheism, as the sun cult of the Roman sacred architecture, could have been a key factor in the design of the mausoleum of Constantine. The Imperial Mausoleum of Constantinople, identified with a *martyrium*-church, is recently interpreted by Cyril Mango[108] as a domed Rotunda ("temple" according to Eusebius), autonomous volume "in the middle of a huge court, filled with pure air, with porticos on all four sides surrounding both the courtyard and the temple itself".[109] The cruciform church dedicated to the Apostles would have been attached to the rotunda by Constantius and consecrated in 370, nine years after his death and the rotunda was to keep only the role of the mausoleum. Ćurčić notes that it is a current spatial composition for the imperial mausoleums around 300. If the Rotunda in Thessalonica is an uncertain example because of insufficient archaeological evidence, the Mausoleum of Maxentius (also called Mausoleum of Romulus) on the Appian Way is very well preserved. Built between 307 and 312, it is distinguished by a great domed rotunda, modeled after the Pantheon, a vaulted annular crypt being developed in the central area. The spacious courtyard is enclosed on all four sides by porticoes of arcs on columns instead of architrave. No previous domed mausoleum is placed with such emphasis in the geometric center of a monumental courtyard and the only relevant precedent of Roman imperial architecture is the Temple of the Sun built by Aurelian in Rome. The Mausoleum of Diocletian in Spalato, built a few years earlier, was also a central domed octagon, peripter, temple-like structure, in a narrow and uncovered courtyard.

Placing the mausoleum-temple in the center of an uncovered courtyard is an innovation of Late Antiquity to the Roman customary law, where the temples (including the round ones), are axially placed on the short border of the rectangular enclosures that precede them.[110] Instead, the Temple of the Sun built by Aurelian in Rome was a round building, peripter, in the middle of a large rectangular courtyard, enclosed by a wall with three *exedrae* on each side, with the exception of the short side of the access. The role of monotheism on arts and architecture in Late Antiquity in general

and particularly during the patronage of Constantine is also checked on the formal centrality of the column of Constantine-Helios in the center of the Forum of Constantinople (330).

The central scheme, although not widespread, deserves full attention of this study: the Golden Octagon in Antioch appears to be the prototype of churches that customize the fourth century monotheistic ideology. These include the octagon-*martyrium* of Nyssa (~380), an edition where the features of the Mausoleum of Constantine in the composite version of 370 can be recognized, when the cross is already superimposed over the initial rotunda. The first cathedral of Athens, a functional conversion of the fifth century, uses the tetraconch inside the Library of Hadrian. The Church of Mary *Theotokos* on Mount Gerizim (484), built by the Emperor Zeno on a sacred place both for the Samaritans and Christians, is in the center of a porticated enclosure, later fortified. Finally, the Octagon of Caesarea Maritima (525-550), which stands on the platform of Rome and Augustus temple built by Herod, is inscribed in a square frame made of rectangular rooms, probably of lower height, with unknown function. The most recent excavations suggest the existence of an extensive Christian remodeling in the fourth century.

The tradition of the central sanctuary in a monumental courtyard is abandoned in the sixth century and it will be punctually evoked later, as two exceptional buildings in the seventh century.[111] At Zvartnots near Ecimiatzin, between 645 and 660, the Catholic Pro-Greek Nerses II builds a tetraconch rotunda, isolated on a platform over-raised by a set of stairs, where the researchers saw a strong relationship with Syria-Palestine. The dome of the Rock, built in 691, is the first monumental building of Islamic worship in Jerusalem. It lies in the highest and central place of an irregular trapezoidal enclosure, bounded by a monumental scale, which is also inside the so-called platform of the temple in Jerusalem, called by Islamic people "the noble enclosure", *Haram- al-Sharif*, and *Templum Domini* by the Crusaders in the twelfth century.

Consequently, the central building located amidst an uncovered monumental courtyard is a monotheistic model, also shared by the Jews, the pagan Sun worshipers, Christians and Islamic people. It seems to be the best iconographic formula for conveying the idea of God's oneness and the absolute centrality of His place in the world, concept eventually made possible in the Holy Land, judging statistically by the examples raised. Constantine and his close advisers are the authors of the Christian version of the monotheistic central scheme in the case of the Golden Octagon

of Antioch. Advocating the doctrine of the uniqueness and centrality of God throughout the empire, the emperor strengthened his own status of unique vicar of God on earth.

The Christian monotheism had also the value of a political doctrine.

Conclusions

The Golden Dome

It seems that we have to choose between a dome of gilded wood, as in Smith's hypothesis and a masonry dome. Taking into account the speed with which sanctuaries were built during Constantine's reign, the temptation to choose the wooden structure is higher. We are also informed about the architects crisis facing Constantine, a very serious argument against a wall complex experiment, which would have required professional technique and knowledge, as the case of Pantheon or Basilica of Maxentius. Finally, we must not forget that the new Christian capital site of the empire had just been inaugurated, so that one can legitimately assume that all available resources arrived to Constantinople.

One possible model for the Octagon's Dome, as already said, could be the willowy dome of *Marneion* in Gaza, described by Mark the Deacon: a round building with two concentric colonnades and a central dome bulb-shaped (kibèrion), elevated at a great height.[112] Theophanes[113] refers to it using the term σφαιροειδής, reviewed by Downey.[114]

Another shining dome was erected on the *Apostoleion*'s hill of Constantinople, probably on a simultaneous site. If we believe as Mango[115] that the dynastic mausoleum was a rotunda, we can detect a parallel to the Golden Octagon in Antioch in the encomium of Eusebius:

> Trellised relief-work wrought in bronze and gold went right round the building...
> And above, over this [ceiling], on the roof-top itself, bronze instead of tiles provided protection for the building, furnishing safety for the rains. And much gold lit this up so that it shot forth dazzling light, by means of the reflection of the sun's rays to those who beheld it from afar. And he encircled the little roof (domation instead of doma for the rest of the building) round about with pierced grilles, executed in gilded bronze.[116]

The portrait of the mysterious central building can be seen also with the description of the octagonal church of Nazianzus. The text is part of the funeral speech written by Saint Gregory of Nazianzus with his father's death in 374. The foundation falls chronologically within the pontificate of his father (328-374), but more likely in the final period.

> It surrounds itself with eight regular equilaterals and it raised aloft by the beauty of the two stories of pillars and porticoes, while the statues placed upon them are true to life; its vault (ούρανω) flashes down upon us from above and it dazzles our eyes with the abundant sources of light.[117]

The unified interior space

So far we have recovered a central domed tower, with its vertical support - columns or pilasters rather than masonry piles that would interrupt the continuity of the interior space. Speaking about this feature of the first Christian meeting places, we should make the following remark: there are two major schemes of the central *naos*, one radial and one circular. The radial variant is found mostly in the transformation process of the central funerary sanctuary in a large central space for meetings: pilgrimage sanctuaries and in general all those spaces that can accommodate multiple activities without the interior unit to suffer (Saint Babylas at Kaoussie or Saint Simeon Stylite at Qalat Seman). Sometimes, large aisles can be detached radially from the central core in a centrifugal movement. Conversely, the second category includes sanctuaries with a stronger centripetal trend and a greater internal coherence, where the central core expands outside. I think this is the best formula for a metropolitan cathedral, as is the case of the Golden Octagon in Antioch - a central space strongly polarized, literally and symbolically. The expression *en kyklo* used by Eusebius supports this hypothesis.

The compact plan seems to be more urban, more contiguous to the *peribolos* theme - a monumental building in the middle of the courtyard - while the radial plan is more common in *extra-muros* construction. The hypothesis of the central Eucharistic altar and/ or the equivalent perimeter entrances instead of the rhetoric of *narthex* on two levels proposed by Krautheimer, also should not be excluded.

NOTES

1. The author of this paper was a NEC-UAR Fellow for the academic year 2010-11.
2. G. DOWNEY remains the foundation of any research: *A History of Antioch in Syria from Seleucus to the Arab Conquest,* Princeton University Press, Princeton 1961; related to primary sources, recent studies of D. WOODS, "Libanius, Bemarchius and the Mausoleum of Constantine I", *Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History* 13, Bruxelles, 2006, p. 428-439; "Malalas, Constantine and a church inscription from Antioch", *Vigiliae Christianae* 69, 2005, p. 54-62 and M. RAIMONDI, "Bemarchio di Cesarea, panegirista di Costantino e Costantinopoli: per una reinterpretazione di Libanio, Or. I 39 41", *Rivista storica dell'antichità* 33, 2003, p. 171-199.
3. FESTUGIÈRE, A.-J., *Antioche païenne et chrétienne*, Paris, 1959, p. 43 and next.
4. SHEPERD, M.H. Jr., "The formation and influence of the Antiochene liturgy", *DOP*, 15, 1961, p. 28.
5. For details on this tradition, idem, p. 30, n. 26.
6. LASSUS, J., *Sanctuaires chrétiens de Syrie: essai sur la genèse, la forme et l'usage liturgique des édifices du culte chretien, en Syrie, du IIIe siècle à la conquête musulmane,* Geuthner, Paris, 1947, p. 201-212.
7. A recent paper dealing with homiletic view regarding the life of the Early Antiochian church: MAXWELL, J.L., *Christianization and Communication in Late Antiquity. John Chrisostom and his congregation in Antioch,* Cambridge University Press, 2006.
8. SHEPERD, M.H. Jr., *op. cit.,* p. 38.
9. Idem, p. 43-4: CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA, *Stromata*, VI. 5.
10. Expression enshrined by GRABAR, A., *op. cit.*
11. EUSEBIUS, *Vita Constantini* 3.50 and *De laudibus Constantini* 9.8-14; we will return to these paragraphs in the following pages
12. WOODS, D., "Libanius, Bemarchius and the Mausoleum of Constantine I", p. 432.
13. DEICHMANN, F.W., "Das Oktogon von Antiocheia: Heroon-Martyrion, Palastkirche oder Kathedrale?", *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, LXV, 1972, p. 40-57.
14. KRAUTHEIMER, R., ĆURČIĆ, S., *Early Christian…*, p. 75-8.
15. ĆURČIĆ, S., „From the Temple of the Sun to the Temple of the Lord: Monotheistic Contribution to Architectural Iconography in Late Antiquity", C.L. Striker Publishing House, *Architectural Studies in Memory of Richard Krautheimer,* Mainz am Rhein, 1996, p. 55-60.
16. JEROME, *Chronicle*, Olymp. 276, 3, p. 231-2 Helm and Theophanes Publishing House, a. 5819, p. 28. 16-17 De Boor Publishing House; as well as Philostorgius, *HE*, Bidez Publishing House, Leipzig 1913, p. 212 and *Chronicon Miscellaneum ad Annum Domini 724 Pertinens,* publishing

and translation E. W. Brooks and J.-B. Chabot, in *Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium* 4, *Scriptores Syri* ser. 3, Louvain, 1904, p. 102.

[17] For comments on the sources providing this date, see DOWNEY, G., *A History of Antioch,* p. 343, n. 106.

[18] *Nuovo Dizionario Patristico e di Antichita' Cristiana*, Genova-Milano 2006, p. 340-636.

[19] PROCOPIUS, *De aedificiis,* II, X, 2-25.

[20] ZANINI, E., *Introduzione all'Archeologia Bizantina*, NIS, Roma 1994, p. 123.

[21] POCCARDI, G., "Antioche de Syrie", *Mélanges de l'École francaise de Rome – Antiquité* 106, 1994, p. 1012, n. 42.

[22] About the difference in tone in the two names, SALIOU, C., "À propos de la ταυριανή πύλη: remarques sur la localisation présumée de la grande église d'Antioche de Syrie", *Syria* 77, 2000, p. 220, n. 24.

[23] LASSUS, J., "Antioche en 459 d'après la mosaïque de Yakto", in BALTY, J., (dir.), *Apamée de Syrie. Bilan des recherches archéologiques 1965-1968,* Centre belge de recherches archéologiques à Apamée de Syrie, Bruxelles, 1969, p. 139.

[24] THEODORET, *HE* 4.26.

[25] EVAGRIUS, *HE*, II, 12, tran. A.-J. Festugière, *Byzantion,* XLV, 2, 1975, p. 268-9.

[26] LIBANIUS, *Discours XI Antiochikos*, 203-212, tran. A.-J. Festugière, *op.cit.,* p. 24-6, 47.

[27] LIBANIUS, *Discours XI Antiochikos,* 206; THEODORET, *Histoire Philothée,*VIII, 8, 1-6 şi *HE* 4.26.

[28] EVAGRIUS, *HE* 2.12.

[29] THEODORET, *Histoire Philothée,* II, 15, 11-20 şi 19; VIII, 8, 1-6.

[30] THEOPHANES, *Chron.*, AM 5878, AD 385/86; DOWNEY, G., *A History of Antioch*, p. 619-620.

[31] MÜLLER, C. O., *Antiquitates Antiochenae,* Göttingen, Dieterich, 1839.

[32] WEULERSSE, J., "Antioche, essai de géographie urbaine", *Bull. ét. or.* (Institut français de Damas), IV, 1934, p.27-79; SAUVAGET, J., "Le plan de Laodicée-sur-mer", p. 81-114.

[33] DION CASSIUS, *Histoire Romaine*, 68, 25,5 quoted in POCCARDI, G., "Antioche de Syrie", p. 998.

[34] POCCARDI, G., *op.cit.*, p. 993-1023.

[35] LASSUS, J., "Antioche en 459, d'après la mosaïque de Yaqto...", p. 146.

[36] LEVI, D., A*ntioch mosaic pavements,* Princeton University Press, Princeton-London-Den Haag, 1947, p. 336.

[37] LASSUS, J., "Antioche en 459, d'après la mosaïque de Yakto...", p. 140, n. 2.

[38] idem., p. 145.

[39] POCCARDI, G., *op. cit.*, p.1005.

[40] LEVI, D., *op. cit.*, p. 323-346.

41 GRABAR, A., *op.cit.,* p. 214 and next.

42 SPIESER, J.- M., *Thessalonique et ses monuments du IVe au VIe siècle, BEFAR,* 254, Athènes, 1984, p. 110-123.

43 POCCARDI, G., *op. cit.,* p. 1009.

44 DUVAL, N., "Existe-t-il une *structure palatiale* propre à l'Antiquité tardive?", D. Levy Publishing House, *Le système palatial en Orient, en Grece et à Rome,* Travaux du Centre de Recherches sur le Proche-Orient et la Grèce antiques 9, Brill, Leyde, 1987, p. 462-490.

45 POCCARDI, G., *op. cit.,* p. 1012.

46 idem, p. 1010.

47 MALALAS, *Chron.* 13.3 (I. 4-6), Dindorf Publishing House, p. 418.

48 LIETZMANN, H., *Das Leben des Heiligen Symeon Stylites*, *Texte und Untersuchungen,* XXXII, 4, J.C. Hinrichs Publishing House, Leipzig, 1908, p. 77.

49 idem, p. 207.

50 LIBANIUS, *Antiochikos = Oratio XI*, 123, Förster Publishing House, I, p. 476, I. 12-14.

51 ELTESTER, W., "Die Kirchen Antiochias im IV. Jahrhundert", *Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, XXXVI, 1937, p. 261-3; first author of this interpretation is C.O.Müller, in *Antiquitates Antiochenae,* Göttingen, Dieterich, 1839; Theophanes related that there was a Taurian gate, associated with a bridge in Antioch, *Chron.* AM 5878, De Boor Publishing House, p. 70, 1. 10-11.

52 DOWNEY, G., *A History of Antioch...*, p. 348, n. 137.

53 SALIOU, C., "À propos de la ταυριανή πύλη...", p. 217-226.

54 ĆURČIĆ, S., "From the Temple of the Sun to the Temple of the Lord...", p. 55-60.

55 MAYER, W., "Antioch and the intersection between religious factionalism, place and power", in A. Cain and N. Lenski (ed.), *The Power of Religion in Late Antiquity*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2009, p. 357-367.

56 ĆURČIĆ, S., "Late-Antique Palaces: The Meaning of Urban Context", *Ars Orientalis*, 23, *Pre-Modern Islamic Palaces,* 1993, p. 67-90; DUVAL, N., *op. cit.*

57 DEICHMANN, F.W., "Das Oktogon von Antiocheia...", p. 40-57.

58 KANTOROWICZ, E.H., "On the Golden Marriage Belt and the Marriage Rings of the Dumbarton Oaks Collection", *DOP* 14, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1960, p. 1-16.

59 GRABAR, A., *op. cit.*, p. 214-222, 329.

60 KRAUTHEIMER, R., *op.cit.*, p. 75-8.

61 KLEINBAUER, W.E., "The origin and functions…", p. 91-114.

62 DEICHMANN, F.W., *op.cit.*, p. 40-57.

63 JANIN, R., *Les eglises et les monasteries de Constantinople. Géographie ecclésiastique de l'empire byzantine*, Paris, 1969.

64   SHEPERD, M.H. Jr., "Liturgical Expressions of the Constantinian Triumph", *DOP*, 21, 1967, p. 57-78.

65   DYNES, W., "The First Christian Palace-Church Type", *Marsyas,* XI, 1964, p. 1-9.

66   AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS, *Res gestae* 22.13.2, tran. Fontaine, p. 129.

67   DEICHMANN, F.W., *op. cit.,* p. 40-57.

68   DOWNEY, G., *A History of Antioch...,* n. 82.

69   *Nuovo Dizionario Patristico e di Antichita' Cristiana*, Genova-Milano 2006, p. 340-636.

70   EUSEBIUS, *VC* 3, 48; 4, 58-60.

71   DEICHMANN, F. W., *op. cit.,* p. 40-57.

72   ELTESTER, W., "Die Kirchen Antiochias...", p. 258; GRABAR, A., *op.cit.*, p. 222-6; DOWNEY, G., *A History of Antioch...*, p. 346; DEICHMANN, F.W., *op.cit.*, p. 43-4; GASCOU, J., "Notes d'onomastique ecclésiale ancienne", *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik,* 96, 1993, p. 137, n. 14.

73   GASCOU, J., *op. cit.*, p. 135-140.

74   THEODORET, *HE*, 5.35.

75   DEICHMANN, F.W., *op. cit.,* p. 40-57.

76   MŰLLER, C.O., *De Antiquitatibus Antiochenis,* p. 104, n. 18.

77   MALALAS, *Chron.*13.17.

78   WOODS, D., "Malalas, *Constantius* and a church-inscription from Antioch", p. 54-62.

79   LASSUS, J., *The Early Christian and Byzantine World,* Paul Hamlyn, London, p. 36.

80   BIRNBAUM, A., "Die Oktogone von Antiochia, Nazianz und Nyssa", *Repertorium für Kunstwissenschaft*, XXXVI, 1913, p. 181 and next.

81   The wording "double-shell construction" belongs to W. MacDonald, in *Early Christian and Byzantine Architecture,* New York, 1962.

82   DYNES, W., "The First Christian Palace-Church Type", *Marsyas,* XI, 1964, p. 1-9.

83   KLEINBAUER, W.E,. *The Aisled Tetraconch*, p. 253 and next.; "The origin and functions…", p. 91-114.

84   Smith, E. B., *The Dome. A Study in the History of Ideas*, Princeton University Press, Princeton-New Jersey, 1950, p. 29-30.

85   Idem, p. 9.

86   Idem, p. 50.

87   Idem, p. 13, n. 12.

88   GREGORY OF NYSSA, *Epist.* 25, *P.G.*, XLVI, 1093.

89   RIVOIRA, G., *Moslem Architecture. Its Origins and Development*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1918, p. 60-1.

90   DE VOGÜÉ, M., *Syrie centrale. Architecture civile et religieuse du I' au VII' Siècle*, 2 vol., J. Baudry, Paris, 1865-1877.

91   EUSEBIUS, *VC*, 4.24.
92   WOODS, D., "Libanius, Bemarchius and the Mausoleum of Constantine I",
      p. 435.
93   POCCARDI, G., *op. cit.,* p. 1002.
94   ibidem, p. 1003.
95   Translation taken from RAIMONDI, M., *op. cit.*, p. 174.
96   RAIMONDI, M., *op. cit.,* p. 171-199; Woods, D., "Libanius, Bemarchius
      and the Mausoleum of Constantine I", p. 428-439.
97   For the Greek text, Heikel Publishing House, p. 221.
98   EUSEBIUS, *VC* 4.40-47.
99   DRAKE, H.A., *In Praise of Constantine*, p. 170, n. 22.
100   For the Greek text, Heikel Publishing House p. 98.29 and the next.
101   For translation, SCHAFF p. 532-3.
102   RAIMONDI, M., *op. cit.*, p. 181.
103   LASSUS, J., "Antioche en 459 d'après la mosaïque de Yakto", p. 140.
104   EVAGRIUS, 6.8, translated by G. Downey. Ephrem became the patriarch
      of Antioch in 527.
105   HILL, G. F., *The Life of Porphyry, Bishop of Gaza, by Mark the Deacon*,
      1913, 75-87, p. 140; CPG 6277: H. Grégoire - M.-A. Kugener, Marc le
      Diacre, *Vie de Porphyre évêque de Gaza. Texte établi, traduit et commenté*
      (Collection Byzantine publiée sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume
      Budé), Paris, 1930; CPG 3626: M. van Esbroeck, "Une homélie sur l'église
      attribuée à Jean de Jerusalem", în *Le Muséon* 86, 1973, p. 283-304; idem,
      "Jean II de Jérusalem et les cultes de S. Étienne, de la Sainte-Sion et de la
      Croix", in *Analecta Bollandiana* 102, 1984, p. 115-125.
106   SMITH, E.B., *op. cit.,* p. 15.
107   ĆURČIĆ, S., "From the Temple of the Sun...", p. 55-60.
108   MANGO, C., "Constantine's Mausoleum and the Translation of Relics",
      Byzantinische Zeitschrift 83, 1990, p. 51-62.
109   EUSEBIUS, *VC*, 4.58, HEIKEL p. 141, SCHAFF p. 555-6.
110   ĆURČIĆ, S., "From the Temple of the Sun...", p. 56, n. 8.
111   ibidem, p. 57.
112   HILL, G. F., *The Life of Porphyry, Bishop of Gaza, by Marc the Deacon*,
      Oxford, 1913, p. 75-87, 140.
113   THEOPHANES, *Chron.* A 5833, p. 36.29.
114   DOWNEY, G., *A History of Antioch…*, p. 23, n. 3.
115   MANGO, C., "Constantine's Mausoleum and the Translation of Relics",
      Byzantinische Zeitschrift 83, 1990, p. 51-62.
116   EUSEBIUS, *VC*, 4.58, HEIKEL p. 141, SCHAFF p. 555-6.
117   GREGORY OF NAZIANZUS, *The speech* 18, 39, *PG* 35, 1037, quoted also
      by SMITH, E. B., *op. cit.,* p. 31.

MARIANA GOINA

Born in 1966, in Abaclia, Republic of Moldova

Ph.D. in Medieval Studies, Central European University, Budapest (2010)
Thesis: *The birth and development of pragmatic literacy in the medieval principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia (fourteenth to sixteenth century)*

Academic Fellowship Program scholar at the department of World History, Chisinau Pedagogical University
M.A. and Ph.D. scholarships, Central European University, Budapest

She published on the topics of literacy, settlement of disputes in Medieval Wallachia, and Eastern and Western *Specula Principum.*

LITERATES IN A QUASI-ORAL SOCIETY MOLDAVIAN AND WALLACHIAN CHANCELLERY SCRIBES (FOURTEENTH TO SIXTEENTH CENTURIES)

During the first centuries of existence of Medieval Romanian Principalities, the use of written culture seems to have been very restricted. Writing was used, if at all, at the level of prince's chancellery, for record keeping and communication, and by the monastic institutions for copying of religious manuscripts. At the other levels of the society the use of writing was sporadic, passive and reactive.

Apparently, the active writing skills hardly went beyond a restricted circle of professional scribes. Most of them seem to have been employed in the state chancellery or monasteries, the only institutions that up to the first quarter of the sixteenth century were actively involved in the producing of documents. In the following lines, I shall give attention to the employee of the prince's chancelleries. I shall try to trace who were the literate clerks who activated in the state chancelleries from the foundation of the Wallachian and Moldavian states up to the end of the sixteenth century. I shall investigate (to the extent the available record would make this possible) their social origins, ages, family relations, and level of education. In addition, I shall look into who were the first producers of regional, urban and village documents when written records began to be used by other strata of the Wallachian and Moldavian society.

The first surviving land charters already suggest that the early literate personnel employed in the princely writing offices were laymen of high social standing. Writing during the early period seems to have been a family enterprise as often kinship relations are attested between employees of the princely offices.

This practice seems at odds with the pattern to be found either in Western Europe or in Byzantium as from Scandinavia to neighboring Poland the ecclesiastical institutions were very active both in promoting as well as producing the early documents as forms of record storage. Conversely, in Wallachia and Moldavia, the church was only indirectly engaged in the producing of early charters as some of the scribes were offspring of highly positioned ecclesiastics. Only later, during the sixteenth century, priests began to play a more active role in the producing of land charters, both as employee in the princely chancelleries or individually at the village level. During the early period, monastic institutions, especially from Wallachia, appear mostly as commissioners of written records as forms of legal proof over land. This might be due to the fact that in the Medieval Romanian Principalities the monastic institutions were apparently dependent on the administrative machinery that the newly founded states had put in place.[1] Only charters issued at the level of princely chancellery had legal value during the early period.

The surviving evidence from Wallachia and Moldavia in regard to the attestation of professional literates is very uneven: while in Moldavia the early data already suggest a pattern of highly positioned and kin related clerks, in Wallachia due to numerous inconsistencies in the practices of the early state chancellery it is hard to unveil the pattern of employment of the early literates. However, when the data become richer, I can notice that the early Moldavian model can as well be traced in the neighboring principality.

The Moldavian evidence

The first surviving names of Moldavian scribes suggest that during the early period the employment in the princely office might have been transmitted from father to son. The skills seem to have been learnt in the office as all fifteenth century Moldavian chancellors are attested as former scribes.

The first signed Moldavian document, extant from 1401, mentions that it was written by Bratei logofăt, (chancellor)[2] and sealed by Pan Tamash.[3] Nineteen years later, Ivașco, son of Bratei (Ivașco Brateevici), is recorded as a scribe in the Moldavian office.[4] Moreover, the same father-son relation can be pinned between other two early names during the early fifteenth century. Chancellor Isaia, who was in the service of

the Moldavian princes between 1409 and 1420, indicated in 1414 that he was the son of Gârdu.[5] As a scribe Gârdu is attested in the Moldavian office in 1407,[6] it is possible that Isaia was his son. According to the extant documents, the two scribes and their fathers were the only clerks recorded as employed in the Moldavian office until 1422, when the number of scribes and chancellors began to expand; by the reign of Stephen the Great (1457-1504) thirty-five other names are mentioned.[7]

As the surviving data gradually build up and enlarge, it unveils more suggestions about the careers of the early literates and practices of the Moldavian state chancellery. One of the earliest most prominent figures that came down to us is Mikhu/Mikhail, scribe and chancellor in the Moldavian office. His family archive, preserved in Poland, provides us with an exceptionally fortunate example for the early period, when family relations, political career, physical property, and whereabouts are possible to trace on the basis of preserved records. An analysis of his life course hints at the status needed to begin a career in the prince's office during the early period and also suggests the practices at work in the Moldavian state chancellery in the fifteenth century. Last but not least, it illustrates to what extent service in the prince's chancellery might augment a man's initial political and economical standing.

Mikhail is attested for the first time as a scribe in 1422, when the Moldavian office seems to have been still run by a restricted number of professional clerks. Only after the first quarter of the fifteenth century, a greater number of scribes began to be attested in the surviving evidence.[8] It seems that he began his service in the prince's office at an early age[9] as there is information about him continuously from 1422 until 1470.[10] In 1443, after twenty-one years of service, he became the head of the Moldavian state chancellery.[11] I see the length of his service before his appointment as a chancellery head as suggestive for the practices of the early Moldavian chancellery. It seems that skills were learnt in the office and the higher personnel of the chancellery were selected from those inside the office.

Mikhail was the oldest son of a wealthy and highly positioned church hierarch.[12] There are extant five charters received by priest Iuga, father of scribe Mikhail, from 1424 until 1436, confirming his land property. Given the fact that from this period 108 Moldavian charters are surviving, (even if the Mikhail's family archives had better chances of reaching us), the number of endowments received by scribe Mikhail' father points to a high social standing and wealth. However, during his thirty-two years[13] service

151

in the Moldavian chancellery, Mikhail' wealth increased constantly. His land estates were much more significant than his father's Iuga and Mikhail was continuously in the process of acquiring new land properties through frequent purchases and the prince's donations; fourteen surviving charters testify to his land property.[14] During his service in the Moldavian chancellery, Mikhail seems to become one of the richest and most influential personalities of his time.[15] His position in the state chancellery offered him the social standing that facilitated the endeavor for a political career.[16] Mikhail/Mikhu, was among the first recorded diplomats, who in 1456, when the Moldavians agreed to pay the first tribute to the Ottoman Empire, was sent to Istanbul to try to negotiate the amount to be paid or, if that was impossible, to agree upon the conditions.[17]

Mikhail's case is not singular. During the reign of Stephen the Great, another chancellor, Tăutu, made a similar brilliant career. Scribe in 1464[18] and chancellor in 1475,[19] his case is illustrative: his family provided clerks and chancellors to the Moldavian chancellery for three centuries.[20] His career is one of the longest known;[21] chancellor under Stephen the Great and his son, Bogdan served the Moldavian princes for forty-seven years.[22] During his long service in the chancellery Tăutu became one of the first state dignitaries, the prince's adviser, and messenger on various diplomatic missions.[23]

The status of Moldavian scribes, similar to that of the chancellors, seems to have been highly ranked. They are addressed reverently in the charters as "faithful noblemen," or "prince's noblemen."[24] They often received written confirmation of their land estates, such as, for instance, Toader, brother of the priest Luca, who was active at the end of the fifteenth century in the Moldavian chancellery both as issuer[25] and recipient of documents. During a period of service of eight years in the state chancellery, he received four charters as a scribe[26] and one as chancellor attesting his land domains.[27]

By the end of the fifteenth century a pattern of kinship relations between the individuals employed as scribes in the Moldavian chancellery becomes apparent. Despite an inconsistent manner of signing their names, it is possible that three brothers, Ion dascal (teacher), Coste, and Toader were writing in the Moldavian chancellery during the same time span.[28] Fortunately, they received numerous land endowments,[29] where the extensive family was recorded. In a property charter received by scribe Toader alone[30] or in a charter of family land partition it is mentioned that scribe Toader, together with his brother, scribe Coste, priest Luca, and

other brothers were grandchildren of pan Negrea,[31] who is attested as governor during the reign of Alexander the Good.[32] The recorded land possessions and the noble status of their grandfather (pan)[33] testify once more to the high social standing and wealth of the Moldavian scribes of the period. Other examples indicate that by the end of the fifteenth century a number of sons of priests were employed as scribes in the Moldavian chancellery.[34]

The turn of the sixteenth century record some changes in the practices of the Moldavian chancellery. After the reign of Stephen the Great (1457-1504), chancellors cease to be appointed from the pool of scribes.[35] I assume that the wider spread of literacy skills allowed noblemen without former training in the chancellery to carry out the functions of the chancellor's role.[36] Moreover, from the early sixteenth century onwards, the head of the chancellery was ranked as the highest dignity of the Moldavian state. Consequently, the function of the head of the chancellery began to be bestowed by the princes as recompense for special merits. Thus, from the sixteenth century onward it seems that the categories of scribes and chancellors began to be separated in the Moldavian chancellery.

A new characteristic of the period is that a novel social category, that of parish priests began to be recorded among the employee of the princes' office.[37] Only during the sixteenth century, the ordained priests seem to have played a more active role in the producing of documents, both as employees of the princes' office and as private individuals who drafted documents at the village level. Moreover, the pattern of kinship relations between chancellors and scribes was substituted by affiliations between scribes and priests.[38] Grămadă considered that the social pool out of which scribes were recruited began to include families of low noblemen and free peasants.[39] I, however, notice that highly positioned noblemen families, however, such as the Tăutus[40] or the family of Dobrul, chancellor under Stephen the Great,[41] provide scribes and chancellors for the state chancelleries up to the seventeenth century. Moreover, blood relation between high state dignitaries and chancellery scribes is consistently recorded in the richer sixteenth century evidence.[42] For instance, scribe Ionashco is shown to be son of a chamberlain and brother of the wife of a high governor, the second highest office in the Moldavian state.[43]

For one of the Moldavian scribes belonging to the new scribe category (*uricar*), documents disclose his predecessors for four generations:

Figure 1. Example of a noble family tree illustrating kin relations among scribes in sixteenth-century Moldavia

Zaharia, former governor (*vornic*),
married Nastea
|
|
Platon, ------- Toader, --------Stanca, married chamberlain Vartic
Priest   unordained priest (*dascal*) |
|
|
Isaia ------- Cârstea Mihăilescu,
high scribe (*uricar*)
|
|
Damian Cârstovici,
scribe

Cârstea Mihăilescu was the grandson and son of high state dignitaries. After the turn of the sixteenth century, however, due to social, political, and economic instability, the situation of certain noble families as, for instance, that of scribe Mihăilescu began to decline. The financial means of the family seem to have been fairly modest, as Cârstea Mihăilescu shared with his siblings and cousins a single village, inherited from their grandfather. Compared to other family members, however, Cârstea Mihăilescu, employee of the prince's chancellery, seems to have been in a better social and economic position than his kinsmen, as he kept purchasing parts of the commonly held village from his relatives.[44]

Additionally, other records of scribes' wealth and capability of purchasing land estates suggest that their services were well paid. They continued to purchase and receive land estates from the princes they served.[45] Although sometimes Moldavian scribes are attested as selling their land estates,[46] usually the extant records point to their position as rich landowners.[47]

Thus, service in the prince's office was an opportunity that brought the employee to a higher social position, wealth, and status. Written culture was restricted and those who could actively participate in its performance

were few. This capacity certainly led to appreciation among their fellows, a rise in social status and, not least, financial benefits.[48] Consequently, certain influential families tended to monopolize the role and secure leading positions in the chancellery for their young relatives. Moldavian state dignitaries remained equally interested in chancellery service, even if this place was no longer so closed and elite-oriented during the sixteenth century, which testifies once more to the economic and political benefits it provided. Further, during the times of political and social instability it provided the necessary financial means to preserve the status quo, as the case of Uricar Cârstea Mihăilescu suggests.

The Wallachian evidence

The data about Wallachian literates employed in the princely writing office during the early period are scarce. This is due to the small number of documents extant from the fifteenth century, and to the inconsistencies of the writing template practiced in the Wallachian chancellery. Even by the middle of the fifteenth century scribes' names are often omitted. Few Wallachian clerks are attested until the end of the reign of Mircea the Old in 1418. Only during the reign of Vlad Dracul (1437-1444), the names of the Wallachian scribes began to multiply, yet by the end of the reign of Vladislav II (1448-1456), only eleven names come down to us. Many foreign names are attested among them, which indicate that natives and foreign scribes were employed together in the Wallachian office throughout the fifteenth century.[49]

Additionally, there is a confusion in the terms used to describe the functions of scribes and chancellors in the Wallachian office as both of them were called logofăt (chancellor) during the early period.[50] A clause in the charter introducing the chancellor who was endorsing the newly written documents with the prince's seal is not characteristic for Wallachian charters. It was, however, specific for the Moldavian chancellery and is of great help in distinguishing between the chancellor and scribes in the early charters.

In Wallachia, the names of the chancellors can be grasped only from the witnesses' lists that are recorded in the *corroboratio*. Unfortunately, rather often witnesses are not recorded in the early Wallachian charters, especially when they register donations to monastic institutions (an extra indication of a lower standing written documents had yet in Wallachia).[51]

As a great majority of early Wallachian charters were issued on behalf of monastic institutions, this constitutes a significant difficulty in tracing the careers of Wallachian employees of the state chancellery. Moreover, in certain cases the witness lists seem to be incomplete, as the names of the chancellors were not recorded among the dignitaries who had witnessed the transaction.[52] These omissions in the record are difficult to understand since chancellor's presence was mandatory for the juridical validity of the given document.[53]

Thus, up to the end of the fifteenth century, the Wallachian evidence is sparse. However, when the evidence discloses the names of the scribes or their family relations, they appear as laymen, kinsmen of high state dignitaries. For instance, scribe Ban records that he is son of the Wallachian governor, the second ranked dignitary in Wallachia.[54] At times, data indicate that the scribes' positions were even coupled with other state dignities.[55]

The data also suggest that during the fifteenth century, Wallachian scribes similar to the Moldavian ones began their service at an early age and remained in the office for a long time, consequently earning the high position of second or first chancellor. For instance, Coica, who is attested as an active Wallachian scribe from 1424 shows up in the witness list as one of the first heads of the chancellery.[56]

The practices in the Wallachian chancellery unfold more consistently only from the reign of Radu the Great (1495-1508) when the documentary evidence multiplies. The data confirm that the fifteenth century model continued to be at work during the sixteenth century: apparently scribes served in the Wallachian chancellery for quite a long time period, and often former scribes made a transition to the post of chancellor.[57] For instance, Oancea is attested as scribe from 1491[58] until 1510, when he became chancellor.[59] However, as chancellor he remained in the Wallachian office only up to 8 January 1512, when the Wallachian Prince Vlad the Young (1510-1512) was removed by Neagoe Basarab (1512-1521).[60] Other examples also illustrate that the careers of Wallachian chancellors may have been shorter than in Moldavia. Probably this was due to the higher degree of political instability of the sixteenth century Wallachia and to the fact that the office of the chancellor was ranked the third highest in Wallachia. These circumstances might have kept certain influential Wallachian noblemen from a life career in the state chancellery.[61]

Further on, kinship relations are attested between professional literates employed in the princely office. One of the earliest examples disclosed

by the data is priest Frâncu, his brother, chancellor Stanciu, and the son of chancellor Stanciu, scribe and later on chancellor, Tudor.[62]

Unfortunately, in Wallachia, during the fifteenth century little evidence is recorded about the scribes' wealth, as few extant charters record their land possessions.[63] Yet, their status seems to have been high, as they are addressed by the princes as jupan (nobleman), the highest Wallachian status during the period.[64] Even after the turn of the sixteenth century, Wallachian scribes were seldom attested as recipients of written charters. Possibly, the high price of written documents was an obstacle for them as for other Wallachian noblemen, as they had to pay the usual taxes to the prince. Yet, when confirmed, land property suggests that scribes possessed considerable land estates. Similar to Moldavia, data show them as wealthy landholders and active purchasers of land estates. Priest Frâncu, similar to the Moldavian priest Iuga a century earlier, was in the prince's service.[65] Later, he is attested among the first Wallachian laymen who recorded in writing his purchased land estates.[66] Together with his brother, chancellor Stanciu and his son, Tudor, priest Frâncu seems to have been – unsurprisingly – very record-minded. They secured their estates twice in the prince's office, after a possible preliminary record in the urban chancellery.[67]

The attestation of kinship relations among various members of the Wallachian chancellery shows an increase by the middle of the sixteenth century and was broadly documented especially towards the end of the century. Chancellors' sons were employed as clerks and later as chancellors. Kinship relations within the chancellery clerks are attested not only between fathers and sons,[68] but also between grandfathers or uncles and their grandchildren and nephews.[69] Grandfathers or childless uncles would choose a grandson or nephew and grant him their name, estates, and, one assumes, learning. The honored favorites seem to have been eager to point to this relation in their records presumably as support for their privileged position.[70]

For the late period, an indicative Wallachian case is the Coresi family, who provided three generations of clerks to the prince's office during the sixteenth century. Scribe Coresi, son of chancellor Coresi, seems to have had at his turn a son or a nephew employed as a scribe in the prince's office.[71] Coresi began his career as a scribe in 1538[72] and only in 1575 is attested as the second chancellor,[73] which shows that, given the numerous employees of the prince's office in the later period, it took longer to attain a higher position. His income seems to have been

significant, as he actively purchased land during a period of social crisis when small land estates were concentrated into the large properties of high noblemen. In the numerous charters he secured, his family appears as wealthy landowners.[74] His father was similarly employed as a chancellor and both of them increased their wealth through official income as well as through the registration of private land transactions.[75]

Thus, although with a certain lag, the data indicate that some elements of the early Moldavian pattern can be traced in Wallachia as well. From the turn of the sixteenth century, when Wallachian evidence is richer, I can notice that clerks employed in the state chancery were offspring of high state dignitaries; they often began their service in the office as scribes at an early age and some, after a long period of service, became heads of the Wallachian chancellery. Yet, the service of the Wallachian chancellors is often shorter than in Moldavia. However, I can notice that certain Wallachian families, similar to the Moldavian case, tended to monopolize the realm and pass the functions in the chancellery from generation to generation.

The price of written documents

Up to the end of the sixteenth century, neither in Moldavia nor in Wallachia information about the official cost to be paid for the drafting of documents can be traced. The only indication about a possible cost of a charter is that of a good horse given by the commissioner as a gift to the prince. The fact that even in countries with a more mature tradition of writing, such as Poland or Hungary, the official taxes were established only at the turn of the sixteenth century[76] suggest that in Moldavia and Wallachia they might have not existed during the period. A Moldavian narrative source confirms that official taxes were established only under the second reign of Constantin Mavrocordat (1741-1743).[77]

The price to be paid for the redaction of certain documents began to be mentioned sporadically only during the sixteenth century. Moreover, the data disclose only the cost of private charters, the demand for which increased in the second half of the sixteenth century.[78] Sparse as it is, the evidence suggests that the price to be paid for the drafting of documents remained high even in the second half of the sixteenth century, when the producing of documents moved down from the state central office to urban, regional and even village level. For instance, chancellor Coresi

received a Gipsy slave as a payment for writing a charter for the two laymen Radu and Moșul.[79] Another example from the same period indicates that a "strip or a belt of land" was purchased for 250 aspers, and fifty aspers were paid for the record.[80] In Moldavia likewise a certain layman Andreica had to pay in 1585 forty zloti (gold coins) for two charters and fourteen zloty for a transaction confirmation note,[81] while during the same period part of a village could be purchased for a hundred zloty.[82]

In addition, I shall notice that according to the surviving evidence, until the middle of the fifteenth century in Moldavia and up to the middle of the sixteenth century in Wallachia, no other group of Moldavian or Wallachian noblemen received so many written donations as chancellors. One may assume that for chancellery clerks and especially for chancellors written documents were more accessible.

An interesting case is that of Harvat, head of the chancellery under Neagoe Basarab (1512-1521), who received eight (extant) charters confirming his previous land estates and new purchases. All of them were received during his service in the prince's chancellery, almost a charter per year, while no charter is attested from the former period of six years when he held other state dignities.[83] This is one of the highest numbers of charters received by a Wallachian individual for the period,[84] and a significant number in itself, as from the reign of Neagoe Basarab survive only fifty-five charters commissioned on behalf of noblemen. This may suggest that prices of written documents were expensive even for the highest dignitaries. Possibly chancellors were exempt from the payment of at least some taxes, as two out of six original charters issued for Harvat mention that the prince "had forgiven the payment of the horse," which presumably constituted part of the tax.[85] Consequently, the employees in the prince's office had not only the financial means to enlarge their land estates but also a preferential status in securing these estates in written form.

Scribes of the Latin, German, Hungarian, and Polish documents who were active in the Moldavian and Wallachian state chancelleries

Most documents produced in Moldavia and Wallachia were written in Slavonic, the official state language of the Medieval Romanian Principalities. However, the Wallachian and especially the Moldavian principality had the capacity to meet the regional language conventions

and produce foreign documents in Latin and German, or after the first quarter of the sixteenth century in Polish or Hungarian. Unfortunately, little more is known about the producers of these documents besides their names. Among the few insights are their places of origins or ethnic background. The particularities of the written documents next to the names of certain scribes, when attested, suggest that most of them might have been of foreign origins coming to Wallachia and Moldavia either from Transylvania or from Poland.[86] However, in certain cases native Moldavians scribes were able to produce documents in Polish.[87]

One of the Wallachian letters indicates that it might have been a practice to request scribes for the drafting of documents in Latin from Transylvania. For instance, Wallachian prince Radu Paisie (1534-1545) asked from the administration of Sibiu for "a well trained and learned scribe since the previous one got sick and I do not have any other left."[88] The letter does not mention whether the prince needed a scribe trained in Latin or Slavonic languages, but it is well known that at the time of Radu Paisie's reign several scribes of Slavonic documents were active in the Wallachian chancellery. Therefore, one might assume that the requested scribe was envisaged for the Latin documents.

After the first quarter of the sixteenth century, the surviving evidence allows to draw some conclusions about the possible practices of employment of foreign scribes. It seems that foreign scribes were enjoying the same status and following the same pattern of service as the local ones. They seem to remain in the princely service for a quite long period and were acting as first proto-diplomats.[89] Their position appears as high. For instance, Radu Paisie promised in his letter of request to the Sibiu administration that he would treat the scribe with honor and pay him accordingly.[90]

Unfortunately, after Bogdan (Lăpușneanu)'s reign, the information is even more laconic; the surviving letters ceased to mention regularly even the names of the scribes who remained in the Moldavian chancellery for several decades.[91]

Local sphere: The producers of the documents issued at the regional and urban level

The social changes experienced in both principalities led to a continuous demand for written documents. I can see that from the sixteenth

century onwards, charters attesting land ownership began to be constantly disseminated throughout society. In the second half of the sixteenth century, offices able to issue written documents multiplied. Furthermore, land charters began to be issued at regional, urban, and village levels.

The data suggest that during the first period some writing offices as for instance the regional one were dependent on the professional literates that activated in the state central chancellery. This fact is endorsed by the names of the scribes as well as by the lay out of the documents and formulas employed. Unfortunately, most of the documents bear no information about the scribes. Even when recorded, most of the names of the local producers have only a single attestation, which suggests that either local documents had a lesser chance of preservation or that scribal activity at the local level was inconsistent and probably occasional. Only in rare cases do urban, regional or village records allow drawing some tentative conclusions.

One of such exceptions is the urban office of Bucharest, which permits some tentative conclusions about professional scribes employed in the urban offices. The number of documents as well as the presence of several scribes at a time indicates that there was a busy and continuous activity going on in the urban office of the Wallachian capital in the last decades of the sixteenth century. The laconic information about the scribes still suggests that the regular practices employed in the central chancellery were translated locally. Kinship relations between scribes and priests, as well as between different scribes are attested.[92] For instance, Eftimie, one the scribes of the Bucharest urban office, whose activity is better documented, is mentioned in a Greek contemporary note as being a son of Priest Grozav.[93] Similar to employee in the princely chancellery, urban scribes seem to remain in the office for a long period.[94] Eftimie remained in the Wallachian urban chancellery from 1563 to 1571.[95] Another scribe, Dimitrie, is attested from 1577 until 1580,[96] while early in 1580 Dimitrie the Old began to be recorded.[97] Dumitrie the Old continued his service in the Bucharest chancellery at least until February1590.[98] Besides these two, eight other names of producers of documents were recorded in the Bucharest urban office in the last two decades of the century,[99] among them a priest and three chancellors. The rather numerous staff indicates that writing activities were continuous at the urban level, at least in certain areas.

The fact that the surviving charters were written in Slavonic indicate that professional scribes were hired in the Bucharest urban office. However,

the lay out of the surviving documents slightly differs from the documents produced in the state chancellery, which might suggest that urban scribes might not have been dependent on the tradition employed in the state chancellery.[100] Instead, they might have been trained in the monasteries, as the lay out of the urban documents is similar to charters produced by monastic institutions.

Conversely, the early Wallachian regional scribes seem to have been directly dependent on the state chancellery, as certain clerks who provided writing services for Craiovesti noblemen during the early sixteenth century are attested among the chancellery's scribes.[101]

Producers of the documents at the village level

The scribes who did the writing at the village level are obscure and their names and status are seldom mentioned. Only occasionally, I can trace a continuous activity of village priests as scribes at the local/village level. One of them was the Moldavian priest Andonie from Childeşti, who recorded land transactions for Governor Bantaş from 1586 until 1596.[102] Priest Andonie seems to have carried out regular scribal activities, as he always is recorded as the producer of documents despite the fact that other literate persons and priests are attested among the witnesses.[103] Moreover, he traveled from his village Childesti to another village, Drăguşeni, to record a land conveyance, despite the fact that a local priest, Lupu, was attested among the witnesses.[104] It seems that literate persons were not available in every village and village priests were not always able to write.[105] The same situation is recorded in Wallachia: priest Pătru from Şura ("Pătru ot Şura") traveled to another village, Balboşi, to record a transaction at the house of another priest, Stoia from Balboşi ("Stoia ot Balboşi").[106] As the record suggests, literate priests were not available regularly at the village level in either Moldavia or Wallachia. This conclusion is endorsed by narratives from the eighteenth century, which allude to a great distress of old parish priests at the decision taken by the Reformist prince Constantin Mavrocordat in 1714, to bestow a tax exemption only on literate priests.[107]

Besides parish priests, among local producers of written documents there were monks,[108] church servants,[109] and possibly teachers.[110] Alike, young relatives of court dignitaries sporadically acted as scribes for documents produced for their fellows.[111] They might have recorded their

personal transactions, those of their servants[112] or fellow noblemen.[113] By the end of the sixteenth century, in Moldavia, even some families of small land holders had literate members capable of recording their land transactions in the vernacular.[114]

Almost half of the forty-two surviving Moldavian documents produced at the village level by the end of the sixteenth century, however, seem to have been written by professional scribes. Some of them were attested among the chancellery's scribes from the period;[115] for instance, a scribe Ionașco was active in the Moldavian chancellery in the last decades of the sixteenth century. During the same period, a local document was signed by the scribe Ionașco, who mentioned that he is from the village of Galbeni.[116] The document is preserved in a copy which makes it impossible to apply any paleographic analyses; it is possible, however, that in a local document the professional scribe had indulge in a less rigorous style and indicated his place of residence.[117] He also indicated that he registered the land transaction in the house of priest Luciul from Galbeni village. In Wallachia likewise, the scribes of the local documents as for instance, Ivașco from Loviște[118] or Stănilă,[119] were active scribes of the state chancellery during the same period. It is known that Moldavian and Wallachian noblemen had their residences in the countryside; presumably, active or former professional scribes provided for their recording needs.

The languages of the documents vary. Usually those commissioned by noblemen are well written. The first distinction between the professional scribes and parish priests is that professional scribes used the Slavonic language for local documents and not Romanian, used mainly by the parish priests. The professional scribes usually employed the formulas of the prince's chancellery and their documents point to a good knowledge of their craft. Conversely, Romanian documents written by the parish priests often suggest unsettled written practices. There are significant differences between private documents written in the assured hand of a professional scribe and those written by the local priest. Besides the vernacular language and finger print employed for the vernacular documents, both their lay out and content are crude, which testifies to the insufficient writing skills of the local priests. For instance, the governor's scribe wrote in a nice script, in accurate lines, well positioned on the page, while the document written by the Wallachian priest Pătru of Șura in fluctuating orthography presents an untrained mastery of writing and style suggesting a novice.[120] Sporadically, parish priests, similar to the practice of the time, mentioned that they had written the documents *manu propria*.[121] The language of

the vernacular documents testifies to a transition period as many Slavonic formulas and linking words are employed in the Romanian documents. This suggests that village priests received only basic training in Slavonic and afterwards turned to the more accessible vernacular language.

The parish priests' documents, similar to the early documents produced in the state chancellery, are less stereotyped. Priest Andonie from Childesti recorded, for instance, that he heard and saw personally the transaction of an impoverished chamberlain's family, who sold their estates out of distress and poverty[122] to a family member, governor Bantas.[123] As a rule, parish priests seldom wrote documents on behalf of noblemen. It might be that this was one of the cases when a low-priced service was needed. Consequently, it may have been the case that, despite professional scribes existing at the village level,[124] the services of parish priests were requested as more affordable.

The functioning of chancery scribes as first proto-diplomats

Moldavian and Wallachian chancellors and scribes alike distinguished themselves abroad, as the first recorded proto-diplomats. The function of the Latin scribes similar to those drafting documents in Slavonic seems to have been coupled with diplomatic missions. The abundant attestation of the chancellery's personnel as foreign emissaries suggests that this was one of their regular functions. [125] In the frequent Moldavian and Wallachian missions exchanged either with Poland or Lithuania, Hungary or Transylvanian urban administrations, foreign and native scribes as well as chancellors are recorded as messengers of the Moldavian and Wallachian princes, carriers of oral information or, later, of written letters. [126] For instance, Iohannes Salanchy, "secretaium nostrum" accomplished many missions to Sibiu under Petru Rares in 1525 as surviving letters of credence -that he presumably carried with him- suggest.[127] In Wallachia alike chancellor Tatul is repeatedly attested as envoy to the Brașov administration and to the Hungarian king.[128] Like scribe Nanul, he delivered the "truthful words of the Wallachian prince Radu Paisie."[129]

In certain cases, the scribes sent to Brașov as envoys of the Moldavian or Wallachian princes are recorded as producers of documents during the period of their diplomatic missions; there are many examples. For instance, Scribe Oprea, active in the Wallachian chancery during the period, carried Basarab the Young's letters to the Brașov administration as well as to the

Transylvanian prince.[130] In Moldavia alike, scribe and chancellor Vulpas, active in the state chancellery during the reign of Stephen the Great, is attested as Stephen's envoy to Brașov.[131]

Sometimes it is uncertain, as in most of the cases only Christian names of the proto-diplomats were employed whether the Slavonic or Latin scribes were those employed as messengers.[132] What is clear, however, is that both native and foreign scribes, as certainly chancellors have combined service in the chancellery with diplomatic missions. They continued to do so in the later period and remained among the most active conveyors of diplomatic missions up to the end of the sixteenth century and beyond.

The education of the early literates

There are no attested schools during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in either Wallachia or Moldavia. The Reformation and Counter-Reformation movements influenced the only attested, highly sporadic, sixteenth century Moldavian schools.[133] Consequently, it is not clear whether literacy skills were learned at home, in the family, from mother, or rather, father to son, or whether they were taught in monasteries. The direct evidence about schooling in the monasteries is attested only during the seventeenth century; for earlier periods only unsubstantiated information is available. However, it seems reasonable to assume that such practices might have grown out of an older tradition. Further on, several attestations of dascăl (teacher) in the Moldavian chancellery suggest that private teachers might have been available for the offspring of noblemen.[134] Their names indicate that they were laymen and I assume that, at least, some children were trained by professional literates at home. Next to it, the kin relations between various literates indicate that the craft was also thought in the families.

It seems that the custom of sending children abroad for education, learning of foreign languages or the acquisition of various crafts was also practiced in Wallachia and Moldavia.[135] One of the earliest surviving Moldavian examples about supposedly basic education abroad is recorded in 1582. It is a letter of grievance of a Moldavian layman, Petru Walachus from Jassy, whose son, sent to Lviv "for education," died there. Unfortunately, little direct evidence is preserved from the researched period. As most of the fostering of children seems to have been based on

private and oral agreements, there is no record about children traveling or being placed for fostering children. Documents seem to have been resorted to only in hostile or exceptional situations.

Again, neither direct, nor indirect evidence allows us to grasp any specific information about the training of chancellery staff. It seems, nonetheless, that the level of their education during this period was low. At least the mastery of the Slavonic language by native scribes, a foreign language for them, seems to have been only superficial. For them scribal activities were rather a craft. The usage of certain pre-existing formulas in the text, sometimes even arbitrary, testifies to their partial knowledge and improper training.

However, cultural relations with the neighboring cultures with a better-established tradition of writing, led to the introducing of new Western practices in the Moldavian and Wallachian chancelleries. For instance, after the middle of the sixteenth century, princes and chancellors sporadically began to use signatures *manu propria* in the charters they endorsed.[136] Chancellors next to princes began to be mentioned as the first lay individuals with intellectual inclinations. They are attested as library owners and writers of chronicles. A chronicle written by a Wallachian chancellor, for instance, was used in 1597 by Baltazar Walter for his work about the deeds of Mikhail the Brave.[137] The author declared in the dedication to the German noblemen that: *Walachico sermone a Dn. Cancellario conceptum, atque ab ipso Waiwoda approbatum contextum, in aula Targowistea obtinebam.*[138] Although the name of the Wallachian chancellor is uncertain, it testifies to the literary preocupations of at least some chancellery employee.[139]

Similarly in Moldavia, literary activities of chancellors may be presumed by the end of the sixteenth century. Luca Stroici/Stroicz,[140] who acted as chancellor under six princes, seem to have made the transition between the previous period with a restricted written culture and the seventeenth century, which may be considered a period of cultural renaissance in the medieval Romanian Principalities. There are opinions that he was one of the first Moldavian laymen who owned a private library.[141] The request of the Polish chancellor, Jan Zamoyski for a "a kronike woloska"[142] (addressed to an unknown Moldavian chancellor in 1597, when Stoici acted as Moldavian chancellor) suggest as well that chancellor Stoici might have had intellectual preoccupations. He might have indeed possessed in his library a Wallachian chronicle or even, as

the general opinion in the Romanian historiography claim, might have written one.

What is clear however, chancellor Stoici was among the first Moldavians for whom the perception of the writing of letters have changed. His correspondence suggest that he was among the first Moldavians for whom the activity of engaging in a written correspondence was not restricted to official and political business but might have included private and even leisure preoccupation.[143]

Thus, even these sparse and scattered evidence suggest at least certain Moldavian and Wallachian chancellors might have been among the first laymen of their times with literary activities. Later, from the middle of the seventeenth century onwards, the number of chancellors and scribes attested as intellectuals of their times, authors of important works, and library owners multiplied.[144]

Conclusion

The early literates, in contrast to the Catholic Europe or to Byzantium, seem to have been laymen, apparently of high social standing, usually sons of high state dignitaries. While monastic figures only occasionally show up in the Wallachian evidence, sons of high ecclesiastical figures are attested among the early native scribes. The Orthodox Church -as an institution- had largely an indirect role in the producing of documents for record storage (pragmatic documents) during the early period.

The professional clerks in the two medieval Romanian principalities were noblemen with significant wealth and status. Reading and writing seem to have been taught in the family, as suggested by the recurrence of this craft among certain families holding chancellery positions across generations, in an almost dynastic tradition. Careers in the chancellery seem to have been lengthy; scribes began they service at an early age, skills seem to have been learnt in the office, and these characteristics mark the chancellery of fifteen century as a somehow autonomous, isolated environment: only former scribes were skilled enough to qualify for the dignity of the chancellor. Only after the turn of the sixteenth century in Moldavia, social pool out of which scribes were recruited has been expanded. The dignity of the chancellor, especially in Moldavia, was no longer acquired by former scribes but bestowed by the princes for special merits. The opening of the chancery is an extra indication about further

dissemination of writing in the sixteenth century Moldavia compared to Wallachia.

The service in the prince' chancellery led to an augmentation of political career as well as increased wealth. Written culture was restricted and persons who could actively participate in its performance were perceived as possessing a distinguishing and highly specialized skill. This capacity certainly led to a rise in social status and, not least, financial benefits. Consequently, the high nobility, and the ecclesiastical leaders tended to monopolize the realm and secure leading positions in the chancellery for their young relatives. The social standing related to practices of written culture is attested not only by the individual careers it made possible, but also by the diachronic development of family policies. Moldavian and Wallachian state dignitaries alike remained equally interested in chancellery service, even when this place was no longer so closed and elite-oriented (sixteenth century Moldavia.) As employment in the prince's chancellery appears to have been a lucrative endeavor, it provided the necessary financial means to preserve the status quo, during the times of political and social instability, as the case of Uricar Cârstea Mihăilescu suggests.

As written culture spread further and written records of landed estates became a necessary legal proof to be provided during judicial processes, local gentry was keen to record in writing any land conveyance. The increased need for written records next to the usage of vernacular as a language of record opened the craft of literate producers for parish priests, sometimes even at village level. Most probably the prices charged by local priests were lower than those of the professional scribes. The new economics of writing facilitated the access to documents for lower social categories and led to the further dissemination of written culture.

NOTES

1   I am grateful to Dr. Michael Clanchy for this observation.
2   In the Danubian principalities the title *logofăt* (from the Byzantine *logothetos*) was used for the head of the chancellery.
3   Despite certain opinions that there was no confusion between the position of scribe and that of the chancellor in Moldavia, one can notice that during the early period certain scribes were called chancellors in the documents. Chancellor Bratei for instance indicated in a document from 1401 that he had written it with his own hand (DRH A, vol. 1, no. 21). Stoicescu also mentions in a footnote that the position of scribes was similar to that of the chancellor in Moldavia; see Nicolae Stoicescu, *Sfatul domnesc și marii dregători din Țara Românească și Moldova (sec. XIV-XVII)* (Princely counsel and the high state dignitaries from Wallachia and Moldavia (14-17 centuries)*, 183, note 219, henceforth Stoicescu, *Sfatul.* Only by mid-fifteenth century clear distinctions in the formulary of the charters were made between scribes, who wrote the charters, and chancellors, who sealed them.
4   *Documenta Romaniae Historica A Moldova* (Bucharest, Editura Academiei, 1980), edited by Constantin Cihodaru, Ioan Caproșu et all, Vol.1 no. 64 (1419); Henceforth DRH A.
5   Ibidem, no. 52.
6   Ibidem, no. 29.
7   See DRH A, vol 1.
8   DRH A, vol. 1, no. 76.
9   DRH A, vol. 1, no. 76.
10   DRH A, vol. 2, no. 169.
11   DRH A, vol. 1, no. 242.
12   In some charters he owned ten villages and additional free land to found new villages (see DRH A, vol.1, no. 56, no. 102, no. 128, no. 129, no. 165). In 1439 he received a new confirmation of his land estates together with his son, Mikhail (DRH, A, vol.1, no.196). In the last charter (1439) he is attested with a higher ecclesiastical rank *protopop.* For Scribe Mikhail see also Mihai Costăchescu, *Documente moldovenenești înainte de Ștefan cel Mare*, (Moldavian documents preceding the reign of Stephan the Great) (Jassy, Viața Românească, 1932), vol. 2, 501-5, henceforth Costăchescu, *Documente înainte de Ștefan cel Mare.*
13   In the last year and a half of Mikhail's presence in Moldavia there is a document extant attesting him as chancellor of the Moldavian chancellery. The last document sealed by him is in Jan. 1454. See DRH A, vol. 2, no. 39. In the last reign of Petru Aron a certain Petru is listed as the Moldavian chancellor.
14   DRH A, vol. 1, no. 165, no. 175, no. 196, no. 225, no. 228, no. 234, no. 250, no. 254, no. 269, no. 279, no. 286; DRH A, vol. 2, no. 21, no. 33, no.48.

15   More than fifty villages are recorded in his possession. See for instance DRH A, vol. 1, no. 250, no. 254, no. 260, no. 279, no. 286. See also Costăchescu, *Documente înainte de Ștefan cel Mare*, vol. 2, 505-6.

16   DRH, A, vol. 2, no. 58 (1456). In Poland he seems to have enjoyed high social standing, as in 1456 Cazimir himself wrote a generous *salvus conductus* offering security throughout the Polish kingdom for him and his brothers, (Costachescu, *Documente înainte de Ștefan cel Mare*, Vol.1, no. 806) as well as liberty for his commercial activities, see Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, *Documente privitoare la istoria românilor*, (Bucharest, Editura Academiei, 1900), vol. 2, no. 111. He received several estates, customs, and money donations from Polish noblemen in case he would be forced to quit Moldova. Mikhail indeed took refuge in Poland after Stephen the Great (1457-1504) became Moldavian prince. Nonetheless, Stephen invited him back in the first year of his reign and continued to invite him for thirteen years to come (DRH A, vol. 2, no. 66, no. 89, no. 138, no. 169). One of the letters written by Stephen was at the request of the Polish king, Cazimir, another fact which points to the significance of Mikhail's position (DRH A, vol. 2, no. 136).

17   DRH A, vol. 2, no. 58 (1456).

18   DRH A, vol. 2, no. 119 (1464). Another Tăutu is attested in 1430 in a cartulary from the eighteenth century (see DRH A, vol. 1, no. 146). This is the only attestation until 1464 and it is unclear whether this is the same family branch.

19   DRH A, vol. 2, no. 201.

20   One of his sons, Toader, is attested as chancellor of the Moldavian office in the later record (see DIR A, vol. 3, no. 436 (1587). Another of his sons, Dragotă Tăutul, appears as scribe in 1497, while his sons at their turn served as scribes in the Moldavian chancellery during the sixteenth century. In the seventeenth century another descendents of Tăutul family are attested by the data. In 1621 Mihail Tăutu, who wrote a document for Vasile Lupu (220) and who presumably acted as a scribe in 1673became chancellor. For the presence of the Tăutu family in the Moldavian chancellery during the seventeenth century see also Grămadă "Cancelaria domnească în Moldova," 176, 215 and Nicolae Iorga, "Contribuții la istoria bisericii. noastre II, Bălinești.", *Anuarul Academiei Romane* 2, No. 34 (1902).

21   Tăutu remained in the service of the Moldavian chancellery until 1511.

22   Usually new princes changed the acting heads of the chancellery since this was an important position in which to keep the dignitary of a former prince and possible opponent. In this case Bogdan kept his father's dignitary. Grămadă considered that the career of a scribe was short, undertaken as a step to a permanent position among the state dignitaries, see Nicolae Grămadă "Cancelaria domnească în Moldova pînă la Constantin Mavrocordat" (The Moldavian chancellery up to Constantin Mavrocordat) *Codrul Cosminului* 9 (1935): 129-231; henceforth Grămadă "Cancelaria

domnească în Moldova." However, the surviving data indicate that this is specific only after the turn of the sixteenth century, while previously scribes remained in the prince's chancellery for a long period and advanced to the career of the head of the chancellery when possible;

23 For his diplomatic activities see Ştefan Gorovei "Activitatea diplomatică a marelui logofăt Ioan Tăutu" (The diplomatic activity of chancellor Tautu), *Suceava Anuarul Muzeului Judeţean* 5 (1978): 237-53; see also Emil Turdeanu, *Études des littérature roumaine et d'écrits slaves et grecs des Princpautés Roumaines*, 136.

24 During the fifteenth century Moldavian noblemen were called *pan*, under Polish influence; See for instance DRH A, vol. 2, no. 123.

25 DRH A, vol. 3, no.3, 10, 24, 25, 74-77, no. 130, no. 134, no. 204, no. 247, no. 293, no. 295 and passim.

26 DRH A, vol.3, no. 179 (1495), no. 192 (1495), no. 196 (undated charter, the modern editors dated it after 1495), no. 263 (1502).

27 Ibidem, no.263 (1503).

28 Ion dascăl (teacher) is attested first in DRH A, vol. 2, no. 199 (1475), no. 206; then his brother Coste, who indicated that he is a brother of Ion dascăl (ibidem no. 249(1483), no. 251, no. 252, 253) and then the most intriguing Toader, brother of Ion dascăl (Ibidem, no. 259 (1484)), who signs in various ways, as Toader, Ion's daskal brother (no.259, 1484), *Toader diac* (scribe) (no. 51, 1489), Toader grămătic (scribe) (no.32, 1488) and simply Toader in most of the cases (no. 1, 1487). Probably the same Toader is confirming his land estates as *Toader pisar* (scribe) (no. 179, 1495), *Toader boier, pisar* (nobleman, scribe) (no. 196, 1496), *Toader boier, credincios pan* (faithful nobleman) (no. 263, 1502), Toader chancellor and his brother, priest Luchii (no.286, 1503). In a single case, in a document from 1492 preserved in a copy (the date is uncertain), Toader, a scribe, signed as "Toader Popović" (son of priest) (DRH A, vol. 3, no.114). It is uncertain whether Toader, son of a priest, is the same person as Toader, "brother of Ion dascal." The relatively close time span may suggest that he is the same person, although it is a question why from his first document in 1484 and until around 1492 he never mentions that he was son of a priest. In the prosopographical analyses by Maria Magdalena Szekely on the sixteenth century Moldavian nobility, it is also indicated that the three scribes employed in the Moldavian chancellery of Prince Petru Rareş were brothers. However, she does not mentioned the scribe who signed as *Toader Popović*; probably she did not consider him the same person as Toader, brother of Priest Luchii. See Maria Magdalena Szekely, *Sfetnicii lui Petru Rareş* (Counselors of Petru Rareş) (Iassy: Editura Unirestităţii Alexandru Ioan Cuza, 2002), 42-4.

29 See, for instance, the charters received by the above-mentioned Toader. DRH A, vol. 3, no.179, 196, 197, 263, 286.

30 DRH A, vol. 3, no.179.

[31] See DRH A, vol. 3, no.127.

[32] Székely, *Sfetnicii lui Petru Rareș*, 48.

[33] The status of *pan*, borrowed from Polish nobility, was given to the most important noblemen of the country as well as to prince's relatives. See Stoicescu, *Sfatul,* 28.

[34] DRH A, vol. 3, no.108; no. 230 ("Ion Popović Ion [son] of priest); *Pisal Alexa Popovici ot Iași* (Written by Alexa, son of a priest from Iassy) DRH A, vol. 2, no. 108.

[35] Up to the end of the reign of Stephen the Great all chancellors are attested as former scribes.

[36] Especially in the early sixteenth century, I note a continuation between the function of treasurer and that of chancellor, as both functions required the knowledge of active written skills. Isac, who became chancellor in 1513, replacing the famous chancellor Tăutu, was previously employed as treasurer, see DIR A/XVI, 1, no. 80. See also the case of Gavriil Totrușan, who replaced chancellor Isac in 1516 (DIR A/XVI, 1, no. 101) and is attested as chancellor until 1523, March 15 (DIR A/XVI, 1, no.192), and then from 1537 to 1540 (DIR A XVI, 1, no.356, no. 364. Similarly Mateiaș (chancellor from 1541 to 1548), was previously employed as high treasurer. For details of the career of Mateiaș see Székely, *Sfetnicii lui Petru Rareș*, 82. Later, the better documented figure of Luca/Lupu Stroici was also previously employed as treasurer. See also Nicolae Stoicescu, "Lista marilor dregători ai Moldovei sec XIV-XVII" (The list of high dignitaries from Moldavia: XIV- XVII centuries), *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie "A.D. Xenopol"* 8 (1971): 402.

[37] DIR A Vol. 2, no.184, no. 208, no. 210; DIR A, vol. 3, no. 495. Often they do not even indicate their Christian names, mentioning just that the document "was written by a priest."

[38] See for instance the very active scribe of the Moldavian chancellery in the third decade of the sixteenth century Cârstea Mihăilescu (DIR A Vol. 3 no. 22, no. 23, no. 27, no. 29, no. 31 (1573) and passim and his possible son Damian Cârstovici DIR A Vol. 3 no. 331 (1585).

[39] Grămadă, *Cancelaria Moldovei,* 180.

[40] Szekely considers that during the sixteenth century there was a general practice among Moldavian noblemen to preserve the dignities within the same families, see Szekely, *Sfetnicii*, 39. See also Virgil Pâslariuc, *Raporturile politice dintre marea boierime și domnie în Țara Moldovei în secolul al XVI- lea* (The political relations between grand noblemen and princedom in Moldavia during the sixteenth century) (Chishinau: Pontos, 2005), 26.

[41] Chancellor Dobrul had a son; Ivanco [son] of Dobrul, is attested as a scribe during the reign of Bogdan (1504-1517). Later he was attested as chancellor: DIR A/XVI, vol.1, no. 25; The grandson of chancellor Dubrul, Toader Ivanco, is attested as a high ranking scribe (*uricar*) during the seventeenth century. See DIR A/XVII, vol. 3, no. 308; see also Szekely, *Sfetnicii lui Petru Rareș*, 88.

[42] DIR A, vol. 3, no. 380 (1586), no. 398 (1586), no. 468 (1588), no. 545 (1590).

[43] DIR A, vol. 3, no. 389 (1586); possibly the same scribe, Ionașco was very active in the Moldavian chancellery between 1579 and 1595.; this is uncertain, however, since he did not record any further details in the numerous charters he signed. See DIR A, vol. 3, no. 148 (1579), no. 188, no. 194, no. 224, no. 522 et passim. See also DIR A, vol. 4, no. 156 (1595).

[44] DIR A Vol. 3, no. 44 (1574), no. 76 (1575), no. 262 (1583). Additionally, he had numerous disputes with neighboring villages, and together with his father, Chamberlain Vartic, had struggled to secure his land estates (DIR A, vol. 3, no. 161 (1579-82), no. 178 (1580).

[45] Ibidem, no. 410.

[46] Ibidem, no. 398, no. 545.

[47] Ibidem, no. 67, no. 380, no.409, no. 468.

[48] John Oxenham, *Literacy. Writing, Reading and Social Organisation* (London: Routledge, 1980), 66.

[49] See *Documente Romaniae Historica B Țara Românească* (Bucharest, Editura Academiei, 1996), vol. 1, edited by Petru P. Panaitescu, Damaschin Mioc et all. Henceforth DRH B. See for instance Calcio (DRH B, vol. 1, no. 72 (1431), no. 94 (1441), no.110 (1453)), Coica (DRH B, vol. 1, no. 64 (1429-30), no. 86, 87, 88 (1439)); Latzco (DRH B, vol. 1, no. 127, no. 128 (1465)), no. 131 (1468)).

[50] See also I.-R. Mircea, "Mari logofeți din Țara Românească (sec. XIV -XVI)" (High chancellors from Wallachia), *Hrisovul* 1 (1941): 117.

[51] See, for instance, DRH B, vol. 2, no. 28, no. 49, no. 56; no. 97, no. 98.

[52] See, for instance, DRH B, vol. 2, no.122, 123, 124.

[53] See ibidem.. See also Stoicescu, *Sfatul,* 179-180. The Moldavian chancellery often stopped its activity during the periods when the chancellors were absent, usually sent on various diplomatic missions. Only after the second half of the sixteenth century a new type of document with a temporary juridical validity was instituted that could be drawn in the absence of the chancellor. See Gheorghe Punga, "De ce lipsesc uricele pentru unele perioade din cancelaria Tarii Moldovei?" (Why are charters not attested during certain periods by the chancellery of Moldavia?), *Studii de istorie medievala si stiinte auxiliare* 1 (1999), 12.

[54] DRH B, vol. 1, no. 248, no. 281. See also DRH B, vol. 4, no.22.

[55] See DRH B, vol. 1, no. 232, no. 242; DRH B, vol. 2, no. 49.

[56] DRH B, vol.1, no. 63 (undated).

[57] Stoicescu also mentions that in Wallachia there was a transition from the function of scribe to that of chancellor. He considers that in this way lower noblemen could ascend the social scale and attain the function of chancellor. Conversely, Iorga was of the opinion that scribes did not belong to the class of noblemen, Iorga, "Cat de veche e școala la români?" 36, 37.

58   DRH B, vol. 1, no. 227.

59   DRH B, vol. 2, no. 78.

60   DRH B, vol. 2, no. 93.

61   After Staico, in 1505, March 26, Bogdan became chancellor of the Wallachian office (DRH B, vol. 1, no. 32) after holding the dignity of high *stolnic*. From 1508, Radu the Great was replaced by Mihnea the Bad and Theodor (a former scribe) is mentioned as chancellor (DRH B, vol. 2, no. 54). In 1510 he returned with the new prince, Vlad the Young (ibidem, no. 68 (1510, April 24)) to move from his office as chancellor to the higher one of governor (ibidem, , no. 78). Ivan logofat is attested only on March 15, 1512 (ibidem, no. 99) since first charters of Neagoe attesting donations to monasteries do not record any lists of witnesses.

62   Frâncu himself seems to have been in the prince's service in 1512 as agent of the princely authority or (*ispravnic)* (DRH B, vol. 2, no. 115), where he is attested as Priest Frâncu from Costeşti. The head of the chancellery, Stanciu, secured his first charter in 1510. He mentions Priest Frâncu as his brother, which helps to show the family relations between various literate individuals (ibidem, no. 78). Stanciu received another four charters confirming his estates (ibidem, no.146, no. 157, no. 161, no. 162). In the first charter, he secured his land estates for him and his brother while in the last two charters (Sept. 1, 1517 and Oct. 29, 1517) he donated all his estates to a monastery not mentioning his brother. Tudor, Priest Frâncu's son, Chancellor Stanciu's nephew, is first attested as scribe in 1504. As early as 1505 a Tudor who describes himself as writer and chancellor is attested (ibidem, no. 40). He is mentioned among witnesses in 1509 as head of the chancellery (ibidem, no. 65) and continued to be mentioned until 1510, when was replaced by Oancea (ibidem, no. 81).

63   Only two charters are extant written on behalf of scribes up to the sixteenth century; see DRH B, vol. 1, no. 208, no. 244.

64   Up to the end of the fifteenth century, the status of *jupan* was given only to the highest noblemen and high state dignitaries. See Stoicescu, *Sfatul*, 27. It is of Serbian origin, see George Mihailă, *Studii de lexicologie şi istorie a lingvisticii româneşti* (Studies about lexicology and history of Romanian lingvistics) (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1973), 8.

65   DRH B, vol. 2, no. 115. In 1512 he witnessed a land exchange among the highest state dignitaries; and was appointed by the prince to guarantee its proper accomplishment.

66   Ibidem, no. 35 (1505).

67   Ibidem, no. 35, no. 42. The charter secured in the prince's office did not clearly specify that it was based on a record produced in the urban chancellery. It only states that the money was paid in front of the urban administrators of Râmnic. Knowing the later practice, however, probably

the transaction was made in Râmnic and a local charter was secured there, which afterwards was confirmed in the prince's office.

68   See, for instance, DRH B, vol. 11, no. 27 (1595).

69   DRH B, vol. 6, no.10.

70   For one of the most detailed accounts see ibidem, no. 130.

71   A scribe who called himself "Little Coresi" signed a document in 1572, when Coresi was already the second chancellor, and it is impossible that he would have signed in this way. In the medieval Romanian Principalities it was customary to name the offspring with the Christian names of family members. See also Szekely, *Sfetnicii*, 84. As it was customary to name one of sons with the father's name, Chancellor Coresi might have named one of his sons or nephews Coresi. Thus, "Little Coresi" might have been a son or nephew of Chancellor Coresi. It is also to be noted that apparently the children who were given their father's or grandfathers' names were later often given the same position in the chancellery (see DRH B, vol. 7, Nn. 90 (1572).

72   DRH B, vol. 4, no. 54; in 1568 he is mentioned as chancellor together with five other chancellors, next to the acting head of the chancellery and the second chancellor (DRH B, vol. 6, no. 100 (1568)). It might be that he still acted as a scribe or the third chancellor.

73   DRH B, vol. 7, no. 232.

74   DRH B, vol. 6, no. 43 (1567). According to the extant record, Coresi received his first charter only after 29 years of service in the prince's chancellery.

75   DRH B, vol.7, no. 232 (1575-6). More literate members might have existed in the Coresi family. Unfortunately it is hard to draw any connections between the family of Coresi, active in the Wallachian chancellery and printer Coresi, who was active in Transylvania (Sibiu (Hermannstadt)) in the second half of the sixteenth century (1560-1581) and who published one of the first known Romanian and Slavonic liturgical books. For more information about Coresi, the printer, see Dan Simonescu, "Un mare editor și tipograf din secolul al XVI-lea: Coresi" (A great editor and printer from the sixteenth century: Coresi), *Studii și cercetări de bibliologie* 11 (1969): 56.

76   In Hungary the amount of the tax was established in 1492, see *Corpus Iuris Hungarici*, I, 548-550. In Poland the exact amount of taxes to be paid for the redaction of various documents was established in 1511 (See Grămadă, *Cancelaria Moldovei*, 155 and note 3). See also Agnieszka Bartoszewicz, "The Litterati Burghers in Polish Late Medieval Towns," *Acta Poloniae Historica* 83 (2001), 17, 19; In Serbia, however, already in the Law Code written in 1349, the payment of chancellors and scribes for document writing is precisely specified.. See *Dushan's Code, 85, no. 129*

77   In his second reign in Moldavia, he established the taxes. See Cogălniceanu, *Cronicile Romaniei* III, 183).

78   See, for instance, DRH B, vol.7, no.128 (1573); DRH B, vol.8, no. 5 (1577).

[79]   DIR B, vol.4, no.187. The price of a gipsy slave during the period could range between five hundreds and a thousand aspers. See DIR B, vol.4, no. 215 (1576).

[80]   It was part of a village that a certain member of the community inherited after the partition of the common land property; DRH B, vol. 8, no. 97 (1577).

[81]   DIR A, vol. 3, no. 353. See also DIR A, vol. 2, no. 77.

[82]   DIR A, vol. 3, no. 337, DIR A, vol. 2, no.77. Nonetheless, the price recorded might have been particularly high as it generated a new written document to ask for the payment back.

[83]   He is attested as high constable from 1508 to 1509 and as high treasurer between 1510 and 1514. See Nicolae Stoicescu, *Dicţionar al marilor dregători din Ţara Românească şi Moldova: sec. XIV XVII* (Bucharest: Editura Ştiinţifică, 1971), 63.

[84]   DRH B, vol. 2, no.121, 144, 167, 171, 172, 179, 204, 206.

[85]   Henri Stahl, *Controverse de istorie socială românească* (Controversial issues about the Romanian social history) (Bucharest, 1969), 130; Constantin Giurescu, *Studii de istorie socială* (Studies of social history) (Bucharest, Editura Academiei, 1943), 251.

[86]   See Gramada, "Cancelaria Moldovei," 26-27.

[87]   Linţa "Documente în limba polonă," 174-5.

[88]   Petre Panaitescu, "Documente slavo-române din Sibiu (1470-1653)" (Slavo-Romanian documents from Sibiu 1470-1653) *Studii şi Cercetări* 32 (1938), no.47; Henceforth Panaitescu, "Documente slavo-române din Sibiu."

[89]   Stephanus Literatus, the secretary of the Moldavian Prince Rareş, is one of the first attested as fulfilling diverse political and economic missions for the Moldavian prince (Iorga, *Acte şi scrisori*, no. 677 (1531, April 8), no. 552 (1528, Febr.14).

[90]   Panaitescu, "Documente slavo-române din Sibiu (1470-1653)," no. 47.

[91]   Linţa "Documente în limba polonă," 177.

[92]   Scribe Voico mentions that he is the son of Deico. See DRH B, vol. 2, no. 157 (1517, July 14).

[93]   DRH B, vol. 5, no. 266 (1563).

[94]   Eftimie is attested between 1563 and 1571 (DRH B, vol. 5, no. 266, DRH B, vol. 7, no. 26).

[95]   Zahariuc, Petronel, ed. "Nouă documente din secolul al XVI-lea privitoare la istoria oraşului Bucureşti," (Nine documents from the sixteenth century related to the history of Bucharest) In *Civilizaţia urbană din spaţiul românesc în secolele XVI-XVIII: Studii şi documente* (Jassy, Editura Universităţii „Alexandru Ioan Cuza", 205-21, edited by Laurenţiu Rădvan, no. 1 (1565, March 1) and no. 2 (1565, May 24). Henceforth Zahariuc, *Nouă documente din secolul al XVI-lea.*

96   (DRH B, vol. 8, no. 73 (1577, May 26), no. 109(1578, Jan. 9), no. 136 (1578, July 5), no. 329 (1580, Nov. 2).

97   Zahariuc, *Nouă documente din secolul al XVI-lea*, no. 4 (1580, Jan.13), no. 5 (1580, March 16).

98   DIR B, vol. 5, no. 448 (1590, Feb.16).

99   Zahariuc, *Nouă documente din secolul al XVI-lea*, no. 6 (1585, Oct.29), Scribe Neag; DIR B, vol. 5, no. 307 (1587, Feb. 6) (The document is signed by Scribe Stan from Săvești); Zahariuc, *Nouă documente din secolul al XVI,*, no. 7 (1587, May 29) Scribe Neanciul; DIR B, vol. 5, no. 425 (1589, May 30) Scribe Grama the Old; Ibidem, no. 454 (1590, Apr.14) Scribe Gherghe, who in 1596 is attested as Gherghe the priest, DRH B, vol.11, no. 150); Zahariuc, *Nouă documente din secolul al XVI-lea*, no. 9 (1593, May 14) The scribe signed his name as Chancellor Stanciul; DRH B, vol.11, no. 268 (1597, Dec. 3) The names of the two scribes were Chancellor Ivan and Chancellor Efrem.

100   See, for instance, DRH B, vol. 5, no. 266 (1563, May 13).

101   The first two written donations made by Craiovești noblemen were written by Scribe Stepan (DRH B, vol.2, no. 47); the same scribe Stepan is attested writing documents for the Wallachian princes (ibidem, no. 72, no. 81).

102   Gheorghe Chivu, Magdalena Georgescu et all, eds., *Documente și însemnări românești din secolul al XVI-lea* (Romanian documents and notes from the sixteenth century) (Bucharest, Editura Academiei, 1979), no. 66, no. 68, no. 83, no. 105. Henceforth Chivu, *Documente și însemnări românești din secolul al XVI-lea.* In the last document (no. 105), the scribe is not recorded, but the fact that all his previous transactions were recorded by Priest Andonie for Governor Bantaș and that the land is from the same village, Drăgușani, indicates that probably Priest Andonie also recorded the land transaction from 1596. Moreover, the style and peculiar formulas employed in the previous charters by Priest Andonie are very similar to this one, which suggests the same scribe. Unfortunately, the original documents are no longer preserved.

103   See ibidem, no. 83.

104   Ibidem, no. 105.

105   DIR A, vol. 3, no. 459. An entire family of free land owners traveled from one village to another to sell their family land estates.

106   Chivu, *Documente și însemnări românești din secolul al XVI-lea,* no .5.

107   Tatiana Celac, ed., *Letopisețul Țării Moldovei* (The Chronicle of the Moldavian country) (Chishinău, Hiperion, 1990), 157; Henceforth Celac, *Letopisețul Țării Moldovei.*

108   DIR A, vol. 3, no. 471 (1588, March 5).

109   DRH B, vol. 11, no. 75 (1594, July 8).

110   The writer of the document signed in vernacular Romanian as *Ion dascăl,* which means teacher. See Chivu, *Documente și însemnări românești din*

secolul al XVI-lea, no. 85 (1592, July 21). For Wallachia see i*bidem,* no. 52 (1582, March 25).

[111] In Wallachia, a nephew of a chamberlain wrote a document in 1577 for a noblewoman Irina. See DRH B, vol. 8, no. 157 (1577, Dec. 15).

[112] DIR A, vol. 4, no. 298, no. 244.

[113] Two documents signed *manu propria* by treasurer (*cămăraș*) Ionașco Bașotă are extant. He wrote the documents for a nobleman whom he called "our father." Possibly he was in his service. See *Documente privind Istoria Românie (Veacul XVI) A Moldova* (Documents concerning Romanian history (Sixteenth Century A Moldavia), ed. by Ion Ionașcu, L. Lăzărescu Ionescu, Barbu Câmpina et all, (Bucharest, Editura Academiei, 1952), vol. 4, no. 43 (1591-2), i*bidem,* no. 298 (1599); Hencerorth DIR A

[114] Chivu, *Documente și însemnări românești din secolul al XVI-lea,* no. 104.

[115] DIR A, vol. 3, no. 306 (1584); DIR A, vol. 4, no. 8, no. 38).

[116] Ibidem, no. 306 (1584, May 4).

[117] Ibidem.

[118] See, for instance, DRH B, vol. 8, no. 32, no. 94.

[119] DIR B, vol. 5, no. 316. He also wrote documents in the central chancellery, see DRH B, vol. 8, no. 19, no. 20, no. 218, no. 221, no. 286.

[120] For the characteristics of the Romanian language of the sixteenth-century documents see the Introduction to Chivu, *Documente și însemnări românești din secolul al XVI-lea,* 158; see also the facsimile no. 5, no. 6, no. 7 of the edited documents.

[121] Ioan Caproșu, "Documente românești din secolele al XV- lea -al XVII- lea," (Romanian documents from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries) Analele Științifice ale Universității Al. Ioan Cuza Istorie 37 (1991): 171-204, no. 3.

[122] Chivu, *Documente și însemnări românești din secolul al XVI-lea,* no. 66.

[123] Ibidem, no. 8.

[124] DIR Al, vol. 3, no. 306. Ionașco, the scribe from Galbeni, attested as scribe in the central chancellery during the period recorded a transaction in the village of Galbeni, in the house of Priest Luciu from Galbeni.

[125] Based on numerous attestations, Szekely considered even that diplomatic functions might have been their main task, see Szekely, *Sfetnicii*, 447.

[126] In one of the political missions by the Moldavian Prince Iliaș (1546-1551), the Moldavian Chancellor Theodorus Boloș fulfilled the function of legate. See Iorga, *Acte și scrisori*, no. 869 (1548, July 2). In the multiple foreign relations established by Stephen the Great at the end of the fifteenth century, scribes were often among the messengers of his diplomatic missions sent to Poland, Lithuania, and Moscow. Among them, Scribe Matiaș was sent, together with Governor Giurgea, to the Polish King Alexander. (See Costăchescu, *Documente Ștefan*, vol. 2, no. 173). In 1498, scribe Șandru

was sent to the high knez of Moscow, and one year later, in 1499, scribe Costea was enumerated among Moldavian ambassadors to the Polish King Alexander. See *Ibidem*, no. 141, 180.

127 Iorga, *Acte si scrisori, ,* no. 520. (1525, Dec. 20).

128 Grigore Tocilescu, ed. *534 documente istorice slavo-române din Ţara Românească și Moldova privitoare la legăturile cu Ardealul 1346- 1603* (534 Slavo Romanian documents related to the relations of Wallachia and Moldavia with Transylvania) (Vienna, n. p., 1931), no. 332, 337 (undated); Henceforth Tocilescu, *534 documente.*

129 Tocilescu, *534 documente*, no. 338.

130 Ioan Bogdan, ed. *Documente și regeste privitoare la Relațiile Ţării Românești cu Brașovul și cu Ţara Ungurească în sec. XV și XVI* (Documents and regestas concerning the Wallachian relations with Brasov and Hungary during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries) (Bucharest, Atelierul Grafic I. V. Socecu, 1902), no.115 (1478-9). Radu the Handsome as well sent one of his scribes, Constantine, to Brașov. See Ibidem, no. 82; henceforth Bogdan, *Documente privitoare la Relațiile Ţării Românești cu Brașovul și cu Ţara Ungurească.*

131 Bogdan, *Documente privitoare la Relațiile Ţării Românești cu Brașovul și cu Ţara Ungurească, n*o.87 (1474).

132 See for instance "Georgius litteratus (Iorga, *Acte si scrisori*, no. 796) or Gasparus (*Ibidem*, no. 695).

133 The first attested school at Cotnari was founded by Despot Voda (1561-1563), a Protestant prince of foreign origin. For more information about this see Maria Crăciun, "Protestantism and Orthodoxy in sixteenth-century Moldavia,"in *The Reformation in Eastern and Central Europe* (Aldershot: Scholar Press, 1997).; See also Maria Crăciun and Ovidiu Ghitta, eds, *Church and Society in Central and Eastern Europe.* (Cluj Napoca: Presa Universitară Clujană, 1998); Maria Crăciun, Ovidiu Ghitta and Graeme Murdock, ed., *Confessional Identity in East-Central Europe* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002); Jesuits had founded a Latin school at Jassy (Vlad Georgescu, *The Romanians: A History*, ed. Matei Calinescu (Ohio: Ohio State University, 1984), 61.

134 DRH A, vol. 2, no. 199, no. 201. In 1475 Ion *dascăl* (John the teacher) signed his first charters. Later data also suggest that noblemen hired private teachers for their offspring.

135 In a narrative from the seventeenth century. See Celac, *Letopisețul Ţării Moldovei*, 223.

136   In Moldavia, it was introduced for the first time by a prince of foreign origins, Despot Vodă (1562-1563). His signatures are in Greek. See DIR A, vol. 2, no. 159, no. 162. In Wallachia Greek was introduced by Mikhnea Turcitul, who was brought up in Constantinople. Nicolae Iorga considered that the usage of signatures began to be employed on documents as a new form of authenticity in consequence of the simplification of the formulary of the documents; however, it seems rather to have been influenced by Western

notarial practices. See Nicolae Iorga, *Istoria literaturii religioase a romînilor până la 1688* (Romanian religious history up to 1688) (Bucharest, Minerva, 1925), 102; Iorga, *Istoria literaturii religioase a romînilor.*

137 Dan Simonescu, "Cronica lui Baltazar Walter despre Mihai Viteazul în raport cu cronicile interne contemporane" (The Chronicle of Baltazar Walter about Michael the Brave compared to the internal Wallachian chronicals) *Studii și materiale de istorie medie* 3 (1959), 55

138 Ibidem.

139 The chancellor was identified by Nicolae Iorga as Theodosie Rudeanu, who acted as chancellor under Mihail the Brave. See Iorga, *Istoria literaturii religioase a romînilor*, 8.

140 He acted as treasurer and then as chancellor from 1580 to 1591 and then from 1595 to 1610.

141 Concerning the treasurer and then chancellor Luca Stroici see Gerd Franck, "Un mare ctitor-boier Luca Stroici" (A great nobleman church founder Luca Stroici" In *Confesiune și cultură în Evul Mediu: In Honorem Ion Toderașcu*, ed. by Bogdan-Petru Maleon and Alexandru-Florin Platon (Jassy, Editura Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza," 2004); See also Bogdan Petriceicu Hașdeu, "Luca Stroici, Părintele filologiei latino-române," (Luca Stroici: the father of Latin-Romanian filology) in *Studii de lingvistică și filologie*, ed. Grigore Brâncuși (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1988). B. P. Hașdeu testified that In 1861, at the University of Lemberg, discovered the catalogue of the private library that had belonged to Chancellor Stroici. He described it as being written on four files of parchment, in Slavonic, by the hand of the chancellor himself. Among the authors Hașdeu mentioned the sympathisers of Reformation ideas such as Carion, Camerarius, Melanchton; see Hașdeu. "Luca Stroici," 70. However, his affirmation cannot be proved today. See Franck, "Luca Stroici," 306.

142 See Irena Sulkowska, "Noi documente privind relațiile româno- polone în perioada 1589 - 1622 (New documents concerning Romanian and Polish relations from the period 1589-1622)," *Studii Revistă de Istorie* 12, No. 6 (1959): No. 2.

143 See Ilie Corfus, ed., *Documente privitoare la istoria României cuprinse în arhivele polone. Secolul al XVI-lea* (Documents concerning the history of Romania found in Polish archives: The sixteenth century) (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1979).

144 See Ștefan Gorovei, "Nicolae (Milescu) spătarul. Contribuții biografice," *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie "A.D. Xenopol"* 21 (1984): 179-182; idem, "Un cărturar uitat: Logofătul Grigoraș," *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie "A.D. Xenopol"* 23, No. 2 (1986): 681-98.

SILVIU-RADIAN HARITON

Born 1979, in Brăila, Romania

Ph.D. Candidate, Central European University, Budapest
Thesis: *War commemorations in inter-war Romania*

Teaching fellow (Historiography) at the University of Bucharest,
Faculty of History (2006-2010)
Member of the International Society for Cultural History (since 2008)

CEU Doctoral Research Support Grant, Russian, East European and
Eurasian Center, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
(September-November 2010)
CEU Doctoral Research Grant, Paris (July 2009)

Participation in international conferences held in Sofia (Bulgaria), Paris
(France), Hamburg and Berlin (Germany), Budapest and Köszeg (Hungary),
Florence (Italy), Chișinău (Moldavia), Romania, Portorose (Slovenia), Stockholm
(Sweden), Fort Leavenworth and Bloomington, Indiana (USA) and Southampton
(UK)

Publications in academic journals and edited volumes published in Bulgaria, Germany, Romania, USA and UK

NATIONALISM, HEROISM AND WAR MONUMENTS IN ROMANIA, 1900s-1930s[1]

On May 16, 1923 a train carrying the coffin with the remains of the Unknown Soldier arrived in Bucharest. It was selected during a ceremony taken place at Mărășești out of nine other unidentified bodies of soldiers fallen on ten most important battlegrounds the Romanian army fought in the Great War. The Unknown Soldier was brought to Mihai Vodă monastery for public mourning and it was buried on the next day in his specially designed Tomb in the Carol Park, the site of the June 1848 popular gathering and of the 1906 General Exhibition. Singled out from a series of other politically and militarily significant places of Bucharest like the statue of Michael the Brave, the initial Petre Antonescu's Arch of Triumph and the Military Club (*Cercul Militar*), the final site was in front of the Military Museum about to be established and to become a place of regularly organized visits for pupils and students during the interwar period. The process of selecting the body, carrying it to Bucharest and especially burying it represented a massive state organized ceremony where the most important public authorities, the hierarchs of the Romanian Orthodox Church, of the Greek-Orthodox Church and of the Catholic Church, officer corps, local notabilities, teachers and university professors, soldiers, high school pupils and students were convoked according to a detailed plan and had to participate. The tombstone was engraved with the inscription: "Here the unknown soldier happily sleeps *întru Domnul*, fallen as a part of the sacrifice for the unity of the Romanian people; the soil of remade Romania rests on his bones, 1916-1919". Besides this religiously shaped message, the inscription followed the Brancovan decorative style to be found in the Orthodox churches of 17th and 18th century Danubian Principalities and re-employed in the decades around the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century as a part of a so-called Neo-Romanian style.[2]

Image 1. The grave of the Unknown Soldier, Bucharest, 1930s.
Source: ANIC, fond Ilustrate, I 3229.

The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Bucharest's Carol Park represented the central piece of an archipelago of war monuments that flourished in interwar Romania following a tradition established in the previous decades. These war monuments were dedicated to the Romanian participation in the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878 (Romania's War of Independence), in the Second Balkan War of 1913 and especially in the Great War. The vast majority of the Romanian war monuments is to be found in the urban areas of the Old Kingdom, in the areas where battles were carried which is nearby the Danube, nearby the Carpathians and on the valleys of Jiu, Prahova and Siret rivers but also scattered in numerous localities of the countryside. Their construction started in the last decades of the nineteenth century with some tens of war monuments being constructed between 1906 and 1914. The years around the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century were a time when the occasions for public celebration multiplied, the political participation in the public sphere intensified, when professional groups able to promote public art were created and a public able to read it and enjoy it took form and, not the least, when resources became more readily available for being invested

in a variety of public building and public monuments. Still, the greatest part of the war monuments under discussion was erected in the interwar period, mostly during the 1920s. During the 1940s resources for building new war monuments became limited due to the Second World War and the subsequent Soviet occupation. Later, war monuments fell into oblivion before being recuperated especially during the Nicolae Ceaușescu's regime and turned again into sites of public rituals and political participation.

This paper contextualizes and details the appearance and the heyday of this particular type of public monuments in modern Romania. While paying attention to both the previous and the subsequent periods, my research concentrated only on the first four decades of the twentieth century when a tradition building upon itself of constructing public monuments started being developed in association within the paradigm of (state) nationalism. The questions framing my research included why war monuments started to appear mostly around the turn of the centuries in Romania? What were the ideological, political, social, economic and institutional contexts? What were the factors that contributed to this delay in comparison with Western and Central Europe? Who initiated them, who supported them financially and logistically, who sanctioned and used them and for what purposes? Who were included and who were excluded in the iconography of these monuments? What were the artistic, cultural and political languages that framed the iconography of war monuments? In approaching the Romanian case, I benefited from the previous work on different aspects of the topic authored by Virgiliu Z. Teodorescu,[3] Florian Tucă,[4] Andi Mihalache[5] and especially Maria Bucur[6] while Ioana Beldiman's work on French sculpture in Romania was a model for placing artifacts in their historical contexts and dealing with them in terms of social command and reception.[7] A first part of the text contextualizes the category of war monuments within the larger European context of the nineteenth century and links it to a series of factors including the transformation of the definition of heroism; a second parts surveys the factors that made possible the appearance of war monuments in the early twentieth century Romania while the following three parts presents and discusses the characteristics of war monuments in the three periods when they flourished in Romania, the period of 1900s-1910s; the 1920s; and the 1930s.

From Hero to heroes: public sphere, monuments and nationalism in the long nineteenth century

War monuments defined in this paper as intentional monuments designed especially for commemorating wars and recognize the contribution of those fallen during these wars are one of the most visible indicators of the impact of nationalism in modern times. They were not only the result of the affirmation of political ideologies but also the result of a series of interlinked processes taking place during the long nineteenth century including those of urbanization, spread of literacy, expansion of the public sphere and political participation, spread of arts and middle and higher education. Some of the most renowned scholars of the cultural history of nationalism like Benedict Anderson and George Mosse paid attention to war monuments. "No more arresting emblems of the modern culture of nationalism exist than cenotaphs and tombs of Unknown Soldiers. The public ceremonial reverence accorded these monuments precisely *because* they are either deliberately empty or no one knows who lies inside them, has no true precedents in earlier times" observed Benedict Anderson thirty years ago in the beginning of the first chapter of his *Imagined communities* pointing to war memorials as embodiments of the symbolic nature of nationalism.[8] Before Anderson, George Mosse was less reflective on the nature of war monuments but more applicative in integrating the series of German national monuments built during the nineteenth century in his cultural history of the artifacts and rituals that helped building a visual culture that contributed to the *Nationalization of the masses* and to the rise of the Nazi ideology in Germany.[9]

It was the body of scholarship devoted to the cultural impact of the First World War that paid a closer and a more systematic look at the spread, iconography and uses of the war memorials dedicated during the interwar period to common soldiers fallen in the above mentioned war. While previously Antoine Prost has documented this type of public monuments in France,[10] Australian historian Ken Inglis opened the way for approaching them in a more analytical way by pointing to the facts that these monuments had the unique feature that "after 1914-1918, both official policy and popular taste leaned towards equality in death". While previously ignored because few of them were considered of artistic value the monuments dedicated to the First World War started being given attention once cultural history became more popular among the academia of English language.[11] The most important scholar of the cultural history of

the Great War, Jay Winter, approached war memorials as the most visible evidence of a quest throughout the villages and towns of Europe for a meaning of the Great War that was to be accommodated in their process of mourning by the generations who fought the war and survived it.[12] Their performative action in front of the younger generations was stipulated by Reinhart Koselleck who underlined that "memorials which commemorate violent death provide a means of identification" for both the dead and the surviving people, on the one hand the dead being identified as heroes of the nation while on the other hand the surviving people being more or less directly suggested to follow their model.[13] While focusing on the war monuments of the Great War because they represent the heaviest part of the constructed and surviving war monuments in general and especially because of their egalitarian significance, the scholars of the Great War paid less attention to the role played by previous developments of public monuments and definitions of heroism that greatly shaped the articulation, iconography and uses of the war monuments dedicated to the First World War. Therefore, for the benefit of this paper, war monuments or the monuments to the fallen soldiers are considered to be a category of public monuments that became widespread in a period of time of about a century spanning from 1850s to 1940s. Either under the form of buildings of more or less public use, gravestones, statues, street names or memorial plaques, public monuments and their spread in the modern era are a telling indicator of the ongoing cultural, social, political and ideological processes.

Monuments are approached by different trends of cultural and art history as political statements in modern times. Public monuments built in the decades around 1900 tend to present a unified vision of the past, they can easily be compared to an open space museum of the nation with several layers of memory while their iconography can be described as heroic, self-aggrandizing and figurative celebrating national ideals and triumphs.[14] While paying no attention to the aesthetical dimension of the war monuments under consideration, this paper focuses on five dimensions of the war monuments: 1) their iconography which is approached as a set of ideological statements, cultural codes and illustrations of cultural pantheons and political discourses; 2) the illustrative function for the ideas of historical event and especially of various types of heroism and subsequent pantheons and thus as an indicator of the process of democratization that the concept of heroism passed during the nineteenth century; 3) their construction and use as sites for performing political

rituals; monuments devoted to groups of men, their spread can be correlated with the dissemination of the idea of "people" with its growing use of national history in arts and in literature; 4) they should not be considered as the result of a monolithic program imposed from top to the bottom even if the cultural, political and artistic languages they employed were designed by artistic and literary groups writing especially for the upper and sometimes middle classes; instead their erection represented the result of vernacular initiative and resources, social groups of a local distribution for whom these war monuments represented an instrument of connecting their contexts to the center(s) of political decision; and 5) in addition to being illustrative of a rhetorical style and content, these war monuments contributed to a visual discourse that reinforced the discourse of nationalism with its embedded military heroism.

Respecting a dynastic principle, funerary monuments had a "prospective" character during the Middle Age being devoted to the fate of the deceased beyond the grave and only since the Renaissance they regained a "retrospective" character being devoted to commemorating life and deeds on earth.[15] The multiplication of "retrospective" monuments was a historical process that took place in early modern Western Europe. Professor Andrei Pippidi defined statues as "itinerant graves", empty graves taking over the manifestations of public devotion to the memory of a dead personality.[16] The rise of the public monument during the early modern period may indeed be correlated with the changing attitudes towards death, death being gradually evacuated from the growing urban areas. Initially restricted to royal and princely figures, monuments started being dedicated also to important military and political men towards the end of the eighteenth century public while the series of events associated with and subsequent to the French Revolution led to the formation of pantheons of Great Men which indiscriminately included historical figures, military, religious and political men as well as men of letters and arts.[17] Symptomatic for this expansion of the pantheons as well as for the definition of Great Men is Thomas Carlyle's 1841 essay *On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History* where heroism is analyzed in different fields of human activity and illustrated with the biographies of Dante and Shakespeare as the literary heroes, the biography of Martin Luther as the religious hero, the biography of Jean-Jacques Rousseau as the intellectual hero, Odin as an example of the divine hero and the biographies of Oliver Cromwell and Napoleon Bonaparte as the military and political heroes.[18]

The ideological, political, social and economic transformations of the nineteenth century contributed to a gradual democratization of heroism, initially confined only to the Great Men and later extended to include different social categories and to the concepts of nation and people. During the first half of the nineteenth century, historical themes became a favorite topic represented in literature and arts, historical characters and scenes being used as references, symbols, models and countermodels for the contemporary political debates and struggles. In parallel with the spread of the historical novels and plays and the making of the public museums like Louvre, visual artifacts created in this period, and later, greatly contributed in setting up the imagery supporting the paradigm of national history in Western Europe.[19] Since the 1830s, the idea of historical patrimony started to develop as a consequence of this process and unintentional monuments like historical ruins, previously treated more like exotic artifacts and source of personal inspiration, received a growing attention with consequences on the closer attention given to the role of intentional public monuments in educating the public.[20]

While for most of the nineteenth century, "heroism" was confined only to describing the deeds of the Great Men, models to be followed mostly by the instructed individuals, the "people" became a growingly visible subject represented mostly in painting and literature and later it included public monuments. After the mid-nineteenth century the Great Men started being represented as surrounded by personifications and social types. Further, starting with the decades around the turn of the nineteenth century great men were rather integrated among the people they were considered representative for or they led or they worked with even if particular features that helped their identification were still preserved. Thus their deeds were no longer considered to be exclusively belonging to them but the result of a collective effort.

Several factors may be taken into account for understanding the transformation of "heroism" from a model for elites to a model for masses of people during the nineteenth century: a) the spread of mass literacy enlarged the reading market and demanded accessible heroes which is visible in the spread of popular novels and theater; b) the expansion of the public sphere and of political participation; and c) the generalization of military conscription in Europe after the victories of Prussia during the 1860s and 1870. Military conscription offered an experience to large masses of men and represented the basis for the development after the 1880s of a process of commemorating the war experiences of the nineteenth century.

This process of war commemoration celebrated the "heroic" deeds of the common soldiers, a process of memorialization aimed at culturally mobilizing the male population for the (possible) war(s) to come. The "hero" turned into "heroes" while "heroism" and "heroic" deeds tended to refer only to acts of courage, braveness, self-sacrifice, sometimes comradeship and brotherhood into arms, all chanted in patriotic literature, textbooks and public and school ceremonies. All these transformations made possible the appearance of war monuments grounded in the paradigm of national history, a military definition of heroism and the uses of public ceremonies for cultural and political mobilization.

In correlation with the growth of the number of instructed people and the number of citizens active in the public sphere, the number of public monuments, especially of statues, increased exponentially in the decades prior to the First World War as a part of the cultural politics of state-/nation-/empire-building all over Europe, the cultural codes associated with the local centers of power helping in (re)inventing the local and national political traditions. Besides lay and religious statues of a symbolic nature, public monuments were dedicated to three types of figures or heroes: a) men associated with the major political decisions contemporary or still directly affecting the period like royal figures, statemen and military leaders; b) men of culture and science especially of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; and c) historical figures, usually belonging to the period of the Middle Age, who were those acclaimed for most of the times as national heroes and mostly used to promote political and national unity.[21]

In France, building and removing monuments followed the violent political changes started in 1789 and reflected the competing political and ideological discourses.[22] However, it was only the Third Republic that pursued a systematic program of disseminating its set of symbols through visual artifacts decorating public buildings and public squares. While the monument of Defense was built in the last days of the Second Empire (Amédée Doblemard) and the statue of Jeanne D'Arc (Emmanuel Fremiet) was erected while awaiting Henri V to accept the tricolor, starting the late 1870s numerous busts of Marianne and statues of political figures of the French Revolution or cultural figures of the French Enlightenment started to adorn the urban areas and the public buildings.[23] Some of the most important statues were the static *Monument to the Republic* of Leopold and Charles Morice (Place de la Republique, Paris, 1879-1883) and the more dynamic *Triumph de la République* of Jules Dalou (Place de la Nation, Paris, 1889-1899). Overall, several hundred monuments

appeared in Paris and elsewhere in France in the decades prior to 1914. A part of them, directly associated with the French Revolution, were removed during the Nazi occupation and the Vichy regime and many of them were unfortunately destroyed partially or entirely.[24]

In Germany, the tradition of *National-denkmäler* consisted in the construction of massive granite monuments placed at the heart of the countryside, symbolically differentiating from if not opposing the bronze and marble statues of France mostly built in urban tissues. Joseph-Ernst von Bandel's Arminius monument situated in the Teutoburg Forest (1839-1875) symbolically identified the German nation with the ancient German tribes and the victory of the latter (9 AD) was celebrated as the victory of their supposedly healthier and uncorrupted way of living over the Roman cosmopolitanism, so much prized in Paris and France where the Roman political traditions represented the model and the foundation of the First Republic and of the First Empire. Johannes Schilling's monument of Niederwald (inaugurated in 1883) representing a *Germania* very similar to the Statue of Liberty and Bruno Schmitz's monument to Kaiser Wilhelm I at the confluence of Moselle and Rhine (inaugurated 1897) symbolically guarded Germany's border with France. Bruno Schmitz authored other two major monuments situated in Porta Westfalica and on the Kyffhäuser Mountain (both inaugurated in 1896) and the biggest of all German national monuments, *The Monument to the Battle of Nations in Leipzig* (1913). All these National- *denkmäler* became sites of national pilgrimage and they can be considered war monuments as well. Furthermore, tens of statues dedicated to Wilhelm I and later hundreds of monuments dedicated to Bismarck spread all over Germany in the decades prior to the First World War, solidifying the visual culture of *volkish* militarism that influenced to a great extent the political affiliations of numerous Germans during the Weimer Republic.[25]

In Austria, statues of Joseph II were erected by the German communities and they became sometimes contested sites as Nancy Wingfield has documented.[26] In Hungary, local authorities constructed numerous columns of the Millennium after 1896, all placed in mountainous regions or on high hills, some of them symbolically guarding Hungary's borders of 1867.[27] In the Balkans, major statues were erected to Prince Milos Obrenovici in Belgrade (1882) and to the Russian tsar Alexander II in front of the Bulgarian Parliament in Sofia (1907).[28]

In this context, where the symbolic legacy of the First Republic and Napoleonic wars heavily influenced the political cultures in France and

Germany, the commemoration of the French-Prussian war of 1870 became the vehicle for employing collective heroes in parallel with a similar process of commemorating the Civil War in United Stated so well before the First World War.[29]

The gradual democratization of heroism and the heyday of this military version of heroism are visible after the Great War in the process of war commemoration that swept (mostly the victorious states of) Europe.[30] For the case of the British Empire and later the Commonwealth, the memory of the Great War played an important role in underlining its political and cultural unity through the shared experience on the Western Front.

After the Second World War, public monuments spread especially in the countries where a process of constructing a historical consciousness supporting and legitimizing local forms of power was under going e.g. the Soviet Union and all the other Communist states or major transformations of the local paradigms were undertaken e.g. the Holocaust. The war monuments constructed within the paradigm of the nation-state during the nineteenth century and especially during the first half of the twentieth century were affected most of the times by indifference. When and where abrupt political changes emerged, the most visible such monuments were affected by various forms of iconoclasm e.g. the major Communist and Soviet monuments in Eastern Europe after 1989.[31]

The rise of the public monument in nineteenth century Romania:

As everywhere else in Europe, the appearance and the spread of public monuments in nineteenth century Romania was the result of a combination of local ideological, political, institutional, social and economic factors. Besides these, the acculturation of the French culture by the local elites played a major role in the articulation of public, artistic and cultural spheres.[32] The first public monuments in Romania to last were those of Michael the Brave in Bucharest (1874) and of Stephen the Great in Jassy (1883) followed during the 1880s by the statues dedicated to illustrious figures of cultural revival like Gheorghe Lazăr and Ion Heliade Rădulescu in Bucharest and Miron Costin and Gheorghe Asaky in Jassy.

Probably close to a hundred public monuments were created in Romania before the First World War and they were dedicated mainly to three types of heroes: the historical figures usually categorized as national

heroes; the cultural personalities who shaped the canon of modern Romanian culture; and the political personalities who created the modern Romanian state during the nineteenth century. Their distribution is clearly regional before 1914, their presence in regions other than their regions of birth and activity dating mainly from the interwar period. When no birthplace, place of death or period of activity could be linked to the respective personality, the choice for a certain cultural or political figure indicates the regional identity of the group of members of initiative and support committee as well as of those who subscribed for the creation and building of the statue in their locality.

Identification, selection, clustering and ordering according to a theme and in chronological order of the public monuments in general and of the war monuments in special was possible due to two main sources of information. One of them is a dictionary compiled during the 1970s by the military documentarist Florian Tucă.[33] The other one is a survey of public monuments ordered in 1937 by the Commission of Public Monuments, established 1929, not to be confused with the Commission of Historical Monuments established in 1892.[34] Both of these surveys are not complete and systematic and a reserve on their accuracy should be preserved at all times. However they are useful in tracing the spread of public monuments in Romania dedicated to the three types of heroes mentioned above, statemen, cultural figures and national heroes, and especially in identifying the war monuments dedicated to the war of 1877-1878, to the campaign of 1913 and to the campaigns of 1916-1919. All of the following lists of monuments are based on these two main sources of information and the lists of the localities are indicated according to the administrative organization of Romania existing in the moment of their compilation, the 1930s and the 1970s.

According to the dictionary of Florin Tucă, a monument dedicated to Stephen the Great was erected in Bârseşti, Vrancea County, in 1904, Mircea the Elder had a statue built in Tulcea in the early 1910s only to be removed by the Bulgarian military authorities during the First World War while Tudor Vladimirescu received attention mainly in Oltenia (Baia de Arama, Mehedinti County, 1898; Targu Jiu, 1898; Cerneti, Mehedinţi County, 1914) and Bucharest (1934). Vasile Alecsandri benefited of the famous monument in Jassy in 1906 while Costache Negri of a monument in Galati in 1912. Political figures like Alexandru Ioan Cuza and Mihail Kogalniceanu received attention mainly in Moldavia. Cuza was depicted as a standing man and therefore as a stateman, riding a horse being a

posture reserved only for princely and royal figures. Cuza's statues were erected in Galaţi (bust in 1888 and, according to Tucă, a statue in 1917), Griviţa, Vaslui County, 1903; Mărăşeşti, 1908; Jassy, 1910/2; Răcăciuni, Bacău County, 1912; Alexandria, 1915 (Ion Iordănescu), Cetate, Dolj County, 1933, Craiova, 1939. The statues of Iasi, Galaţi and Craiova were authored by Raffaelo Romanelli. Statues to Kogălniceanu were built at Galati, 1893; Piatra Neamţ (Wladimir Hegel); Iasi, 1911; Dorohoi, 1913 and Bucharest, 1936.[35]

Romanian monuments dedicated to the War of Independence (the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878):

The appearance and the spread of war monuments in the late nineteenth century Romania was possible in the context of commemorating the Romanian participation in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 and it represented the embodiment of a militarized conception of heroism disseminated especially after the 1870s. The Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 was immediately interiorized in the political and historical culture of Romania as the Independence War (*Războiul de Independenţă*) and it quickly became the cornerstone of King Carol I's reign. While 1866 moments of his election as a prince and of establishing the Constitution were the creation of the Romanian political elites, only after 1871 his personal influence being firmly established, Carol I's role in the successful Romanian involvement in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 was pivotal and therefore uncontestable. Especially since the 1890s his image became increasingly more visible in the public sphere in connection to the symbolic affirmation of the young Romanian kingdom through the development of the public infrastructure on the one hand and through the commemoration of the War of Independence on the other hand. While he showed no personal ambition for being immortalized because he saw himself as an element of equilibrium in the volatile Romanian politics and never as an absolute monarch, in spite of maintaining the army as his personal domain, the commemoration of the 1877-1878 war was partially based on and in the same time contributed to a growing cult of Carol I's effigy.[36] However, few busts were dedicated to him compared to those dedicated to the historical, political and cultural figures and no public subscription or parliamentary initiative for providing public funds for erecting a statue seems to have been successfully launched before the 1930s. Based on the 1937 survey of public

monuments, I could identify only three monuments dedicated to Carol I before 1914. A first one was authored by C. Bălăcescu and it was built in Turnu Severin. Placed in the courtyard of the local high school "Traian," it cost 7.000 lei.[37] Other two monuments appeared in Călugăreni (1913) and Gh. Lazăr, Ialomița County (1914).[38]

The Romanian participation in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 in the Romanian arts and literature before the First World War

An iconography of the Romanian participation in the war started early to develop, King Carol I being the first to order paintings describing moments from the war, including his presence. Thus he ordered five paintings to Johann Nepomuk Schönberg in order to adorn his residences, the Royal Palace in Bucharest and the Peleș residence in Sinaia, Prahova County.[39] However, during the war a series of artists were conscripted including Nicolae Grigorescu, Sava Henția and George Demetrescu Mirea. They had the opportunity to document and sketch drawings of soldiers in different moments of their daily life.[40] Among them, Grigorescu is probably the mostly known to create a large number of paintings, especially during the 1880s. *Atacul de la Smârdan* (The attack of Smârdan, 1885, 253x390cm) is probably the largest but some other pieces, impressive through their size, were *Vedeta* (85.5x122.5cm) and *Spionul* (1878-1880, 74x143.5cm). For the first one, Grigorescu received from the city of Bucharest a portion of land of 1823sqm close to the Victoria Square. For other two, *Dorobanțul* and *Recunoașterea*, Nicolae Blaremberg paid 12.000 lei. Besides a large number of sketches and paintings, in 1878-1879 he printed at Paris an "Album of the Independence War", only ten images out of the intended thirty being printed in the end. A set of such five images were supposed to be sold at twenty lei or six lei a piece but not many of them were actually sold and therefore in 1902 he donated the rest of the issue to the Ministry of Public Instruction. The ministry donated sets of ten copies to the normal schools for preparing teachers and a copy to every rural school having a building in good condition and only if the teacher agreed to pay for the frame.[41] The difficulty of distributing these images is illustrative for the ways how the cultural politics of war memorialization were implemented and for the popular indifference their study should be placed against.

Presenting Nicolae Grigorescu's work including his paintings dedicated to the war experience of 1877-1878, Vlad Țoca observes they depict

rather idealized figures with no particular feature or expression on their faces[42] denoting their conception as part of an impersonal visual program corollary to the national ideology. The same observation may be extended to the war monuments under discussion, constructed before and after the First World War. When representing human figures, the focus is on their bodies and their solemn, resigned or broken posture and hardly on the features of their faces that could have denoted personal feelings.

The commemoration of the Independence War took numerous forms and it is visible in numerous forms of media. It was not a systematic policy promoted by a monolithic state, as it is visible in the difficulty of disseminating the images created by Nicolae Grigorescu, but the result of a set of initiatives of local and national actors who were active in the public sphere, actors sharing the language of nationalism and many times being active either in the public bureaucracy or in the parliamentary activity. This was visible in the spread of war poetry, later to be included as a part of primary schools' curriculum, in the initiatives of streets' renaming, in the publication of self glorifying recollections and military textbooks etc.[43]

While a military fashion started to spread among some members of the Romanian upper classes, especially among children and women (illustrated by Ion Luca Caragiale's *Domnul Goe* while Queen Maria's representation as an officer of *roșiori* troops is more of an exception),[44] in many cities including Bucharest and Brăila square names and street names were changed during the early 1880s in order to celebrate the outcome of the war and the names of the victories or bodies of the army: *Piața Independenței, Calea Victoriei, Calea Rahovei, Calea Plevnei, Calea Griviței, Calea Dorobanților, Calea Călărașilor, Roșiori Street* etc. Rahova, Plevna, Grivița represented names of battlefields where the Romanian army has fought while the others represented names given to different branches of the Romanian army. Before 1908 when all young men started being conscripted if they were in their early twenties, only about a quarter of them were actually trained in the barracks for several years, either in the regular infantry (*infanteria de linie*) or in the regular chivalry (*roșiori*). The rest of them, about three quarters of those conscriptable in their early twenties, were trained periodically, once a week and for several weeks in the autumn, as territorial infantry troops (*dorobanți*) or territorial chivalry troops (*călărași*). Added to these names, streets carrying the names of Mihai Bravul and Stephen the Great were reminders of the glorious past and of the brave behavior attributed to the Romanian people by the historical and literary writings of the time.[45]

Numerous recollections or histories of the war were written since the 1880s but especially around the turn of the centuries,[46] the events were always part of the military textbooks[47] while the celebration of twenty-five years since the war took place triggered an increase of attention given to commemorating the Romanian participation in the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878. A column of forty meters in height, engraved with scenes from the war to be authored by Karl Storck, was proposed; a play entitled "Peneș Curcanul" was written by actors of the National Theater and it was staged there on May 11 and 19, 1902. The theme was used in several examples of the school theater encouraged at that time.[48] The third volume of his Comanesteanu family saga, Duiliu Zamfirescu's *At war* (In război) was initially published in 1897-1898 in *Convorbiri literare* and significantly in separate volumes in 1902 and 1907.

Vasile Alecsandri quickly wrote during the war a series of poems like *Peneș Curcanul*, the *Sergeant*, *Ode to the Romanian soldiers* and *Hora de la Plevna* which were published in 1878 in the volume *Our soldiers* (*Ostașii noștri*). Alecsandri created the character Peneș Curcanul based on the real life Constantin Țurcanu (1854-1932), a sergeant of *dorobants*, the Romanian territorial infantry troops between 1872 and 1908. The hero necessary for providing a unitary narrative, Peneș Curcanul became the main character of many subsequent romanced histories of the war, including of the first Romanian movie, *Independența României* (1912). During the First World War Constantin Țurcanu volunteered to fight in the Romanian army and apparently he also enrolled all his sons and grandsons.[49]

A teenager in the years following 1877-1878, George Coșbuc dedicated a great part of his writing to the memorialization of the Independence War, his marriage with the daughter of school books editor C. Sfetea in 1895 and his activity as a director in the Ministry of Public Instruction after 1902 probably playing a role in focusing his attention to writing war poetry. While early poems like *Trei Doamne și toți trei* (1891) and *Recrutul* (1893) were included in his volume *Balade și idile*, the volume *Songs of bravery* (Cântece de vitejie, 1904) collected the largest number of poems dedicated to glorifying the Romanian participation in 1877-1878, all of them written between 1898 and 1904. This volume included *Dorobanțul*, 1900; *Scut și armă*, 1902; *Mortul de la Putna*, 1903; *Pe Dealul Plevnei*, 1900; *Cântecul redutei*, 1898; *Povestea căprarului*, 1898; *Coloană de atac*, 1900; *O scrisoare de la Muselin-Selo*, 1901; *Raport (Luarea Griviței)*, 1898. Song [*Cântec*], the opening poem of this volume is illustrative for the cultural agenda it carried: "Raise your head, you worthy people/

All of you who speak the same language and carry one name/You all should have a single goal and a single wish/To proudly raise above all in this world/The tricolor!"[50] In addition, in 1899, Coșbuc published two narrative accounts dedicated to the participation of the Romanian army in 1877-1878: *Războiul nostru pentru neatârnare* (Our war for independence) and *Povestea unei coroane de oțel* (The story of a steeled crown). This period correlates with the period of intensification of public celebrations in Romania and the appearance and spread of war monuments.

All these cultural artifacts contributed to the articulation of a warrior culture that served as an instrument for further cultural mobilization for war where war monuments played a major role. Illustrative for this warrior culture is Ioan Nenițescu's *Lion cubs* (Pui de lei), a poem that entered school curriculum and pupils' folklore ever since:

> There were heroes and there still are/
> And there will be among the Romanian people/
> Born out of hard rock/Romanians grow everywhere!//
> It's our inheritance/Created by two men with strong arms/
> Steeled will/Strong minds and great hearts.//
> And one is Decebal the diligent/And the other one is Traian the rightful/
> For their homeland/They bitterly fought so many enemies.//
> And out of such parents/Always fighters will be born/
> Who for their motherland/Will stand as the next [fighters]//
> There were heroes and there will be/Who will defeat the evil enemies/
> Out of Dacia's and Rome's ribbon/Forever little lions will be born.[51]

It comes at no surprise that the first Romanian movie was dedicated to the war of 1877-1878. The two hours movie was authored by Grigore Brezianu and it included a cast composed mostly by the actors of the National Theater of Bucharest. Brezianu obtained the necessary 400.000 lei from Leon Popescu, a rich senator of Ialomița. Popescu was also helpful in gaining the support of the War Department for the 80.000 troops used as extras as well as the military equipment used for fostering realism to the movie. The script was supposed to be as historically accurate as possible and the character of PeneșCurcanul became the common hero that viewers were able to connect with. With explicit emphasis on being realist and aiming at stirring emotions, the movie had a pedagogical aspect which is visible also in the fact that its premiere on September 1, 1912, was accompanied by a libretto listing the most important scenes with their

accurate historical chronology. Significantly, a competitive project with the same topic authored by Gaumont with a cast of a different Romanian theater was stopped by the Romanian authorities on the grounds of not being historically accurate.[52] Historical objectivity became once again the instrument for eliminating alternative interpretations to the officially approved historical perspective.

The Romanian war monuments before the First World War

In this context, war monuments dedicated to a collective hero took either the form of celebrating historical figures who led the Romanian people in their fight against the never ending foreign invasions during the Middle Age or the form of celebrating the three major events of the nineteenth century that shaped the Danubian Principalities and Romania: the 1821 revolt led by Tudor Vladimirescu, the 1848 revolution in Wallachia and the war of 1877-1878. The monuments dedicated to Vladimirescu were already surveyed in a previous section. The celebration of fifty years since the Wallachian revolution of 1848 contributed to the appearance of the first highly visible war monument dedicated to a collective hero and in the same time one of the first public monuments in Bucharest. Initiated by Eugeniu Carada, the monument authored by Wladimir Hegel (1839-1918) was inaugurated in September 13, 1903, actually on the fifty-fifth anniversary of the struggle of Dealu Spirii of 1848 when Ottoman troops occupied Bucharest and removed the revolutionary government. Dislocated during the 1980s to make place to the present Palace of the Romanian Parliament, the monument to the firemen was restored on September 13, 1990. A Victory trumpets the victory of liberalism and nationalism and supports a wounded fireman.[53]

It was only the Romanian participation in the 1877-1878 that best fitted the criteria for a national celebration: it involved a large number of people from all historical regions of the Old Kingdom of Romania, it was victorious and it greatly shaped the cultural and political realities contemporary to those organizing and assisting the commemorative practices. While a first Arch of Triumph was built in 1878 for the troops returning from Bulgaria,[54] the first monuments dedicated to 1877-1878 were erected nearby the most important battlefields in Bulgaria where the Romanian troops took their part, at Plevna, Rahova and Smârdan. Authored by Fritz Storck, together with a chapel constructed at Grivița,

they cost 180-190.000 lei that were paid by the Department of War. The monument at Smârdan is described in 1898 by a visitor as being "a bronze woman, looking to Bulgaria's interior, holding a light in her right hand and a sword in her left hand; keeping her right foot on a cannon and her left foot on a broken chain" with the inscription "Giving your life in a manly way, you have given life to your country and liberty to Bulgaria. Grateful Romania will never forget you; what is gained through fiery battles must be piously preserved. Nations that reward those faithfully serving them assure their future." The same traveler was observing that monuments "remind us forever the glorious deeds of a people on the one hand and they steel the future generations and strengthen the sentiment of patriotism on the other hand",[55] an observation that confirms Reinhart Koselleck's theoretical analysis of the role of war monuments.

According to the two surveys of public monuments that were used as primary sources for this study, over sixty war monuments were constructed before 1914, several of them in the first decades after the war but the greatest part of them being built after 1907, mostly in the county capital cities next to Danube (Calafat, Turnu-Măgurele, Tulcea etc.), in the cities around Bucharest (Potlogi, Pitești, Ploiești) and fewer in the rather mountainous regions of Moldova (Vrancea, Neamț etc). This geographical distribution is not necessarily an indicator of the origin of the sacrificed troops but it is rather an indicator of the urban communities able to mobilize the resources necessary for erecting these monuments.[56]

Interestingly enough, based on these lists, monuments built in Moldavia seem to appear only after 1907. The greatest part of these monuments were not constructed in relation to the local cemeteries and no special war cemeteries or sections dedicated to war graves were created in the cemeteries existing or being created before the First World War. Why two thirds of the war monuments constructed before 1914 were inaugurated after 1907 may be related not only to a more coherent policy of stressing national unity after the Great Peasant Revolt and to a greater availability of resources but also to the activism of the teachers impregnated by the cultural policies of Spiru Haret.[57]

The design of these monuments does not include any religious reference either in the form of dedications, the presence of crosses or the employment of floral elements associated with the old Orthodox monasteries, the old Romanian culture or the newly stylized Neo-Romanian. In most of the cases, they represent obelisks having sometimes an eagle on top of them,

soldiers of different army corps, female figures representing either Patria or Victory holding flags, laurels or swords. Below them, bas-reliefs depict scenes of battles particularly associated with the group of heroes to whom the monuments were dedicated and many times they list the names of the local fallen officers and soldiers. The same iconography is going to be employed for the war memorials dedicated to the First World War when initiated by committees composed mostly by active and retired officers. This is hardly surprising since the military usually represented an agency of secularization in societies living in rural conditions in their greatest part and motivated by religious worldviews as it was Romania at the time but also most the countries of South-Eastern Europe. For example, the monument of Calafat (1886) was represented by an obelisk with a captured Turkish shell on top of it and an eagle with stretched wings, both removed during the First World War, and guarded by two cannons. The same obelisk with an eagle on top of it was also represented at Azuga (1905) and Pitești (1907). A column was built at Târgoviște (1905) to which other two were added after 1918.

Representations of the *dorobanț,* the soldier of the territorial infantry troops, are illustrative for the gradual shift from representing officers, obelisks or single female figures, even if the names of the local fallen sergeants, corporals or privates were listed bellow, to the representation of the common soldier as embodying the idea of heroism as it was articulated and disseminated through the public system of education and through the military training. Not included in the above mentioned list is the Cernavodă Bridge (built 1890-1895) which has two massive statues of *dorobants*[58], symbolically "guarding" the entrance from the newly acquired territory of Dobruja and in the same time "taking into possession" the new province. While the war monument of Câmpulung (1897) represented the bust of mayor Dimitrie Giurescu, a war monument of Craiova (1900) represented a *dorobanț*, the one of Turnu-Măgurele (1907) authored by Romano Romanelli also presented a *dorobanț* while the war monument of Potlogi presented a mountain trooper (1910). Later, the monument of Focșani (1914) was composed of an attacking *dorobanț* and a female holding a flag and showing the direction of attack while the was monument built at Râmnicu-Vâlcea (1915) depicted as well a female representing Patria holding an open book engraved with the names of the local fallen towards the direction of the viewers' eyes.

Image 2. The monument to the heroes of Putna County fallen in the War of 1877-1878, built 1916.
Source: ANIC, Fond Departamentul Artelor, dos. 69/1937, ff. 101 and 108.

Most of these monuments were erected through public subscription. However, few data survived as it is the case of those concerning most of the other public monuments in Romania. The monument of Azuga was inaugurated on September 5, 1905, being erected by the local citizens with the help of the Predeal's mayoralty, of the local school and of Banca Sinaia;[59] the monument of Focșani authored by Oscar Spaethe inaugurated on June 29, 1916, had a committee presided by General Gheorghe Marcovici. The costs of these monuments varied between less than 1000 lei to 20.000 lei. The monuments of Chirnogi (1907) and Jilava (1908), both in the Ilfov County cost 7000 lei and 2000 lei respectively.[60] The monument of Șuțești, Brăila County (1912) cost 4500 lei.[61] The most expensive monuments were built in Azuga (1904) costing 20.000 lei, in Turnu-Măgurele (1906), authored by Romano Romanelli and costing 15.000 lei,[62] and in Potlogi, Dâmbovița County (1910), this last monument being authored by Aristide Iliescu and costing 12.400 lei.[63]

Between the moments of initiating the construction of these monuments and their inauguration more than a decade has passed. For example, the construction of the monument of Tulcea was initiated already in 1879 but its final realization was due to the efforts of the local prefect, no other than the above mentioned poet Ioan D. Nenițescu. Nenițescu supported the work of the local League for Dobruja's Prosperity (*Liga pentru propășirea Dobrogei*) founded in 1896. Through public subscription, with support from the Tulcea's mayoralty and by organizing public festivities dedicated to collecting the necessary funds, the twenty-two meters granite obelisk flanked by an eagle and by a five meters *dorobanț* statue was finally inaugurated on May 2, 1904 in a position that dominated the city. Started by sculptor Giorgio Vasilescu (1864-1898) the monument was finalized by sculptor Constantin Bălăcescu (1865-1913) in 1899. During the First World War the monument was destroyed, the obelisk was restored in 1932 while the eagle and the *dorobanț* were restored in 1977.[64] An interesting case is represented by the statue *Avântul Țării* [The country's impetus/enthusiasm] dedicated to the Romanian soldiers of the Second Balkan War, a medal with the same name being conferred at the time. A subscription list was started immediately after 1913 but due to the beginning of the First World War the statue was inaugurated only in 1924. The jury to decide the winning project was formed out of Dr. Constantin Istrati, painter George Demetrescu Mirea, architect Nicolae Nenciulescu and Colonel Victor Radovici. Out of the thirty-four projects, sculptor Emil Wilhelm Becker's project grouped a soldier with a gun in his hands about to start to attack, an allegorical figure holding a flag and representing Patria bestowing and encouraging him while an eagle watches him from the direction of his feet. It cost 40.000 lei, 9.000 lei being provided by the mayoralty of Bucharest and 27.000 lei being collected through public subscription and organization of public gatherings. Initially placed on Calea Griviței, in front of then School of Artillery and Engineering (*Școala de artilerie și geniu*), it changed its place probably in 1940 to the present emplacement in the Mărăcineanu Square, where at that time the Ministry of National Defense had its headquarters.[65] Few other war monuments were constructed for commemorating the Romanian participation in the Second Balkan War. With the help of the 1937 survey of public monuments I could identify other four monuments besides the one from Bucharest: a monument dedicated to "Alipirea Cadrilaterului la Patria Mumă" in Cuiugiuc (?), Durostor (1913), another "Avântul Țării" in Râmnicu Sărat (1913) and two other war monuments in Drăgănești, Vlașca (1913) and Huși (1914). They

were so few not necessarily because the respective war played a minor role in the public sphere. When the committees of initiative were able to restore their activities after 1918 they merged the significance of their monuments dedicated to the War of Independence and to the Romanian participation in the Second Balkan War with the significance of the war monuments dedicated to those fallen in the First World War thus many of the monuments built during the interwar period being devoted to both or all three wars the Romanian army took part before the Second World War.

War monuments during the 1920s:

Romania did not experience a "Lost Generation" as Great Britain did, at least not at the level of the political, cultural and social elites, and this had an important impact on the whole process of commemorating the Great War and in constructing war monuments in Greater Romania. Those able to read, to write and to convey ideas were limited in their number. Most of them either benefited from a limited military training as baccalaureates and were conscripted as reserve officers or had the connections to get them conscripted in the war administration. Few were those fighting in the first line as Ștefan Zeletin, Camil Petrescu, Nicolae Tonitza and GeorgeTopârceanu did, the last three being taken prisoners, or could take a closer look at the home front as Nichifor Crainic did being a sanitary during the war. Most of the intellectuals who were not conscriptable worked as war journalists as it was the case of Nicolae Iorga, Mihail Sadoveanu, Octavian Goga, Gala Galaction and others.

This situation had several consequences. On the one hand, at the level of the political, cultural and social elites, the direct experience of war was rather silenced, a memory boom in the years immediately after the war concentrating on debating the erroneous decisions of 1916, participants in this debate most of the time seeking explanation and justification of their own acts especially if publicly perceived as coward or incompetent. On the other hand, especially during the 1920s, with notable exceptions, the construction of war monuments was rather the result of vernacular initiative, the initiators of the public committees aiming at gathering funds for constructing was monuments being direct participants in the war like military of all ranks, teachers who also were conscripted as officers and relatives of the fallen.

Silencing the experience of the war at the level of the elites had several reasons. Firstly, the most important was above explained and consisted in a lack of direct experience of the frontline, the experience that would have legitimized at that time in Romania a written opinion on the war experience. While privileged or at least given an equal foot by cultural history of the last decades, the experience of the home front was not legitimating enough for a public statement since the heavy part of the population experienced it to some extent and it was probably considered too well known for being explained; this is probably why few written recollections about the direct experience of the war were preserved, by these understanding reflections on the experience of the life in the trenches, combat and forms of escapism. Secondly, many of the cultural elites were educated in Germany, some of them campaigned for the alliance with the Central Powers, remained in the occupied territory and several of them were judged and convicted at the end of the war as it was the case of Constantin Stere and Tudor Arghezi. While part of an oral tradition, this experience was also silenced until recently not only at the level of the public memory but also in the Romanian historiography. Thirdly, numerous members of the social elites refuged at Jassy enjoyed a standard of living which many times contrasted with the misery of the troops and the rest of the population which sought refuge in Moldova.[66] Finally, if none of these personal reasons were the case, then bringing up the negative experiences of the war would have been interpreted as questioning the outcome of the string of events debuted in 1916 and ended with the Treaty of Trianon.

Furthermore, a group of artists including Jean Al. Steriadi, Camil Ressu, Nicolae Dărăscu, Cornel Medrea, Ion Jalea, Oscar Han, Ion Teodorescu-Sion and Ștefan Dimitrescu were mobilized and attached to the general headquarters of the Romanian army (*Marele Cartier General*). They were encouraged to depict the experience of war, General Constantin Prezan intending to establish a national military museum at the end of the war. A first exhibition of this group was organized in Jassy in January 1918. After being demobilized they organized themselves in the society "Arta Română" later joined by Nicolae Tonitza and Dumitru Paciurea.[67] They organized exhibitions in Jassy and Bucharest including artifacts inspired by the war experience, mostly known being Dimitrie Paciurea's *The God of war*. Later, in 1919 and 1920, the theme of war has dominated the Saloon of the Romanian Sculptors, but this time painter Francisc Șirato, one of the most influential art critics during the interwar period, has condemned the

sentimental rhetoric of this type of sculpture, considering it non-artistic.[68] Probably as a consequence, the war experience was hardly thematized in painting and sculpture. However, war literature developed especially during the 1920s. Mihail Sadoveanu authored *Bloody pages: stories and impressions of the frontline* [File sângerate: povestiri și impresii de pe front] (1917) and later the novel *The Lăpușneanu Street* (1923), Hortensia Papadat-Bengescu shared her experience in *Balaurul* (1923) while Ion Minulescu has written *Red, Yellow and Blue* [Roșu, Galben și Albastru] (1924) which places a love story during the retreat to Iasi from late 1916. War poetry has been written by Octavian Goga, Nichifor Crainic, Camil Petrescu and several others. Still, the most important novels were Liviu Rebreanu's *The forest of the hanged* [Pădurea spânzuraților] (1922),[69] Cezar Petrescu's *Darkening* [Întunecare] (1927-1928) and *The eyes of the ghost* [Ochii strigoiului] (1942) and Camil Petrescu's *Last night of love, first night of war* [Ultima noapte de dragoste, întâia noapte de război] (1930). The chronology of writing and publishing these novels correlates with an intense interest among the reading public in the early 1920s, an interest in the war experience which later decayed and during the 1930s it became quite thin.

The official politics of war commemoration initiated during and especially immediately after the end of the war is responsible for legitimizing and supporting the spread of war monuments in interwar Romania. The care for the dead soldiers was stipulated in the Peace Treaties with Germany and Hungary. Through the articles 155-156 of the Treaty of Trianon (1920), the Hungarian as well as the allied and associated governments took their responsibility to respect and take care of the soldiers buried on the territories resulted from the respective treaties.[70] The construction of public war monuments was stipulated by the September 1920 law "for honoring the memory of the fallen heroes" as one of the types of commemorative actions to be carried out next to listing the local dead soldiers in the mayoralties and schools and maintaining the graveyards specially laid out for those fallen during the First World War. Transylvanians no matter of their nationality were not excluded from this process of commemoration and this is visible in the high number of war monuments constructed during the interwar period in the region. However, the 1920 law explicitly focused on the commemoration of the Romanians. According to the motivation introducing the law to the Chamber of Deputies, the construction of war monuments was supposed to express the energy of the nation (*cea mai justă expresie a energiei*

naționale) prepared by 2.000 years of "sufferings, unbending faith and fight for the affirmation of the Latin genius":

> Together with those who contributed to the rising of our Patria, together with those who survived this generation of sacrifice, the fallen have their own rights. They do not ask for our tiers – in exchange, they pretend the recognition of their sublime sacrifice and the transformation of this sacrifice into a symbol, example and stimulant for new heroic deeds which are needed for the complete consolidation and the future of our *neam*. [...] In front of these graves, in front of these temples, the youth of the future will come in every hard time for the country to receive the gospel and here it will learn, more than in any other place, the path to follow so that our people to deserve, as in the past, the moral leadership of the surrounding people, a role that represents the basic principle of our existence as a Latin people at the gates of Orient.[71]

This law was issued together with other three aimed to offer assistance to those affected by the Great War, establishing the National Office for Protecting the War Invalids, War Orphans and War Widows. A society for the Cult of the Heroes was established while different other societies were involved.[72]

Monuments built during the 1920s included the cross of Caraiman and the statue dedicated to the chivalry troops in Jassy. The Cross of Caraiman in the Bucegi Mountains was built between 1926 and 1928 and it included an electric installation that was lighted during the night of August 14 to 15 until the beginning of the Second World War. Placed at 2291m above the sea level, the thirty meters cross is placed on a fifteen meters postamen.[73] The statue built in Jassy for those fallen among the chivalry troops (*Monumentul Diviziei a II-a Cavalerie*) had a committee presided by Mihail Sadoveanu and including Sextil Pușcariu. The committee was established in 1925, the projected statue and its surroundings being considered as part of a possible extension of the Copou Garden, the major green area inside the city. The cost of creating this monument and laying the area around was 1.500.000 lei and it was covered through public subscription and the organization of social gatherings. It presents a chivalry soldier on a horse charging an invisible enemy and having on his left a woman representing the goddess of Victory showing the way with one hand and about to place laurels on his head with the other hand.[74]

Image 3. The monument cross of Caraiman, Bucegi mountains.
Source: ANIC, fond Ilustrate, I 3030.

Most of the times the monuments were erected in the home towns and home villages of the soldiers, as it were the case of the monuments from the War of Independence, for the identified soldiers and on the former battlefields when they were not identified. This is why the inter-war monuments dedicated to the Great War are concentrated mostly on the counties nearby the Carpathians, on the villages from the valleys of Jiu, Olt and Prahova rivers and around the Carpathian passes from the region of Moldavia. Based on the dictionary of Florin Tucă I could identify more than 200 monuments dedicated to the memory of those fallen in the First World War. However travelling in the countryside one could observe a much higher number of monuments, almost every village having placed nearby its church, cemetery, school or townhall a monument of various shape. Besides them, *troitas* and memorial plaques in the halls of major public institutions.[75]

The statistic ordered in 1937 by the Commission of Public Monuments, already mentioned as one of the two major sources of information for this paper, indicates about 1500 war monuments constructed in Romania especially in the rural areas. The statistic was ordered mainly due to the vernacular character of the process of constructing such war monuments during the interwar period, a process thus rather escaping the control of central authorities. Since most of the war monuments already built in the downtowns of the major Romania's cities was rather known, these statistics sent by the local administration to the above mentioned Commission dealt with the war monuments built in the rural areas as well as in the smaller urban localities.

An analysis of these unsorted statistics indicates a number of 697 monuments out of a total of 735 public monuments only in the rural regions of Oltenia, Muntenia and Dobruja, a number of 198 war monuments out of a total of 263 public monuments in the regions of Moldavia, Bukowina and Bessarabia and a number of 478 war monuments dedicated to the First World War out of 636 public monuments existing in the regions of Transylvania and Banat.

In case of the regions of Oltenia, Muntenia and Dobruja, out of the 735 public monuments listed in this survey and 54 others included in a previous 1936 survey listing monuments of Mehedinți county, totaling 789 monuments, 38 monuments were dedicated to the war of 1877-1878, three monuments were dedicated to the campaign of 1913, three monuments to Carol I and 48 were public monuments with a different dedication, most of them busts of different local personalities and several historical

monuments. Therefore, 697 were dedicated to those fallen in the First World War. Comparatively, for the same region, the dictionary compiled by Florin Tucă identified about one hundred similar monuments including those from all urban areas left out in their greatest part by this survey. Consequently, one may estimate safely that at least 1200 war monuments commemorating the First World War were erected during the interwar period all over (Greater) Romania. For an illustration of the density of war monuments in the countryside in most of the regions of Oltenia, Muntenia and Dobruja here is a list of their number by county: Mehedinți (50), Gorj (43), Romanați (44), Olt (41), Argeș (68), Muscel (55), Dâmbovița (66), Vlașca (50), Ilfov (67), Prahova (70), Buzău (48), Râmnicu-Sărat (10), Brăila (11), Ialomița (38), Constanța (26) and Durostor (10). This density suggests that in almost every locality a war monument was built.

With the mention that the war monuments were not exclusively dedicated to the Romanians, for the regions of Moldavia, Bukowina and Bessarabia, the number of war monuments were the following: Bacău (22), Vaslui (9), Jassy (22), Roman (45), Baia (19), Botoșani (12), Câmpulung (3), Rădăuți (8), Cernăuți (10), Hotin (2), Bălți (6), Soroca (7), Lăpușna (2), Tighina (3), Cahul (4), Cetatea Albă (17) and Ismail (7) while for the regions of Transylvania and Banat the counties the number of war monuments was the following: Someș (25), Sălaj (10), Satu Mare (1), Năsăud (15), Bihor (19), Arad (30), Cluj (25), Turda (11), Alba (25), Hunedoara (4), Ciuc (6), Odorhei (55), Trei Scaune (12), Târnava Mare (6), Târnava Mică (16), Sibiu (25), Făgăraș (11), Brașov (11), Timiș-Torontal (105), Caraș (41) and Severin (25).

Numerous war monuments were created by sculptors Spiridon Georgescu, Ioan Iordănescu, Theodor Burcă and Dumitru Mățăoanu. However, in their heaviest part the war monuments were constructed by local stone workers, probably tombs and graves builders, and only a few of them were created by professional sculptors. Most of them were built during the 1920s and they cost between 20.000 lei and 100.000 lei, only larger monuments created by sculptors in cities costing more. The creation of the Commission of Public Monuments in 1929 may thus be interpreted not only as establishing an instrument for controlling and excluding alternative political and cultural interpretations belonging to the ethnic and religious minorities but it may be interpreted also as creating an instrument of a professional group interested not only in the creation of artifacts respecting their standards of quality but also in keeping the market under control.

During the 1920s, public contests were organized for a series of planned public monuments aimed at decorating Bucharest including the statues of kings Carol I and Ferdinand, Spiru Haret as well as war monuments like those dedicated to the infantry, aviation, railroad heroes or the Arch of Triumph. However, in the case of most of these contests, their results were not taken into account by the deciding authorities who ordered them and sometimes provided the necessary funding for their organization.[76] Many of these sculptors were members of the deciding committees or they were in close relationship with their members. For example, poet Ion Minulescu, a member of the Commission for Public Monuments, was officially the head of the Direction of Arts of the Ministry of Arts until 1944. Effectively, the direction was lead after 1936 by Ion Theodorescu Sion, painters Eugen Ispir and Marius Bunescu and sculptor Ion Jalea.[77]

The construction of war monuments during the 1920s may be characterized by a multiplication of vernacular initiative combined with a scarcity of available resources. The great majority of these monuments were built at the initiative of the local officers, teachers or priests. Most probably the later two categories combined their efforts even if the initiative was registered as coming from only one of them. The initiative committees included local notabilities as well. These committees pursued gathering funds for constructing their monuments through public subscriptions, lotteries, postcards selling while donations from public institutions represented the greatest part of the contributions. Only a few of these monuments were built entirely by the Society for the cult of the heroes which is indicative that commemoration was not a process imposed from above but it rather fulfilled expectations at the local level. This suggests that these politics of war commemorations during the interwar period rather followed than set the general trend. This suggestion is confirmed by the establishment of the Commission of Public Monuments during the late 1920s with the aim of amending the numerous proposals for war monuments and its activity during the 1930s.

The costs varied. A local teacher supported by a committee built in 1930 in Jina village of Sibiu County a monument of four meters in its diameter and eight meters in its height at the cost of 149.000 lei.[78] A monument built in 1933 in Aiud with funds raised on different occasions by the officers of the local garrison cost 30.000 lei and it had rather large dimensions (4x4m and 8m in height).[79] A *troița* offered by the society for the cult of the heroes was erected in 1932 in Silistra at the cost of 169.000

lei.[80] The monument of Caracal cost 185.000 lei, 90.000 lei being gathered by the Society for the cult of the heroes, 30.000 lei by the prefecture of the Romanați County and another 30.000 lei by the mayoralty of Caracal, 3.000 lei were given by the local branch of the National Bank (*Banca Națională a României*, BNR) while the rest of them, 32.000 lei, came from public subscription.[81]

Unlike the monuments built during the period prior to the First World War, many of these monuments included a cross as a part of their iconography if not directly as a symbol on top of the monuments and thus fully religious in their meaning (e.g. Cross of Caraiman) at least in the form of the military decoration associated with the participation in the war, "The commemorative cross of war" (*Crucea comemorativă a Războiului*), a decoration with a special design issued following a French model. In numerous cases of war monuments, as it was the case with the monuments built before 1916, these monuments took the form of obelisks, sometimes with eagles on top of them, they represented soldiers of different army corps but mostly infantrymen, many of them sculpted by Spiridon Georgescu, Ioan Iordănescu and Dumitru Mățăoanu who all specialized in creating variations of this theme, or female figures representing either Patria or Victory or both of them holding flags, laurels or swords and showing the way to and inspiring soldiers. Added to them oak leafs and olive trees suggested the perennial strength of those who fought and died and the aspirations of those who survived.

Below them, bas-reliefs depicting scenes of battles were not as frequent as before the war while most of the times lists of the names of the local fallen officers and soldiers accompanied dedications like "Tell to the future generations that we made the supreme sacrifice on the battlefields of 1916-1918 for the reunification of all Romanians" (Bragadiru, Ilfov County, 1919) or "To you heroes of Romanați this temple of ancient virtues was erected, to you piously the thoughts of those of today and tomorrow are dedicated, you deserve the thankful tribute of the reunited people forever celebrating the unity of all Romanians" (Caracal, 1925) or "Nothing is more saintly/And more beautiful in this life/Than to die as a fighter/Wrapped up in Tricolor!" (Zalha village, Ileanda, Sălaj County, 1937).[82] The most frequent size of these statues is around two meters. Most of the statues were placed on postamens as twice as tall. When representing human figures, the focus is on their bodies and their solemn, resigned or broken posture and hardly on the features of their faces denoting personal feelings. Few monuments were constructed to officers and this is illustrative for both

the vernacular character of the process of constructing these monuments and the democratization of the concept of heroism.

During the 1930s, the memory of the war became more official as a part of Carol II's strategy of projecting himself as the savior of the nation and the cultural unifier of a morally divided country. Larger categories of people affected by the war received pensions and land. The style of the uniforms of the officer body resembling the French army suffered a dramatic change for the first time in decades and in the same time Carol II pursued a policy of gaining the support of the army. The projection of a unitary and prosperous Romania different from the Old Kingdom is visible in the multivolume project of Romania's Encyclopedia *(Enciclopedia României)* edited by Dimitrie Gusti, a perspective that shaped the interpretation of many researchers of the interwar period ever since. The memory of the First World War in the public discourse became more official, the sufferings of the war became rather silenced and illustrative for this transformation is George Topârceanu's story of captivity in Bulgaria (*Pirin Planina. Episoduri tragice și comice din captivitate*, 1936) where the author feels the need to justify himself why he can't keep the account funny in all moments; the Commission of Public Monuments already started to function and to amend the proposed projects of war monuments. This commission was already established in 1929 and consisted of five members, the director of the Department of Arts, two sculptors, a painter, an architect and a secretary. Members of this commission were Ion Minulescu as the director of the Department for most of the 1930s, Ion Pașa was its secretary for the same period, Frederick Stock, Ion Jalea and later Cornel Medrea, Mihai Onofrei, Jean Al. Steriade, Camil Ressu, Horia Teodoru and Horia Creangă were its members. Its archive represents the most important source for studying the dynamics of the war monuments during the 1930s.[83]

The war monuments of Bucharest

Many of these war monuments constructed in Bucharest during the interwar period and dedicated to certain branches of the army were placed in areas that were peripheral at that time or in the process of being restructured. Thus, the Unknown Soldier was placed in the south, in the Carol Park, the monuments to the aviation heroes, to the teacher heroes and to the infantry as well as the Arch of Triumph were placed around and northern to the area of Victoria Square while the monuments dedicated to the sanitary and the medical corps, to the engineers troops

and a small monument dedicated to infantry troops too were placed around the Cotroceni area.[84]

A monument to the French heroes was created in 1920 in one of the most visited places of Bucharest at that time, Cișmigiu Garden. It was authored by Ion Jalea who lost his left arm at Mărășești, participated in the *Arta română* group and went after the war to study at Paris with Antoine Bourdelle. He received the Legion of Honor and Marshall Ferdinand Foch was present at the inauguration of the monument which represents a feminine figure that could be a mother, a wife, a daughter or Patria kissing a dying soldier on his forehead. The monument to the railway heroes, authored by Ion Jalea and Cornel Medrea, was apparently built in 1923 but it carries 1930 as the date of its creation. Three groups of figures include in the middle a Victory about to place a crown of laurels on the head of an engineer, a couple of smiths and a soldier with a woman and a walking child.

In the area of Victoria square and north of it, three important war monuments were erected during the 1930s. The monument to the teachers-heroes (*Monumentul eroilor corpului didactic*) was authored by Ion Jalea and Arthur Verona. Representing three soldiers carrying the body of one comrade on a shield, it was inaugurated in 1930 in one of the most visible places of Victoria Square, chosen for the monument to the Soviet soldier from the late 1940s to the 1970s. The monument dedicated to teachers-heroes was taken down in 1940 at the suggestion of Ivan Meštrović to make room to the monument of King Ferdinand. While the latter was in the end given another location on Kisseleff Avenue, the former was never restored and its track was lost.[85] Ion Jalea's monument to the infantry troops was erected in 1936 in the first circus of Kisseleff Avenue from where it was taken down when King Ferdinand's monument was finally placed there. It represented a group of soldiers in attack position, a group placed on a large stone pedestal.[86] The monument to the aviation heroes was inaugurated on July 20, 1935, after two public contests were organized in 1925 and 1927. Authored by Lidia Kotzebue with the help of the sculptor Iosif Fekete (Negrulea), it is an obelisk having on top Icarus stretching his wings about to fly and three figures at the base of the obelisk, probably representing three moments in Icarus's downfall. Seen from afar it may look like a cross.[87]

Image 4. The monument to the aviation heroes, Bucharest.
Source: Bogdan Furtună. *Monografia monumentului "Eroilor Aerului"*
(Bucharest: s.l., 1939), p.17.

Spiridon Georgescu's the Lion (June 22, 1929) and the Infantryman (1930) are both placed in the Cotroceni area, close to the Botanical Garden. The first is a monument dedicated to the engineering troops who fought not only in 1916-1919 but also in the Second Balkan War. It represents a lion keeping one of its paws on several war trophies. At each of the four corners, soldiers representing a pioneer, a pontoneer, a railway worker and a phone operator have between them bas-reliefs depicting moments of their activity. The inscription says "Tell to the future generation that we made the supreme sacrifice on the battlefields for the reunification of our people." It was erected at the initiative of the general Constantin Ștefănescu-Amza, the first director of the military museum mentioned above.[88] The second represented a soldier pretty similar to many other war monuments to be found in the country. Also, not far away, on the new boulevard opened towards the Cotroceni Palace, not far away from the Faculty of Medicine and the Babeş and Cantacuzino Institutes, a monument to the medical and sanitary personnel who died during the war was authored by Raffaello Romanelli and it was inaugurated in 1932. The monument includes a group of three figures, a wounded soldier, a medicine officer and a Victory holding a sword in one hand and a crown of laurels about to be placed on the officer's head who instead points to the fallen soldier. Below them a bas-relief depicts scenes from the war involving the medical and sanitary corps having in the center a female figure usually identified with Queen Mary.

Other war monuments built in Bucharest included a monument dedicated to "eroilor din războiul de reîntregire" authored by Vasile Ionescu-Varo which was placed on current Silvestru street and inaugurated on June 22, 1924; a monument "to the last defender" (*Ultimul străjer al capitalei*) placed in Băneasa, north of Bucharest, proved to be a real grave for sergeant Nicolae Păianu when in 2007 the monument was moved to a different location; finally another monument was built in the Militari area in 1936 at the initiative of the prefect Gheorghe Marinescu.[89]

The Arch of Triumph inaugurated in 1922 gradually decayed and its remaking from durable materials was postponed due to the lack of financial resources. Only after 1930 the government approved the necessary funds for architect Petre Antonescu and the monument was inaugurated on December 1, 1936, eighteen years after King Ferdinand's and Queen Maria's reentering Bucharest. Thirty meters in height and with the arcade having seventeen meters in height and ten meters in width, the Arch was made out of marble, granite and chalk.[90] The monument's inscriptions

focus on King Ferdinand and Queen Maria, both receiving two meters effigies, as creators of Greater Romania, with the support of the entire nation, the monument's iconography indirectly suggesting the rally of the entire nation around Carol II. Two large inscriptions were written by Nicolae Iorga, one facing the city outskirts being dedicated to King Ferdinand's entering Bucharest on October 16, 1922, while the second facing the downtown was saying:

> After centuries of religiously endured sufferings and heavy battles given for preserving the national being, after a defense of the human civilization full of sacrifices, justice was finally accomplished for the Romanian people through the sword of King Ferdinand with the help of the entire nation and the moral support of Queen Maria.[91]

Laterally, two other inscriptions were glorifying those who "through the light of their mind and the power of the soul have prepared the national unity" and to those who "through their braveness and sacrifice realized the national unity."[92] Above them, two inscriptions were placing Carol II's reign in immediate sequence to Ferdinand's reign and thus erasing the first reign of King Michael (1927-1930): "MCMXXXVI Regnante Carolo Secundo" and "Anno nono regni ejus" (the ninth year of our reign). Below, King Ferdinand's proclamations to the country at the moment of declaring war to Austria-Hungary in August 1916 and at the coronation of October 15, 1922 were engraved. These two dates were inscribed on the façade facing the city while other four dates were engraved on the façade facing the outskirts: August 15, 1916 (the first entering in Transylvania); November 10, 1918 (the second entering in Transylvania); January 8, 1918 (the entering in Bessarabia); and October 24, 1918 (the entering in Bukowina). At the inauguration, Carol II gave a long speech praising the spirit of sacrifice of those fallen in the First World War and underlining the pragmatic character of the monument:

> The one passing by this Arch of Triumph should think that if it represents the commemoration of the Romanian glory it is built on the bones who believed and sacrificed themselves; and if these stones would have a voice, they would shout: 'You passerby, think about the sacrifice of the fallen! What do you do for strengthening and consolidating your Fatherland?' […] O! Precious stones, memorials of moments of bravery, memorials of the nation's belief and hope, watch for ever and tell everyone that only through faith and sacrifice for the common good things can be built on this earth.[93]

217

This quote illustrates best the performative aspect added to the process of war commemorations and the central role given to war monuments as conceptualized by Reinhart Koselleck. The Arch was built not only to commemorate those fallen in the First World War, those who contributed to the cultural mobilization for war in the previous periods, the figures of King Ferdinand and Queen Mary as symbols of Greater Romania but it also postulates their behavior of self sacrifice and faith in their leaders as a model for the contemporary and subsequent generations. The First World War presented as the last major chapter of a multisecular national history of continuous struggle for political unity to be followed by renewed efforts for the cultural unification of the country. This vision is also visible in the Romanian Atheneum's impressive historical painting authored by Costin Petrescu between 1933 and 1938 (75x3m), the same painter who decorated the Orthodox Cathedral of Alba Iulia (*Catedrala Reîntregirii Neamului*).

Image 5. Carol II at the inauguration of the Arch of Triumph, Bucharest. Source: ANIC, fond Fototeca, II 322.

The mausoleums and ossuaries

Besides this variety of war monuments, a series of mausoleums, ossuaries and collective war cemeteries were initiated in places where a large number of soldiers were known to have died but it was impossible to individualize their bodies. Monuments were built in such cases in Șcheii Brașovului, Tulcea, Devesel (Mehedinți County), Toplița (Harghita County, 1925), Târgu Ocna (Bacău County, 1925-1928), Soveja (Vrancea County, 1929), and at Valea Mare-Pravăț, this last one being known as the mausoleum of Mateiaș (1928-1935).[94] Probably the most important such monuments were those of Mărăști and Mărășești. They were initiated almost immediately after the end of the First World War and their process of construction stretched over the whole interwar period.

The mausoleum of Mărășești was initiated by the National Orthodox Women's Society (*Societatea Ortodoxă Națională a Femeilor Române*, SONFR) at its congress in Bucharest (June 8, 1919) at the proposal of Pimen Georgescu, the Metropolite of Moldavia and the head of the Romanian Orthodox Church that supported the Romanian government refuged in Jassy during the war.[95] The implication of Alexandrina Cantacuzino in the construction of this monument, initially supported by the Romanian government at a time when it was headed by General Alexandru Averescu, was met with reluctance by the following Liberal government.[96] In the end, the construction of the mausoleum took almost fifteen years being officially inaugurated on September 18, 1938. Designed by architects George Cristinel and Constantin Pomponiu, the mausoleum is thirty meters in height and forty meters in diameter being built out of concrete and being covered with andesite. An exterior frieze designed by Ion Jalea and Cornel Medrea depicts the battle of 1917 while an interior mural painting was authored by Eduard Săulescu. The sarcophagus of General Eremia Grigorescu was placed inside in the center of the mausoleum while crypts contain the remains of about 6000 soldiers and officers.[97]

The mausoleum of Mărăști was a complex set of various buildings erected during the interwar period on the place of the battle of Mărăști (July 9-17, 1917). A "Mărăști" Society was established in January 1918 by the officers of the Second Romanian Army with the aim of commemorating the battle and its fallen soldiers through various types of actions and with the aim of reconstructing the village bearing the same name that was destroyed during the fighting. The honorary president of the society was general Alexandru Averescu followed after his death in 1938 by General Arthur Văitoianu. It

took ten years to collect the necessary financial means through donations, public subscription, social gatherings and support from the authorities and to reconstruct the destroyed village including a school and a church. The construction of the proper mausoleum designed by architect Pandele Șerbănescu was started in June 1928 and it was finished only in 1941. Due to the events of the Second World War and later its subsequent political transformations that swept the country, the mausoleum was never officially inaugurated. The building has three levels, two of them being placed underground. The first level was organized as a museum of the battle while the second level hosts twelve ossuaries of 5.342 soldiers belonging not only to the Romanian army but also to the German and Russian armies. These ossuaries were covered by glasses with a model showing an angel designed by Queen Maria in a style close to Art Nouveau. At the ground level, four sarcophaguses of generals Alexandru Averescu, Alexandru Mărgineanu, Nicolae Arghirescu and Arthur Văitoianu are placed next to crypts of officers. The external decorations were realized by sculptor Aurel Bordenache. One of them represented a higher officer on a horse, a young woman and a child, the second one grouped a large eagle, a soldier on the horse and a pair of parents with two children. Fifteen marble stones list the names of the known fallen soldiers. Two eagles were sculpted by Spiridon Georgescu while a bust of General Alexandru Averescu that was sculpted by Oscar Spaethe was placed in front of the mausoleum.[98]

Probably best known worldwide are the group of monuments of Târgu-Jiu authored by Constantin Brâncuși in 1937-1938. Brâncuși already proposed in the early 1920s a war monument in the form of a fountain for his native village Hobița (Gorj County) but his proposal was not accepted due to the disagreements between the two commissions that initiated the project. In 1934 or 1935, Aretia Tăttărescu, wife of prime minister Gheorghe Tăttărescu and president of the League of Gorj's Women (*Liga Femeilor Gorjene*), proposed Militza Petrașcu to create a monument commemorating the heavy battles of Jiu Valley of October 1916, a monument to be placed in Târgu-Jiu. Petrașcu already authored a statue of famous Ecaterina Teodoroiu. However, she proposed Constantin Brâncuși for completing the new project.

A newly built road called the Avenue of Heroes's Souls and later Heroes' Avenue (*Calea Sufletelor Eroilor; Calea Eroilor*) united a table and a gate surrounded by chairs, placed at one of its ends, nearby the Jiu River, and a column, placed at the other end. A Heroes' Church was already under construction in the middle at an equal distance from the two ends.

Nowadays known as the Table of Silence, Gate of the Kiss and the Column of the Infinite, they initially had a variety of names: the Round Table, the Heroes Portal and the Monument of Gratitude also randomly named in the local archives as the Peace Monument or the Heroes Monument or the Heroes Tower.[99] When a local official proposed placing an eagle on top of the Column, Brâncuși angrily rejected the idea.

The abstract nature of these monuments allowed them being read, approached and interpreted in the most diverse way by viewers with diverse cultural backgrounds who projected their own mindsets. The local and military authorities read them during the 1940s as being war monuments, the local priests invested them with religious meaning while a variety of art critics and art historians offered them during the Communist regime a variety of interpretations varying in their esthetical, philosophical or ethnographic emphasis.

War monuments during the Communist regime:

While numerous monuments dedicated to political leaders were dismantled if not destroyed in 1948 or immediately after (e.g. Mestrovic's monuments of Carol I, Ferdinand I and Ionel Brătianu etc.), during the 1950s war monuments enjoyed a curious tolerance if not support from a regime preaching peace. Since they were dedicated to common people not only thematically but also as a target audience these war monuments fit in the paradigm of socialist realism. Sculptors who designed war monuments during the interwar period like Cornel Medrea and Ion Jalea continued their activity during this period, the latter one being the author of numerous statues dedicated to historical figures during the 1970s. While bronze was the favorite material during the prewar years and stone during the interwar period, concrete became a very much used material during the 1960s to 1980s. The growing emphasis on nationalism during the 1960s led to a revalorization of the cultural heritage of the past. This was visible in the reestablishment of the Commission for Historical Monuments in the mid 1960s, existing monuments especially those dating from the Middle Age started to receive a growing attention while numerous other monuments were erected during the 1970s, especially around 1977 when a century was celebrated since Romania's proclamation of independence.

The regime's need for sites dedicated to political and ideological ceremonies is visible in the construction of monuments dedicated to the Romanian participation in the Second World War against Germany. These

221

monuments were used for commemorating the events of August 23, 1944, events that were considered as the founding moment of the Communist regime in Romania even if their significance changed from celebrating Romania's liberation by the Soviet Union to celebrating a local insurrection and later to invoking it as a revolution. In the following lines, based on the dictionary authored by Florin Tucă, I listed most of these monuments in order to better illustrate their topical, regional and chronological clustering and the regime's change from an exclusive antifascist discourse to an encompassing nationalist discourse.

Ploiești's monument to Independence was destroyed during the Second World War but it was restored in 1954 in order to celebrate ten years since August 23, 1944.[100] Monuments to the Soviet soldiers were erected in Bucharest, Jassy and Neamț during the 1950s while monuments to the Romanian soldiers fighting in the Second World War against Fascism started to appear during the late 1950s: Stănișești, Bacău County, 1948, Rucăr, Argeș County (1957), Moreni, Dâmbovița County, 1958, Păulești, Prahova County, 1959, Bacău, 1959, Bucu, Ialomița County, 1960, Urziceni, Constanța, 1968 and Giurgiu, 1976.

Since few monuments in general and especially fewer war monuments were previously built in Transylvania, this area became a destination for placing new public monuments: Baia Mare, 1959, Moisei, MM, 1959, Cehu Silvaniei, 1959, Arad, 1960; Ludus, Mures, 1960, Timisoara, 1962, Satu Mare, 1963, Carei, 1964, Târgu Mures, 1964, Covasna, 1973, Sf. Gheorghe, 1973, Miercurea-Ciuc, 1974, Sighetul Marmatiei, 1974, Dej, Cluj, 1981, Oradea, 1982.[101] Besides the symbolical taking into possession of the area in the name of the Romanian people and being used as outlets for disseminating a unitary vision of Romanian history, these monuments were also used as local sites for local political, ideological and cultural ceremonies, most famously for granting the status of pioneers for pupils in primary schools.

Statues of the major figures of the nationalist pantheon of Ceausescu's regime were erected in every major city during the 1970s and 1980s. They are also war monuments since they were created in order to illustrate the official discourse focused on the unity of all people around their leaders and on the history of the continuous struggle against foreign invasions, a theme very much valued after Nicolae Ceaușescu's standing out against the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.[102] Especially Transylvania benefited of this attention for historical figures. Michael the Brave was embodied by some of the largest monuments like the equestrian

statues in Alba-Iulia, 1968 (Oscar Han); Cluj, 1976 (Marius Butunoiu) and Sf. Gheorghe, Covasna County, 1982; while smaller monuments commemorated his victory of Gurăslău, Sălaj County, 1976 and his death nearby Turda, Cluj County, 1977 (Marius Butunoiu). Decebal and Avram Iancu were the other two most important historical figures celebrated in Transylvania. The first one received an equestrian statue in Deva, 1976 (Ion Jalea) and a bust in Timișoara, 1977, Burebista receiving only a monument in the Măgura artistic camp, Buzău County, in 1979. Avram Iancu benefited from a monument in his birthplace in Alba County, 1972, and an equestrian statue in Târgu-Mureș, 1978.

In Muntenia, Mircea the Elder was one of the first instrumentalized and honored historical figures with monuments in Râmnicu-Vâlcea, 1966 (Ion Irimescu), Turnu Măgurele, 1970 (Oscar Han), Tulcea, 1972 (Ion Jalea), Constanta, 1972 (M. Butunoiu). Vlad the Impaler received only one monument, in Giurgiu in 1977. In Moldavia, Stephen the Great represented the local great hero with statues in Vaslui in 1972 and Piatra Neamt in 1974 (Oscar Han) and monuments in Băcăoani, Vaslui County, 1975; Suceava, 1977; and Jassy in 1979 (Marius Butunoiu). In many cases, the inauguration of these monuments during the 1970s benefited from the presence of Nicolae Ceaușescu. Besides emphasizing the newly built civic centers, creating a site for the local official ceremonies, the monuments illustrated the narrative of national unity at the local level. Adherence to the narrative of national history, many times used as a wooden language by the cultural and political activists reflecting their lack of sophistication and many times cynicism, was their way to connect to the political center and solidify their legitimacy in controlling the local context.

Conclusion:

Dedicated to great men like monarchs or generals and later to common soldiers, war monuments represents a category of public monuments that spread during a period of around a century, from about 1840s to about 1940s, with a period of exceptional flourishing during the interwar years, especially in Europe and North America. With few exceptions, war monuments were ignored by art history until recent decades when cultural history brought them to attentions as indicators of larger social, political and cultural trends of the society.

The spread of public monuments dedicated to the military/medieval heroes, to some of the most important the cultural figures or leading

politicians during the last decades of the nineteenth century was the result of a series of interlinked processes including those of urbanization, top to bottom spread of literacy, expansion of the public sphere and political participation, spread of arts and middle and higher education. As a part of this process of using artistic artifacts for grounding cultural and political discourses, war monuments best embodied the paradigm of national history, a military definition of heroism that shifted during the same period from celebrating the deeds of great men to emphasizing common people and thus they contributed to the reinforcement of a visual discourse of state nationalism through their use during public ceremonies.

In Romania, war monuments appeared in the context of the growing cult of national heroes in the last decades of the nineteenth century and multiplied as a part of the process of commemorating the Romanian participation in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 (*Războiul de independență*). They started to spread around 1900 when a stable and coherent national historical memory was formed, the state started to put a greater emphasis on public ceremonies and celebrations, participation in the public sphere intensified, professional groups and a reading public were formed and resources became more readily available. About sixty such monuments were erected especially in Muntenia and especially after 1907, a regional and chronological clustering which is not necessarily only an indicator of the impact of the commemorative practices but also of the prosperity of the urban communities able to afford the construction of a local public monument at that time.

During the interwar Romania, the number of war monuments increased dramatically to over a thousand all over the country but mostly in Muntenia and Moldavia. While before WW I war monuments served mostly celebrations of a victorious participation in the war after 1918 the significance given to commemorating those fallen in the war became prevalent. These significances coexisted from the very beginning since plaques listing those fallen were placed at the base of all war monuments. However, the importance invested in these artifacts shifted during the inter-war period, the commemoration of those fallen becoming prevalent. While a legislative framework definitely encouraged the construction of war monuments and their use for anchoring the discourse of nationalism, most of those constructed in the inter-war period were the result of a vernacular initiative. Combined with the scarcity of resources, this contributed to their construction taking place over a long period of time, sometimes of the entire interwar period as it was the case of the mausoleums of Mărăști and Mărășești.

NOTES

1   The author of this paper was a NEC-*Adevărul* Fellow for the academic year 2010-11. An early version of this paper was presented on September 28, 2010 while being a visiting fellow at the Russian, East European and Eurasian Center of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (September-November 2010) and expanded for being presented on June 8, 2011 while being a fellow of New Europe College in Bucharest (March-July 2011) and for the conference *Cult of Heroes in Central Europe from the 1880s to the Second World War – Transnational and trans-disciplinary aspects* (Paris, November 25-26, 2011). The following abbreviation ANR-DANIC was used for Arhivele Naționale ale României, Direcția Arhive Naționale Istorice Centrale when indicating the source of the images included in this text.

2   "Aici doarme fericit întru Domnul ostașul necunoscut, săvârșit din viață, în jertfa pentru unitatea neamului românesc; pe oasele lui odihnește pământul României întregite, 1916-1919"; for detailed accounts of the procession see Traian Popa-Lisseanu. *Soldatul necunoscut, istoric și cult*, Publicațiile societății „Frontul Mărășești" nr. 1 [The unknown hero, history and cult]. The publications of the society „Frontul Mărășești" nr. 1] (Bucharest: Tipografia Ovidiu, 1936) and Valeria Bălescu. *Eroul Necunoscut. Istorie trecută și recentă* [The Unknown Hero in Bucharest. Past and present history] (Bucharest: Editura Militară, 2005); for the French and British models established in 1919, see Ken Inglis, "Entombing unknown soldiers: from London and Paris to Baghdad", *History & Memory,* vol. 5, nr. 2, 1993, pp. 7-31.

3   Virgiliu Z. Teodorescu, „Monumentul public, carte de vizită a identității unui popor" [The public monument, a visit card for a people's identity]. In *Globalizare și identitate națională, Simpozion 18 mai 2006* [Globalization and national identity, symposion May 18, 2006] (Bucharest, Editura Ministerului Administrației și Internelor, București, 2006), pp. 102-111.

4   Florian Tucă. *In memoriam: itinerar eroic* [Remembering: a heroic itinerary] (Bucharest: Editura Militară, 1971); Florian Tucă and Cristache Gheorghe. *Altarele eroilor neamului* [Altars to the heroes of the nation] (București: Europa Nova, 1994).

5   Andi Mihalache. *Mănuși albe, mănuși negre. Cultul eroilor în vremea Dinastiei Hohenzollern* (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Limes, 2007);

6   Maria Bucur. *Heroes and victims. Remembering war in twentieth-century Romania* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009); Maria Bucur, "Edifices of the past: war memorials and heroes in twentieth-century Romania," in Maria Todorova (editor). *Balkan Identities. Nation and Memory* (New York University Press, 2004) pp. 158-179.

7   Ioana Beldiman. *Sculptura franceză în România (1848-1931). Gust artistic, modă, fapt de societate* [French sculpture in Romania (1848-1931). Artistic

preferences, fashion, society] (Bucharest: Editura Simetria, 2005). Needless to say, this project was inspired and shaped by the magnificent Pierre Nora's series of *Lieux de mémoire*: *La République* (Paris: Gallimard, 1984), *La Nation*, 3 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1986), *Les Frances*, 3 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1992). Selections of these contributions were published in English as: *Realms of memory*. Edited by Lawrence D. Kritzman, translated by Arthur Goldhammer, 3vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996-1998) and *Rethinking France: les Lieux de mémoire*, translated by Mary Trouille (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2001).

[8] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined communities. Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. Second edition. (London, New York, Verso, 1991, c1983), p. 9.

[9] George Mosse. *Nationalization of the masses. Political symbolism and mass movements in Germany from the Napoleonic wars through the Third Reich* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991, c1975); when dealing with the national monuments, Mosse draws on the work of Thomas Nipperdey, "Nationalidee und Nationaldenkmal in Deutschland im 19. Jahrhundert", *Historische Zeitschrift*, nr. 206/3, June 1968; George Mosse, "National cemeteries and national revival: the cult of fallen soldiers in Germany", *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 14, 1975.

[10] Antoine Prost, "Monuments to the dead" in *Realms of memory*. Edited by Lawrence D. Kritzman, translated by Arthur Goldhammer vol. II: The construction of the French past: Traditions (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 307-330; and Antoine Prost, "Verdun", *Realms of memory*, vol. III: Symbols, pp. 377-401.

[11] Ken Inglis, "War memorials: ten questions for historians," *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporaines,* nr. 167, July 1992, pp. 5-21.

[12] Jay Winter, "War memorials and the mourning process" in Jay Winter. *Sites of memory, sites of mourning. The Great War in European cultural history*. Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare nr. 1 (Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 78-116.

[13] Reinhard Kosellek, "War memorials: identity formations of the survivors" in *The practice of conceptual history. Timing history, spacing concepts*. Translated by T.S. Presner (Stanford University Press, 2002), pp. 285-326.

[14] James E. Young, "Memory/Monument" in *Critical terms for art history*. Edited by Robert S. Nelson and Richard Shiff (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), consulted through http://www.credoreference.com/entry/uchicagoah/memory_monument; November 18, 2010; the author thematizes on the opposition between the nineteenth century monuments and those built after the Second World War emphasizing the deconstructive intention of the latter, their physical accessibility and lack of intentional monumentality; however the centrality of these memorials in making visible a (counter-) discourse and promoting a (counter-) memory as well as the support from

central and local authorities are elements that place them in correlation with the democratic transformations of the last century and rather in continuity with the first group thus making all them part of a historical series.

[15] Erwin Panofsky. *Tomb sculpture. Four lectures in on its changing aspects from ancient Egypt to Bernini.* Foreword by Martin Warnke. Edited by H.W. Janson (London: Phaidon, 1992).

[16] Andrei Pippidi. *About graves as landmarks of national identity* (Budapest: Collegium Budapest, 1995).

[17] Maurice Agulhon, "La 'statuomanie' et l'histoire" *Ethnologie française*, 8, 1978, pp. 145-172; H.W. Janson, *The rise and fall of the public monument* (New Orleans: The Graduate School of Tulane University, 1976); Eveline G. Bouwers. *Public Pantheons in Revolutionary Europe. Comparing cultures of remembrance, c. 1790-1840* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

[18] Thomas Carlyle's *On heroes, hero-worship and the heroic in history* [1841]. Notes and introduction by Michael K. Goldberg, text established by Michael K. Goldberg, Joel J. Brattin and Mark Engel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

[19] Francis Haskell, "The manufacture of the past in nineteenth-century painting", *Past&Present*, nr. 53, November 1971, pp. 109-120.

[20] Alois Riegl, "The modern cult of monuments: its character and its origin," *Oppositions*, nr 25, 1982, pp. 21-51; Françoise Choay. *L'Allégorie du patrimoine* (Paris: Seuil, 1992). In English: *The invention of historical monument.* Translated by Lauren M. O'Connell (Cambridge University Press, 2001).

[21] Eric J. Hobsbawm, "Mass-producing traditions: Europe, 1870-1914" in *The Invention of Tradition.* Edited by Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 263-306; Sergiusz Michalski. *Public monuments. Art in political bondage 1870-1997* (London: Reaktion books, 1998); Helke Rausch, "Staging realms of the past in 19th-century Western Europe: comparing monumental strategies of middle-class nationalists," *East Central Europe*, vol. 36, nr. 1, 2009, pp. 37-62.

[22] For the use of Marianne: Maurice Agulhon, *Marianne au combat. L'imagerie et la symbolique républicaines de 1789 à 1879* (Paris: Flammarion, 1979)

[23] Maurice Agulhon, *Marianne au pouvoir. L'imagerie et la symbolique républicaines de 1880 à 1914* (Paris: Flammarion, 1989)

[24] Michalski. *Public monuments*, pp. 13-55;

[25] Michalski. *Public monuments*, pp. 56-76;.Rudy Koshar, *From monuments to traces. Artifacts of German memory, 1870-1990* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), pp. 15-79; Mosse, *Nationalisation of the masses*, pp. 47-72.

[26] Nancy Wingfield, "Statues of Joseph II as sites of German identity" in Maria Bucur and Nancy Wingfield (eds.) *Staging the past: the politics of*

commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, 1848 to the present (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2001), pp. 178-205.

[27]   Bálint Varga, "Arpad meets the city: the reception of the 1896 Millenium monuments in the Hungarian peripheries", paper presented at the international conference *Le Culte des héros en Europe centrale (1880-1945) – Aspects transnationaux et interdisciplinaires* (Paris, 25-26 November 2011).

[28]   Ioana Beldiman, p. 36.

[29]   Annette Becker, "Monuments aux morts après la guerre de Sécession et la guerre de 1870-1871: un legs de la guerre mondiale?", *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporaines,* nr. 167, July 1992, pp. 23-40; David G. Troyansky. "Monumental politics: national history and local memory in French Monuments aux Morts in the department of the Aisne since 1870," *French Historical Studies*, 15, 1, Spring 1987, pp. 121-141; Karine Varley, "Contesting concepts of the nation in arms: French memories of 1870-1 in Dijon," *European History Quarterly*, vol. 36, nr. 4, 2006, pp. 548-573;

[30]   Michalski, chapter 3, "Memorials to the Great War", pp. 77-92; Annette Becker. *Les monuments aux morts: patrimoine et mémoire de la Grande Guerre* (Paris: Errance, 1989); Antoine Prost, "War memorials of the Great War: monuments to the fallen" in *Republican identities in war and peace. Representations of France in nineteenth and twentieth centuries.* Translated by Jay Winter with Helen McPhail (Oxford, New York: Berg, 2002), pp. 11-43; Daniel J. Sherman. *The construction of memory in interwar France* (Chicago UP, 1999); George L. Mosse. *Fallen Soldiers. Reshaping the Memory of the Two Worlds* (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

[31]   Alina Șerban, "The destiny of public monuments: celebration, abandonment and political iconoclasm, *Bucharest: matter & history*, pp. 251-269.

[32]   A survey on several recent works on the cultural history of French-Romanian transfers was offered in Silviu Hariton, "Francophonie and its Romanian entanglement: a review article", *Balkanistica*, vol. 24, 2011, pp. 265-284.

[33]   Florian Tucă and M. Cociu, *Monumente ale anilor de luptă și jertfe* [Monuments to the years of fighting and sacrifice] (Bucharest: Editura Militară, 1983) is an alphabetic dictionary of all public monuments still existing in 1970s and early 1980s Romania; it was realized through compiling brief data the author found in tourist guides; it includes indexes of names with numerous mistakes of the indicated pages, an index of the represented characters and another one grouping the information by county.

[34]   ANR-ANIC, Fondul Ministerul Artelor, dos. 68-70/1937. In the case of the region of Muntenia, data refer only to the counties of Mehedinți, Gorj, Romanați, Olt, Argeș, Muscel, Dâmbovița, Vlașca, Ilfov, Prahova, Buzău, Râmnicu-Sărat, Brăila, Ialomița, Constanța and Durostor, missing counties being those of Tulcea, Caliacra, Teleorman, Vâlcea and Dolj. In the case of the regions of Moldavia, Bukowina and Bessarabia, data were collected for

the counties of Bacău, Vaslui, Jassy, Roman, Baia, Botoșani, Câmpulung, Rădăuți, Cernăuți, Hotin, Bălți, Soroca, Lăpușna, Tighina, Cahul, Cetatea Albă and Ismail, missing counties being those of Putna, Tecuci, Covurlui, Tutova, Fălciu, Neamț, Dorohoi, Suceava, Storojneț and Orhei. In the case of the regions of Transylvania and Banat the counties, data were collected for the counties of Someș, Năsăud, Bihor, Arad, Cluj, Turda, Alba, Hunedoara, Ciuc, Odorhei, Trei Scaune, Târnava Mare, Târnava Mică, Sibiu, Fărăraș, Brașov, Timiș-Torontal, Caraș and Severin, missing counties being those of Satu Mare, Maramureș, Sălaj and Mureș. Out of the seventy-one counties Romania had in the interwar period data is missing for nineteen of them which represents about a quarter of them. In the same time information on the public and war monuments of some of the important cities including Bucharest are missing which confirms one of the conclusions of this texts that interwar war monuments were in their heaviest part the result of vernacular initiative possible in a framework created by the state legislation. Information on Mehedinți County was taken from ANR-ANIC, Fondul Ministerul Artelor, dos. 61/1936.

35 Tucă and Cociu, *Monumente ale anilor de luptă și jertfe* [Monuments to the years of fighting and sacrifice] (Bucharest: Editura Militară, 1983). Few of these monuments were discussed in detail and this includes war monuments as well. Introductions in the history of sculpture in Romania are offered by George Oprescu, *Sculptura statuară romînească* [The history of the Romanian statues] (Bucharest: ESPLA, 1954); Vasile Florea, *Arta românească. Modernă și contemporană* [The Romanian art. Modern and contemporary] (Bucharest : Meridiane, 1982), pp. 224-259 for the period of nineteeth century; Mircea Deac, *50 de ani de sculptură. Dicționarul sculptorilor din România, 1890-1940* [Fifty years of sculpture. The dictionary of the Romanian sculptors, 1890-1940] (Bucharest: OIDICM, 2000) details on the work of some of the sculptors involved in creating public and war monuments.

36 Carmen Tănăsoiu, *Iconografia lui Carol: de la realitate la mit* [The iconography of Carol I: from reality to myth] (Timișoara: Editura Amarcord, 1999); Andi Mihalache, "Jubileul. Reprezentări ale regalității în portrete și medalii jubiliare: modele europene, replici românești" [The jubilee. Representations of the royalty in portraits and commemorating medals: European models, Romanian adaptations] in his *Mănuși albe, mănuși negre…*, pp. 124-149.

37 ANR-ANIC, Fondul Ministerul Artelor, dos. 70/1937, f. 88.

38 ANR-ANIC, Fondul Ministerul Artelor, dos. 70/1937, ff. 48 and 64.

39 Adrian-Silvan Ionescu, *Penel și sabie. Artiști documentariști și corespondenți de front în Războiul de Independență (1877-1878)* [Brush and sword. Documentary artists and front correspondens in the independence war, 1877-1878] (Bucharest : Editura Biblioteca Bucureștilor, 2002), p. 159-162.

40   Marin Mihalache, "Epopeea independenței și arta de evocare istorică" [The epopee of independence and the history evoking art] in *Epopeea independenței în arta plastică românească* [The epopee of independence in the Romanian arts]. Introduction and selection of illustrations by Marin Mihalache (Bucharest: Editura Meridiane, 1977), pp. 5-15; Ion Frunzetti. "Plastica independenței" [The Independence War in the contemporary Romanian arts], *Studii și cercetări de istoria artei*, vol. 24, 1977, pp. 3-52 and Ion Frunzetii, "Contribuția pictorilor la plastica Independenței" [The painters' contribution to the representation of the Independence War], *Arta și literarura în slujba independenței naționale* [Art and literature serving the national independence] (Bucharest, Editura Academiei, 1977), pp. 157-200.

41   Petre Oprea, "Un act patriotic a lui Nicolae Grigorescu: Albumul Războiului Independenței" [A patriotic deed of Nicolas Grigorescu: the Album of the Independence War] and "Rolul colecționarilor în impunerea unor mari valori artistice" [The role of art collectors in promoting some great artists] in *Repere în arta românească (secolul al XIX-lea și al XX-lea)* [Landmarks in Romanian art. Nineteenth and twentieth centuries] (Bucharest: Maiko, 1999), pp. 28-30 and 34-41. The first was originally published in *Revista muzeelor and monumentelor*, nr. 1, 1989 while the second appeared in *Contemporanul*, December 7, 1984.

42   Vlad Țoca, "Visual mythology: the case of Nicolae Grigorescu as the National Painter" in *Re-searching the nation: the Romanian file. Studies and selected bibliography in Romanian nationalism*. Edited by Sorin Mitu (Cluj-Napoca: International Book Access, 2008), pp. 104-114.

43   Sorin Alexandrescu, "Război și semnificație. România în 1877 [War and significance. Romania in 1877]" in A.P. Goudoever (ed.), *Romanian history 1848-1918. Essays from the First Dutch-Romanian Colloquim of Historians 1977* (Historische Studies, xxxvi), Groningen: Wolters-Noordoff, 1979, pp. 61-84, republished in Sorin Alexandrescu, *Privind înapoi, modernitatea* [Looking back, modernity] (Bucharest: Editura Univers, 1999), pp. 19-46.

44   Adrian-Silvan Ionescu, *Modă și societate urbană în România epocii moderne* [Fashion and urban society in nineteenth century Romania](Bucharest: Paideia, 2006).

45   Irina Stănculescu, "Apariția și evoluția denumiriror de străzi din București" [The appearance and the evolution of the street names in Bucharest], *București. Materiale de istorie și muzeografie*, vol. XIV, 2000, pp. 137-185.

46   Mihail Dimitrescu. *Amintiri și episoade din Resbelul pentru independență*. Cu o privire retrospectivă asupra desvoltării armatei române de la 1859 [Recollections and moments of the independence war. With a retrospective incursion in the development of the Romanian army since 1859] by veteran captain… Foreword by I. Nenițescu (Bucharest: Tip. Gutenberg, Joseph Gobl, 1893); further examples are mentioned in George Muntean, "Proza" and Rodica Florea, "Memorialistică, scrieri istorice, corespondență" [Memories,

historical writings, correspondence], *Arta și literarura în slujba independenței naționale* [Art and literature serving the national independence], pp. 49-65 and 87-102.

47 Elefterie Dumitrescu (1855-1938). *Educațiunea și datoriile morale ale soldatului. Precepțiuni și exemple* [The education and moral duties of the soldier. Rules and examples] by Major... of Argeș 4th Regiment (Bucharest: Inst. De Arte Grafice Carol Gobl, 1901).

48 Mihai Florea, "Teatrul românesc în slujba independenței naționale" [The Romanian theater serving the national independence], *Arta și literarura în slujba independenței naționale* [Art and literature serving the national independence], pp. 67-85, p. 84.

49 Archibald [Gheorghe Rădulescu], *Impresii de călătorie. Paris-Reims-Verdu n-Mărăști-Mărășești. Note de om năcăjit* [Travel recollections. Paris-Reims -Verdun-Mărăști-Mărășești. Notes of an unpset man] (Bucharest: Institutul de Arte Grafice Cartea Medicală, 1924), p. 126.

50 "Sus ridică fruntea, vrednice popor!/Câți vorbim o limbă și purtăm un nume/ Toți s-avem o țintă și un singur dor - /Mândru să se nalțe peste toate-n lume/ Steagul tricolor!"

51 "Eroi au fost, eroi sunt încă/Și-or fi în neamul românesc!/
Căci rupți sunt ca din tare stâncă/Românii orișiunde cresc//
E vița noastră făurită/De doi bărbați cu brațe tari/Și cu voința oțelită/
Cu minți deștepte, inimi mari.//Și unu-i Decebal cel harnic/
Iar celălalt Traian cel drept/Ei pentru vatra loc amarnic/
Au dat cu-atația dușmani piept.//Și din așa părinți de seamă/
În vechi s-or naște luptători/Ce pentru patria lor mamă/
Vor sta ca vrednici următori.//Au fost eroi și-or să mai fie/
Ce-or frânge dușmanii cei răi/Din coasta Daciei și-a Romei/
În veci s-or naște pui de lei."
Ioan S. Nenițescu (1854-1901). *Pui de lei. Poesii eroice și naționale* [Lion cubs. Heroic and national poetry] (Bucharest: Ig. Haimann, Tip. "Gutenberg" Joseph Gobl, 1891)

52 Manuela Gheorghiu, "Cinematograful, un aliat al istoriei" [The cinema, history's ally] in Ion Frunzetti and George Muntean (eds.) *Arta și literarura în slujba independenței naționale* [Art and literature serving the national independence], pp. 225-238. Grigore Brezianu's movie was the theme for another movie, *The rest is silence* (2007), directed by Nae Caranfil; conceived during the 1980s, it plays on the relationships between arts, funding providers and politics in general; see http://www.restuletacere.com/

53 Virgiliu Z. Teodorescu, "Monumentul eroilor pompieri" [The monument to the firemen heroes], *Buletinul Comisiunii Monumentelor Istorice*, nr. 4, 1991.

54   Constantin Bacalbașa, *Bucureștii de altădată* [Bucharest of the past], vol.
      I, 1871-1884 (Bucharest: Editura Universul, 1935), pp. 256-258; a picture
      of the moment was published in *Enciclopedia României*, vol. I (Bucharest:
      Imprimeria națională, 1939), p. 874; Virgiliu Z. Teodorescu, "Arcul de
      Triumf din București. Contribuții documentare" [The Arch of Triumph of
      Bucharest. Documentary contributions], *Studii și cercetări de istoria artei*,
      vol. 16, nr. 2, 1969, p. 338.

55   P. Rădulescu, "Monumentul român de la Smârdan" [The Romanian
      monuments of Smârdan], *Albina*, București, vol. I, nr. 28-29, April 11-12,
      1898, pp. 897-900.

56   Here is a list of the monuments still surviving in the early 1980s Romania,
      based on the dictionary compiled by Florin Tucă: Vișina, Dâmbovița County,
      1878; Calafat, Dolj County, 1886; Câmpulung, Argeș County, 1897 (author
      Dumitru Demetrescu-Mirea); Ploiești, Prahova County, 1897; Craiova,
      Dolj County, 1900 (Oscar Spaethe); Tulcea, Tulcea County, 1904; Azuga,
      Prahova County, 1905; Târgoviște, Dâmbovița County, 1905; Calafat again,
      1907; Turnu-Măgurele, Teleorman County, 1907; Pitești, Argeș County,
      1907; Jilava, Ilfov Counyu, 1908; Moinești, Bacău County, 1908; Mărășești,
      Păunești, Suraia and Vîrteșcoiu, all situated in the Vrancea County and all
      four inaugurated in 1909; Șuțești, Brăila County, 1909; Potlogi, Dâmbovița
      County, 1910; Sascut, Bacău County, 1910; Cislău, Buzău County, 1911
      (Storck); Ciupercenii Noi, Dolj County, 1912; Rucăr, Argeș County, 1912;
      Dumbrăveni, Suceava County, 1913; Baratca, Neamț County, 1913; Mălini,
      Suceava County, 1914; Focșani, Vrancea County (author Oscar Spaethe),
      1914; Râmnicu-Vâlcea, Vâlcea County, 1915 (author Ion Iordănescu);
      Râmnicu-Sărat, Buzău County, 1915 (author Alexandru Severin); Ungureni,
      com. Măneciu, Prahova County, 1915-1916; Bucharest, 1916 (author
      Oscar Han). Besides these monuments listed by Tucă, I could identify other
      thirty-one monuments with the help of the 1937 survey of public monuments
      of Oltenia, Muntenia and Dobruja. Twenty-three of them were built in the
      Vlașca County and the dynamics of their construction suggests that the
      area around Bucharest was prioritized by an ambitious or just a dedicated
      prefect who played a major role in initiating and supporting their process
      of construction. Eight of them were built before 1901, ten of them were
      inaugurated in 1904 and only five of them then after: Călugăreni, 1878;
      Frătești, 1881; Grădiștea, 1893; Stoenești, 1894; Găujani, 1890; Bălănoaia,
      1898; Purani, 1899; Gastiu, 1900; Dărăști; Gogoșari; Malu, Căscioarele,
      Corbii-Ciungi, Crevenia Mică, Fărcășanca, Roata, Tudor Vladimirescu și
      Scurtu, all ten in 1904; Babele, 1906; Căsnești, 1908; Comana, 1913;
      Strâmba, 1913; Stănești, 1914. Other monuments dedicated to the war of
      1877-1878 were built in Rucăr, Muscel County, 1902; Vișina, Dâmbovița
      County, 1904; Tonea, Ialomița County, 1904; Corbul, Constanța County,

1906; Boldu (1909), Dumitrești (1909), Măicănești (1912) and Vârteșcoi (1914), all four in the Râmnicu Sărat County.

57 There is no war monument built before 1907 in the region of Moldavia according to ANR-ANIC, Fondul Ministerul Artelor, dos. 69/1937.

58 Maria Bucur, *Heroes and victims…*, p. 29.

59 ANR-ANIC, Fondul Ministerul Artelor, dos. 70/1937, f. 65.

60 ANR-ANIC, Fondul Ministerul Artelor, dos. 70/1937, f. 40-41.

61 ANR-ANIC, Fondul Ministerul Artelor, dos. 70/1937, f. 84.

62 ANR-ANIC, Fondul Ministerul Artelor, dos. 68/1936, f. 25.

63 ANR-ANIC, Fondul Ministerul Artelor, dos. 70/1937, ff. 65 and 45.

64 Florica Cruceru, "Monumentele Dobrogei" [The monuments of Dobruja], *Revista muzeelor și monumentelor. Monumente istorice și de artă*, vol. 50, nr. 1, 1981, pp. 11-19;

65 Ion Neacșu, "Un monument rătăcit în istorie [Avântul Țării]" [A monument wandering in history], *Buletinul Muzeului Militar Național*, nr. 3, 2005, pp. 272-279.

66 A four pages letter of Ștefan [Motăș] Zeletin to Vasile Bogrea from January 7, 1917, makes this compain, AMR-DANIC, Fond Colecția de personalități etc., dos. Vasile Bogrea, ff. 2-4.

67 Barbu Brezianu, "Gruparea 'Arta Română' (1918-1926)" [The 'Arta Română' group, 1918-1926], *Studii și cercetări de istoria artei. Seria artă plastică*, vol. 11, nr. 1, 1964, pp. 144-151.

68 Ioana Vlasiu, "Emile Antoine Bourdelle și sculptura interbelică din România" [Emile Antoine Bourdelle and the Romanian sculpture during the interwar period] in *Influențe franceze în arhitectura și arta din România secolelor XIX și XX* [French Influence on Romanian art and architecture of nineteenth and twentieth centuries] Edited by Augustin Ioan (Bucharest: Editura ICR, 2006), pp. 125-127.

69 Liviu Rebreanu. *Forrest of the hanged*. Translated from Romanian by A.V.Wise (London: Peter Owen, 1967).

70 *Tractat de pace între puterile aliate și asociate și Ungaria. Protocol și declarațiuni, din 4 iunie 1920 (Trianon)*. Bucharest: Imprimeria Statului, 1920. ANIC, fond Parlament, dos. 1898..

71 Ministerul de Război, Oficiul Național I.O.V., *Recunoștința națiunei către cei cari au făurit „România mare"* [The national gratitude to those who made Greater Romania] (Bucharest: Cartea Românească, 1920), pp. 10-11: "La fel cu toți cei care au contribuit la ridicarea Patriei, la fel cu cei ce supraviețuiesc generației de jertfă, morții își au drepturile lor. Ei nu cer lacrimile noastre; pretind însă în schimb, în mod imperios, recunoașterea sacrificiului lor sublim și ridicarea la înălțimea unui simbol, care să constituie exemplul și stimulentul a noui eroisme de care va avea nevoie completa consolidare și viitorul neamului nostru [...] În fața acestor morminte, în fața acestor temple, veni-va tinerimea viitorului, în orice moment greu pentru țară, spre a primi

cuvântul de ordine și aci va învăța, mai mult ca oriunde, drumul de urmat, pentru ca neamul nostru să merite, ca și în trecut, conducerea morală a popoarelor ce ne înconjoară, rol care constituie totuși principiul existenței noastre de popor latin la porțile Orientului."

72 Niculae Niculae, "Unde ne sînt monumentele?" [Where are our monuments?], *Buletinul Monumentelor Istorice*, vol. 42, nr. 2, 1973, pp. 73-76; Niculae Niculae, "Societăți și așezăminte pentru ridicarea operelor comemorative" [Societies and organizations dedicated for constructing commemorative artifacts], *Revista muzeelor și monumentelor. Monumente istorice și de artă*, vol. 46, nr. 2, 1977, pp. 79-82;

73 Tucă, 1983, p. 122. Inauguration on September 14, Ziua Sfintei Cruci.

74 Radu Filipescu, "Monumentul Diviziei a II-a Cavalerie din Copou" [The monument to the Second Chavalry Division of Copou Park in Iasi] in *Patrimoniu național și modernizare în societatea românească: instituții, actori, strategii* [National patrimony and the modernization of the Romanian society] Edited by Dumitru Ivănescu and Cătălina Mihalache (Iași: Editura Junimea, 2009), pp. 239-248.

75 Speranța Diaconescu, "Unitatea națională oglindită în plăci memoriale din București" [The national unity as represented in memorial plaques in Bucharest], *București. Materiale de istorie și muzeografie*, vol. 12, 1997, pp. 250-255.

76 Petre Oprea, *Critici de artă în presa bucureșteană a anilor 1931-1937* [Art critics in Bucharest journals, 1931-1937] (Editura Tehnică Agricolă, 1997), pp. 14-15.

77 Petre Oprea, *Critici și cronicari în presa bucureșteană a anilor 1938-1944* [Critics and art chroniclers in Bucharest journals, 1938-1944] (Bucharest: Editura Maiko, 1999), p. 12.

78 ANR-ANIC, fond Ministerul Artelor, dos. 61/1936, f. 46.

79 ANR-ANIC, fond Ministerul Artelor, dos. 61/1936, f. 5.

80 ANR-ANIC, fond Ministerul Artelor, dos. 61/1936, f. 22.

81 *Romania Eroica*, March 1929, p. 14. However, in 1936 the cost of the same monument was evaluated at 1.500.000 lei, see ANR-ANIC, Fond Ministerul Artelor, Dos. 61/1936, f. 41.

82 Bragadiru: "Spuneți generațiilor viitoare că noi am făcut jertfa supremă pe câmpurile de bătălie din 1916-1918, pentru întregirea neamului"; Caracal: "Vouă, eroilor din Romanați, vi s-a ridicat acest templu al virtuților strămoșești, către voi se îndreaptă cu pioșenie gîndirea celor de azi și de mâine, vouă vi se cuvine în parte prinosul de recunoștință a unui neam întreg eternizând unirea tuturor românilor"; Poroinica/com. Mătăsaru, Dâmbovița (1935, Vasile Blendea): "Liniștit vă fie somnul/Astăzi bravilor eroi/Glorie, vă strigă țara/Veți fi pildă pentru noi//Neclintiți vom face stâncă/Să pătrăm ce ne-ați lăsat/Tot pământul țării noastre/Ce-i cu sânge amestecat//[...] Glorie vă strigă țara/Pentru sângele vărsat/Glorie, vă strigă satul/Nimenea

nu v-a uitat//Voi trăiți în mintea noastră și în inimă de mamă/Voi trăiți în copilașii care încă vă mai cheamă//"; Zalha, com. Ileanda, jud. Sălaj: "Nimică în lume nu-i mai sfânt/Și mai frumos pe acest pământ/Decât să mori ca luptător/Înfășurat în tricolor". The last quote is from a song apparently sung by Transylvanians volunteers in Romanian army.

83   Decret pentru atribuțiunile comisiunii monumentelor publice, *Monitorul Oficial* nr. 52, March 5, 1930, p. 1758; Hamangiu, XVIII, 168; Virgiliu Z. Teodorescu, "Informații referitoare la activitatea desfășurată de către Comisia Superioară a Monumentelor Publice" [Information concerning the activity of the Comission for Public Monuments], *Revista Arhivelor*, vol. 12, nr. 1, 1969, pp. 129-134 surveys some of the files from the commission's archive concerning a variety of monuments; Ioan Opriș, "Comisia Monumentelor Publice și activitatea ei" [The Comission for Public Monuments and its activity], *Revista Arhivelor*, vol. 50, nr. 3, 1988, pp. 267-276 affirms that the comission was established as early as 1922 by a Ministry of Cults and Arts's decision and its director during the 1920s was Z. Pielișanu; however, the source of this information is a 1933 file which suggest that probably due to a low level of activity it was oficialy (re)established in 1929 under the directorship of Ion Minulescu.

84   Dan Berindei et al, *Istoria orașului București* [The history of the city of Bucharest] (Bucharest: Muzeul de Istorie al Orașului București, 1965); Victoria Dragu Dimitriu, *Povești cu statui și fântâni din București* [Stories with statues and fountains] (Bucharest: Editura Vremea, 2010).

85   Anca Benera, *Bucharest: Matter & history*, pp. 84-91.

86   *Istoricul înfăptuirii monumentului infanteriei, 1921-1936* [The history of making the infantry monument, 1921-1936 (Bucharest: Monitorul oficial – imprimeria națională, 1936); Anca Benera, pp. 104-113.

87   Bogdan Furtună, *Monografia monumentului „Eroilor Aerului"* [The monography of the monument "To the Heroes of the Sky"] (Bucharest: s.l., 1939.

88   "Spuneți generațiilor viitoare că noi am făcut suprema jertfă pe câmpurile de bătaie pentru reîntregirea neamului"; *Revista Geniului*, July 1929 and January-Feburary 1937.

89   Victoria Dragu Dimitriu, *Povești cu statui și fântâni din București* [Stories with statues and fountains in Bucharest] (Bucharest: Editura Vremea, 2010), p. 85.

90   Constantin Kirițescu, *Arcul de Triumf și epopeea română. 1916-1918-1922-1936* [The Arc of Triumph and the Romanian epos, 1916-1918-1922-1936] (Bucharest: Editura Casei Școalelor, 1936); Virgiliu Z. Teodorescu, "Arcul de Triumf – contribuții documentare" [The Arch of Triumph – a documented contribution], *Studii și cercetări de istoria artei. Seria artă plastică*, vol. 16, nr. 1, 1969, pp. 338-340; Virgiliu Z. Teodorescu. *Arcul de Triumf* [The Arch of Triumph] (Bucharest: Editura Militară, 1995).

[91]   Kirițescu, *Arcul de Triumf...*, p. 24: "După secole de suferințe creștinești îndurate și lupte grele pentru păstrarea ființei naționale, după apărarea plină de sacrificii a civilizației umane, se îndeplini dreptatea și pentru poporul român prin sabia Regelui Ferdinand cu ajutorul întregei națiuni și gândul Reginei Maria."

[92]   "Glorie celor ce prin lumina minței și puterea sufletului au pregătit unirea națională"; "Glorie celor ce prin vitejia și prin jertfa lor de sânge au înfăptuit unitatea națională."

[93]   Kirițescu, *Arcul de Triumf...*, p. 32: "Acela ce va trece pe lângă acest Arc de Triumf să se gândească că, daca reprezintă comemorarea gloriei românești, el are la temelie oasele acelora care au crezut și s-au jertfit și că, dacă aceste pietre ar avea glas, ar striga: 'Trecătorule, gândește-te la jertfa celor căzuți! Ce faci tu pentru întărirea și consolidarea Patriei tale?' […] O! Pietre scumpe, amintitoare de ceasuri de vitejie, amintire a crezului și a speranței neamului, stați vecinic de veghe și spuneți tuturora că numai cu credință și jertfe, pentru interesul obștesc, se poate înfăptui ceva pe acest pământ."

[94]   Cristache Gheorghe and Ionel Batali, *Ansamblul monumental de la Valea Mare – Mateiaș* [The monument of Valea Mare – Mateiaș] (Bucharest, 1985). Drept : 69.613

[95]   Pimen Georgescu, *Mărășești, Locul biruinții cu biserica neamului* [Mărășești, the place of victory with the help of the nation's church] (Tipografia Monastirei Neamțu, 1924).

[96]   *Istoricul înființării bisericii neamului de la Mărășești* [The history of making the nation's church of Mărășești] (Bucharest: Tipografia Cărților Bisericești, 1925).

[97]   No historical account that was written about the long process of building this Mausoleum as it is the case with the history of the other mausoleums paid attention to the political agenda of the initiators and of the contesters. Zefira Voiculescu, *Întru slava eroilor neamului. Istoricul mausoleului de la Mărășești* [For the glory of our heroes. The history of the mausoleum of Mărășești] (Bucharest: Editura Militară, 1971) is rather a touristic guiding brochure which presents some general information without much references; Valeria Bălescu. *Mausoleul de la Mărășești* [The mausoleum of Mărășești] (Bucharest: Editura Militară, 1993) used the arhive of the Society for the Cult of the Heroes and focues on the technical details without much attention to the cultural and political backgrounds of the involved historical actors; only Maria Bucur pursued in *Heroes and victims*, pp. 125-132 an analysis of the significance of Mărășești Mausoleum.

[98]   Florian Tucă, *Câmpul istoric de la Mărăști. Istoricul mausoleului de la Mărăști* [The historical field of Mărăști. The history of the mausoleum of Mărăști] (Bucharest: Editura Militară, 1973) is also more of a touristic guiding brochure; Florian Tucă, "Societatea Mărăști și principalele ei înfăptuiri" [The Mărăști Society and its main realisations] in *Armata și societatea românească*

[Army and the Romanian society] Edited by Al. Gh. Savu (Bucharest: Editura Militară, 1980), pp. 345-352; Valeria Bălescu, "Mărăști – o promisiune onorată" [Mărăști – a honored promise] in *Eroi și morminte* [Heroes and graves], vol. 2, 2008, pp. 18-63.

99   Ion Mocioi, *Brâncuși, Ansamblul sculptural de la Târgu-Jiu (documentar)* [Brâncuși. The sculptures of Târgu-Jiu] (Târgu-Jiu: Comitetul pentru cultură și artă al județului Gorj, 1971) uses local conty archives to reconstruct in great detail the moments of constructing each element of the sculptural ensamble; Marielle Tabart, *Brâncuși. Inventatorul sculpturii moderne* [Brâncuși. The inventor of modern sculpture] (Bucharest: Univers, 2009, c1995), pp. 88-91 includes pictures from the inauguration of October 27, 1938.

100   Tucă, 1983, p. 304-5.

101   Mircea Deac, "9 mai 1945 – 9 mai 1985. Monumentele victoriei" [May 9, 1945 – May 9, 1985. The monuments to victory], *Revista muzeelor și monumentelor. Monumente istorice și de artă*, vol. 16, nr. 1, 1985, pp. 3-7.

102   Decree 117 of October 23, 1975 concerning the war graves and the commerative works stated: "Cinstirea memoriei celor care și-au jertfit viața în lupta pentru libertatea și independența patriei, precum și pentru apărarea cuceririlor revoluționare ale oamenilor muncii, constituie una din tradițiile scumpe ale poporului român și, totodată, un mijloc important pentru educarea patriotică a maselor"; *Buletinul oficial al Republicii Socialiste România*, anul XI, nr. 111, partea I, October 30 1975, p. 1.

SUSAN MBULA KILONZO

Born in August 1979, in Machakos, Kenya

Ph.D., Maseno University, Kenya (2008)
Dissertation: *Christian Diversity and Community Development in Vihiga District, Kenya*

Senior Lecturer, Department of Religion, Theology & Philosophy, Maseno University, Kenya

Associate research Fellow, Open University, Milton Keynes, UK (2009-2012)

Research Grants and Fellowships: International Development Centre (African Researchers' Grant on Youth and Development in Africa), Open University, Milton Keynes, UK (2009), UPEACE Africa (2008-2010)

Attended conferences, seminars, training workshops and summer schools in over 25 countries across Africa, North & South America and Europe

Book:

Christian Diversity and Community Development: Role of Christian Denominations in Human Physical, Social, Cultural, and Spiritual Development in Vihiga District, Kenya, Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010, ISBN 987-3-8383-9074-1

Published over 20 journal articles and chapters in internationally peer-reviewed volumes

THE POTENTIAL OF THE CHURCH AS A COMMUNITY INSTITUTION IN PEACEBUILDING IN AFRICA LESSONS FROM KENYA'S ETHNIC CONFLICTS

Introduction

The 2007 general election in Kenya is reminisced as an event that exemplified destruction that ethnic politics can have on a country. It was clear that most Kenyan politicians are ethnically aligned and divided in political endeavors. They are using the ethnic card to survive and hang on to power. This paper however argues that in this kind of pandemonium, where human rights find little or no respect from these leaders, there is yet another institution that can be non-tribal and non-partisan because it is a separate entity from the state. This institution is the Church. When politicians are divided and seek to divide the populace along ethnic lines, pitting one ethnic community against the other; when support for political positions is sought along ethnic boundaries and when ethnic enclaves are thought to be the safest anchorages for securing not only political positions but also economic resources; religious groups, and especially the leaders' plausibly, should rise above partisan politics to speak not only for the voiceless in the society but also condemn the atrocities committed by the ruling government and individual political leaders. They have the potential to pull together human capital towards a more unified and autonomous state that is not based on ethnic rifts but on humanity as one race that serves for interests of peace for all. There are however questions that the paper raises from the experience that Kenya has had in pre- and post-election violence in the country which started in 1992, and whose heightened crisis was manifested in 2007 general

241

elections. Has the Church been able to valiantly condemn the atrocities committed by the government against innocent citizens? Has it been able to rise above bigoted politics and unite people across the ethnic divides? Do politicians respect the voice (if any) of religious leaders? If not, why? Is the Church as an independent institution relevant and credible in Kenyan political environment?

There are two dichotomies that the paper employs to analyze the involvement (or lack of it) of the Church in peacebuilding efforts in Kenya. In the era of Kenya National African Union (KANU), major Christian denominations including the Catholic Church, Anglican Church of Kenya and Presbyterian Church of East Africa were known to be outspoken about the crimes committed by and through the state. In the 2007 general elections however, partisan politics ruled the Church and it became difficult for most of them to stand out from the affiliation and call for a return to peace during the post-election violence. This paper will explore these trajectories in an effort of showcasing the credibility and relevance (or lack of the same) by Christian groups in the country. The arguments and sediments in this paper are triggered by the experience that Kenyans had in the wake of 2007/8 post-election violence that culminated into an orgy ethnic cleansing process in most parts of the country leaving an estimate of 1,200 people dead and over 350,000 internally displaced (IDPs) and over 300 churches burned, but also draws related examples from past ethnic clashes that have, in the history of the country, been witnessed before, during, and after elections.

The paper gives a brief historical account of political and land related ethnic clashes since 1992 so as to have a lens through which the role of the Church can be examined. The discussion may not provide specific case studies to empirically substantiate the arguments but draws examples from the different Christian groups for contextualization. The first part of the paper gives background information about the country and historicizes the genesis of ethnic politics. The second part defines peace, peacebuilding and religious peacebuilding and examines brief case studies where interventions by religious groups have worked towards institutionalizing peace. The third part analyses the efforts of the Church in building peace in Kenya's political ethnic conflicts.

Background Information

Kenya got her independence from the British colony in December 1963 and was led by Jomo Kenyatta as the first president. He died in 1978 and Daniel Arap Moi took over. Moi had served as Kenyatta's vice president since 1966. During Kenyatta's reign, the political regime was dominated by Kikuyu elite from Kenyatta's home district-Kiambu. Kenyatta is also said to have favored those of his tribe by allocating them fertile lands and allowing them to occupy certain spaces in the city (Kagwanja 2005, Turner & Brownhill 2001, Smedt 2009). Moi, unlike Kenyatta, came from a smaller ethnic community-the Kalenjin. He was deemed the right candidate to steer the country towards a more accommodating human rights era without ethnic supremacy. At first, this seemed to work because Moi promised an administration that would not condone tribalism and corruption. In due course however, his concern became the Kikuyus and Luos who seemed to be against his leadership. He therefore began to centralize and personalize power.

In 1982 Moi amended Act number 7 of the Kenyan constitution and introduced section 2 (A) that made the country a de jure one party state to maim the leaders who wanted to campaign for presidency. He criminalized competitive politics and critics of his leadership by use of the security forces. He also banned all ethnic welfare centered associations and extended his control mechanisms to elections. The queue voting system replaced the secret ballot with voters feeling intimidated to line up behind the candidates. The electoral system personnel were all answerable to the president. He interfered with the judicial process and 'kalenjinized' all the public and private sectors as he 'de-kikuyunized' the same. Moi's remaining worry by 1990's however was the Church, particularly the Anglican Church of Kenya, the Catholic Church and the Presbyterian Church of East Africa. These accounted for over 70% of Christians in the country. Together with the umbrella body, National Christian Council of Kenya (NCCK), they continued to criticize his authoritarian rule. Since 1980s, the Church had remained the central locus of dissent against Moi regime with the pro-democracy and human rights movement using cathedrals and compounds of churches as venues for expressing their views and drawing plans of action.

With continued outcry from both the oppressed and the Church, the international community, especially the U.S Congress condemned the atrocities of Moi's leadership and passed the foreign export financing

and related programs appropriation Act of 1991 requiring Kenya to meet certain conditions before $15 million in economic and military aid could be disbursed. The government repealed section 2(A) of the constitution allowing multipartyism again in December 1991. Despite the return of multipartyism, Moi and his Kalenjin allies did all they could to hold onto power for 10 more years. Moi not only used divide and rule politics but also instrumented violence and used youth militias and gangs to silence his opponents. Both 1992 and 1997 general election processes were not just quite flawed but characterized by violence that was dubbed 'ethnic' and 'land' clashes (quite a number of scholarly works have historicized the atrocities committed by both Kenyatta and Moi government, some of which include: Kagwanja & Southall 2009, Steeves 2006, Lynch 2006; 2008, Lonsdale 1994, Branch & Cheeseman 2009, Klopp 2002).This political history of violence can explain the repeated occurrence of violence in the country. Much of the ethnic violence that has recently plagued Kenya and claimed several thousand lives has its roots not in fundamental ethnic rivalries, but rather in politics of ethnic coalitions (for explanations see *inter alia* Omolo 2002, Steeves 2006, and Kagwanja 2005).

Kenya is divided into eight provinces and each ethnic group can easily be rightly placed within a given province, as well as a smaller geographical locality-say a district. This means that the political leaders are ethnically elected, especially the members of parliament, who have to campaign within their constituencies. To this end, ethnic identities have been used to tailor the country's politics. A Map of Kenyan provinces and major ethnic groups appears hereunder:

Fig. 1 Map of Kenyan Provinces and Major Ethnic Groups

Kenya's population of 38, 610, 097 (2009 population census)is highly heterogeneous with 42 different ethnic groups. Some of the major ethnic groups include the Kikuyu (22 percent of the population), the Luhya (14 percent), the Luo (13 percent), the Kalenjin (12 percent), the Kamba (11 percent), the Kisii (6 percent), and the Meru (6 percent).[1] Dozens of languages are spoken, with a set of borders imposed on it by an outside colonial power, a national government that asserts authority across those ethnic divides and a system of government not entirely consistent with traditional Kenyan notions of authority or governance.

While the diverse ethnic groups may be seen as a rich socio-cultural diversity they have acted as a tool for political, social, cultural, and sometimes economic divide. The numerous parties in the country have been forming alliances depending on ethnic strengths to support presidential candidates in the general elections. In corroboration with this, Steeves (2006) explaining the role of ethnicity and leadership in the

245

country notes that big men shift alliances, parties and coalitions for their own and community's interest. These political alliances have therefore been sources of ethnic rivalries in the country. The history behind the land clashes which has been used as a political tool for ethnic cleansing, and which, to a great extent was used as a basis for triggering the ethnic purging during the post-election violence of the 2007/8 in the country, for example, was and is still attributed to the political manipulation of the ethnic differences and ethnic territorial settlements in the country. This touches the very core of peaceful co-existence of the people of Kenya. This is therefore eating into the community's socioeconomic and political institutions, and now the religious groupings, with a worrying effect.

The religious groups are very diverse in the country. Religious diversity ranges from missionary religions from Europe, America and Asia as well as African initiated churches. Christianity is widely practiced though. Statistically, Mbiti (1973:144-5) explains that Kenya is one of the most Christian countries in Africa with 78% of her population following the faith. Christianity has mushroomed denominationally with emergence of sects, cults and denominations which could be characterized as schisms, novels and renewals. Islam is the second largest religion in the country with a following of about 10% of the population. Besides, there are indigenous religious groups that mostly counter Western religiosity and try to maintain the traditional beliefs and practices of Kenyans. This paper will purposely give a keen focus and draw examples from Christianity to explain the relevance of the religion in conflict situations of the country. The term Church will be widely used to refer to the institution of Christian groups in the country, whether mainline, Pentecostal charismatic and splinter groups, or the African Instituted Churches. Reports[2] of the 2007 post-election violence revealed that more than 300 churches were burned down in different parts of the country. This raises critical questions on the respect and morality of churches that were once vital in the history of the country.

Historicizing Ethnic Clashes in Kenya: A brief Overview

Kenyan political climate has been characterized by ethnic tensions for a long time. These historical tensions are not just related to political positions but also land and other territorial occupations. Smedt (2009) warns that, as most people have tended to argue, it would be oversimplification to

just see the violence in Kenya as an ethnic or tribal problem. There are quite a number of underlying precipitating factors such as land, weakening of government systems (especially the judiciary), and the gradual loss of the state monopoly of legitimate force, allowing proliferation of militias and gangs which are manipulated and used by the politicians in pursuit of electoral victory. Other factors, according to Smedt include economic and political exclusion and ethnicized discourse of Kenyan politics. The history of especially the land clashes can be linked to the influence by the British colonization on land allocations and territorial occupations (for detailed discussion see Rutten and Owuor 2009).[3]

Discussing the politics of patronage-client in Kenya, Smedt (2009) gives a brief expose of how such politics occupies Kenya's past and present. It sure was one of the characteristics of pre-colonial ethnic communities where local 'big-men' exercised authority by sharing out their wealth with the obedient poor. During the colonial period, the British introduced ethnically defined administrative units (tribes), and as a result ethnic groups became political tribes. The 'big man' stayed. Daley (2006) cites research that has shown that colonial regimes grouped people into ethnic groups and conveniently used them for the purposes of political control. It was however expected that, with the advent of modernity, the social knot from the colonial groupings would vanish and put ethnic enclaves into a halt. These cocoons have however persisted to date. In independent Kenya, Kenyatta encouraged the emergence of 'big men' through patron-client relationships which widened nascent ethnic divisions. The elite colluded with Kenyatta to access privileges without sympathy for the poor. In addition, during colonial times, white settlers worked closely with the Kikuyu in the farms. Then at independence in 1963, some of the best land was taken over by the Kikuyu, even if it belonged to other ethnic groups before colonization. Moi's reign worsened the situation through his approach of 'Kalenjinizing' public and private sectors and also through divide and rule politics. Many politicians resulted into political tribalism, the deliberate use and manipulation of ethnic identity in political competitions.

Serious tribal clashes in Kenya began in the Rift Valley Province on 29th October, 1991 (just before the 1992 general elections), at a farm known as Miteitei, situated in the heart of Tinderet Division, in Nandi District, pitting the Nandi, a Kalenjin tribe, against the Kikuyu, the Kamba, the Luhya, the Kisii, and the Luo.[4] The clashes quickly spread to other farms in the area and into Kipkelion Division of Kericho District, which had a multi-ethnic

composition of people, among them the Kalenjin, the Kisii and the Kikuyu. Later in early 1992, the clashes spread to Molo, Olenguruone, Londiani, and other parts of Kericho, Trans Nzoia, UasinGishu and many other parts of the Rift Valley Province. In 1993, the clashes spread to Enoosupukia, Naivasha and parts of Narok, and the Trans Mara Districts. In these areas, the Kipsigis and the Maasai were pitted against the Kikuyu, the Kisii, the Kamba and the Luhya, among other tribes. The clashes revived in Laikipia and Njoro in 1998, pitting the Samburu and the Pokot against the Kikuyu in Laikipia, and the Kalenjin mainly against the Kikuyu in Njoro. The raiders were well organized and coordinated. The attacks were barbaric, callous and calculated to drive out the targeted groups from their farms, to cripple them economically and to psychologically traumatize them.

In general, the clashes started and ended suddenly, and left a trail of destruction, suffering and disruption of life. The causes of the clashes have been given as conflict over land, cattle rustling, political differences and ecological reasons among others. It is however evident that the re-introduction of multi-partyism in December 1991 tended to magnify and fuel tribal loyalties and to complicate the resolution of inter-tribal border conflicts not only, along the Trans Mara South Kisii border but also, along the cutline between the Samburu-Pokot and the Kikuyu in Laikipia among other areas (Akiwumi Report on tribal clashes in the Rift Valley, 2005-http://www.scribd.com/doc/2204752/Akiwumi-Report-Rift-Valley-Province). Reports by the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) indicate that from 1991 to 1996, over 15,000 people died, and over 300,000 were displaced in the contested areas. In the run up to the 1997 general elections, new violence erupted at the Coast killing over 100 people and displacing over 100,000. Other incidences of politically instigated clashes were witnessed between 1999 and 2005 (also see Klopp 2002, Ndegwa 2005 and Odhiambo2004). According to Klopp (2002) the regime pioneered the *Majimbo* (regionalism/federalism[5]) system of leadership that incited the local community (Kalenjins) to evict the minority ethnic groupings in the Rift Valley province.

The continued use of militia by the state to perpetrate violence marked the departure of institutionalization of violence, but also birth and re-birth of a wide range of militia groups, which targeted the need to fight for their territorial occupation. The struggle for land as Musambayi (2005:507) argues, pits those who promote capitalist enterprises against those who reassert a subsistence political economy in concert with others worldwide engaged in popular globalization from below including the springing

up of certain movements in the examples that suffice here are the youth banned movements such as Mungiki and the Kalenjiworriors.[6] The violent activities of these movements have been well documented by scholars *inter alia* Jacqueline Klopp (2002), Turner and Brownhill (2005) Mutuma Ruteere (2008), Musambayi Katumanga (2005), David Anderson (2005).

The use of the militia (most of which are founded within ethnic groups, for example, Mungiki-Kikuyu, Baghdad Boys-Luo, Kalenjin warriors-Kalenjin) by the state and at times individual politicians is evident. Branch and Cheeseman (2008:15) argue that though the initial intention of the gang-formation may not have been for political purposes but rather in response to economic issues, the state or individual politicians later use these gangs for intrumentization of violence. The two scholars have more recently included elite fragmentation, political liberalization, and state informalization as factors that explain post-election violence in Kenya but also added that the "origins of each can be traced to the style of rule employed by Daniel Arap Moi".

The organization of groups and especially into ethnic youth militias is perfectly exemplified in the Kenya's 2007/8 post-election violence which brought to the surface deep-seated antipathy among the different ethnic groups in Kenya. The announcement of President Mwai Kibaki as the ultimate winner of a highly contested election by extra 231,728 votes over the Orange Democratic Movement's (ODM) candidate, and the now Prime Minister RailaOdinga in the late afternoon of 30 December 2007 was the final blow for those who anticipated change in the political rule of the country. The chaos that followed in the country was an indication that certain Kenyan ethnic groupings were ready waiting for an opportune time. It was a time for reclaiming "territorial boundaries" that they thought "belonged" to them since before the country's independence. The massacres left over 1,200 dead while the ethnic cleansing saw over 350,000 others displaced. The attacks were very well pre-planned with certain prominent leaders of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), beginning the preparations of a criminal plan to attack those identified as supporters of the Party of National Unity (PNU). A radio reporter with one of the ethnic FM stations, and a prominent ODM supporter, was a crucial part of the plan, using his radio program to collect supporters and provide signals to members of the plan on when and where to attack. The ODM leaders are said to have coordinated a series of actors and institutions to establish a network, using it to implement an organizational policy to commit crimes. Their two goals were: (1) to gain power in the Rift Valley

Province, and ultimately in the Republic of Kenya, and (2) to punish and expel from the Rift Valley those perceived to support the PNU (collectively referred to as "PNU supporters").[7] By 4 January 2008, it was evident that Kenya was facing a crisis not just due to unresolved contention of the election outcome but also what was becoming apparent killing and eviction of innocent ethnic groupings from their lands and occupations in several parts of the country.

As Orobator (2008) argues, the disillusionment of Kenyans with the political class, as well as Kenya's politics of ethnic groupings has revived the debate over the role of religion in society in the country. The voices of Kenyans questioning the role of religiosities in times of conflicts cannot be ignored. The pictures depicting lack of respect for churches during post-election violence did not go unnoticed. Yet as Abuya (2009) argues, all over the world, places of worship have long provided a haven for those in need of shelter and security. On the other hand, international law recognizes the sanctity of churches. The law of armed conflict for instance prohibits parties from "any acts of hostility against places of worship". They are places that have served as places of refuge for thousands of victims in different places. Unfortunately during the early days of Kenyan 2007/8 conflict, the most horrific act of barbarity was committed inside a church, where scores of innocent Kenyans were burned to death as they huddled together for safety and comfort. Churches have also served as gathering places for Kenyans seeking divine intervention. Millions continued to throng to places of worship to pray for peace to return to their land. A turn to religion for solace and relief highlights the critical role of religious leaders. The ability of religious leaders, as Orobator (2008) argues, to establish themselves as viable alternative agents and facilitators of peace in a time of crisis remains limited. This crisis proves that the church in Africa still lacks an effective mechanism of sociopolitical engagement towards peace and peacebuilding. The section that follows hereunder tries to explain the meaning of the terms peace, peacebuilding and religious peacebuilding.

Defining and Contextualizing the Term Peace

Generally, peace is described as a state of freedom, rest, quietness and calmness. In peace and conflict studies, the terms "negative peace" and "positive peace" are applied habitually. Negative peace

describes the absence of war or violent conflicts, whereas positive peace includes a comprehensive range of factors related to the creation and institutionalization of justice and freedom (Bangura, 2007:34). The complexity of these factors not only contributes to the absence of war, but also augments the totality of peace in human society. This means that positive peace should gratify human needs as well as contributing towards the fulfillment of human rights. Atrocities such as ethnic cleansing are a clear indication that there are unaddressed issues within communities that can lead to conflict and the use of force and abuse of human rights. This paper conceptualizes peace as a state and process of calmness in which community members through the help of the community institutions (particularly religious institutions) endeavor to maintain peaceful co-existence, and in case of conflicts, they aspire to resolve them amicably and resolute to work towards developing their livelihoods as a way of enhancing transformative and sustainable peacebuilding efforts.

Weber (2004:32) argues that it is not surprising that after the mass slaughter of World War II and the feat of Nuclear Armageddon in the late 1950s, the budding discipline of peace research concentrated on the elimination of international armed conflict. Peace then was interpreted as an absence of war and the discipline of peace research left other social problems to different disciplines. Weber explains that peace is too often simply understood as the damping down of conflicts that are aimed at changing the *status quo.* Galtung (1969a) shows that the search for peace should move from direct violence and its elimination (which is negative peace) to the broader agenda that also includes structural violence and its elimination (thus moving towards positive peace). Structural violence is an indirect form of violence built into social, political and economic structures which give rise to unequal power and consequently unequal life opportunities. It includes exploitation, alienation, marginalization, poverty, deprivation, misery, among others. In the presence of negative peace therefore, the societal structures are still not at peace and so there is a likelihood of a rebound into conflicts. This has been the situation in Kenya since 1992. On his article on [...] *insane nations and insane states*, Galtung (1998) provides three relevant points that illustrate how violence is propagated as well as accepted as a cultural vice within the communities. He gives the following three points:

1. People posing as normal prepare mass murder.
2. Most of us live in systems that repress, exploit, or both and we do nothing about it.

3. Some of us justify, even glorify, the aforementioned as human nature.

These are three forms of violence (direct, structural and cultural-also see Galtung1969b). Violence is prepared, threatened and carried out intentionally (direct) or unintentionally (structural). Failure to address root causes of conflict implies that the grounds for peace are not solid enough and any wrong move, either from the community of the state, could easily trigger violence. In times of violence non-governmental organizations, civil organizations and as well as other community based institutions including religious bodies have been shelters for the targeted communities. They have been active in ensuring peacebuilding processes as well as a strong aid in reconstructing communities that are emerging from effects of wars. They are also strong sources of trauma healing for the affected. This however does not mean that the masses can escape the need for building positive peace which eliminates the root causes of strife and antagonism.

Peacebuilding

Drawing from the works of Johan Galtung (1969a) and other peace researchers, the former UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali Boutros, initially defined peacebuilding in relation to a conflict-continuum that passed from pre-conflict prevention, through peacemaking and peacekeeping. By unearthing this concept Ghali defined it as an action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict (Call, 2008; Barnett, *et al.*; 2007). As a contemporary policy term, 'peace building' has a general but imprecise meaning. It is most usually understood as a set of transitional reconstruction activities undertaken in a postwar phase, designed to lay the foundation for longer-term developments such as democratization, economic development and social justice. As the term progressively came into use in the 1990s, it typically referred to international assistance to implement peace agreements after civil wars, commonly organized under the UN and, more rarely, under ad hoc institutions (Astri, Kristian and Arne 2002:876).

To Call, peacebuilding are actions undertaken by international or national actors to institutionalize peace, understood as the absence of armed conflict and a modicum of participatory politics. It is more than the elimination of armed conflict-a process that aims at creation of positive

peace by eliminating the root causes of conflict so that the actors no longer have the motive to use violence to settle their differences (Call, 2008:3; Barnett *et al.*, 2007). The latter argue that peacebuilding means more than stability promotion. It is designed to recreate a positive peace, to eliminate the root causes of conflict, to allow states and societies to develop stable expectations of peaceful change. According to Butros (1995), peacebuilding as a process facilitates the establishment of durable peace and tries to prevent the recurrence of violence by addressing root causes and effects of conflict through reconciliation, institution building, and political as well as economic transformation. In cases where the violence has resulted from political squabbles, the government takes long to re-examine the effects of her oversights. The situation is even worse in cases where the crises of violence have to be settled through sharing of power, like in the example of Kenya-2007/8 post-election violence. For violence to end, power sharing deal had to be steered by Mr. Koffi Anan through UN initiative. Studies have indicated that in such deals, concerned parties become more focused on what shares go to either side (Yakinthou 2009, Noel 2009, Bercovitch & Kadayifci 2009, Wolpe & McDonald 2008). Little attention is paid to the peace building processes to enhance healing within the affected communities (see Amr Abdalla 2001:159-160).

Donais (2009:6) argues that there are different perspectives of peacebuilding, with the liberals insisting that it entails global norms surrounding principles of good governance which should carry weight. The second vision of peacebuilding affiliated with eminent conflict resolution practitioners such as John Paul Lederach is what has come to be known as peacebuilding from below and a model which this paper adopts. This is concerned with the need to nurture and create the political, social, and economic space within which indigenous actors can identify, develop and employ the resources necessary to build a just, peaceful and prosperous society. As opposed to liberal counterpart, the second perspective is communitarian in character. Communitarian approaches stress the need for tradition and social contexts in determining the legitimacy and appropriateness of particular visions of justice and ethics. In this case, good governance must derive from and resonate with the habits and tradition of actual people living in specific times and places. In some quarters, this has been referred to as "Track II" diplomacy (for example see Jafari 2007). Unofficial or "Track II" diplomacy, demonstrates that civil society actors perform a key role in conflict resolution and may help to facilitate the actions of official government diplomacy. The need for local ownership

is imperative. Active participation of the locals remains relevant because any peace process that is not embraced by those who live with it is likely to fail (Donais 2009). This is the approach that this paper employs.

Conceptualizing the Role of the Church (Religion) in Peacebuilding

The possible role or involvement of religion in politics is still regarded with much distrust, which can be explained by several contributing factors. First, due to the religious wars during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Peace of Augsburg (1555) and the Peace of Westphalia (1648) established the principle *of cuitisregio, eitisreligio* (each region its religion) as a way to deal with religious diversity within Christianity and to ensure that religions would play no role in interstate relations. In other words, tolerance appeared to be the means to establish peace between religions *across* borders. Hence, the problem of religion in the "international" scene was "solved," namely by keeping it out of this sphere; however, this left many unanswered questions about religious plurality *within* societies. Second, the enlightenment's suspicion of tradition and its emphasis on the human person as a rational individual led to a shift in focus to this latter, unanswered issue. The birth of "the individual" and the focus on its autonomy played a vital role in the emergence of individual religious tolerance, implying freedom of choice, speech and conscience (Funk and Ellen 2010:740). Debates over involvement of religion in the public have been ongoing (see for example Okullu 2003; Stichel & Deckard 2010). The discussion will not delve attention to these debates since there is already an indication that some religious groups have broken through the ice to take part in 'secular' issues, and are already in the limelight as either positive or negative conduits of peacebuilding. The focus is on the involvement (or lack of it) of Christian religious groups in Kenya's peacebuilding processes.

At a descriptive level, it is important to see that religions do, *de facto*, contribute to society, for better or for worse. Religion is however ascribed to as a force that be used as a tool for peace and development but also a source of destruction and harm. Batson (1993:4) explains that the mass suicide and the murder of the 913 members of people temple in Jonestown, Guyana in 1979 was a chilling reminder of the potentials of destructiveness of religious fanaticism. A relevant example too is the

suicide bombing of the twin towers in America on 11 September 2001 and the bombings of the underground transport systems in London in July 2005. Wars and crusades have been waged in the name of religion as have persecutions and torture. Religion is however a powerful component and tool for effecting change. As Haynes (1998) explains,

> "there is no such thing as religion without consequences for value systems. Group religiosity like politics, is a matter of collective solidarities and, frequently, of inter-group tension and conflict, focusing either on shared or disagreed images of the sacred, or, on cultural and class, in short, political matter".

Kristian and Hanne (2008) aver that religion is not just individual. It is also social, offering each believer a sense of belonging to the community of fellow believers. It serves both as a compass for individuals as well as the community, locating the believers within extended ontological setting. It is an identity indicator which has the potential to gather or scatter for peacebuilding, and conflict as well. Many religions are relatively independent of the state. They may lack official status but not relevance. Neglecting them in issues related to conflicts might therefore be detrimental; one, because these groups are also familiar with people's needs. An example that suffices here is the Oslo Accord where Oslo was brokering peace between Israel and the Palestinians. The religious actors were ignored and to date these actors still ignore the Accord (Kristian & Hanne 2008; Omer 2007:110). With the noted potentials religious groups have the strength for speedy, effective community organization, mobilization and influence.

There is a rapidly growing literature on the relationship between religion and peacebuilding (Appleby 2002; Johnston 2003; Duduet 2006; Kristian & Hanne 2008). According to Kristian & Hanne (2008:352), despite its intensity, influence and magnitude, worldwide, religion is a multifaceted phenomenon which shapes one's explanation of its very role in the society. The two scholars further argue that within the discipline of religious studies, it is common to distinguish between two basic perspectives: On the one hand, there is the substantive approach which focuses on the elements that constitute religion, or what religion is. This is contrasted on the other hand by the functionalist approach, which focuses on the social and cultural consequences of religion, or what religion does for a social group or for an individual.

The question of religion, conflict and peace came to worldwide attention with the decline of the Cold War and the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Discussion of the connection of religion and violent national or civil conflict emerged in earnest in the early 1990s as a result of the dissolution of communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Little 2005:96). However, it is also important to note that even as the Cold War existed, ethno religious conflicts had also persisted in places like Sri Lanka, Bosnia, Israel/Palestine and Northern Ireland. These conflicts were however not taken seriously. In recent years, there has been a rising interest in how religion can be used in both conflict resolution and the peacebuilding process (see Shore 2008). The association between religion and extremism is two-way: religious groups get involved in politics and secular groups utilize religion for political ends (Brewer, Higgins and Teeney 2010:1020).

For Stichel & Deckard (2010:740), there are good reasons to claim that religion should play a good role in peacebuilding and conflict-resolution. This is because religions are already public actors, however, they are not yet sufficiently integrated involved and engaged in peacebuilding. Some religious actors have, from historical evidences, made significant contributions to peacebuilding. This is because, as Stitchel and Deckard (2010:746) argue, the processes associated with reconciliation – confession, repentance, forgiveness, mercy, conversion, among others, based on self-reflection and acceptance of personal responsibility – have emerged from religious and not secular backgrounds.

The importance of religious peacebuilding is obvious from the widespread, central role religion plays in the individual and collective identity of warring communities. However scholarly works indicate that religion has been politicized and war-justifying aspects of sacred texts emphasized rather than peaceful teachings (Abu-Nimer 2001, Little 2005). The rise of religious fundamentalism in politics is cited as a barometer of what Putzel (1997) calls the darker side of social capital (also see Shore 2008). There have been controversial views about the involvement of religion in the secular activities including politics. Armstrong (2007: 208) argues that Christian fundamentalists are ambivalent about peace – and especially peace in the Middle East – because their interpretation of the Bible is that the end times will be characterized by war in the region and that the antichrist will disguise itself as a peacemaker.

When we view religion as strictly a promoter of violence or dismiss it as irrelevant to our goals, we risk misunderstanding the local dynamics

of conflict and simultaneously overlook a potent resource for addressing urgent conflicts. Religion, with its unmatched authority among many communities in every region of the world, carries within it a diverse set of traditions and methodologies that promote peace. If attention is paid to religion, the focus remains on the extremist beliefs and actions of a minority, rather than the ways it guides and inspires the majority and can be harnessed for good (Jafari 2007:111-2). Many of today's wars as Haynes (1998) avers are protracted civil wars, causing dramatic societal changes. The wars and the transformation resulting thereby define the opportunities that religious groups have on their potentials either to play a positive or negative role. In this case, their community function can either be weakened or strengthened depending on their ability to (or not to) respond.

"Religious peacebuilding", a term for a relatively new focus within the academic field of conflict and peace studies, makes its own case for the necessity of interaction between religions and political activity (Stichel & Deckard, 2010:744; Boulding, 1986). Religious peacebuilding according to Appleby (2000) can be defined as a "comprehensive, theoretically sophisticated and systematic process performed by religious and secular actors working in collaboration at different levels and at various proximities to conflict zones". This field may involve religious and secular actors working in collaboration at different levels and at various proximities to resolve conflicts in zones of war and conflict. "Religious peacemakers" therefore can be defined as religious individuals or representatives of faith-based organizations that attempt to help resolve inter-group conflicts and build peace (Gopin 2005; Ellis & ter Haar 2005). Appleby (2006: 1-2) explains that these groups are most likely to be successful when they: have an international or transnational reach; consistently emphasize peace and avoidance of the use of force in resolving conflict; have good relations between different religions in a conflict situation, as this will be the key to a positive input from them.

Where social institutions are weak or government is viewed as illegitimate, Sampson (1997) avers that faith-based institutions and local religious leaders often play a critical role in meeting the needs of their communities. Islamic teachings for example advocate for amicable approaches to resolving strife. Both Islamic religion and tradition have a multitude of resources with which conflicts can be resolved peacefully and nonviolently. Islamic scripture and religious teachings are rich sources of values, beliefs, and strategies that promote the peaceful and

nonviolent resolution of conflicts (Abu-Nimer 2000-2001:219, Niazi 2009, Na'im 2006, Manus 1998, Abu-Nimer and Ayse 2008). The faith based institutions therefore carry moral authority, define social values and goals and are often most trusted among the people.

Some relevant case studies

The involvement of religious actors in peacebuilding has not been without success despite the criticisms from peacebuilding practitioners, state agents and the scholarly world. There are efforts by religious groups in different parts trying to take necessary action towards building peace. Taking an example of Poland, the transition from communism was strongly supported officially by the Catholic Church (Herbert 2003). Catholic clubs were formed as intellectual spaces to envision a new Poland but they also facilitated the development of an independent movement of intellectuals, utilizing human rights discourse against the government, and protesting against the government's own constitutional reforms. The church traversed from local parish to diocese, going between national and global networks, articulating on many stages its intellectual challenge to communism. But the political confrontation was not only intellectual, for the church materially and culturally assisted Solidarity in its active engagement with the political peace process. The Pope eventually provided much of the vocabulary for Solidarity on human rights (Herbert 2003:205).

The churches were wholly excluded from the public political process in Northern Ireland that negotiated the Good Friday Agreement, in large part because of anticipated internal disagreements over the settlement. Nevertheless, they were used as back channels of communication prior to the talks, and prominent church people have since been co-opted by the government to lead over-sight of decommissioning and to take forward the question of how the conflict should be remembered. The British government drew up a list of Protestant clergy who they thought they could recruit to sell the Good Friday Agreement, an idea later abandoned when it was leaked to the press; their principal target was Archbishop Robin Eames, Head of the Anglican Church (which is the established church in England, but disestablished in Northern Ireland), (Brewer, *et al.*, 2010).

In Africa, an example that suffices from the efforts of the Catholic Church is the role of Sant' Egidio. Sant'Egidio is a church-based public lay association, formally recognized by the Catholic Church but with

an autonomous statute (See Haynes 2009). While citing Smock (2004), Haynes (2009) explains that during the early 1980s Sant'Egidio became engaged in various international dialogues. The aim was to try to prevent or reduce tension between conflicting groups and to seek to mediate between them. Since then Sant'Egidio has played an active peace-building role in several African Religions in Mozambique, Nigeria and Cambodia 63 countries beset by civil war, including: Algeria, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Co^te d'Ivoire, Mozambique and Sierra Leone. It has also been active in Colombia, Guatemala and Kosovo. In each case, the country was beset by serious conflict between polarized groups; in some cases conditions were exacerbated by the fact that the effectiveness of central government to administer had diminished significantly.

One of the clearest success stories of Sant'Egidio's peacemaking efforts occurred between 1989 and 1992 when the organization was extremely influential in resolving the civil war that had ravaged Mozambique since the mid-1970s. Following well-intentioned but eventually unsuccessful efforts to end the war emanating from the international community, Archbishop Goncalves thought Sant'Egidio might succeed in bringing the government together to talk peace with the rebels of the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) insurgents. Sant'Egidio could set up a meeting between RENAMO and the government without it meaning that the RENAMO rebels would be regarded as an entity with the same status as the ruling regime. But Sant'Egidio also had a second important asset: 'humble awareness of its own shortcomings in orchestrating international diplomacy, which caused it to seek out the special expertise of governments and international organizations' (Smock 2004: 1). These efforts were complemented not only by the United Nations but also by 10 national governments, including those of the United States, Italy, Zimbabwe and Kenya. Once peace negotiations were successfully completed in 1992, the United Nations assumed responsibility for the implementation of the peace agreement (Haynes 2009, Appleby 2006).

Nigeria can be cited as a case resulting from religious dialogue. Since the 1960s religion has been prominent in Nigerian civil conflict where missionaries and religious partisans see themselves in a zero-sum game to win souls, sometimes entering into deadly conflict. Haynes (2009) argues that there has been a long history of rivalries between Christians and Muslims in the country. A specific case that we can highlight here is the occurrences of the late 1980s when Muslim members of the Constituent Assembly wanted Sharia law in the Nigerian constitution,

while Christians would not countenance such a move. Negotiations on the issue broke down (and were to an extent superseded by other controversies) whilst President Babangida was forced to affirm in October 1988 that Nigeria would remain a secular state. Tensions between the two communities had already escalated into political violence. In early 1987, and again in May and October 1991, anti-Christian riots broke out in parts of northern Nigeria (Maier 2001). In total, over 3,000 people were killed in Christian–Muslim clashes between 1987 and 1993. From the early 1990s, inter-religious violence became a common feature of life in Nigeria, primarily involving Muslim and Christian communities. One of the worst-hit regions was the northern state of Kaduna (Haynes 1996). This led in 1995 to the founding of the Muslim–Christian Dialogue Forum (MCDF), a charity to foster Christian–Muslim dialogue. It was the result of the combined efforts of two former enemies – a Christian pastor, James Movel Wuye, and a Muslim imam, Muhammed Nurayn Ashafa, both esteemed members of their religious communities. They served as joint national coordinators of MCDF, based in Kaduna. Both made the decision to turn away from similar paths of violence and militancy. Instead, they embraced non-violence, reconciliation and the advocacy of peaceful relations between their communities, and sought to encourage others to join them in this goal (Haynes 2009).

The 'truth' recovery process in South Africa was led by the churches through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), and Archbishop Tutu in particular, for they had a residue of legitimacy that came from their strong anti-apartheid credentials (Brewer, Higgins and Teeney 2010). The commission is believed to have played a key role in the political negotiations between Nelson Mandela's African National Congress and F.W de Klerk's National Party which ended over 40 years of apartheid (Shore, 2008:161). Though in the proceedings of the TRC there was little or no mention of justice, in the hearings there was an explicit appeal to religion, especially Christianity, as a legitimate method for truth-telling, and as a way to foster reconciliation among former enemies. The TRC adopted a more restorative approach (forgiveness+reconciliation) than a retributive one (Justice=Punishment). This approach was not fair to those who wanted justice and therefore TRC adopted the African concept of *Ubuntu*, which is translated from the Xhosa axiom "*umuntu ngumuntu ngabaye bantu*", meaning people are people through other people. This approach created artificial polarity between reconciliation (Ubuntu) instead of adopting Western retributive approaches of justice. The TRC is an example of an

international conflict resolution process in which Christianity played a central role, and as such considered a prototype by some scholars, policy analysts and others seeking to advance an alternative approach to conventional international conflict resolution (Shore 2008:162).

Religious conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes are therefore alternative approaches to conflict resolution that incorporates religious thought in the resolution mechanisms. The simple thesis according to Shore (2008) is that if religion can be used to fuel conflicts; if it can be used to hurt or harm (thus a source of violence) the, it should be in one way or the other considered in conflict-resolution and peacebuilding processes, otherwise key resources from religion will be overlooked and sacrificed.

Religion and peacebuilding in Kenya

The task here is to explain the participation of churches especially in the ethnic clashes that have preceded or succeeded general elections since the introduction of the multiparty system in the country in December 1991. I will do so by offering an analysis of whether their participation was active and or passive. I begin by looking at their role from a historical perspective in order to contextualize their participation in a post elections violence setting.

Mue (2008) uses critical-historical approach to explain the failure of religious groups and specifically the role of the church in post-colonial Africa. He argues that the Church did well in supporting the colonial administration but did not act to condemn the social injustices of the colonial era, preferring instead to engage in political diplomacy with colonial powers. Though it may be noted that the missionaries and the colonialists were one and the same (as the saying goes; the flag followed the cross), later leadership in African churches would seem was undertaken by African leaders, who did little to condemn the injustices of the political leaders of the time. The leadership of first and second presidents of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta and Arap Moi respectively, evidence unspeakable forms of injustices, notably the assassinations of senior and junior political leaders who dared expose the ills of the government. Other injustices included harsh laws and restrictions on press freedom and academic freedom, elections rigging and corruption. These injustices took place as religious groups and leadership watched in silence especially during the Kenyatta regime.

During Moi's regime, some Church leaders teamed up to condemn the election rigging as well as corruption and the detentions that people faced without trials. This was in the late 1970s and early 1980s before Kenya became a de jure one party state. The Church had remained the central locus of dissent against the Moi regime, with the pro-democracy and human rights movements using Church compounds to express their views. The leaders too remained outspoken and condemned the atrocities committed by Moi against his rivals. For example, Bishop Henry Okullu of the Anglican Diocese of Maseno, teamed up with Bishop David Gitari, Rev. Dr. Timothy Njoya of the Presbyterian Church of Eastern Africa, Rev. Dr. Julius Kobia, the General Secretary of the NCCK, Bishop Prof. Zablon Nthamburi of the Methodist Church, Archbishop Raphael Mwana'a Nzeki of the Catholic Church, Archbishop Manases Kuria of the Anglican Church of Kenya, Archbishop Zacchaeus Okoth of the Catholic Church-Kisumu Diocese, Archbishop John Njue of the Catholic Church, and Bishop Alexander Muge of the Eldoret Anglican Diocese (Gathogo 2007). Through the NCCK, the Church consistently criticized Moi's authoritarian regime. The state however seemed to hunt down some of the church leaders in attempted assassinations. In 1989 Bishop David Gitari escaped death narrowly after he screamed as he moved to the top of his storied house thereby inviting his friendly neighbors who thwarted the killing ordered by Moi (Gathogo 2007).Presbyterian minister Rev. Timothy Njoya was arrested in 1988 for suggesting that Kenyans should hold discussions on critical questions affecting the Country. Bishop Alexander Muge was later killed in early 1990 in a mysterious road accident which was blamed on some government functionaries.

Immediately after the re-introduction of multipartyism in Kenya, Moi tactfully engaged in ethnic politics and instrumentized violence by the use of hired militia. This led to massacres and eviction of people from their legally owned lands. The aim was to have the opposition displaced just before elections and therefore prevent them from voting. Fear was instilled to the minority ethnic groups in certain regions through violence. The escalation of ethnic violence at the time saw a few courageous church leaders such as Bishops Henry Okullu, Alexander Muge and David Gitari of the Anglican Church of Kenya, Ndingi Mwana'a Nzeki of the Catholic Church, Rev. Timothy Njoya of Presbyterian Church of Kenya, Rev. Mutava Musyimi the secretary general of the NCCK, and Fr. John Anthony Kaiser-a Mill Hill missionary priest from U.S.A, become vocal critics of the ethnic clashes instigated by Moi's leadership. The leaders

accused Moi of bull-dozing the country without respect for human rights. Some of the leaders like Fr. Kaiser openly criticized Moi and indicated that they were ready to testify against him and his allies at the International Criminal Court on accounts of human rights abuse and death of innocent Kenyans. His outspokenness led to his assassination.

Fr. John Kaiser had lived in the country for over 36 years and was assassinated on August 24, 2000 in an early morning as he drove to Naivasha town in the Rift Valley. In the few years before his death, he had become the Voice of the People, unafraid to speak out against the corruption that permeated the Kenyan government. In public forums and in the Kenyan and international press, Kaiser accused Kenya's president, Daniel ArapMoi, of staging bloody tribal wars in order to drive people from their land and seize it for certain tribes. Throughout the 1990s, Kaiser had been followed, harassed, and even beaten and placed under house arrest by Kenyan police and the Criminal Investigation Department. In 1998, when Moi organized a tribunal called the Akiwumi Commission to look into the causes of ethnic violence, Kaiser was determined to testify. He assembled documents and traveled to Nairobi, where he spent several weeks sitting outside the courtroom waiting to be called. When he finally did take the stand in February 1999, his testimony caused a sensation. He claimed the government had instigated the tribal clashes, and he named Minister of Defense Julius Sunkuli, Cabinet member Nicholas Biwott, and President Moi himself. In the constitution of Kenya, it is written that you cannot defame the president. Fr. Kaiser publicly said Moi should be indicted in the world court at The Hague for crimes against humanity, and he volunteered to testify. The commission never bothered to release the report! Meanwhile, Kaiser had found another crusade. Two girls in his parish claimed they had been raped and impregnated by Julius Sunkuli. Kaiser encouraged them to take legal action against the minister, the second most powerful man in Kenya. Although the two girls succumbed to government pressure and dropped the rape charges against Sunkuli, the case damaged Sunkuli's reputation enough that he lost the 2002 parliamentary election. Fr. Kaiser however paid the cost. The Nakuru police commander Andrew Kimetto described Kaiser's final hours to *The Nation* (one of Kenya's media houses), based on crime-scene evidence. Kaiser's truck was hijacked and driven off the main road into the forest. He was pulled from the truck and forced to kneel. An assassin then shot him in the back of the head. The killers drove the truck back to the Naivasha-Nakuru Highway, dumped his body (for more details see http://

www.millhillmissionaries.com/Death of Father Kaiser.pdf). The religious leaders despite the threats, assassinations and harassments continued to pinpoint the atrocities of the political leaders.

As ethnic conflicts and other forms of human rights violations intensified in the 1990s, the Church through NCCK and Kenya Episcopal Conference issued statements protesting the government's inaction in maintaining order and in stopping human rights violations. In one of their pastoral letters addressed to Moi, the Roman Catholic Church wrote:

> Although our pleas, requests and advice seem to have been ignored by you, we on our side will not abandon our responsibilities… We have seen and heard so much wickedness perpetrated in Kenya since the clashes began. Innocent people, peaceful and humble, even the churches and mosques have been attacked and destroyed. All these abominations are done in your name by some of your cabinet ministers, your district commissioners, your district officers, your General Service Unit and your police… (Kenya Episcopal Conference, through The Standard, Nairobi, October 30, 1993).

The NCCK, which dates back to 1908, is an umbrella organization for Christian churches in Kenya. It has a long and consistent record of working to spur development at all levels - economic and political as well as spiritual. In campaigning for greater democracy and a more open society, and attempting to serve as the 'voice of the voiceless', it clashed with the authorities many times. In the early stages of the ethnic clashes in the Rift Valley, the NCCK launched a multi-faceted program called the NCCK Peace and Reconciliation Project to address the large scale internal displacements, and to try to work for reconciliation among the rival groups. Financial support for the project was provided by the Government of the Netherlands, at the outset (1992-1993) through the Dutch Ministry for Development Co-operation, and later on, via Dutch Interchurch Aid (DIA). The Peace and Reconciliation Projects established by the NCCK at that time were primarily emergency relief and rehabilitation programs at a time when the victims of ethnic violence required assistance. But the focus gradually shifted from relief and rehabilitation to peace and reconciliation, with concerted efforts to prevent ethnic conflict, improve inter-ethnic relationships, reduce the suffering as a result of ethnic violence, and create awareness on issues causing conflicts. It was during phase II, from 1994 until 1996 that the first efforts were made to present an integrated approach in which relief and rehabilitation efforts were linked to reconciliation

programs with a more social focus. Subsequently, beginning with phase III in August 1996, more extensive reconciliation programs were initiated to not only restore hope to the victims of violence and provide them with a means to earn a decent living, but also to assist them in re-integrating themselves into the communities they had fled. NCCK organized hundreds of Good Neighborliness Seminars, open to elders, local opinion leaders, local politicians, educators, community workers, government workers, and members of other important groups and organizations at the local level. At these seminars, the participants could discuss the causes of the local conflicts and analyze the effects that these conflicts had on their communities, and could examine potential strategies for successfully resolving the conflicts without resorting to violence.

In those meetings held for community leaders, the leaders' own roles in promoting peace and reconciliation were a focus of the discussions. Meetings held exclusively for women gave women the chance to participate in ways that would not have been possible in mixed seminars. In seminars focusing on youth, the participants were challenged to re-evaluate the values that resulted in them perceiving 'the other' as enemy, and encouraged not to allow others to manipulate them into acts of violence, but rather to channel their energies into more constructive activities. Intercultural sports and social activities were also encouraged. Those seminars bringing together elders and traditional leaders were of particular importance, as traditional leaders are held in high regard and retain enormous influence in their communities. In its own description of its activities, the NCCK attributes much of the Peace and Reconciliation Project's success to its 'inclusive' approach and while that is no guarantee of success, it, in the view of the NCCK, helped to reduce the level of violence in the Rift Valley, and enhanced mutual understanding among ordinary people (http://www.gppac.net/documents/pbp_f/3/3_kenya.htm, accessed 26 March 2011).

Here it emerges that churches in Africa and Kenya in particular, and especially the mainstream churches may not have the required resources to steer peacebuilding efforts successfully. Financial stability is just one of such challenges. This implies the shortcomings of religious actors in the field of peacebuilding. Scholars and peacebuilders in the field increasingly agree that the leadership of religious agents for peace is essential to the success of religious peacebuilding (Stichel & Deckard, 2010; Haynes, 1998). The leaders therefore need commitment and training in non-violence and connection with the religious community and beyond state borders that can

inspire and guide them as well as others down that path. Ground support is therefore needed since the views of religious leaders always contradict those of politicians. They are also less visible (from the national picture), mostly able to access members of their congregations.

Kenya's 2007/8 post-election violence

The efforts of the Church before 2005[8] in Kenyan politics indicated a significant involvement in humanitarian activities. The Church in the Moi era seemed to be committed to condemning atrocities of the government. This however took a different twist since 2005 during the constitutional referendum which was quite enmeshed in ethnic politics. Gabrielle Lynch's research on Kenya's Constitutional Referendum (2006) shows that the referendum process clearly acquired an ethnic logic as the different sides were labeled and adopted orange and banana signs for 'no' and 'yes' respectively. The prevailing image then was communities supporting and following their prominent 'ethnic spokesmen', lining up as generals in a battle. Lynch uses the referendum as a case study, a means of teasing out the role and relevance of ethnicity in Kenya's contemporary and multi-party context. In this case, she observes that the idea of ethnic bloc coming together to form winning or losing coalitions is not new to analyses of post-colonial Kenya politics (also see Branch and Cheeseman 2008 and Smedt 2009).The idea of ethnic voting blocs headed by ethnic 'big men' coming together to form winning or losing coalitions (Rutten & Owuor, 2009) did not spare the Church and thus affected its moral position as well as its authority in the 2007 general elections in the country. The section below explores this observation.

The inability to bring together the warring political parties and their leaders was detrimental to the peace-building processes in the post-election violence of 2007/8. Even though the two leaders were able to agree to power sharing- after intervention from the international community- that in itself did not guarantee peacebuilding and reconciliation as stipulated in the national accord. It is certain that although peace mediation efforts may succeed to restore tranquility in any situation of conflicts, there obviously misses a link between the pacts provided by the mediation process and peace building processes that lead to the healing of the affected and hurting citizens. As Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) and, Nilsson (2009) have argued, for peace to hold, parties must engage in costly concession by turning word

into deeds through the implementation of the agreed provisions to share power. What role then did religious groups play in this political wrangle?

Before the PEV, religious groups had indicated that they were on guard by educating people not to be misused by the political leaders in conflicts. The NCCK had indicated that they will tackle local politicians' lack of accountability. One of the leaders said that: "We want to monitor the political campaign and keep a check on how it unfolds…inflammatory speeches and so on"- This was however by word and not action. For details see this link-(http://kenvironews.wordpress.com/2007/09/26/kenya-clashes-elections-and-land-church-keeps-watch-in-molo/, Accessed 26 March 2011). After the elections and with the starting of the violence, as members of the civil society embarked on peace-building efforts, the participation of religious groups was minimal. It was evident they were not visible at the national level to champion for the rights of the displaced and assist in peace-building process as was the case with many Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

During and immediately after PEV, unfortunately, when the country needed the voices of reason, these voices seemed to have vanished or embedded to the regime. The inability of the religious groups to fully take part in the conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes is attributed to the fact that the worshippers had expected the religious leaders to advise them to vote with dignity and conscience as well as elect leaders of their choice. Instead, the leaders took sides with the political parties and challenged each other on historical issues such as land, which was the main cause of ethnic conflicts and cleansing. An example is cited of Nyanza Catholic Bishops who openly challenged Cardinal Njue after he took an opposing stand on the highly emotive *Majimbo* (federal) debate. Because of his central Kenya origins, Njue was perceived to be playing the ethnic card to back President Kibaki (from central Kenya), while Nyanza Bishops supported Kibaki's opponent, Raila Odinga on his promotion of *Majimbo*.[9] In the run up to the 2007 general elections, several religious groups were therefore seen as being openly partisan along ethnic lines. Media reports showed "prophesies" especially by leaders of various Christian churches about who would win the presidential elections. The churches also had their preferred presidential candidates according to geographical and ethnic boundaries. Similarly, in Mombasa, Muslims campaigned for their fellow Muslim candidates. Media releases were to comment that they had seen churches and mosques of ODM and PNU but not of the faiths they profess. As a result of the religious alliances over

267

300 churches were burned during the post-election violence, an indication that religious institutions, especially the church, were no longer respected. Other instances cited are the political alignments of churches that took strange twists when at the height of the general election campaigns, a Nairobi parliamentary candidate was invited to Presbyterian Church of East Africa (St. Andrews Church) to call for support of President Kibaki.[10] This raised eyebrows since the Church is in a cosmopolitan city, drawing worshippers from all political persuasions. The Church had lost her moral authority and as such was not spared.

On the Sunday of 30th December 2007, horrific reports of a mob that torched 80 villagers hiding inside a church in Eldoret among them children, made world headlines. The African inland church (AIC) in Kibera, Nairobi, was also burned on 2nd January 2008. It did not go unnoticed that the Bishop of the AIC church, Silus Yego did not speak against the violence.[11] As members of the civil society embarked on peace-building efforts, the participation of religious groups was minimal. It was evident they were not visible at the national level to champion for the rights of the displaced and assist in peace-building process as was the case with many Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

The IDPs who sought refuge in the camps at least saved their lives despite the noted challenges. Those who sought refuge in places which were thought to be safe haven such as churches faced the wrath of the rioting gangs. One sad story told by a Kikuyu lady suffices here in the Eldoret incident that led to the highest number of lives lost at once.

"On the 1st of January 2008 at around 10 a.m., I heard people yelling that some raiders were coming. I saw smoke coming from some houses in our village and the houses were burning. Everyone in the village started running away to the church (KAG). My mother who was 90 years old was with me at the time. I decided to take my mother into the church for safety. After a few minutes, I saw more raiders coming towards the church….We thought the raiders would not attack the church. Many people were being pushed into the church by the raiders. The raiders threw some mattress into the roof of the church and threw more into the church. They were also pouring fuel (petrol) onto the mattresses. All of a sudden I saw fire break out. I took my mother towards the main door to get her outside, but there were many others scrambling toward the door as well. We both fell onto the floor. I wanted to save my mother from the burning church, but one of the raiders prevented me. I saw the fire had reached where my mother was. I heard her cry for help as the fire burnt her, but I could not help."[12]

Kikuyu men attempting to defend their people were hacked to death with machetes, shot with arrows, or pursued and killed. The death toll for this horrific incident was 17 burned alive in the church, 11 dying in or on the way to the Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital-Eldoret, and 54 others injured who were treated and discharged. Analysts and U.N. officials saw echoes of the 1994 Rwanda genocide, when churches were turned into slaughterhouses for some of the 800,000 moderate Hutu and Tutsi victims (Read more: http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1699181,00.html#ixzz1Hzbknmks).

A few of the vocal Christian leaders like Bishop Margaret Wanjiru of Jesus is Alive Ministries and the Member of Parliament of Starehe used their political positions and religious power to call on for peace.[13] Other efforts noted were by certain churches that tried to re-settle internally displaced persons who were evicted from the camps after a year. In Eldoret, Lilian Nyambura[14] (not her real name) explained that her Pentecostal Assemblies of God church, Kiambaa, re-settled her after her home had been burned down by the "natives" during the skirmishes. She was among the few people who escaped the inferno that claimed over 80 lives in Kiambaa Church that had been set ablaze by marauding youth in Eldoret.

The paltry participation of religious groups in peacebuilding processes raises questions about the expected role of these groups in promoting human dignity following violence that left thousands of Kenyans displaced and dead. Orabator (2002) observes, religious groups in Africa tend to be reaction bodies that watch as events unfold and to the crumbling of what would have otherwise been salvaged. It is only after the situation is out of hand that the groups scamper to collect and bind the pieces when it is already too late. So far, the literature reviewed seems to suggest that there exist expectations for religious groups during and after conflict. The expectation that religious groups should intervene in times of conflict and human suffering is what propelled voices from sections of the Kenyans to challenge the groups to act.

After being silent for almost one year, the religious groups came out in defense of justice and human rights. In the months of February through April 2009, religious groups and other civil organizations were actively involved in persuading the president and prime minister to resolve their difference amicably. What was significant in the response by these religious groups was their condemnation of corruption in the political leadership and poor governance in the country. Philip (2008) insightfully argues that, in the long and difficult process of peace-building in post-conflict states,

corruption has increasingly been identified as a major obstacle to success and as something whose eradication should be of high priority. The public condemnation of the President and Prime Minister centered on the failure to punish corruption in high places, to deal with extra judicial killings by the police and to resettle thousands made homeless by the post-election violence (The Daily Nation, 20 February 2009). The cheers by Kenyans on witnessing this public act were an indication of what they expected of the religious leaders since the violence had been witnessed. For example, the leaders castigated the coalition government as follows:

"You (meaning the President and the Prime Minister) have been reluctant to punish your friends who are greedy, you have neglected the IDPs; you have not acted decisively on insecurity and extra-judicial killings. Kenyans hoped that the two of you would unite the diverse ethnic communities into one united nation of Kenya; that you would punish those who break the law even if they are your friends; that you would turn your faces from corruption and greed; that you would resettle the IDPs back to their homes; that you would facilitate the creation of jobs for the unemployed especially the youth; but all Kenyans are witnessing are disagreements within the Grand Coalition instead of cohesion and there have been little or no effort towards healing and reconciliation. Kenyans are now disillusioned with your leadership and you should take responsibility for the status of the nation. We urge you to take charge and restore dignity and unity, equity and justice for all the people of Kenya. We pray that God will help you to overcome the challenges facing our nation with courage and devotion (The Daily Nation, 20 February 2009)."

Another public act was a formal apology by the NCCK for taking sides during the 2007 general elections. This was in an effort for the church to recover her credibility, and show support to the peace building and reconciliation process. At the same time, an inter-religious forum consisting of the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM), the International Society of Krishna Consciousness (ISKON), the Episcopal movement, the Hindu society, and NCCK remained outspoken about the ills of the political leaders in the country. NCCK's initiative to collect over one million signatures from all the administrative provinces sought to support the prosecution of leaders who instigated the post-election violence. Similarly, a group of churches formed the "wheels/caravan of hope (*msafara*)" initiative. This is a peace initiative that coordinated prayers for the nation and food distribution to internationally displaced

persons all the way from Mombasa, through Nairobi, Nakuru, Eldoret and to Kisumu. Other initiatives by the churches included collaboration with the provisional and district administrations. For example, churches in the Rift Valley province joined the Rift Valley provincial commissioner to reconcile communities most affected by the 2007-8 elections violence.

The delay in implementing peacebuilding and reconciliation mechanisms is what continues to rally religious leaders to challenge Kibaki-Odinga coalition government to go past partisan politics and redeem Kenyan in the Rift Valley, Western and Nyanza provinces who still feel unsafe and unprotected from their fellow citizens in their own country. However, it is observable that the Church has not gained a strong footing and is not outspoken about political issues as before. Even now as The Hague beckons the "Ocampo six"[15] to get ready to appear for trials for having orchestrated Kenya's post-election violence, the Church are dump-silent about the issues. Not one of them has been heard, either commenting or calling for actions to speed up justice for the victims of violence. A letter in the Daily Nation by Stanley Nganga partly demonstrates concerns from the populace about the silent religiosity in the nation. He laments:

> Why is the Church silent as The Hague debates rages? In the history of the struggles, the church has played a significant role since freedom and justice are divine. Here in Kenya, the clergy have reached a spiritual and moral death. The men and women of God have abandoned their divine calling of serving God and humanity. Preachers are no longer the Cardinal Maurice Otungas, henry Okullus or the Alexander Muges that we used to admire. The Njoyas and Ndingis of Kenya are dead (emphasis added). What they mind is the financial and economic gain from their highly publicized ministries, some with very peculiar names. They are silent about the Hague debates because some of them are partakers of this satanic cup of ethnicity. They are quiet on the tension our political leaders are creating because they also support different camps. Their failure to provide spiritual, moral and political guidance led to the post-election violence. This is a big moral and spiritual tragedy of the church. Church leaders are supposed to be watchdogs of the society. They should give guidance and ensure peace, righteousness, freedom and justice reign (Daily Nation, Monday, 14 March 2011).

Towards a viable solution

As churches are being urged to positively contribute towards peacebuilding processes, it is reckoned that generally, and as Appleby (2006: 1-2) argues, there are a myriad of challenges facing religion as an institution to enable it steer peacebuilding activities. Some of the already mentioned hurdles include financial and skill limitations. There is therefore a need to find out if there are any international affiliations through which these institutions can be aided to successfully reach the congregations, most of which the politicians and civil society organizations might not reach, in an effort to educate communities on the relevance of building unifying institutional structures. Secondly, there is need to check for consistency in the activities of the religious institutions and if they are always advocating for peace. The paper has indicated that there seemed to be unity and consistency of the Church in condemnation of abuse of human rights during the Moi era. The 2005 constitutional referendum however divided the voice of religious leaders and as such their moral authority weakened. The height of this weakness was exhibited in 2007 post-election violence. The paper therefore suggests the need to check on consistency of the Church. One way through which this can be achieved is through engaging the umbrella organizations such as the NCCK, the Episcopal Movement, as well as dialogue with other religious bodies including SUPKEM, ISCON, Hindu Leadership Council and Organization of African Independent Churches (OAICs). It is also important to understand the relations of a given religion with others so as to determine whether, as Appleby (2006) argues, this can be a sustainable way of building peace.

Aapengnuo (2010) explains that, at the core of ethnic conflicts is the relationship between ethnic groups and the state in the search for security, identity and recognition. The Church, in an effort to bridge these gaps of identities, should act as the voice of the masses unifying the people at community's grassroots towards a common front. Though the legal system might not at the moment provide compact solutions to the crises facing the communities, the Church as a community institution that is engaged in peacebuilding activities of the people, is expected not only to voice out the grievances of the people, but bring together warring communities in grassroots development and peace collaborations. Efforts of these activities are now observable in the Eldoret region of the Rift Valley. Bishop Korir of the Anglican Church is calling for unity between the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin living in the area. This he has done through common development

projects such as seed distribution and provision of dairy goats which are to be shared by the two communities through reproduction.

That the masses have been used in times of elections and political referendums for selfish ambitions of the political leaders is a fact that has been evidenced in Kenya's political environment. It is for this reason that the aid of non-governmental bodies, including religious institutions, comes in handy. Religious groups can directly oppose repression and reconcile communities by engaging them in dialogue and transformative development activities to the disadvantage of a selfish government. On the other hand, as Wainaina (2009) recommends, religious groups should fearlessly join the international community and continue to urge the government to hold perpetrators of human rights violations to account and also support initiatives to strengthen judicial independence and the establishment of a society based on the rule of law and human rights. This is the one of the ways to address the root causes of ethnic rivalries. The causes, for example, of land squabbles in most parts of the country are known. This has not only been documented in research done by Kenyan and other scholars, but are within the reports from commissions formed by both the government and private bodies to investigate the land clashes, in the Rift Valley and Western provinces in the late 1990s (see Klopp, 2002; Odhiambo, 2004; Ndegwa, 1997; Turner and Brownhill, 2001; Mueller, 2008).

By all means, religious institutions should be in the forefront to advocate for a long-lasting solution to eminent issues that cause violence in the country. This is because, any peace building mechanisms devoid of the root cause of conflict fail to sufficiently account for past injustices and fail to put forward mechanisms to enable future reconciliation and complete healing (see Omer 2007:110). In particular, Mue (2008) urges religious groups to be in the forefront of fighting tribalism and forging an abiding spirit of nationhood. The groups should advocate against ethnic politics that has divided the 42 ethnic groups, as an effort to form a united Kenya. In sum, advocating for social justice should be the priority of all civil organizations in the country.

NOTES

1. Read more: Kenya - Location and size, Population, Tourism, Financial services, Dependencies, Capital:http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Africa/Kenya.html#ixzz1J2HkZax3

2. For example, see the Waki report (2008) whose mandate was to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the violence, the conduct of state security agencies in their handling of it, and to make recommendations concerning these and other matters

3. The two scholars give a chronological account of ethnic rivalries in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras in Kenya.

4. Despite this observation, literature indicates existence of tribal clashes even in pre-colonial Kenya when the different Kenyan ethnic groups were trying to claim geographical spaces and settle down. The history of the clashes is also recorded during the colonial period and especially the ethnic divisions by the colonialists so as to control and tame the power of interaction of the ethnic groups (Rutten and Owuor, 2009)

5. For elaborate explanations of these systems of governance see Klopp, 2002 and Branch and Cheeseman, 2008.

6. Mungiki is a terror movement in Kenyan history known for its brutality to the citizens especially if they, or the state, do not comply with their demands. It is believed to have emerged in the late 1980's in the Rift Valley Province, first with a religious outlook, later as a militia to defend the Kikuyu minorities living in parts of the Rift Valley Province from the Kalenjin Warriors who had been "incited" by certain politicians in Moi's government to evict Kikuyu from their farms. The movement later relocated to Nairobi and asserted themselves in various parts, taking control of certain sectors including the matatu industry (public transport), which is their major source of income. It is now a terror group that masquerades as a religious sect, a social movement "fighting for the rights of the youth", as well as a political group, among many faces.

7. See the Waki Report (2008) written by the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) that investigated the facts and circumstances surrounding the violence, the conduct of state security agencies in their handling of it, and made recommendations concerning these and other matters. One of the recommendations was the perpetrators of violence should be prosecuted at the International Criminal Court (ICC). Cases for the six key suspected perpetrators of the violence are as of now being handled by ICC.

8. In the year 2005, the Church generally started taking part in partisan politics, dissatisfied by lack of fulfillment of promises made by the National Rainbow Coalition Party which came into power in 2002. The referendum process was an evidence of a divided Church with some denominations supporting

the Orange team led by Raila Odinga whereas others supported the banana team led by Mwai Kibaki (the then President). The Orange team which was opposing the draft constitution won, and this marked a clear demarcation of the two groups, whose differences were manifested in the 2007 general elections. The Orange Democratic Party (formed after Raila's team won in the referendum) was believed to have won in the rigged elections of 2007. This triggered mayhem in the country unearthing buried animosity of ethnic differences.

9   Kweyu, Daily Nation, January 2008, p.11

10   Kweyu, Ibid

11   Mathenge, G. in the *Sunday Standard, 6 January 2008, p.11*

12   This story was told to the Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence (CIPEV) otherwise known as the Waki**C**ommission (formed to investigate the causes of post-election violence) by a Kikuyu woman who lost her mother in a church inferno deliberately set on by youth of the host community. It is a story that was confirmed by an official of the Kiambaa cooperative farm where the Church was located.

13   The Daily Nation, 8 January 2008, p.9.

14   Oral interview with Lilian Nyambura at Kiambaa on 23 July 2009

15   Immediately after the National Accord was signed on the 29th February 2008 to have a government of coalition as a temporary solution to the Kenyan 2007/8 crisis, a task force-Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence-was formed to investigate into the nature and events of the post-election violence. One of the recommendations of the commission was that the key politicians who took part in planning and orchestrating the violence should be tried at the International Criminal Court if the local tribunals are not able to handle the cases. Mr. Kofi Annan who mediated brokered peace agreements was handed an envelope containing six names, which he has handed over to the ICC. The six in Kenya are largely referred to as the Ocampo six (Louis Moreno Ocampo is the Chief Prosecutor from ICC who is handling the Kenyan case).

REFERENCES

Aapengnuo Mweyang (2010). Misinterpreting Ethnic Conflicts in Africa. *JFQ.*58(3), 13-17

Abu-Nimer Mohammed (2000-2001). A Framework for Nonviolence and Peacebuilding in Islam. *Journal of Law and Religion.*15(1/2), 217-265

Abu-Nimer Mohammed (2001). Conflict Resolution, Culture, and Religion: Toward a Training Model of Interreligious Peacebuilding. *Journal of Peace Research.* 38(6), 685-704

Abu-Nimer, Mohammed and Ayse, Kayadfci (2008). Muslim Peace-Building Actors in Africa and the Balkan Context: Challenges and Needs. *Peace & Change.* 33(4)

Abuya Odhiambo (2009). Consequences of a Flawed Presidential Election. *Legal Studies.* 29 (1), 127–158

Amr Abdalla (2001). Principles of Islamic Interpersonal Conflict Intervention: A Search within Islam and Western Literature. *Journal of Law and Religion.*15 (1/2) 151-184

Appleby Scott. (2000). *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation.* Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield

Appleby, Scott. (2006). Building sustainable peace: the roles of local and transnational religious actors. Paper presented at the Conference on New Religious Pluralism in World Politics, Georgetown University, Washington, DC

Armstrong, K. (2007). *The Bible: The Biography.* London: Atlantic Books

Astri, S., Kristian, H., Arne, S. (2002). After Bonn: Conflictual Peace Building. *Third World Quarterly.* 23(5), 875-891

Bangura, Karim (2007). The Study of Peace and Conflict Studies: Reflections on a Scientific Approach, in McCandless, Bangura, *et al.* (Eds.), *Peace Research for Africa: Critical Essays on Methodology,* Addis Ababa: University for Peace

Barnett Michael, Hunjoon Kim, O'Odonnell, Madalene, and Sitea, Laura (2007). Peacebuilding: What is in a name? *Global Governance.* 13, 35-58

Batson, David (1993). *Religion and the Individual: A socio-psychological perspective.* Oxford: New York University Press

Belshaw David (2001). *Faith in Development: Partnership between the World bank and Churches of Africa.* Oxford: Regnum Books International

Bercovitch, J. and Kadayifci, A. (2009). Religion and Mediation: The Role of Faith-Based Actors in International Conflict Resolution. *International Negotiation.* 14, 175-204

Boulding Elise (1986). Two Cultures of Religion as Obstacles to Peace. *Zygon* 21(4), 501-518

Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1995). "Democracy: A Newly Recognized Imperative," *Global Governance* 1:1

Branch Daniel & Cheeseman Nic (2009). Democratization, Sequencing and State Failure in Africa: Lessons from Kenya. *African Affairs.* 108(430), 1-26

276

Brewer John, Higgins Garreth, and Teeney Francis (2010). Religion and Peacemaking: A Conceptualization. *Sociology.* 44(6), 1019-1037

Call Charles (2008). Ending Wars and Building Peace: International Responses to War-torn Societies. *International Studies Perspective.* 9, 1-21

Daley Patricia (2006). Ethnicity and Political Violence in Africa: The Challenge to the Burundi State. *Political Geography.* 25, 657-679

Donais Timothy (2009). Empowerment or Imposition? Dillemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Process. *Peace and Change.* 34(1), 1-26

David Anderson (2002). Vigilantes, Violence and the Politics of Public Order in Kenya. *African Affairs.* 101(405), 531-555

Ellis Stephen & ter Haar (2005). *Religion and development in Africa.* Background paper prepared for the Commission for Africa

Funk Deckard & Ellen Stichel (2010). *Between The "Already" And The "Not Yet": A Peace Perspective And A Catholic Theological Viewpoint on Religion and Politics.* Equinox Publishing Ltd. 1 Chelsea Manor Studios, Flood Street, London Sw3 5sr

Galtung Johan. (1998). On the Genessis of Peaceless Worlds: Insane Nations and the Insane States, in *Peace and Conflict. Journal of Peace Psychology.* 4(1), 1-11

Galtung, Johan. (1969a). Violence, Peace and Peace Research. *Journal of Peace Research.* 6(3), 167-191

Galtung, Johan. (1969b). *Peace by Peaceful Means.* Newsbury Park, CA: Sage

Gopin, M. (2005). World religions, violence, and myths of peace in international relations, in: G. ter Haar& J. Busutill (Eds) *Bridge or Barrier. Religion, Violence and Visions for Peace.* (Leiden: Brill)

Gathogo Julius (2007). Church and State Conflict in Kenya 1986-1991: Archbishop David Gitari's Role. *Swedish Missiological Themes.* 95(3), 265-284

Haynes Jeffrey (2009). Conflict, Conflict Resolution and Peace-Building: The Role of Religion in Mozambique, Nigeria and Cambodia. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics.* 47(1), 52–75

Haynes, Jeffrey (1998). *Religion in global politics.* London: Longman.

Haynes, Jeffrey (1996). *Religion and Politics in Africa.* London: Zed.

Herbert, D. (2003). *Religion and Civil Society.* Aldershot: Ashgate

Jafari Sheherazade (2007). Local Religious Peacemakers: An Untapped Resource in U.S. Eoreign Policy. *Journal of International Affairs.* 61(1), 111-130

Jarstad, Anna and Nilsson, Desirée (2008). From Words to Deeds: The Implementation of Power-Sharing Pacts in Peace Accords. *Conflict Management and Peace Science.* 25(3), 206 -223

Kagwanja Peter (2005). "Power to Uhuru": Youth Identity and Generational Politics in Kenya's 2002 Elections. *African Affairs.* 105(418), 51–75

Kagwanja Peter & Southall Roger (2009). Introduction: Kenya-A democracy in retreat? *Journal of Contemporary African Studies.* 27(3), 259-277

Klopp Jacqueline. (2002). Can Moral Ethnicity Trump Political Tribalism? The Struggle for Land and Nation in Kenya, in *Journal of African Studies,* 61:2, pp. 269-294

Kristian Harpviken & Hanne Røislien (2008). Faithful Brokers? Potentials and Pitfalls of Religion in Peacemaking. *Conflict Resolution Quarterly.* 25 (3)

Lonsdale, J. (1994). "Moral Ethnicity and Political Tribalism" in P. Karsholm & J. Hultin (Eds.) *Inventions and Boundaries: Historical and Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism.* Occasional Paper 1:11 p. 131-150

Lynch Gabrielle (2006). The fruits of perception: 'Ethnic politics and the case of Kenya's Constitutional Referendum. *African Studies.* 65(2), 233-270

Lynch Gabrielle (2008). Courting the Kalenjin: The Failure of Dynasticism and the Strength of the ODM Wave in the Kenya's Rift Valley Province. *African Affairs.* 107(429)

Maier, K. (2001). *This House has Fallen: Nigeria in Crisis* (Harmondsworth: Penguin)

Mbiti John (1973). "Diversity, Divisions and Denominationalism." In Barrett D. (Et al; Eds) Kenya Churches Handbook: The Development of Kenyan Christianity 1498-1973). Kisumu: Kenya. Evangel Press

Mueller Sussane (2008). The Political Economy of Kenya's Crisis. *JEAS.* 2(2)

Manus I. 1998. Democracy and Islam: Implications for Civilizational Conflict and the Democratic Peace. *International Studies Quarterly.* 42(3), 485-511

Musambayi Katumanga (2005). A city under siege: Banditry & modes of accumulation in Nairobi, 1991-2004. *Review of African Political Economy.* 106, 505-520

Na'im, A. (2006). *African Constitutionalism and the Role of Islam.* University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia

Ndegwa Stephen (2004). Citizenship and Ethnicity: An Examination of Two Transitional Movements in Kenyan Politics. *Journal of American Political Science Review.* 91(3), 599-616

Niazi, S. (2009). 'Peaceful Approaches to Conflict Resolution in Muslim Context' in Kakar, N. and Niazi, S. eds. *Peace Education: Islamic Perspectives, Curriculum/Teaching Module.*Costa Rica: University for Peace

Nilsson, Niklas (2009). Obstacles to Building a Civic Nation: Georgia's Armenian Minority and Conflicting Threat Perceptions. *Ethnopolitics.* 8(2), 135-153

Noel, S. (2009). Democratic and Legal Obstacles to Mediator-imposed Peace Plans. *Ethnopolitics*, 8(2), 239-242

Odhiambo, Atieno (2004). Ethnic Cleansing and Civil Society in Kenya 1969-1992. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies.* 22(1), 29-42

Okullu Henry (2003). *Church and State in Nation Building and Human Development.* Nairobi: Uzima Press

Omer Otalia (2007) Religion versus Peace: A False Dichotomy. *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism.* ASE Conference Special, 7(3), 109-131

Omolo Ken (2002). Political Ethnicity in the Democratisation Process in Kenya. *African Studies.* 61(2), 209-221

Orobator, Agbonkhianmeghe (2002). The Church as Family: African Ecclesiology in its Social Context: Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa

Orobator Agbonkhianmeghe (2008). A Tale of Two Elephants: Overcoming the postelection crisis in Kenya. *America*, 198(8),14-16

Putzel, J. (1997). Accounting for the "Dark Side" of Social Capital. *Journal of International Development.* 9, 939–949

Rutten Marcel & Owuor Sam (2009). Weapons of Mass Destruction: Land, Ethnicity and the 2007 Elections in Kenya. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies.* 27(3), 305-324

Sampson Cynthia (1997). "Religion and Peacebuilding," in William Zartman and Lewis Rasmussen (eds.) *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques,* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press)

Shore, Megan (2008). Christianity and Justice in the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission: A Case Study in Religious Conflict Resolution. *Political Theology.* 9(2), 161-178

Smedt Johan (2009). No Raila, No Peace!' Big Man Politics and Election Violence at the Kibera Grassroots. *African Affairs.*108 (433), 581–598

Steeves Jeffrey (2006). Beyond Democratic Consolidation in Kenya: Ethnicity, Leadership & Unbounded Politics. *African Identities.*4(2), 195-211

Stichel Ellen & Deckard Julianne (2010). Between the "Already" and the "Not Yet": A Peace Perspective and a Catholic Theological Viewpoint on Religion and Politics. *Political Theology.* 55(5), 738-763

Synod of Bishops (1992). "Justice in the World," in David Shannon and Thomas O'Brien (eds.) *Catholic Social Thought: The Documentary Heritage* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1992)

Turner, T. and Brownhill, E. (2001). African Jubilee: Mau Mau Resurgence and the Fight for Fertility in Kenya, 1986-2002. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies.*22, 1037-1041

Wainaina, Ndung'a (2009). Kenya Let Opportunity for Change Slip, Daily Nation, 27 February 2009

Weber Thomas (2004). The Impact of Gandhi on the Development of Johan Galtung's Peace Research. *Global Change, Peace and Security.* 16(1), 31-43

Wolpe, H. and McDonald, S. (2008). Democracy and Peace-building: Re-thinking the Conventional Wisdom. *The Round Table.* 97(394), 137-145

Yakinthou, C. (2009). Reflections on a 'Meditrated' Conflict. *Ethnopolitics.* 8(2), 243-246

CRISTIAN NAE

Born in 1079, in Craiova

Ph.D. in Philosophy, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University, Iasi (2008)
Thesis: *Arthur C. Danto's Philosophy of the Artwork. Definition, Interpretation, Evaluation*

Lecturer, "George Enescu" University of Arts, Iasi, Chair of Art History and Theory
Member of the editorial board of *META-Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology and Practical Philosophy* Journal
("Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University Press)
Member of the European Society for Aesthetics
Former editor of *Vector Magazine*

Recepient of a "Patterns_Lectures" grant for "Researching and Understanding Recent Cultural History" offered by ERSTE Stiftung, 2010
Post-doctoral research grant at "George Enescu" University of Arts, Iasi, financed by CNCSIS (National Council for Scientific Research in Higher Education), 2010

Conferences attended in Spain, Italy, Sweden, Hungary, France and the Czech Republic
Articles published in various journals, conference proceedings and collective volumes

Book:

Arta după sfârșitul artei. Danto și redefinirea operei de artă, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University Press, Iasi, 2010

IS CONCEPTUAL ART INHERENTLY NON-AESTHETIC? ART, IMMATERIAL LABOR AND THE POLITICS OF AESTHETICS[1]

Conceptualism as Crisis in the Aesthetic System of Art

There seems to be widespread consensus in contemporary art theory and aesthetics concerning the function and nature of Conceptual art understood in a broad and encompassing sense. It formalizes interpretive presuppositions that reached an unprecedented consensus about the antagonistic relationship between conceptual art and contemporary aesthetics. This interpretive consensus is based on two dogmas. The first dogma states that, considered to be the direct heir of Duchamp's anti-aesthetic ready-mades, conceptual art practices are usually interpreted as an *anti or an-aesthetic* artistic manifestation. The second assumption is that the anti-aesthetic character of conceptual art happens not only as a programmatic artistic intention, but also a result of rendering irrelevant the sensuous appearance of the artwork. The shortest formulation of the second interpretive assumption might be alternatively stated as follows: the relationship between form and content is contingent.[2] Taken together, these two dogmas can be considered to sum up a major crisis of the aesthetic definition and appreciation of art in the twentieth century art, marking a certain crisis of modernism.

However, these assumptions share a certain reading of aesthetics, marked by a Kantian tradition, as well as a specific formalistic stance towards conceptual art. In what follows, I would like to propose an alternative reading, according to which conceptual art, in its diverse historical forms, is neither anti- (or an-) aesthetic (as the first dogma would claim), except for a very limited notion of the aesthetic stemming from Kantian philosophy and Clement Greenberg's art criticism; nor

283

does it simply render irrelevant the sensuous appearance of the artwork (as stated by the second dogma). Instead, we may redefine the first assumption by stating that it actually expands the political dimension of aesthetic experience, by replicating patterns of community and social communication inside the artistic field. Such replication bridges the autonomy of art and its closed institutional system (the artworld) with the broader sphere of experience. Thus, conceptual art may be considered to re-organize the "distribution of the sensible"[3] proposed by these formats of experience. Consequently, the simple thesis that I propose in the present text is that the relationship between form and content in conceptual art is not contingent, as it may seem. Even in conceptual art, form matters. It is rather the discrepancy between the material articulation of signs and their significance that becomes relevant as a critique of visual representation. Moreover, by linking the history of art with a history of forms of labor, as Jacques Rancière seems to suggest, I think that we may reconsider the core problem of conceptual art as being related more to the way community may be produced in and through artistic communication.[4]

Conceptual art and "conceptualism": a brief genealogy

For those unfamiliar with the artistic phenomenon in question, conceptual art might be briefly described as an "art of the mind" [instead of the senses].[5] That is, it can be defined by means of its medium specificity, either as an art of language - "a kind of art of which the material is language"[6] - or as an art in which verbal language signals the "dematerialization" of the signifier towards pure significance.[7] It might also be formally defined as a distinct artistic genre or language, informed by the neo-avant-gardes broader reaction to the aesthetics and values prompted by abstract expressionism.[8] The latter attitude prevailing, it can further be defined as "an art of ideas" (instead of forms), as it was exemplified by Joseph Kosuth's art series *Art as Idea as Idea* and defined both by artists and by art critics and theorists.[9] Consequently, Conceptual Art becomes an artistic *manner* of expression or a "style".[10] One of the essential features of conceptual art in its historical manifestations is the unprecedented expansion of artistic objecthood, including documents (photographs, notes, instructions etc.), readymade objects, displacement and re-contextualization of objects, as well as performative actions

(interventions) that shade a new light upon a certain context, and (spoken or written) words.[11]

Conceptualism may be understood from an art-historical perspective as describing a line of artworks encompassing both the historical conceptual art of the sixties and seventies and later "post-conceptual art" or "neo-conceptual" artistic productions. In this sense, it can be defined in terms of medium heterogeneity rather than as the art of language in a strict sense – that is, as a type of art in which object and idea coexist on an equal plan, being articulated in a contrasting tension rather than as a formal synthesis. But this later recollection between materiality and idea is often considered to represent new type of "everything-goes" formalism, in which idea itself becomes form. For instance, Western European and North American post-conceptual art manifestations (especially as represented by the group of the Young British Artists in the nineties), may be understood not as the historical accomplishment, but rather as the exhaustion of early conceptual art's critical potential or as an "aesthetization of the neo-avant-gardes".[12] According to Julian Stallabras, the transformation of "pure" conceptual art of the late sixties and seventies, oriented towards meta-artistic inquiries and socio-political interventions, into the global, and thus, *formal* conceptualism of the nineties is possible when art history is itself transformed into a pure history of empty forms.[13]

From a philosophical perspective, we may also understand the term "conceptualism" as denoting the core of the neo-avant-garde conceptual art as a historical phenomenon, its abstract and general features which may be later applied to other artistic phenomena. According to such a view, "conceptualism" describes a specific critical artistic attitude towards the nature and the function of art, characterized, on the one hand, by a meta-artistic questioning of the means and limits of artistic language and its social function and, on the other hand, by a sharp critique of visual representation. Thus understood, conceptual art becomes the basis of all-encompassing, contemporary artistic practices. As a set of defining features, conceptualism has been often reduced either formally to the use of written or verbal language as art or (and consequently), to an an-(or anti-) aesthetic new genre of art, according to which form is irrelevant, or at least contingent to the message or "idea" to be conveyed. In other words, the communicational function of art prevails over the aesthetic function.

Nevertheless, as I will try to prove in this paper, the major importance of conceptualism for contemporary art and for its particular aesthetic regime does not lay in the invention of a new artistic language, but

in the redefinition of the very notion of artistic form as a structure of communication or language. In what follows, I advance a reading of conceptual art informed by Jacques Rancière's articulation of aesthetics and politics and the post-Marxist notion of "immaterial labor", understood as cognitive, affective and linguistic production of knowledge, emotions and signs.[14] According to Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, "since the production of services results in no material and durable good, we define the labor involved in this production as *immaterial labor* — that is, labor that produces an immaterial good, such as a service, a cultural product, knowledge, or communication."[15] Following Rancière, I claim that conceptual art may be considered a particular form of "redistribution of the sensible", that is an articulation of ways of doing and making that affects other social practices and productions,[16] or a specific articulation of artistic work and labor which instantiates particular political and aesthetic regimes of community. Consequently, in its historical development and geographical diversity, I state that conceptual art advances possibilities of living in common and social interaction corresponding to specific aesthetic practices. Some examples of particular aesthetic regimes of communication in conceptual art may include what I will instantiate as "system aesthetics", an aesthetic of administration", and an "aesthetic of services".

Two Dogmas of Conceptualism

Let us start our discussion of the anti-aesthetic aspect of Conceptual art by summarizing the two influential dogmas which support the interpretive consensus. The first dogma can be formulated as the anti-aesthetic stance or the demise of aesthetic experience. We can have at least two formulations of this dogma. The first one would state that conceptual art is aesthetically neutral: it is not concerned with the production/ presentation of objects to look at, endowed with specific qualities and/ or producing an aesthetic experience for the viewer. This formulation of the dogma is supported by several artistic statements and a long list of possible examples. We may quote, for instance, Joseph Kosuth, a pioneer of American, "analytic" strand of conceptual art, who explicitly states: "The point is this: aesthetics, as we have pointed out, are conceptually irrelevant to art. Thus, any physical thing can become objet d'art (…) but this has no bearing on (…) its functioning in an art context".[17]

We may also take into account, as notorious examples, Robert Morris's *Statement of Aesthetic Withdrawal*, an art piece in which the artist declares that, by his sole authority, he virtually withdraws any aesthetic qualities associated with one of his former works. The declaration alone (stated in a properly bureaucratic authenticity form) suffices to ascribe or to withdraw qualities to or from an object who is otherwise aesthetically-neutral as a vehicle of meaning.

There is a second, specifically narrow sense in which we can interpret the above-mentioned dogma. It runs as follows: conceptual art is anti-aesthetic, in opposing Greenbergian formalism and purism as the main values informing the definition and evaluation of art. Up to a certain extent, this thesis is also supported by a large amount of evidence. Much of "East-Coast" American and British Conceptual art grew out of a reaction against Greenberg's system of artistic values, favoring presentness of the object and advocating the purity of the artistic medium as "high art", which lies in its own proper visuality and is eventually reduced to the "flatness" of the canvas.[18]

On the contrary, just like other neo-avant-garde tendencies, Conceptual art seems indifferent to the materiality of the object. It addresses thinking rather than the senses; it favors either low quality or hybrid materials (like Fluxus or Arte Povera) or industrially produced materials (like in Minimalism or in Pop Art). Sometimes, the very realization of the artwork may be delegated to others (like in John Baldessari's *Tips for Artists*) or it may be even unrealized, or realized by the public at will (as in Lawrence Wiener's *Statements*). Additionally, "pure" conceptualists tend to replace visuality with textual description or other forms of recording information.

Ironically, in their overt anti-Greenberg reaction, the so-called "hard-core" conceptualists like Joseph Kosuth or the Art & Language group tend to become as purists as Greenberg itself. Just like Greenberg did in theory, the above-mentioned artists transform art into art theory and run an investigation into the nature of art. In their works, pure visuality is replaced by pure concept or ideas; subjectivity is evacuated by pure "objectivity"; sensuality is replaced by thinking processes; considered oppressive, "high art" is collapsed into "low art" or no art at all; being considered as the key factor in the definition of art, aesthetic value is declaratively negated. The purism of form becomes the purism of the idea.

If we take a closer look, we may easily notice that this dogma relates to a narrow understanding of aesthetic experience as a subjective activity of disinterested contemplation of the "free play of forms". It is informed

by Greenberg's own reductionist interpretation of the Kantian aesthetic judgment that conflates disinterestedness with "aesthetic distance".[19] The redefinition of this dogma that I propose assumes that aesthetic experience as experience of pleasure or displeasure provoked by the contemplation of forms can be replaced by the understanding of the phenomenology of aesthetic experience as a political "distribution of the sensible".

The second dogma concerning the non-aesthetic character of conceptual art concerns the "dematerialization" of the art object or the irrelevance of artistic form for the artwork's value, appreciation and even meaning. There is a famous quote of Sol Le Witt that may summarize this dogma: "what the work of art looks like isn't too important. It has to look like something if it has physical form. No matter what form it may finally have it must begin with an idea. It is the process of conception and realization with which the artist is concerned".[20]

Given the fact that language tends to favor pure significance and to get reed of the signifier at all, the idea of the "dematerialization" of the art object has been proposed as a definition for conceptual art practices of the late sixties.[21] In Lucy Lippard's account, conceptual art "emphasizes the thinking process almost exclusively", which may "be provoking a dematerialization of art, especially of art as object".[22] This conclusion is supported by the so-called "linguistic turn" initiated by conceptualism. "When works of art, like words, are signs that convey ideas, they are not things in themselves but symbols or representatives of things. Such a work is a medium rather than an end in itself. The medium need not be the message."[23]

Nevertheless, as the Art and Language group members noticed, "dematerialization" is a rather too strong term, since, in written or visual form, matter remains, after all, the support of the signification. Therefore, it might be replaced with "invisibility".[24] In my opinion, a different critique of this dogma can show that what has been perceived as "dematerialization" is in fact part of a larger drive towards the heteronomy of art, commonly initiated by the neo-avant-garde's *indifference towards the medium*.[25] If we interpret conceptual art not in isolation, but in connection with other forms of art of the time, we can see that, unlike Joseph Kossuth solitary inquiry into the purity of art, conceptual art at large militated also for the abolition of the distinction between art and life. This critique of the autonomy of art from the other spheres of experience can be narrowly understood as an iconoclast critique of (abstract expressionist) painting (supported for instance, by Charles Harrison[26]), in relation to which the

intrusion of language makes art dependent upon "external relations" to its own modernist system of values and history. But, as I would like to suggest, placed in relation to other social practices, it can also be perceived as a radical critique of the modernist autonomy of the artistic form and objecthood by means of the transformation of the artwork in a system of communication, inherently related to other social communication systems in the broad sense. It is this connection between the dematerialization of the artwork and the rise of service industry, the management and the technology of information which allows for a specific sense of aesthetic experience connected with the everyday-life aesthetic experience.

Let us summarize. Both these dogmas concerning conceptualism relate not to a positive description, but to a negative understanding and definition of conceptual art in close relation to a Greenbergian understanding of Modernism and of aesthetic experience. The first conceptualist dogma attacks the centrality of subjective aesthetic experience, emotionally defined, regarded as a corollary of the second dogma. The second dogma attacks the understanding of the artwork as an aesthetic object whose expressive qualities are embedded in its sensuous (albeit, visual) appearance**.** Together, the two dogmas reinforce the reading of Conceptualism in merely formal terms.

Rethinking the Sensible:
Expanding the Notion of Aesthetic Experience

In order to allow both for the fact that conceptual art does take into account form in the actual production or presentation of the artwork and that it facilitates a specific type of aesthetic experience, allow me first to expand the narrow sense of aesthetic experience reduced by Greenberg to a certain type of formal appreciation of the material qualities of the artistic object.

There is a sense in which Conceptual Art may accommodate an aesthetic use of ideas which returns our discussion to the properly Kantian description of the aesthetic character of art. In this sense, art is the presentation of aesthetic ideas, that is, of ideas (of reason) that cannot be presented or subsumed under a concept, but which can be instead metaphorically presented to imagination and intellect in their material embodiment. Instead of instantiating ideas, conceptual art may be considered to actually expand ideas in imaginatively complex ways.[27]

Nevertheless, it is not this sense of conceptualism's intrinsic aesthetic character that interests me here, but a new understanding of aesthetic experience which gets art back to the sphere of intersubjectivity and politics. The Kantian model of disinterested judgment points out to an autonomous sphere of aesthetic experience, in which the appreciation of art and the appreciation of nature are separated, just like cognition and morality seem to be separated from the aesthetic judgment. As we know, unlike cognitive judgments which are determinative, aesthetic judgments are reflexive. They concern particular objects, but cannot subsume the subjective representations of the objects under a specific general concept. Instead, they can convey a feeling of pleasure or dislike which accompanies an object's representation for the subject. According to this feeling, the object is judged to be beautiful or not.

However, according to Jacques Rancière, aesthetic experience may also be understood in a more radical sense of the term related to our sense-experience of the world. It is related with the economy of space and time as structuring conditions (or *a priori* forms) of our perception - the "transcendental aesthetics" of Kant's first *Critique*. In Rancière terms, "aesthetics can be understood as the system of a priori forms determining what presents itself to experience (…) it is a delimitation of space and time, *of the visible and invisible*, of speech and noise, that simultaneously determines the place and the stakes of politics as a form of experience".[28] In this sense, the aesthetic experience of art is not an autonomous sphere of experience in itself, separated from moral life and cognition, but it is always embedded in different *historically determined* conditions of perception which are to be found in the society at large. In this sense, we can speak about the aesthetics of politics.

Just like the relationship between art and politics, the relationship between art and aesthetics is, therefore, constitutive. As Rancière puts it, "aesthetic practices as I understand them, (…) [are] forms of visibility that disclose artistic practices". In turn, "artistic practices are ways of doing and making that intervene in the general distribution of the ways of doing and making as well as in the relationship they maintain to ways of being and forms of visibility".[29]

The underlying assumption at work here is that art, understood as a type of social practice and a specific economy of labor, is always a part of the social life. Its objects are not autonomous in being socially unrelated, but rather by means of their specific regime of existence. In this respect, aesthetics is a specific regime of art, one that connects labor

and autonomy. Consequently, art as praxis is structurally related to society and to the way social life is constituted and governed, that is, to politics. Put in historical terms, art knows three regimes of existence – one in which is judged ethically according to its function, the other in which art is reduced to an aesthetic representation, the final one in which aesthetic experience and politics are mixed in order to create a different equalitarian social regime. This defines *strict sensu* the politics of aesthetics. Such redefinition of the aesthetic regime of art also implies a distinct sense of visuality, which is not reduced to the qualities of the surface, but to the position of the subject in relation to the object and to the formats in which we may perceive our world as such. It relates, in other words, to a politics of seeing and speaking in and about society, which is not limited to a passive mirroring of social life, but with an active transformation of existing living conditions by inventing new correspondences between discursive practices and material forms, between artistic and political actions. According to Rancière, "the representative regime in arts is not the regime of resemblance (….) but a certain alteration of resemblance – that is, of a certain system of relations between the sayable and the visible, between the visible and the invisible".[30]

Let us also take a closer look at Rancière idea of the "politics of form". Broadly speaking, different types of social government and politics, that is, the sharing of common social life, are prescribed or reflected in the formats of (visual) art genres and media. In their own historicity, artistic forms reflect privileged types of politics, of which modernism, in Rancière interpretation would stand for the democratic regime of artistic representation. Briefly, in their quest for the autonomy of new artistic forms, avant-garde artists challenge the democratic regime of art and propose new distributions of space and time for the experience of the daily world, that is, new forms of commonality and sociability.

To sum up, artistic forms are challenging the possibilities of political and social experience, by challenging our experience in the intersubjective world. In Rancière terms, "what links the practice of art to the question of the common is the constitution, at once material and symbolic, of a specific space-time, of a suspension with respect to the ordinary forms of sensory experience"[31] – that is, aesthetic experience. Consequently, if it is considered to offer such an aesthetic experience and it is considered to be art, then conceptual art offers itself a new distribution of the sensible and works in its aesthetic regime to establish a new form of artistic democracy.

Art as Immaterial Labor:
Conceptual Art and the Redefinition of Form

Let us now return to the linguistic characteristic that may serve to define the medium specificity of Conceptual Art and to establish its unique position inside the regime of Visual Arts. I would like to take into account the definition of conceptual art as an information-based communication process – an interpretation also supported, among others, by Alexander Alberro.[32] Such a definition is not incompatible with what I previously stated concerning both the heteronomous and heterogeneous character of conceptual art. For it is not the presence of written or spoken language that plays the crucial part in the constitution of art as being *conceptual*, but rather the very process of communication between artists and the public, understood in a broader sense. In this sense, *any* other structures that serve at recording, analyzing and transmitting cognitively relevant information may be used in the construction of an artistic project: ready-mades, documents, words and actions – including visual language like in documentary photographs.[33]

We may note that the idea of dematerialization still plays an important part in understanding conceptual art if redefined as an information-oriented communicational structure, since the image of the artwork as an aesthetic object "to be looked at" is replaced with the transmission of information between the artist and its public. But if, conceptual art focuses on communicational and informational structures and sometimes borrows these structures from related fields such as the scientific language of sociology, cybernetics and analytic philosophy.[34] For instance, it is the case of Joseph Kosuth's insistence on tautology and analytical propositions, or of Art and Language's use of an "academic philosophical jargon". But other conceptual artists also analyses the transmission, replication and critique of information in different other social fields such as law and administration, politics, sociology and the humanities at large. Thus, conceptual artists more often highlight impersonal and intersubjective formats of communication, pointing to the conditions of discourse and perception in which such public communication is structured in present-day social life. As Johanna Drucker and Edward A. Shanken have already suggested, the widespread use of language as a simple system of communication may be related to the advancement of technologies of communication and the rise of the "information paradigm" in the late sixties, the time when conceptual art appears (more or less) as an

autonomous genre on the artistic scene.[35] The emancipatory potential of transmitting unaltered information at distance in physical space may be associated with the desire to "dematerialize" the artwork to the point it becomes a mere system of communication deprived of aesthetic qualities.

However, in order to understand this assumption, we should also question the type of subjectivity they require from their viewer. In other words, how is the subject of artistic experience conceived by such artistic practices? And what type of subjectivity do they propose or relate to? It is obvious that the subject of conceptual art is a disembodied subject, the agent of thought and speech lacking any specific features. In other words, it is a linguistic abstraction. Artistic and aesthetic relations are formed in the space of pure semiotic communication, whose assumption is that language speaks itself, that is, that language articulates itself as a "text" while artists and viewers alike are not its creators, but merely its users. Meanings are the results of structures, that is, of simple semiotic codes, patterns and rules that govern intersubjective communicative experience. Such assumption is crucial for understanding conceptual art from the point of view of its relations both with aesthetic experience and forms of labor included in its production. For the major turn to be taken into consideration besides the "linguistic turn" in art history and theory in the late sixties is also the advancement of "immaterial labor", that is, forms of labor that create affects and information instead of producing material objects.

Allow me to exemplify several types of social communication patterns and systems used in conceptual art that relate to these shifts in the construction of subjectivity and artistic labor. First and foremost, we find the widespread use of juridical and administrative language, that we may summarize under the heading of an "aesthetic of administration". Many artists make use of administrative systems of artistic production, exhibition and reception, highlighting the constitutive character of the institutional context and its relations with other related social systems in which art is embedded. For instance, we may consider Mel Ramsden's *Guaranteed Painting*, which offers a certificate of artistic authenticity and value associated to an empty canvas, or Robert Morris' *Statement of Aesthetic Withdrawal*, where the artist claims to withdraw all aesthetic qualities from a previous sculpture, exhibiting the model of the sculptural piece accompanied by a certificate of aesthetic demise. Secondly, politics, sociology, economy and journalism are favorite fields for the *investigative* character of socially and politically engaged conceptual art and institutional critique. An illustrative example is Hans Haacke's *MoMA*

Poll and *Documenta Visitor's Profile*, in which the system of voting and the form of sociological inquiry are used to interact with the public. We may also note the use of public communication systems, such as the postcards (On Kawara's *I Got Up Series*), or telegrams, such as Raushenberg's (in)famous *Portait of Iris Clert*, in which the relationship between personal and the public/impersonal systems of communication is set forth by means of the use of the often impersonal formats favoring the "pure" transmission of information, or the use of advertising such as the Art Workers's Coalition famous *Q. And Babies? A. And Babies* annotated war crimes photograph. According to this paradigm of artistic production, operations of *classification, selection, recording and restructuring* information become autonomous artistic procedures.

This "aesthetic of administration" is not restricted to the realm of Western conceptual art. On the contrary, state bureaucracy and its excessive formalization of everyday life to the point that commonality becomes a regulative but empty form, becomes the background of archiving practices in the former Soviet Union that aim at deconstructing the rationality of the "big archive".[36] For instance, Ilya Kabakov's installations such as *The Man Who Never Threw Anything Away* expose the inner failure of the state machinery which turns material evidence in compulsive repetition and accumulation of debris without any coherent internal structuring principle. It is in this respect that we may understand the relation between the use of linguistic structures in the former Eastern Europe and the linguistic character of its ideology. As Boris Groys has noted, historically realized communism as a totalitarian political regime of an ideological nature may be understood by a complete "linguistification of society", where ideas replace commodities.[37] The hegemony of language becomes the background against which forms of social protest and alternative forms of subjectification become available. Whenever art seems to involve absurd or nihilistic actions and statements, of blunt character and minimalistic appearance, as in the artworks of the Moscow-based group Collective Actions, we may understand their incomprehensibility in relation to the rationality of social structures and beaurocratic language. If the logic of communism is a totalizing one, which means that a fragment of language and the whole linguistic structure of society are intricately related, a piece of nonsense is taken to imply the nonsense of other similar operations which sustain party ideology by means of logical paradoxes. The basic assumption active here is the same fundamental one: that language is an essentially social activity: "people's relationships with language

are understood to be a model of their relationships with society".[38] Consequently, to show the contradictions inside the structure of language means to show the contradictions of society itself. In their first action, *The Appearance* (1976), two members of the group come out of the forest carrying suitcases after a period of waiting. They distribute to the other members of the group that simultaneously formed the audience certificates of presence as participants to the event and disappear as mysteriously as they have arrived. Written language serves to record these actions and comment upon the content of the accompanying documentary pictures. It serves as a framing device for a politically charged notion of "nothingness", challenging the dominant ideology of "work" as a normative idea and an empty word.

Finally, we may recall the widespread use of the so-called "service industry" in which conceptual art sometimes serves as a critical tool questioning the power structures confining a certain regime of visibility. Aware of the rise of social communication as part of the growing industry of services, some conceptual artists subvert capitalist economy by replicating the same structures of working in constructed artistic situations. Thus, they highlight power relations operating inside particular systems of service industry. They also render visible the often "invisible" processes or situations. A case in point may be Mierle Laderman Ukeles's feminist and institutional critique interventions, such as the *Hartford Wash* (1973) in which, by hiring herself as a maintenance worker to the Museum, she made visible the maintenance work that supports the presentation of art in the artworld remaining nonetheless invisible for the large public.

We may note that all these spheres of communication are not proper to the artistic sphere or the artworld. They belong to the larger system of social communication in which art takes part. Also, we may note that they are not invented by the artists, but merely replicated with a twist inside the artworld. Artistic communication is situated within existing language-systems. Whenever they are duplicated inside the artworld, the usual regime of perception and the distribution of the visible and invisible, the relation between the spoken and the unsaid, are dislocated from their normal functioning and rearticulated. In this sense, conceptual art may be defined as a continuous process of *recoding*. What is already visible is put in words (as in Art Worker's Coalition's work); invisible administrative conditions can be brought into language (like in Mel Bochner's or Hans Haacke's examples); what is invisible is brought into light (Mierle Laderman Ukeles's case); finally, what is already known to

stand into a specific relation is set into different possible relations, such as in Art and Language's use of indexical systems in their famous *Index 01* work. All these works serve both to communicate information and prompt to moral questions.

We may also note that the dematerialization of the object understood as the simple communication of information does not exclude per se the existence of an aesthetic regime of conceptual art. There are two senses in which the replication of the formal structures of social communication can be called aesthetic. In the first sense, Benjamin H. D. Buchloh criticizes the so-called "pure" or "analytic" conceptual art, characteristic for the initial stages of American conceptual art as meta-artistic investigation,[39] of replicating conditions of production of post-Fordist society, in which administration of work has replaced production of objects.[40] In this sense, Buchloh rightly considers that "analytic" or "pure" conceptual art like Kosuth's "investigations" ultimately stages a manner of communication relevant for the language of administration and therefore, instead of critically subverting the relationship between art and the market, it is only proposing a particular "an aesthetic of administration", inserting a new language into the artworld. Indeed, much of "pure" or "analytic" conceptual art can be understood not only as a philosophical analysis of artistic language, but also as an aesthetic replication of social communication systems in late-capitalism.

But conceptual art may not only imitate social life, by formally replicating already existent structures of communication, but it may also critically challenge and reconfigure relations of power inscribed in these patterns of communication and social production. As I mentioned, by its democratic impulse and emancipating intentions, it may also relate back to the aesthetic regime of art as a specific "distribution of the sensible" by inventing structures of (in)visibility, disclosing power relations and proposing particular formats of creative participation.

To summarize, Buchloh's "aesthetics of administration" thesis points to an inherent aesthetic dimension of conceptual art, highlighting the importance of the formats of art installation and presentation to the public and pointing out the relation between their aesthetic potential and the social world they replicate or relate to, starting from the type of labor that is included in their construction. But this replication is aesthetic not only in the sense of being an imitation of existing structures of communication into the language of art that can further be appreciated for its formal qualities, but also if we conceive it as a critical questioning of their inherently

political potential, taken as constitutive conditions of social, intersubjective experience. Aesthetic critique may occur by consciously altering the patterns of perception inscribed in the forms of language they replicate inside the artworld. With the risk of offering a very rough illustration of the idea of the political regimes inscribed in the new artistic forms proposed by conceptualists, let us mention several meanings of the political represented in the above-mentioned examples. For instance, we may encounter an authoritarian regime of artistic communication, where the artist is the main legitimating principle for the meaning and experience of the work, while the public is only the executor of the artists's instructions, such as Rauschenberg's telegram reducing a portrait of the gallerist Iris Clert to a mere assertion – "this is the portrait of Iris Clert if I say so - or Morris's decision of imaginarily withdrawing aesthetic qualities form an artistic piece. On the other hand, we may also encounter a critique of forms of representational democracy, like the use of the voting system in Haacke's work, or even direct participatory democracy such as Ukeles's *Sanitation Project*. But in a more nuanced sense, critical aesthetics concerns what I have described above in relation to the aesthetic regime of experiences and their redistributions proposed by conceptual art (that is, their own micro-politics) as a relationship between the visible and the sayable.

Therefore, in a positive description of conceptual art, we may consider that the replacement of purely visual objects (in the narrow artistic sense) with other systems of communication in a broad sense (documents, interventions, instructions, indexes, signs, conversations, statements, maps), both replicates and questions a specific configuration of communication as cognitive labor and its related intersubjective experience in present-day society.

Concluding Remarks: On the Aesthetic Potential of Conceptual Art as a Critical Tool

The critique of the two dogmas of conceptualism I have advocated so far advances a reading of conceptualism not only as a mere negative form of critique of the autonomy and purity of the Greenbergian type of modernist art, but as the introduction of a radical heteronomy of the artwork in the artistic language, both aesthetically and politically inscribed into social systems and relations. If conceptualism implies a critique and subversion of aesthetic regime of art, it does so rather by reusing

familiar "regimes" and patterns of social communication in order to expose the relationship between art and social production of knowledge rather than by merely rejecting a narrow concept of aesthetic experience inherited from Kantian theory, related to a formalist theory of art which reduces form to visual appearance. To put it bluntly, I have claimed that the aesthetic potential of conceptual art lies in the "redistribution of the sensible" that it operates by using existing social communication patterns and strategies and producing art as "immaterial labor". Relating thus to a political economy of space and time, (post-)conceptual artists politically propose and challenge different types of living in "common". Thus, conceptualism as a typology of artistic production can be ultimately understood as an artistic practice of *critical aesthetics*, defined by artistic uses of everyday-life patterns of communication in order to reflect or refract dominant patterns of social labor and the conditions of living in common they relate to.

NOTES

1   The author of this paper was a NEC-*Adevărul* Fellow for the academic year 2010-11.
2   Paul Crowther, *The Language of Twentieth Century Art*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1997, pp. 178-179.
3   Jacques Rancière, *The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribuition of the Sensible*, transl. Gabriel Rockhill, London and New York, Continuum, 2006, pp. 12-20.
4   Jacques Rancière, *Aesthetics and Its Discontents*, Cambridge and Malden, Polity Press, 2009, p. 22.
5   Paul Wood, *Conceptual Art*. London, Tate Publishing, 2002, p. 6.
6   *Ibidem.*
7   Simon Morley: *Writing on the Wall. Word and Image in Modern Art*. Thames and Hudson, London, 2003, p.143.
8   Paul Wood, *Varieties of Modernism*. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 2002, pp. 296-8.
9   Le Witt, Sol: "Paragraphs on Conceptual Art". in Alexander Alberro and Blake Stimson (eds.): *Conceptual Art: A Critical Anthology*, Cambridge Mass., The MIT Press, 2000, pp. 12-18; Lippard, Lucy and Chandler, John: "The Dematerialization of Art" in Alexander Alberro and Blake Stimson (eds.): *Conceptual Art: A Critical Anthology*, *ed. cit.*, pp. 46-52.
10 Paul Wood, *Conceptual Art*, London, Tate Publishing, 2002, p. 75.
11 Tony Godfrey, *Conceptual Art*, London, Phaidon Press, 1998, p. 7.
12 Julian Stallabras, *Art Incorporated*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 152.
13 *Ibidem*, p. 174.
14 The notion of immaterial labor was introduced by Paolo Virno and Maurizio Lazaratto in the seminal article "Immaterial Labour", trans. Paul Colilli & Ed Emory, in Paolo Virno & Michael Hardt (eds.), *Radical Thought in Italy*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996, pp. 132-146. It was later popularized by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in their subsequent works published in the 2000's.
15 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000, p. 239.
16 Jacques Rancière, *The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribuition of the Sensible*, transl. Gabriel Rockhill, London and New York: Continuum, 2006, p. 13.
17 Joseph Kossuth, "Art after Philosophy", in Alexander Alberro and Blake Stimson (eds.): *Conceptual Art: A Critical Anthology*, Cambridge Mass.: The MIT Press, 2000, p. 164.
18 Clement Greenberg, "Modernist Painting". In Clement Greenberg: *Clement Greenberg: The Collected Essays and Criticism*, vol. IV, ed. John O' Brian, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960.

[19] Dairmuid Costello, "Kant after Le Witt", in Peter Goldie and Elisabeth Schellekens (eds.), *Philosophy and Conceptual Art*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007, pp. 97-100.

[20] Sol Le Witt, "Paragraphs on Conceptual Art", in Alexander Alberro and Blake Stimson (eds.): *Conceptual Art: A Critical Anthology*, Cambridge Mass.: The MIT Press, 2000, p.12.

[21] Lucy Lippard and John Chandler, "The Dematerialization of Art", in Alexander Alberro and Blake Stimson (eds.): *Conceptual Art: A Critical Anthology*, *ed. cit.,* pp. 46-52.

[22] *Ibidem*, p. 48.

[23] *Ibidem*, p. 49.

[24] Terry Atkinson, "Concerning the Article 'The Dematerialization of Art'". In Alexander Alberro and Blake Stimson (eds.): *Conceptual Art: A Critical Anthology*, Cambridge Mass.: The MIT Press, 2000, pp.

[25] Paul Wood, *Varieties of Modernism*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002, p. 97.

[26] Charles Harrisson, *Conceptual Art and Painting. Further Essays on Art and Language*, Cambridge Mass.: The MIT Press, 2001.

[27] Dairmuid Costello, *op.cit.*, pp. 110-111.

[28] Jacques Rancière, *The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible*, London and New York: Continuum Books, 2006, p. 13.

[29] *Ibidem.*

[30] Jacques Rancière, *The Future of the Image*. London: Verso, 2007, p. 12.

[31] Jacques Rancière: *Aesthetics and its Discontents*. Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press, 2009, p. 23.

[32] Alexander Alberro: "Reconsidering Conceptual Art. 1966-1977". In Alexander Alberro and Blake Stimson (eds.), *Conceptual Art: A Critical Anthology*. Cambridge Mass.: The MIT Press, 2000. Pp. xvi- xxxvii; Alberro, Alexander: "Introduction: At the Threshold of Art as Information" in Alexander Alberro and Patsy Norvell: *Recording Conceptual Art*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001, pp.1-17.

[33] Tony Godfrey, *Conceptual Art,* Oxford: Phaidon Press, 1998, p.7 .

[34] Peter Osborne, "Conceptual Art and/as Philosophy", in Michael Newmann and John Bird (eds.), *Rewriting Conceptual Art*, London: Reaktion Books, 1999, pp. 47-65.

[35] Edward A. Shanken, "Art in the Information Age: Technology and Conceptual Art", in Michael Corris, *Conceptual Art: Theory, Myth, Practice*, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 235-250; Johanna Drucker, "The Crux of Conceptualism: Conceptual Art, the Idea of Idea and the Information Paradigm", in Michael Corris, *Conceptual Art: Theory, Myth, Practice*, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 251-269.

[36]   Sven Spieker, *The Big Archive. Art from Beaurocracy*, Cambridge Mass: The MIT Press, 2008, pp. ix-xiv.

[37]   Boris Groys, *The Communist Postscript*. London: Verso, 2010, pp. 1-32.

[38]   Ekaterina Bobrinskaya, "Moscow Conceptualism: Its Aesthetics and History", in *Total Enlightenment: Conceptual Art in Moscow 1960-1990*, edited by Boris Groys, Berlin: Hatje Cantz, 2008, p. 58.

[39]   Peter Osborne, "Conceptual Art and/as Philosophy", in Michael Newmann and John Bird (eds.), *Rewriting Conceptual Art*, London: Reaktion Books, 1999, pp. 48-50.

[40]   Buchloh, Benjamin H. D., "Conceptual Art 1962- 1969: From the Aesthetics of Administration to Institutional Critique", in *October,* 55, 1990, pp. 105-43.

THEODOR-CRISTIAN POPESCU

Born in 1967, Turda
Ph.D., University of Arts, Târgu-Mureş

Thesis: *Overflow of People or Overflow of Ideas. The Pioneers of the Post '89 Romanian Independent Theatre Movement: Attitudes, Strategies, Impact*

Assoc. Prof., University of Arts, Târgu-Mureş

2000-2001 Fulbright Grant, University of Montana

Theatre director, more than 40 performances staged in Romania, Canada and USA

Numerous awards and participations in festivals, workshops and conferences in Romania, United Kingdom, Germany, Slovenia, Bulgaria, The Netherlands, Poland, etc.

Several articles published in Romanian theatre magazines

THE FIRST WAVE OF THE ROMANIAN INDEPENDENT THEATRE AFTER 1989: FORMS OF MANIFESTATION*

A new model comes into existence; three different interpretations of the notion of "failure" in connection with the Romanian independent theatre of the nineties

Toward the end of the nineties, the notion of "failure" is more often than not present in the discourse of the Romanian independent theatre's most visible practitioners.

The general economic, social and political context is not very optimistic. Not unlike every other ex-communist society in Eastern Europe, the Romanian one is excessively politicized. The first half of the decade sees the radical polarization of the Romanian society in two parts: one consisting of those seeing themselves as victims of the former regime, the other of those perceived as former profiteers. The confrontation is harsh; the society seems to reach the boiling point.[1]

The CDR-PD-UDMR government, arriving to power in 1996 with a message constructed around the notions of "morality" and "competence", gives eventually the impression of not being able to "change" Romania. The president Emil Constantinescu declares that he is permanently obstructed by the former "nomenklatura" and "Securitate" and decides not to candidate for a new term, so that in 2000 the options for president consist of the ex-communist Ion Iliescu and the radical nationalist Corneliu Vadim Tudor . In general, the ex-communists seem to adapt better to this new reality, but then again, not only in Romania:

> While the heroes of the anti-Communist protests continued to indulge
> their dreams of a new society based on justice, honesty and solidarity, the
> ex-Communists were able without difficulty to accommodate themselves
> with the new capitalist rules. Paradoxically, in the new post-Communist
> condition, the anti-Communist stood for the utopian dream of a true
> democracy, while the ex-Communists stood for the cruel new world of
> market efficiency, with all its corruption and dirty tricks. (Žižek, 2009:10)

Miners come several times to Bucharest to impose their will; during
their sixth approach the authorities decide finally to confront them in the
Olt County: the TV stations broadcast apocalyptic- ridiculous medieval-like
fights between the gendarmes and the miners, talking about "the battle"
of Costești and "the peace treaty" of Cozia. While big banks (Dacia
Felix, Bancorex) and mutual funds that seemed solid (SAFI, FNI, FDF,
etc.) crash noisily, sweeping away people's deposits, the press uncovers
illegal cigarettes operations carried by military airplanes on the country's
main airport.

Corruption seems endemic.

Many decide to live elsewhere. Romania becomes a country that
gives an important emigration, the census of 2002 recording more than
a million people that have left the country during the previous decade.[2]

In 1999, the total budget for culture represents 0.10% of the Gross
Domestic Product and the minister Ion Caramitru is interpellated in the
Parliament regarding the "general bankruptcy" state of the Romanian
cultural sector[3].

Under these circumstances, the survival instinct prevails and the
"unique" theatrical model of the state subsidized repertory theatre[4] closes
unto itself: to an inquiry conducted by the Ministry of Culture among the
employees of state theatres, the majority responds that it supports the
preservation of the *status quo.* That means that a majority of state employed
theatre practitioners has chosen the benefit of permanent (even if poorly
paid) employment against the risk of creating a theatrical open system.

As a result, the notion of "failure" is assumed by more and more artists
that have chosen to create independently. The new UltimaT magazine
writes about the "failed genealogy" of the theatrical alternative and about
"the creative unrest, the adventurous interrogation, the willingness to
serve acute pains":

One cannot, obviously, display an alternative critical discourse in the absence of an alternative to the mainstream theatrical practice. What if one has enough of writing in the same way about performances that use the same old means and techniques (already obsolete) relating to the same audience that the theatre makers of the sixties used to relate to? We are in 1999 – let us note the apocalyptical references of this number – a moment in time when, despite the decade-long efforts, the alternative practice of the Romanian theatre reclaims itself from a failed genealogy.[5] (UltimaT 1999, #1:3)

But being independent implies a way of thinking and acting that leads to models different from the "unique" one subsidized by the Romanian state: the repertory theatre.

In what follows I will argue that the notion of "failure" does not apply, despite the almost general impression at the time, to the impossible task to replicate and compete with the state theatres in terms of structure and permanence of operations. The new models came into being with new structures and characteristics. The disappearance or the transformation of some of those newly imagined organizations does not necessarily prove to be a failure, but a sign of normalcy according to the rules of the new reality. On the contrary, the notion of "failure" can be ascribed to the lack of recognition of these new models by a harmful environment, causing their retarded development and to the independent movement's own weaknesses, to their lack of solidarity and support for each other and to their lack of courage to depart from the validated esthetic models and their fear of marginality.

The contradiction of the "art theatre" as institution.
A rhythm of destruction and construction.
The new cultural entrepreneurship

Contrary impulses: to take roots or to leave. To cultivate and protect your territory or to go out hunting. The comfort of one's fortress or the adventure into the unknown.

Throughout the nineties, the Romanian theatre is forced to look for ways to reposition itself in the world. The "unique institutional model" (Miruna Runcan) of the state theatre functioning in a repertory system[6] proves to be a structure able to cultivate and protect the "art theatre"[7],

but also a restrictive formula because of its outdated and cumbersome structure and functioning practices. Its problem now is how to re-link itself to the society, how to become necessary again:

> Beyond the aesthetic results, the well-deserved fame and successes, there is the problem of theatre's presence in its historical context, of theatre's meaning. For theatre cannot be reduced to performances; it is not only an artistic form, but also a form of existence and reaction. (Barba, 2010:20)

From this perspective, there are artists who feel slowed down in their endeavors, isolated or even completely blocked by the unique formula that has turned the "art theatre" into "state theatre", artists who realize that what they miss is precisely the "fear of nothingness" that such a "state art" manages to protect them from, artists who were ready to give up their "immortality" (permanent employment in an officially sanctioned structure) to regain their "mortality" (the freedom of action, with all the "dangers" implied).[8]

This is a double impulse.

On the one hand, those who have chosen a dimension for their artistic project of a scale closer to „human needs" have given up the „major idea" of being arts' servants in one of its „temples", of a project „bigger than themselves" for the „somehow diminished status" of a kind of „entrepreneur in an artistic world and market."[9] Their independence includes a new relationship with the society – impossible during the previous historical period – and a different cultural attitude, becoming a component of their practiced art, in agreement with the contemporary dimensions present in all of the other artistic fields.

On the other hand, all methods that strive toward renewing theatrical practices aim to avoid „the atrophy of its artistic muscles" – it is the very idea that Stanislavski and Nemirovici-Dancenko have placed at the base of founding MHAT[10]. The notion of a rigid, fixed, permanent institution is in contradiction with the idea of „art theatre", which Anatoly Smelianski associated „by necessity" with „a certain ephemerality".[11] The contradiction between the idea of means and practices' renewal and the idea of institution that Stanislavski was so afraid of when he was trying to persuade the new Soviet authorities "to avoid showering money over the young theatres, in order to leave them a certain feeling of danger, of a risk inherent in the theatrical profession"[12], is "one of the problems that

confront the world's art theatres. Often their promoters are in conflict with their own creation. The idea has dried out, but they are still trying…"[13]

That is why one of the most significant directors of the twentieth century, Peter Stein, proposes "a rhythm of destruction and construction" to fight "the petrification":

> The art theatre that we are talking about here feels the need to create institutions, and that produces a contradiction. An avant-garde action like that of the art theatre ends up as institution and it becomes, as a matter of fact, a tombstone weighting heavily upon theatre's development. Then the danger of petrification emerges. Yes, petrification remains the biggest threat… We intend to propose the community a serious thing, with its own rules and, in the meantime, we sacrifice the other important dimension of theatre, its futility, its vocation for entertainment, its mobility. That is why we have to construct, then to destroy relentlessly and then to reconstruct. It is the correct rhythm.(Stein in Banu, 2010:91-92)

Let us explore a few facts about the "rhythm" of the Romanian theatre of the nineties.

Cosmopolitan beginnings. Foreign exploitation of the socialist infrastructure. The new internationalism of the nineties: Easterners are meeting in the West

Taking advantage of its president's (Ion Caramitru) constructive energy and prestige, The Romanian Association of Theatre Artists (UNITER) becomes, during the first years after 1989, the privileged, almost unique partner of the external links with the Romanian theatre. UNITER changes rapidly its structure from a section-based organization into a project and programs institution. Two big projects define its rebirth : "Seeding A Network" with the British theatre – "created in 1991 by The British Council, The Royal National Theatre in London, London International Festival of Theatre, the Romanian partner being UNITER (national coordinator Marian Popescu) covering all the performing arts fields (acting, directing, stage design, playwriting, literary management, management)" (Măniuţiu, in Maliţa, 2006:398) and "Le printemps de la liberté" with the French theatre, involving the presence of numerous French artists in Romania between March and June 1990: Antoine Vitez, Gérard Desarthe, Patrice

Chéreau, Virgil Tănase, Robert Pinget, Joel Jouanneau, Raymond Cousse, Hélène Delavaut, Massimo Schuster, Elisabeth Macocco, Peter Brook in Bucharest, Timisoara, Cluj and Iasi, the revenue from tickets sales being donated to the host institutions. Numerous other tours, exchanges, visits and participations in festivals abroad will continue to be facilitated by UNITER.

During a first visit of France as part of a Romanian political delegation in 1990, Ion Caramitru proposes the creation of a Franco-Romanian theatre, inspired by the model of the old Romanian-born French *sociétaires* of the *Comédie française,* which were touring Romania before WWII, presenting (in French) some of the successful shows of the previous Parisian season. The French side accepts a project-type, non-permanent structure on an alternative basis: a French Director, Sophie Loukachevsky, is invited to create a performance with Romanian actors using a French text in Bucharest and the Romanian director Alexandru Tocilescu is invited to direct a Romanian text with French actors in Paris. Cristina Dumitrescu is named director of this "project, not institution" (Bărbulescu, 1994, #2-3:38). Confused by the contact with a Romanian society that seems to be completely disoriented, Sophie Loukachevsky decides eventually to propose a collage of different authors (Marx, Sartre, Claudel, Pirandello) under the title "Six Characters In Search Of...". The performance has just a few Romanian representations with a very limited impact, but is toured extensively in the francophone world: Montréal, Québec, Limoges, Paris, Strasbourg, Geneva, Orléans, Avignon, etc. Tocilescu'answer will be to put on stage Matei Vișniec's "Old Clown for Hire" (under the French title "On mourira jamais") with the French clown troupe Les Macloma at Théâtre du *Rond-Point* in Paris. The third project (and the one with the biggest impact) will also bring, paradoxically, the end of the Franco-Romanian theatre. By inviting theatre practitioners from French Canada, the Romanian side steps unwillingly on the mined field of the delicate intercultural relationships between France and another French expression territory. The French side decides to abort the project. The two Romanian actors, Sandu Mihai Gruia and Oana Pellea, take the show on their own and exploit it successfully for many years.[14]

Another model of a bilingual theatre is the Irish-Romanian Theatre, defined by its initial coordinator Marian Popescu as "not an institution, but a formula of cooperation between Romania and Ireland" (Bărbulescu, 1994, #2-3:36). The first project is named "Ceausescu's Ear" (written and directed by Gerard Stembridge) coproduced by UNITER, Teatrul

Mic in Bucharest (where three representations are hosted) and the Old Museum in Belfast. Again the representations abroad (restricted this time to Ireland) outnumber the ones at home. The facilitator of this project is a person that mediates constantly and vigorously the Irish-Romanian cultural cooperation, Professor John Fairleigh. A foundation has replaced eventually this project, initiating diverse cultural events in different artistic fields.

The "Eugene O'Neill" Romanian-American Theatre, created and led by the director Alexa Visarion, does not always exhibit a very visible American side. The staging (in English) of Sam Shepard's "Fool for Love" and Tennessee Williams' "Orpheus Descending" by Adrian Pintea in the mid-nineties are enriching the Bucharest theatrical landscape, but they do not penetrate the American market. Other stagings are also exclusively realized by the Romanian side, such as Sam Shepard's "The Buried Child", directed by Cătălina Buzoianu and coproduced with the Bulandra Theatre in 1996.

These bilingual institutions are fuelled mainly by the Romanian theatre practitioners' desire to create a framework for the collaboration with their colleagues from abroad, followed by a presence in the respective foreign cultural spaces. Gradually, this process is controlled more and more by the Romanian state theatres that prefer to build their own international relations, taking advantage of the inherited infrastructure that they exploit exclusively. The majority of the Romanian state theatres begin during these years to look for and cultivate external partnerships, sometimes in a spectacular manner, like the National Theatre of Craiova, whose representations abroad outnumber by far the ones at home during several seasons.

Such a mutation is best exemplified by the most complex British-Romanian theatrical exchange program – NOROC. Initially twelve British partners associated to promote individual exchanges, visits and "know-how" transfer. The Romanian coordinator was UNITER.

The initial concept of the NOROC program was that of a reciprocal infusion of creativity by direct contact (tours, internships, workshops in both countries) between two theatrical realities displaying a great appetite for this form of art, but completely different experiences and history. The NOROC program was the longest, the amplest, the most coherent and fertile international project that the Romanian theatre was involved in after 1990. It made possible the international confirmation of many Romanian

actors and directors, the Romanian theatre being seen, for several years, as a highly creative and vital movement. (Măniuțiu, in Malița, 2006:402-403)

A first wave of projects is absorbed by the state theatres due, on the one hand, to the monopoly they hold on the theatrical infrastructure (which gives them credibility to the foreign partners, despite their slowness in decision-taking and actions) and on the other hand to the influence of big festivals, which prefer to invite mainly big shows with huge casts (as an exemple, Silviu Purcărete's performance based on Aeschylus'"The Danaids" has a cast of more than 100 actors) that are almost impossible to produce in Western theatre anymore. The Romanian theatre acquires thus an exotic aura, displaying high artistic qualities, but selling itself cheaply, quite often the Romanian artists receiving only a per-diem for their participation in festivals, instead of substantial fees. The impulse expected from abroad by some Romanian theatre practitioners toward the transformation of the Romanian theatrical landscape through the encouragement of independent initiatives changes direction: by cheaply exploiting the big state theatres' ensembles, the foreign partners encourage implicitly the Romanian *status quo* and privilege the big Romanian partners that monopolize the resources.

It is to be mentioned that all of these exchange programs are taking all through the nineties the East-West direction, between the "small" and the "major" cultures.[15] The Easterners are neglecting each other, and when they meet, this happens invariably in the West. There is no Romanian-Czech or Romanian-Polish theatrical initiative, although these cultural spaces could have benefited a lot from a common framework of exchanges. The links are also broken during this decade throughout the Balkan space, where conflicts spring and spread rapidly. The Easterners aim to assert and validate their new identities in the West and this is seen as a crucial action in order to take part into the European and global new order:

After 1989, we can, however, notice that there are two key contradictory demands in cultural policies that had influences that were both specific and not always positive on the cultural cooperation measures within the region. The first demand – **identity questioning** – could seem to lead to greater mutual regional cooperation, but in fact, it constituted itself in a barrier and was more of a constraint. [...] In opposition to this quest for a lost national identity, the second characteristic, **the need of integration in the world,** was also "destimulative" for Balkan cultural cooperation. To be present in London, Paris and New York became a crucial demand

and guaranteed the feeling of being acknowledged as part of the world, of global culture, of the values that count, i.e. values recognized abroad. (Radu, Ferchedău, 2005:16)

For me personally, the participation in the "Seeding A Network" program (by hosting the Black Mime Theatre artist Denise Wong and engaging in a research trip that took me to London, Leicester, Sheffield, Manchester, Nottingham, Belfast and Dublin) and my participation in a group project together with the London's "Central School of Speech and Drama" students under the supervision of playwright Carryl Churchill and director Mark Wing-Davey (that led to the creation of "Mad Forest"[16]) influenced greatly my beginnings as a theatre director. Many other exchanges followed.[17]

Taking a great part of their energy from the contact with foreign partners, who during the nineties are coming almost exclusively to Romania's Capital, most of the first Romanian independent initiatives in theatre took place in Bucharest.

Too many people or too many ideas for a theatrical system? Forms of crossbreeding

Aiming to propose an alternative to the culture of success, to the triumphal tours and international co-productions privileging the big institutions, the playwright Radu Macrinici initiates in 1992 the International Theatre Festival "Atelier": "a festival of the new experiences in the twentieth century theatre, forbidden or intermittently present in the life of the Romanian theatre practitioners and audience." (Macrinici, 2000, # 2 (22):14) His action derives from the observation that Romania did not take advantage of the international visibility brought by the violent crash of its totalitarian regime to promote its young artists, but "exported Hamlet, Richard III, Ubu Rex – big theatre on big texts".[18] The festival tries to be a less glorious meeting place, less obsessed of the big names and more interested in the intimate dimension of dialogue. The performances are followed by late night discussions involving artists, critics and audience. Like most of the independent initiatives, the "Atelier" festival uses the infrastructure of a state theatre, first in Sfântu-Gheorghe and now in Baia Mare (with some editions in Sighişoara in-between).

This way of "parasitizing" the state theatres by the independent initiatives was first defined as "crossbreeding" by the director Mihai Măniuţiu:

> I do not believe that the weak, but tenacious alternative strivings are a real competition for the subsidized state theatre. But they should exist. They are a form of crossbreeding. Nobody can afford to live from what the independent theatre provides. The alternative artists are getting into a form of crossbreeding, forced to work inside the system, but also wishing something else. Nowhere in the world does a director who cares about his interests abandon the subsidized theatre. Crossbreeding is a vital element, the blood mixing creates formulae that, even if initially annoying, prove themselves fertile in the end. The crossbreeding is even more necessary now, when neither the subsidized theatre, not the independent one can have an autonomous existence. It is necessary because it is a proof that one can do otherwise, too. (Măniuţiu, 1999, #12:6-7)

This way of presenting the facts suggest a new type of pressure on the theatre system. But there are different opinions about the origins of this pressure. Some theatre practitioners consider that:

> Generally speaking, the alternative theatre is practiced by actors, directors, playwrights, etc. that did not have or had restricted access to "un-alternative" stages. [...] I strongly believe that any playwright, actor, director, designer, composer, etc. can hardly wait to get rid of the "alternative", providing that they find a place in the opposite camp. (Cornişteanu, 2000, #2 (22):10)

> or

> I believe that the independent theatre' birth is caused by an inflation of actors, directors and even designers. A great number of people have no access to theatres anymore. It is irrelevant why. And they are trying to express themselves, they are not looking for permanent employment. (Dinulescu, 2005, #282)

In other words, too many people are fighting for very few available places in the institutionalized theatres, a situation due to the exponential growth of the number of accepted students by the schools of theatre after 1990. Waiting for the next available place inside the system, the "unemployed" artists are doing what they can to keep themselves busy and to attract some attention. Others believe that

attaching the idea of independent theatre to a surplus of practitioners that cannot find employment anymore is not the best example. Many of those who would easily find a place in state theatres prefer to work with independent theatres, or with both systems. I think we could rather speak about an overflow of ideas, not an overflow of people. (Popovici, 2005, #282)

In this last case, we are talking about

[...] a reinvention of the theatrical codes affecting all the creative sectors. The alternative theatre represents, I believe, an attempt to adapt the theatrical language to the present time sensitivities. [...]The assumed risks and difficulties, organizational or of a more subtle nature, provoke, I think, an artistically aggressive attitude and often radicalize the theatrical act. This "artistic radicalism", whether nourished by important artistic experiences or juvenile anxieties, increases the vitality of the theatrical gesture and the interest for the revival of the theatrical communication. [...] The alternative theatre continues, I believe, the attitude of creativity and wish to communicate that have generated all the known forms of theatrical manifestations and denies the museum-type culture, the indifference toward the present time sensitivities and anxieties, the wearing out and incapacity of the dead forms. (Galgoţiu, 2000, #2(22):11)

Both "overflows" are valid reasons for an independent theatrical act. But regardless of what is putting this new pressure on the institutionalized system, one cannot deny its existence. Throughout the decade, the state theatres are shaken by crises, resignations or even strikes.

There is too much commotion in the Romanian theatre" declares indignantly an old critic, Valentin Silvestru.[19] And another one, Paul Cornel Chitic, demands "a set of instructions to use freedom" to calm down the theatre practitioners: "What happens with the theatres and inside the theatres after the 22nd of December 1989? [...] Exactly what was inevitable to happen. The liberation from the dictatorship was taken for freedom. And freedom, defined as unhindered access to opportunity, is privatized. Directors, actors, consider that freedom is their own, everyone's own freedom, everyone as a social being and not as an artist. This freedom is harmful because it leads to an amnesia affecting the minds. Most of them forgot that, as people belonging to the stage, they have dreamed and tried to snatch from the censorship bits and pieces of what we all used to call THE FREEDON OF THE THEATRICAL ART, THE FREEDOM OF THE STAGE.[...]

315

Everybody is impatient. We are all waiting. What are the theatres waiting for, obviously, without wasting their time? A law for theatres. Even if they do not want it, this law is necessary as a set of instructions to use freedom. (Chitic, 1990, #1:19)

The "creative silence" that defined the times before 1989 is lost forever.

The first impulses for independent projects are coming from different directions. Besides the stimulus offered by foreign partnerships and exchanges, another impulse comes from the desire to exploit freely a theatrical production, which now has a legal framework. In 1990, The "Scorpio" Private Theatrical Society assumes a theatre study on Caragiale from the National University of Theatre by Professor Mircea Albulescu's acting students, exploiting for the first time publicly an internal theatre university presentation. "ARCA (Romanian Artists in Faith and Truth)" stages Marc Camoletti's "Boeing Boeing"[20] mainly with National Theatre actors. The critics are unimpressed:

[...] we are asking ourselves if in the case of this new theatre [...] we are experiencing an original way of privatizing. Legal, of course, but not very encouraging for the desired new spirit that should animate private companies, for the necessary independence of private theatre. Which, we hope, will not be just an original, legalized new way to exploit old gigs. (Parhon, 1990, #3:27)

In the same spirit of a popular theatre, that aims to make use of the extended network of the country's cultural houses to organize long tours throughout the country, Dorina Lazăr founds the "Bucharest Company". She remembers the huge crowds that gathered when actors from Bucharest were touring the countryside before 1989. Hoping to continue this success, but exploit it commercially this time, the Bucharest Company (registered as a "for profit" organization) produces three comedies: "I come home from Paris" in 1990 (directed by Nicolae Scarlat, with Hamdi Cerchez, Mitică Popescu, Mihai Dinvale, Mihai Mihail, Dorina Lazăr, Adina Popescu), "Midnight Holdup" by Sami Fayad in 1992 (directed by Tudor Mărăscu, with the same group of actors plus Tamara Buciuceanu) and "A Farewell to Women" (directed by Mihai Berechet, with Ștefan Iordache and Angela Similea). The staging formula comprises, in all of these three cases, a minimal stage design, but very well-known actors (all of them permanently employed by state theatres). The actors are putting on and taking off the set,

driving the minibus, hiring a very limited number of technicians, in an effort to minimize expenses. They like what they are doing and they feel free, getting in touch with their inner condition of the all-ages itinerant actor. But whatever worked before 1989 proves irrelevant in and after 1990. The Bucharest Company ceases activities in 1996 and radiates itself in 2000, when Dorina Lazăr decides to join the management team of the Odeon Theatre in Bucharest. This is one of very few cases of an independent cultural manager transferring her competencies to a state institution; there are also Mircea Diaconu at Nottara Theatre and Constantin Chiriac at the State Theatre (later named National Theatre) in Sibiu.

This type of theatrical private enterprise that aims at financial independence and profit proved ephemeral at the beginning of the nineties. After long years of being offered low-priced state subsidized theatre tickets, the audience is unwilling to pay more and they do not seem interested in the same things that they found entertaining during the previous years. The audience changes and nobody can anticipate what will interest them. It is too early for commercial success in this field.[21]

But several independent formulae will try to place themselves under the sign of artistic excellence.

The first notable example is that of Levant Theatre, founded in 1990 by Valeria Seciu. The plays are chosen on already proven contemporary texts, the performing spaces are often unconventional and the actors very well-known in order to attract the audience to these new spaces:"the independent version of a high-class theatre."[22] The Levant Theatre opens its first production in 1991 at the Atelier Stage of the National Theatre in Bucharest with Matei Vişniec's "Old Clown For Hire", directed by Nicolae Scarlat, with Mitică Popescu, Alexandru Bindea and Adrian Negru (who is also stage managing). There were 30 representations and one invitation to the Bonner Biennale of 1992. Later the same year they continue with a second production at the "burned hall" (a space inside the Bucharest's Royal Palace that was burned during the December 1989 events): Stefan Ţanev's "Socrate's Last Night" directed by Ştefan Iordănescu, designed by Nic Ularu, with Maia Morgenstern, Claudiu Istodor, Mircea Andreescu, Valentin Uritescu, Cerasela Stan. There were 40-50 representations, demanding huge efforts to schedule it (due to the actors' employment in different state theatres, each with its own schedule and priorities) and it was toured to the Tramway Theatre in Glasgow through the NOROC program in November 1993. In 1994, the Levant Theatre produces "Death and the Maiden" by Ariel Dorfman, directed by Cristian Hadjiculea,

designed by Ștefania Cenean, with George Constantin, Dana Dogaru, Dan Condurache. Only nine representations were possible, this being, regretfully, George Constantin's last character in theatre.[23] Then came Levant's most admired production: "The Pelican" by August Strindberg, directed by Cătălina Buzoianu, stage design started by Nic Ularu and finished by Lia Manțoc, with Valeria Seciu, Vlad Zamfirescu, Oana Tudor, Domnița Constantiniu, Valentin Popescu. It opened in 1995 at Dalles Hall (in the space of a visual art gallery), was nominated at UNITER prizes in six categories and presented at the Sitges Festival the following year. "The Pelican" is considered Levant Theatre's highest artistic achievement. One last project is started, but never finished, by a German choreographer with four young actors, based on Horia Gîrbea's "Madame Bovary Are The Others". It is too late, because the tiredness took over: after six years of huge efforts, The Levant Theatre runs out of steam and closes operations in 1996. Although it has reached the highest artistic recognition, as it had strived to, confronted with the perspective to start again from scratch with a new production, the team of the Levant Theatre did not find the energy to continue. The ceasing of Levant's activities proves another point: an organization can go only that far when all of its energy springs from the charisma and dedication of its founding leader (in this case Valeria Seciu).

There are two other relevant examples of organizations striving for artistic excellence that attained highly recognized results during this decade: SMART (Select Management Art), a private theatrical enterprise that is part of the Media Pro group built by Adrian Sârbu and The Art-Inter-Odeon Foundation that will later turn into Teatrul Act.

SMART introduces the concept of advertised limited series of representations (in coproduction with a state theatre), hoping to exploit the performance as an audio-visual product once that the theatre audience shrinks below a certain point. Benefitting from aggressive advertisement campaigns through the Media Pro channels (television, radio, written press), SMART built the image of a luxury producer: paying generously and selling expensively. The tradition of low-priced state-subsidized theatre tickets was rewritten. The tickets to "Joan of Arc" and "Richard II" (directed by Mihai Măniuțiu), coproduced with the National Theatre, "The Taming of the Shrew" (directed by Mihai Măniuțiu), coproduced with Bulandra Theatre or "A Stormy Night" (directed by Mihai Măniuțiu) and "Saragosa – 66 days" (directed by Alexandru Dabija), both coproduced with Odeon Theatre represented the double or triple of the value of tickets to other performances presented by the same state theatres. It was thus

proven that an insistent advertising campaign that transforms into "stars" the theatre practitioners persuades the audience to pay substantially more. A secondary negative effect was caused by the "legend" of the high fees accompanying every project of this organization, so that SMART's passage through the state theatrical system left great expectations regarding the fees of any private or independent coproducer, a fact that endangered or made impossible many other "crossbreeding" projects. Eventually, toward the end of the nineties, SMART ceased discreetly to operate.

The Art-Inter Odeon Foundation is important from a different perspective. Initiated after the sudden dismissal of Alexandru Dabija from the position of manager at Odeon Theatre, it represented the natural continuation, into the independent territory, of the artistic program proposed by him for the state theatre that he was not allowed to reform.

> At Odeon Theatre we made all kind of attempts.[...] But only a few of us, very few, were trying to do everything all the time – from moving a table to sketching the repertory or organizing a tour. The idea to separate the competencies or to structure a normal functioning system did not exist. We have used all of these three years' time to prove ourselves. [...] Then, after three years, when I considered that we had proved ourselves and when I had a clear and solid program for the year to come, we tried to alter the theatre's structure. [...} Of course we have proven ourselves, we attained success, but underneath the theatre is rotten as a system, as a structure. I did not manage to overcome this purely Romanian stage of the leadership: if the leader vanishes, everything crashes down. Or I was trying to structure an institution able to function after 3 or 15 years, too." (Dabija quoted by Măniuțiu in Malița, 2006:403-404)

With a substantial external (mostly British) support, the artists forming the creative core of what was defining Odeon Theatre (mainly Alexandru Dabija, Mihai Măniuțiu, Marcel Iureș and Doina Levintza) have formed in 1995 the Art-Inter-Odeon foundation that would lead in another three years time to the opening of the first independent theatre space in Bucharest, Teatrul Act. "Murder in the Cathedral" by T.S. Eliot (coproduced with the National Theatre in Cluj), presented mainly on a British tour, will be the only performance created by this organization before the opening of Teatrul Act. The decision of these first-class artists to move their operations into the independent field had a remarkable impact, including upon themselves.

In retrospect, I think the Odeon moment had a tremendous importance for the development of our independent theatre movement. Whether they were aware of the exemplary value of that moment or not, the theatre practitioners that were feeling the need of an alternative to the institutionalized system have realized that they cannot succeed inside the system, but separate of it or, wherever there was a desire for "emancipation", in partnership with it. (Măniuțiu in Malița, 2006:404)

After the opening of its own space on Calea Victoriei, Teatrul Act continues to pursue the artistic excellence as a priority, but eventually it evolves, after 2000, into an open space, a host for performances, concerts, workshops, conferences, playing the role of an independent cultural centre.

Against the prevalence of a pessimistic general opinion, that usually predicts the failure, and not the success of new initiatives,[24] new theatre companies continue to emerge by mid-nineties. Some of the most visible include: Teatrul Fără Frontiere ("Theatre Without Borders"), Compania Teatrală 777, Fundația Antigona, Fundația Toaca and Teatrul Inexistent. The common denominator of these otherwise very different theatre companies is their placement in a theatrical territory that privileges communication above artistic excellence. These new companies reposition themselves by looking for a new relationship with their targeted audience and by cultivating the free choice at all levels of artistic creation.

Artistic director Mihaela Sârbu aims for her Teatrul Fără Frontiere „to attract the 18-40 years audience, a realist and pragmatic segment, passionate of social and political themes and not interested any more in the conventional theatre, perceived as distanced from reality, counterfeited, theatrical." (www.teatrulfarafrontiere.ro). Starting in 1996, Teatrul Fără Frontiere follows an uneven and winding road, with several creation periods, succeeding in staying active and managing sometimes up to four productions per season.

Regarding Compania Teatrală 777, I quote from an interview given at the time of launching its first production:

For this company I am proposing a three-directions project: the identification of sensitive points in the collective mentality and of unexplored territories in the complex relationships of the individual with the contemporary society; original plays or national premieres that are tackling the issues mentioned above and the production of these performances in (Romanian and foreign) partnerships. (Francia, 1997)

The company is active between 1996 and 2000, creating four productions with Odeon, Nottara and Bulandra theatres, together with other Romanian and foreign partners.

President Lelia Ciobotariu explains the birth of Antigona Foundation:

> [...] I could not find in theatre what I had imagined this profession would mean for me. I do not see this as a matter of generation, in my case is very personal, something to do with my inner structure. Everything looked alien to me, I could not meet my dreams, nothing mattered. So I said No, this means we have to look somewhere else, we have to create our own... (Dumitru, 2007)

The Foundation produces performances irregularly and reinvents itself periodically, lately creating a sub-structure named "Proiect Replica" which realized coproductions with Bulandra and Metropolis theatres.

Regarding Teatrul Inexistent, artistic director Theo Herghelegiu names "a few essential points:

– To orient the repertory toward immediate problems from community's life and that address to the community
– To approach the audience as a live element, co-participant in the artistic act
– To avoid dependence of a certain space; multifunctional, minimalist stage design
– To use the participants (actors)' abilities in a varied and surprising manner
– Interdisciplinarity (dance, music, visual arts) (Herghelegiu, 2000, #2 (22):11)

Teatrul Inexistent has functioned tenaciously for more than a decade (since 1998) in theatrical and non-theatrical spaces, creating recently "the first independent musical" in partnership with Teatrul Arca, another independent organization in Bucharest.

Finally, Toaca Foundation wants to be "a working structure for contemporary arts, outside the state system", focussing on international partnerships and becoming a member of networks such as IETM (Informal European Theatre Meeting), EMF (European Mime Federation) and TEH (Trans Europe Halles) (Măniuţiu, in Maliţa, 2006:411-413). Toaca Foundation has a relatively discreet presence with five theatrical productions (the first in 1997, the last in 2001), but also with workshops, conferences, exhibitions, interdisciplinary projects.

All of these companies collaborate with state theatres, as Teatrul Inoportun (an UNITER project, with Victor Ioan Frunză as its first artistic director, which has produced four performances between 1991 and 1994)[25] and Trupa pe butoaie ("Troupe on barrels" – another UNITER project active between 1994 and 1997) have done before them and as many other will do after them. With very few exceptions, this is the road to be taken by all the independent structures that do not have a performing space.

> Let us notice already that the independent companies' association with state theatres will become a general practice, perpetuated up until today. The reason is simple enough: the lack of necessary funds not only to rent or fit up a space to perform, but also to maintain it functional, if supposedly obtained. (Măniuțiu, in Malița, 2006:396)

Trying to compensate as it could for the lack of performing spaces available to independent companies, UNITER offers its building (a former villa used by Nicu Ceaușescu in the central area of Bucharest) for some of the performances produces under the banner of Teatrul Inoportun or Teatrul de Cameră (both structures being UNITER's creation). But this generous offer did not manage to create more than just "beginnings".[26] The only structures offering a space for independent creations are the festivals, among which only one is exclusively dedicated to them. Altfest ("different, something else, somewhere else" as it defines itself) is "an independent theatre festival, uncompetitive, open to alternative creations – music-theatre, movement-theatre or image-theatre – in unconventional spaces targeting the independent companies in Central and Eastern Europe." (Stănescu 2000, #2(22):18). Altfest survived only two editions, in Iași and Bistrița.

Many independent projects die a natural death when the energy of their main founder and animator dries out. Others take long breaks, reinvent themselves periodically and have a syncopated existence. Only three organizations have managed during those years to have their own performing space: Teatrul Act, managing its own space in a basement on Calea Victoriei; Teatrul Luni (Monday Theatre, named after the day of the week when state theatres have their free day and actors are free to perform independently) in the Green Hours Club on Calea Victoriei, not far from Teatrul Act and the Underground Project of Dramafest Foundation using a space belonging to Ariel Theatre in Târgu-Mureș.

Two new organizations turned themselves rapidly into state institutions, obtaining permanent state subsidies since opening, due to the strong

personalities founding and leading them (and to their strong political connections), and to the specific niche they occupied: Teatrul Masca (led by Mihai Mălaimare) and Teatrul Excelsior (led by Ion Lucian).

Independent, alternative, experimental

All through the nineties, but later, too, the terms of independent, alternative and experimental are used interchangeably and somehow confusingly to define different theatrical initiatives outside the institutionalized system. In this paper, I decided to use the term independent as the least common denominator for a variety of theatrical creations produced outside state theatres.

The "experimental" theatre is not necessarily linked with the notion of independence, but with that of research. Obviously, every artistic act implies researching in a certain degree, but the notion of experimental theatre has more to do with a laboratory-type activity, aiming the discovery of new means of artistic expression that can be carried away perfectly (as it has been in the past) inside state-subsidized institutions (the case of Jerzy Grotowski in Poland or Aureliu Manea here, for exemple).

> The concept could be dilluted, extended (for Brecht, any non-aristotelic theatre was experimental) or, on the contrary, restricted to very specific theatrical experiences that target either the dramatic or scenic activity in its wholeness (such is the case with the first experimental studio in the history of theatre founded by Stanislavski in 1905 under the umbrella of the Art Theatre in Moscow and offered to his disident disciple Meyerhold who stages here a text by Maeterlinck without presenting it to an audience) or just a part of the scenic process – the text (like the Italian or Russian futurists), the architecture and stage design (see Gropius), the costumes and the gestuality (see Oskar Schlemmer and the experiences of Bauhaus). (Măniuțiu in Malița, 2006:392)

Regular subsidies and a protective framework can foster research. Moreover, many independent theatre practitioners are not privileging research, so I will not use the notion of experimental to describe their activities.

The problem with the notion of "alternative" theatre is that one has to place it in permanent relationship with the type of theatre that it aims to be an alternative of. In other words, the alternative theatre can be defined only in opposition with another theatre, and this can limit the definition both

aesthetically (for whatever is today "alternative" can become "mainstream" tomorrow) and institutionally (for such an organization can gain access to public funds at some point). We could probably go back in time to find elements of alternative manifestations trying to take roots whenever conditions allowed it.

That is why I believe that the notion of "independent" theatre can cover the examples analysed briefly in this paper if they conform to the three minimal conditions defined by a well-known personality of independent cultural policies, Emina Višnić:

    a. "They have not been set up by the state or by some other external organization, but have established themselves

    b. They independently decide on their organizational structures, bodies and processes of decision-making and management

    c. They depend neither on the state nor on any other entity for their program content or finances" (Višnić, 2008:10)

The advantage of this definition is that it is broad enough to include theatrical practices that are not limited to a specific scope (aesthetical research) or reference (alternative to mainstream), but restricts the organizations to those not depending on the state or other bodies, which seems an acceptable understanding of the notion of cultural independence. The examples of the organizations I selected to present in this paper will correspond to these three definitions.

Why independence? Independent organizations in collision with the immediate reality of the nineties. Between ideology and structure

The break-up with the past in the former communist countries means the abandon of some standards that had been perceived as compulsory:

> After the change of political regime, the social standards were also converted: what had been black was white now and all was upside down. This black and white view at the communist past was probably logical and necessary, and it is perhaps characteristic for every society after a change of political regime. (Kunderová, 2008)

But if this was visible in the immediate reality, it wasn't necessarily the case in the legal system, which did not allow a wide margin of innovation

for theatres. The main obstacles were the old socialist-generated working laws, which governed the employment of theatre practitioners. That is why the project of turning the old culture house "Mihai Eminescu" in Bucharest into a project theatre named Urmuz failed at the beginning of the nineties. It is not hard to imagine the impact of such an institution on the independent theatre's development, once that it would have been turned into a centre for presentation of new theatre works. The director of that time, Corina Șuteu, whose successful subsequent career will focus on cultural policies,[27] is very radical on the matter: "My personal solution is as follows: except the National Theatres, all the other state theatres should become centres for presentation of the theatrical creation." (Șuteu, 1994, # 2-3:8). She considers that the notion of "trust" could have compensated, for a while, the outdated legal system.

> If there is a project theatre, there should be a clear law stating its structure and how it is supposed to function. Not to be told, like I was "solve the problems, but if it does not turn out well, we will fire you." We do not even discuss about a very simple notion named trust. Or, when you get the feeling that is not about a proposition, but a trap, the trust vanishes. They destroy in this manner the fundamental impulse of the cultural manager, which is the desire to do something because one loves what he/she is doing. (Șuteu, 1994, # 2-3:8)

The notion of "trust" was placed highly on the list of fundamental values defining the interdependence of the independent cultural sector with the society at large by the participants in the 2010 conference "New Times, New Models", an "International conference on governance models of independent cultural centres" hold in Maribor, Slovenia. The conference tried to look at the role that the independent culture plays in the development of the society, both on a global and a local level, focusing on inventive, dynamic and sustainable models of governance of independent cultural centres and the relationship between these and public authorities.[28] "If they do not trust us, why do they hold public offices?" someone asked at the conference.[29] Because when one innovates and creates new formulae of structuring and developing cultural organizations, one operates near the edges of legality and the trust is needed in order to move forward; the legal confirmation could come later, sanctioning a positive experience, if that is the case. Or, trust is one of the missing links during the nineties in Romania not only between theatre practitioners and

authorities, but even among theatre practitioners themselves, who wanted opposite things: some of them the preservation by all means of the closed institutional system guaranteeing their permanent employment, others the experimentation of new formulae of transformation and opening of the theatrical practices and the relationship with the audience. "The past weights down on the spirit and the future does not bring immediately the new. In Romania, let us dare saying it, the theatre practitioners do not prove ready to change everything. The old mentalities persist." Thus writes the most prestigious Romanian-born theatre theoretician and critic, George Banu. (Turcoi, transl.,1990, # 11-12:73)

The quest for the relationship that would make a space dedicated to cultural activities necessary again to the community it belongs to is retarded for several reasons. The communitarian action is compromised after the long decades of communism; people are longing now for private spaces, and not for more common ones. Nobody wants to experiment anything else but the pure and tough capitalism, nothing can impeach the privatization of everything. When that is no happening fast enough, it is seen as a weakness of the government. Also voluntary or not-for-profit activities are not popular, after many years of people's exploitation by the socialist state under the cover of these concepts. The notion of cultural or communitarian activist sounds unbearably immediately after 1989. Everything that seems leftist is suspect, there is a civic deficit. It is a time of maximal individualism, of fast accumulations of wealth and getting rich above all and by all means. Many non-profit organisations provide cover for commercial activities.[30]

Many spaces formerly used for cultural activities are laid hands on by different private entities that transform them into bars, discotheques or casinos (the network of national cinema theatres is almost completely dismantled like this). From this perspective, the determination shown by the state theatre employees in defending their institutions had at least the positive effect to keep them functioning: no state theatre was ever closed; the circuit was kept intact, even if sometimes it proved to be extremely weak.

There is no policy regulating the occupation of the empty public spaces, so that an offer for cultural purposes or community services is treated by the authorities on equal terms with a commercial one, which greatly reduces the not-for-profit sector's abilities to get access to public spaces. In other countries, the artists squat public places and start directly to offer cultural or communitarian services. The authorities are thus forced to negotiate with them, and more often than not the solidarity shown by the local

community strengthens the artists' position, helping them to keep the space they occupied. The squatting, used all over Western Europe during the seventies and eighties is also adopted by the Slovenian and Croatian artists after their countries proclaim independence and the Yugoslav army retreats during the nineties: "Pekarna" independent cultural centre in Maribor is a former bakery of the Yugoslav army[31], "Metelkova Autonomous Cultural Centre" occupies a former barracks in the centre of Ljubljana, another former barracks – "Karlo Rojc" – becomes an independent cultural centre with the same name in Croatia, etc.[32]

The artists that had occupied – illegally, as it is always the case in the beginning – these premises have been supported by the local communities because they had opened the spaces to those communities and other artists, and did not keep them only for themselves. The notion of "openness" represents, besides that of "trust", values that were mostly missing during the nineties in the Romanian theatrical system. In order to protect their own working place and having lost the habit of open competition, the employees of state theatres have monopolized the inherited infrastructure, instead of sharing it with other artistic organizations. Although, as it was the case in other ex-communist countries at the beginning of the nineties, a lack of energy was prevailing in the state theatres, resulting in the under-usage of these theatrical infrastructures. Here is Oleg Efremov in a dialogue with Iuri Liubimov after their comeback to Russia about the atmosphere reigning in Moscow's famous theatres:

> We are public servants, public servants employed by the state. An absurd attitude toward art. [...] At us, instead of work, ambitions reign. The energy is spent on everything and nothing. But not on work." Iuri Liubimov: "I have been away for six years. I came back. What do I find at Taganka?[33] First of all – the old age. And not because of the passage of time, but because of the laxity. (Sianu, transl, 1991, # 1-2:84)

But even if they lacked the motivation and energy to fill the spaces they possessed, especially during the first years after 1990, the state theatres did not become cultural centres open to other organizations' work through project competitions.[34] The other infrastructures (communications, transport, etc.) were gradually opening, but the theatrical one is still waiting to be placed at the disposal of those that can generate valid artistic projects; its permanent "ghettoization" cannot be justified anymore (and it should never be) in a more and more open society.

Because transparent programs to fund, support and integrate independent theatrical initiatives do not exist during the nineties, the only method for an organization to survive is to depend entirely on the personal connections of its leader. Although no state theatre has an official program to coproduce or present independent theatre performances, such a thing is made possible mainly through personal connections. But too much dependence of a company's activity on the personal relations of its director generates multiple problems: a bigger fragility, too much weight placed on an arbitrary context (where people benevolent to the cause are placed, or not, in key social or political positions), a premature tiredness of the leader, the development of a sense of ownership over the organization (generated by the enormous personal involvement) that can block ideas or practices that the leader does not encourage and the tendency of such a leadership to become permanent and never abandon his/her "baby" organization. All of these can erode an independent organization, transforming it into a fragile and, paradoxically, closed structure. Staying open demands effort and generosity. But even more than that, it also demands some forms of organization and protection.

To compensate for such fragilities, a network of independent theatre organizations is definitely necessary. The networks become a serious presence in the European cultural field: "The networks of the 80s and 90s – the period marked by the expansion of trans-national, and particularly of vocational networks in the field of culture – were led by the principle "to be present and to establish contacts." These are primarily information-communication networks whose projects background exists for purposes of enhancement of informational capital, as well as advocacy capital of individual innovative initiatives and schemes of collaboration." Eventually, these networks will evolve into "horizontal project collaborative platforms of operational types. Only project collaboration ensures the survival within the network for individual members. This is how they become stronger, thus recognizing cultural and socio-cultural developmental micro-impulses as their dominant frame of reference for activities." (Dragojević in Vidović, edit, 2007:7-8). The project as a base for collaboration is the most democratic formula, as it establishes partnerships among equal members, thus ensuring everybody's survival in a context where surviving alone would be problematic. Not understanding the importance of this collaborative formula and trying too hard to succeed through themselves - but being often blocked by the lack of access to the infrastructure and the impossibility to guarantee any

form of continuity for their partners, especially the foreign ones – many independent companies exhausted themselves prematurely and did not get over the phase of the "beginnings".

Emil Cioran considers the beginning as eternal in the Romanian culture, the lack of the "culture of the precedence" (Dumitru , 2007) being a national trait conceptualized as "the Romanian Adamism":

> Any man who wants or is called to play a prophetic role in Romania's life must be convinced that in this country every gesture, every action, every attitude is an absolute beginning, that there are no continuations, replays, lines or directives. For what must be done no one precedes us, no one urges on us and no one helps us.[...] Everyone of us is in Adam's situation. Or perhaps our condition is even worse, for we don't have anything behind to regret. Everything must be begun, absolutely everything. We have only the future to work with. The Adamism in culture means only that every spiritual, historical and political problem springs for the first time, that everything we live is determined in a new world of values, in an unparalleled order and style. The Romanian culture is an Adamitic culture, because everything that is born in it is unprecedented. (Cioran, 1990:39-40)

What is certain is that we can talk about many more "beginnings" during the nineties in the Romanian independent theatre than "continuations" or "developments". Somehow, as trust, openness and the necessary changes in the working legislation and cultural policies (allowing access for independents to public funds and theatrical infrastructure) were missing, what we have are more or less different artists as "lonely wolves"[35] striving for "artistic excellence". This culture of the success, the relentless pursue of the masterpiece, which might be a (hidden or open) drive for every artist, limits drastically the quest for partners of new theatre companies founded mostly by young artists, who are inherently in a "dilettante" phase.

> Such innovative "dilettantism" [...] is usually accepted only on the territory of the alternative theatre. Here, via negativa, we see the limitations of the repertory theatres vis-à-vis contemporary drama: they cannot afford the risk neither of ephemeral nor "raw" productions, and they cannot afford "dilettantism". It does not only limit them in their choice of the plays, but in fact also in the choice of the modes of their production. (Yakubova, 2009)

The fear to "fail" is given a theoretical justification by the aesthetician Victor Ernest Masek, manager on Nottara Theatre immediately after 1989:

329

[...] a failed performance implies, besides the irrecoverable material losses, the embarrassing situation of the public recognition of a fiasco. That is why, under normal circumstances, the creators of a performance (we do not take here into consideration the experimental dramaturgy) are usually leaning toward conformism, toward sure, previously-verified solutions, toward formulae already accepted by the audience and having thus a predictable acceptance. From here a more rigorous critical censorship on new ideas, questioned and often considered not viable before having a chance to materialize and so to be confirmed or infirmed as artistic facts. (Maşek, 1990, #7-8:54)

There is, as Victor Ernest Maşek openly states, a fear of the audience immediately after 1989, when theatre seem to have lost its power. The fragmentation of the audience into "audiences" appear to many state theatre managers as a calamity that they have to fight, by stubbornly looking for the lost formula of unanimous success that "was validated" by the audience before 1989.

It is useless to ask ourselves: is the Romanian contemporary theatre transferring a sociable model into the mentality of its spectators, a model capable of counterbalancing those furnished by the American film industry and the aggressive televisions' imagery? Is the Romanian theatre a provocative behavioural counter model to the media show? No. For the option is not really between television and theatre. The option is legitimized when it is made between several, enough forms of performance, between different modes to represent – through drama – the reality. (Popa, 2000, #1(21):47)

The new companies are often treated with condescendence by the theatre critique, even when they come from abroad and are selected through very official channels; after describing the companies taking part in the "British season" organized by The British Council, companies that the regular Romanian audience is very likely to be unfamiliar with – Opera Circus, Told By An Idiot, Empty Space and Volcano – Margareta Bărbuţă, director of the Romanian centre of the International Theatre Institute, concludes her review in a national theatre magazine with "I miss the great British theatre!" (Bărbuţă, 1997, # 4-5:51)

Another cause for the delay in the development of independent theatre is the actors' fear to give up the permanent employment in a state theatre ensemble: only Mircea Diaconu[36] and Ştefan Iordache, followed later by Marcel Iureş (in sign of protest for the dismissal of Alexandru Dabija from

the helm of Odeon Theatre) have chosen to become "free-lance" among the very well-known actors. Because the number of well-known actors that have left the system is so low, they do not change the rules of the game, moreover, they regret sometimes the path taken – "Not only that I am worse now, I am much worse" declares Mircea Diaconu. (Dumitrescu, 1991, #9-10:20).

The free-lance actors do not initiate a professional organization to defend their rights, like almost everywhere in the world. The only professional unions that include theatre practitioners are those formed inside state theatres, where actors, directors, designers and technicians are thrown together in the same union belonging to a particular state institution, and not to a particular professional category. These unions are part of the big centralized unions that the state negotiate with, leaving the free-lance artists outside.

To conclude

Stepping on the territory of a new type of civic and artistic initiative, the independent theatre organizations of the nineties become, most of the time without wanting it, testing instruments of the Romanian society's weaknesses - reflected both in the general context and in their own methods and decisions. By refusing to accept the idea that the only valid institutional model is the one inherited – the state subsidized repertory theatre – the artists who try the independent path have the courage of wanting to decide by themselves the type of exchange with the society they want to engage in; they want to take advantage of the chance to reinvent themselves as social actors and, implicitly, as artists.[37]

The short life of many of these independent initiatives does not mean that they have failed, but that they have lived according to different rules, mainly accepting the ephemerality and the short term of their projections as signs of normalcy.

The ultimate purpose of all independent artists during the nineties was to redefine their inter-dependence links with the other participants in the big social game, by placing themselves, as a Slovene artist plastically expresses, "in the empty space between ideology and structure".[38]

Despite its tremendous efforts, the independent sector does not develop to a spectacular level during the nineties. But it imposes its presence as a sign of normalcy, eventually starting a genealogy.

NOTES

1   "[...] the discourse is exalted, hot-headed, ultimatum-like. It does not express rational thoughts, but moods. [...] In short, after the totalitarian freezing, we are melting in dissolution of emotions, reacting with love or hate when all is needed is our clear judgment." (Pleșu, 1993, #1).

2   www.recensamant.ro.

3   Nicolae Popa (deputy), interpellation recorded at the Chamber of deputies with # 603B/20 oct. 1999.

4   A term coined by Miruna Runca, defining the dominant model of the subsidized repertory institution in the Romanian theatre system.

5   If a translator is not indicated, it means the text has been translated to English by me throughout this paper.

6   That means having a permanent ensemble of artists and technicians and presenting the performances (preserved in a "repertory") alternatively.

7   "The art theatre" is not a matter of rebellion, but one of transformation. It has to do with working daily and moving slowly forward. It is linked with growing old, not with exploding." (Banu, 2010:30).

8   "The passage from "phase one" to "phase two", the transformations of the "art theatre" into "state theatre" – like it happened in Russia – means the transformation of a mortal theatre into an immortal theatre. What the Soviet Union has produced – a powerful system of about 700 theatres and little theatres of "state art". What are the consequences? In the absence of a threat of destruction – to the individual or the company – there is neither philosophy, nor creative energy. The fear of nothingness gave birth to religions, cultures, rituals, arts. A theatre deprived of this perspective gets out of its tracks. Its muscles atrophy." (Smelianski in Banu,2010:77-78).

9   "The artists can now be whatever they want, without the burden to serve the main narration. They have no duty toward art: they can now serve human needs. [...] The price they pay for this freedom, though, is that of a somehow diminished status. They do not dedicate themselves to a project bigger than themselves. [...] Today's artists are not disciples in their vocations anymore, but entrepreneurs in an artistic world and market." Julius, 2009:203).

10   The Moscow Art Theatre, one of the world's most famous theatre institutions.

11   "The fear that actor's muscles atrophy. Therefore, an axiom of a relentless "actor's work with himself", a concept deriving from the idea of art theatre. Such a life is, obviously, difficult, based on sacrifice. That is why art theatre have, by necessity, an ephemeral existence." (Smelianski in Banu, 2010:79).

12   Ibid., p. 78.

13   Ibid, p. 77.

14   The date this material is drafted the performance "Je m'en vais" („Mă tot duc") is part of the Metroplis Theatre's repertory.

15   One has to take these notions at their polemic value, as Cioran does.

[16] A new, original play by Carryl Churchill written after and based on the Romanian experience of the group. The performance based on this play was produced in London and New York and presented on tour in Bucharest.

[17] I was the Romanian partner for the group of the "Central School of Speech and Drama" students that collected about 5000 theatre books, transported them to Bucharest, constructed the shelves of a new library and donated everything to the National University of Theatre and Film. Later, I was the first Romanian invited to the Royal Court Summer Residency in London (Alina Nelega, Andreea Vălean, Peca Ștefan, Maria Manolescu, Gianina Cărbunariu, Mihaela Michailov, etc. will follow) and, together with Anca Bradu and Nona Ciobanu I took part in the only edition of The European Directors School in Leeds .

[18] From an interview taken in October 2009.

[19] In a conversation with a young critic, Claudiu Groza.

[20] Romanian title: „Logodnicele aterizează la Paris".

[21] There will be an explosion of this kind of initiatives 10-15 years later.

[22] As considered by Ionut Corpaci, main helper of Mrs. Seciu throughout the existence of this theatre company.

[23] He died in 1994.

[24] "The individual initiatives face most likely pessimism; the first reaction is the mistrust and strong belief in the failure of that enterprise." Grecu, 2000:2).

[25] Inoportun Theatre presented its first production in 1992.

[26] As expressed by Ion Caramitru, interviewed in 2010.

[27] Founder of ECUMEST, expert and consultant in the field of cultural management and European cultural policies, since 2008 director of the Romanian Cultural Institute in New York.

[28] See www.pekarna.org/ntnm.

[29] By Chris Torch, manager of Intercult, Stockholm.

[30] The press of the nineties presents numerous investigations in the activities of non-profit foundations whose only purpose seem to be to avoid import taxes for cars or electronic equipment.

[31] The very place where the "New Times, New Models" conference took place; it will be completely transformed for Maribor, Cultural Capital of Europe 2012.

[32] Romania has many such barracks abandoned by the army, as, according to NATO rules, it has to move outside of inhabited sites; but there is not one single case yet for a change of destination toward cultural activities of such a place.

[33] A famous theatre in Moscow.

[34] "The Romanian artistic community, the unions that were just getting organized, UNITER – all of these were very fresh, involved in endless discussions without producing any results. The repertory theatre could not

be re-structured and that persists until nowadays. There isn't still a functional system in place…" Corina Șuteu, in an e-mail, Jan. 2010.

35   The writer Petre Barbu defined himself as a "lonely wolf", denying an invitation to collaborate with Compania Teatrala 777 in mid-nineties.

36   Who confesses (in an interview I took him in 2010) that he has tried to persuade many of his colleagues to do the same, but failed.

37   This is declared by almost all of the artists mentioned in this paper in different interviews taken during the last years.

38   Gregor Kosi, intervention at the „New Times, New Models" conference.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

BANU, G.,(coord.) Teatrul de artă, o tradiție modernă. (Transl. Mirella Nedelcu-Patureau, Edit. Alina Mazilu). Nemira, București, 2010

BANU, G., „O sută de ani de teatru de artă" in Teatrul de artă, o tradiție modernă. (Transl. Mirella Nedelcu-Patureau, Edit. Alina Mazilu). Nemira, București, 2010

BANU, G, „România și teatrul său sau Strigăte și șoapte", (transl. by Constanța Turcoi from Theatre/Public, nov-dec. 1990) in Teatrul azi #11-12/1990

BARBA, E., Teatru – singurătate, meșteșug, revoltă, Nemira, București,2010

BĂRBULESCU, C., „Teatrele româno..." in Teatrul azi #2-3/1994

BĂRBUȚĂ, M., "Chipul tânăr al teatrului britanic", in Teatrul azi #4-5/1997

CHITIC, P. C., „Ce se întâmplă cu teatrele?" in Teatrul azi #1/1990

CIORAN, E.M., Schimbarea la față a României, Humanitas,București, 1990

CORNIȘTEANU, M., answer to the inquiry „Nativ sau alternativ" in Scena #2(22)/2000

DIACONU, M., „Pe aici, prin acest spațiu mioritic, călcăm pe prejudecăți", (interview taken by Cristina Dumitrescu) in Teatrul azi #9-10/1991

DINULESCU, R., intervention quoted by Iulia Popovici, „Ghidul de utilizare a teatrului independent, în România și aiurea. Dialogul imposibil al independenților cu ei înșiși" in Observator cultural #282/2005

DRAGOEVIĆ, S., "The Importance of Microimpulses in Culture:The Example of Clubture" in Dea Vidović (edit.), Clubture, Culture as the Process of Exchange, Clubture, Zagreb,2007

DUCE, V., „Vă prezentăm Teatrul Masca", in Teatrul azi #7-8/1990

DUMITRU, A., Interview with Lelia Ciobotariu as part of Cine mai are nevoie de teatru după '89?, a research project in the framework of the eSourcing, a program by ECUMEST in partnership with Erste Foundation, 2007.

DUMITRU, A., „Seeding an independent theatre. Note pentru o cultură a precedentului." as part of Cine mai are nevoie de teatru după '89?, a research project in the framework of the eSourcing, a program by ECUMEST in partnership with Erste Foundation, 2007.

GALGOȚIU, D., answer to the inquiry „Nativ sau alternativ" in Scena #2(22)/2000

GRECU, A., "Distribution of non-institutionalized productions in Romania", a study for Mobile Theatre Network, 2000

HERGHELEGIU, T., answer to the inquiry „Nativ sau alternativ" in Scena #2(22)/2000

JULIUS, A.,Transgresiuni. Ofensele artei. (transl. Tania Șiperco), Vellant, București,2009

KUNDEROVÁ, R., "What for Are Theatre Reviews from Communist Era Today? Methodological problems of research on theatre of Communist totalitarian regime." Paper read at the conference "What was there before the After?" in the framework of the Contemporary Drama Festival, Budapest, 2008

MACRINICI, R., answer to the inquiry „Nativ sau alternativ" in Scena #2(22)/2000

MALIȚA, L., (coord.), Viața teatrală în și după comunism, EFES, Cluj, 2006

335

MAȘEK, VE., „Capcane și limite" in *Teatrul azi* #7-8/1990

MĂNIUȚIU, A., „Încercare de panoramare a fenomenului teatral independent din România anilor 1990-2005" in LIVIU MALIȚA (coord.), *Viața teatrală în și după comunism,* EFES, Cluj, 2006

MĂNIUȚIU, M., intervenție in the debate „O revoluție în teatru?" in *Scena* #12/1999

PARHON, V., „O șușă" in *Teatrul azi* #3/1990

PLEȘU, A., „Dilema cea de toate zilele" in *Dilema* #1/1993

POPA, S.V., „Non-public" in *Scena* #1(21)/2000

POPOVICI, I, „Ghidul de utilizare a teatrului independent, în România și aiurea. Dialogul imposibil al independenților cu ei înșiși" in *Observator cultural* #282/2005

RADU, O. and FERCHEDĂU, Ș., (edit.) A Short Guide to the Romanian

Cultural Sector Today. Mapping Opportunities for Cultural Cooperation. A review performed by

the ECUMEST association, comissioned by the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Bucharest and

published with the support of the Romanian Cultural Institute, 2005

REDACȚIA UltimaT, „Către un discurs critic al prezenței" în *UltimaT* #1/1999

RUNCAN, M., Modelul teatral românesc, Unitext, București, 2000

SIANU, M., (transl.) 1991, „Intelectualii: posibilitatea de a ieși din subteran. O convorbire între Iuri Liubimov și Oleg Efremov", after *Teatr* #9/1990 in *Teatrul azi* #1-2/1991

SMELIANSKI, A., „Zile faste și nefaste ale ideii de teatru de artă." in Teatrul de artă, o tradiție modernă. (Transl. Mirella Nedelcu-Patureau, Edit. Alina Mazilu), Nemira, București, 2010

STĂNESCU, S., answer to the inquiry „Nativ sau alternativ" in *Scena* #2(22)/2000

STEIN, P., „A construi, a distruge, a reconstrui." in Teatrul de artă, o tradiție modernă. (Transl. Mirella Nedelcu-Patureau, Edit. Alina Mazilu), Nemira, București, 2010

ȘUTEU, C., (quoted in) „Managementul teatral între rigorile teoretice și improvizațiile

practice", a dialogue between D. Solomon, M. Boiangiu, A. Dabija, C. Șuteu în *Teatrul azi* #2-3/1994

VIDOVIĆ, DEA (edit.), Culture as the Process of Exchange, Clubture, Zagreb, 2007

VIŠNIĆ, E., (edit.), A Bottom-up Approach to Cultural Policy-Making, policiesforculture, Amsterdam-Bucharest-Zagreb, 2008

YAKUBOVA, N., 2009, "The Changing Notions of "Alternative Theatre" and "Repertory Theatre" over the Last Two Decades in the Post-Communist Region", Paper read at the conference *"What was there before the After?"* in the framework of the Contemporary Drama Festival, Budapest, 2008

ŽIŽEK, S.,"Post-Wall: Neo-Anti-Communism" in The London Review of Books, volume 31 # 22/2009

www.pekarna.org

www.recensamant.ro

www.teatrulfarafrontiere.ro

COSMIN GABRIEL RADU

Born 1979, Bucharest

PhD candidate in Sociology, University of Bristol, UK
Thesis: *Between Struggle and Consensus, Distribution and Recognition:
Petty Smuggling and Cross-Border Trade at the Romania-Serbia Frontier
from the Late 1940's to the Schengen Accession*

Scholarships and grants from: University of Bristol, University of Manchester,
Central European University Budapest, University of Bucharest,
Ratiu Family Foundation, Socrates-Erasmus & Phare

Presentations at conferences in Romania, Italy, Slovenia, Hungary, Germany,
Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Serbia, Austria, Poland, UK, Russia, Finland

Articles and chapters on borders, space-time, state, illegality, petty cross-border
trade, smuggling and contraband, border control and surveillance, migration,
urban marketplaces

DWELLING AND CROSSING THE FRONTIER: POLITICAL SUBJECTIVITIES AND MOVING LANDSCAPES ON THE ROMANIA-SERBIA BORDER[1]

On January 5, 1990 I met a large group of French in Severin about to go to Vârciorova to make it a locality twin to theirs. They had consistent aid to distribute to the locals, as it was the fashion those days immediately after the fall of Ceaușescu. "Are you crazy?" I told them frankly. "Vârciorova is underneath the waters of the Danube since the early 1970's". They went instead to Schela Noua where the former dwellers of Vârciorova were living then and talked to them. (Fieldnotes, Dr. Tr. Severin, July 2010)

"Until the dam, the Danube had no idea that the politics had changed". (Recorded interview, Orșova , August 2010)

"The human gets used to everything: well-being, wire fences, freedom…" (Recorded interview, Orșova , July 2010)

Introduction

This article explores subjective political constructions of the changing landscape at the border between Romania and Serbia. It does so by considering the building of the Iron Gates dam in the 1960's and 1970's and the massive relocations of population that resulted in a different landscape of the Danube, with a number of localities flooded, either completely disappeared (Ada-Kaleh, Vârciorova) or rebuilt at different places (Orșova, Eșelnița). Even if both sides were transformed, I will concentrate on the Romanian one as this has been far more affected in terms of number of people and localities that moved. Another important ethnographic reference is the massive deportations from the border to the Eastern part of Romania in the context of the Soviet nationalizing of

the private property in the 1940's and 1950's. Also, the illicit flights of so many people into Yugoslavia and further into Western Europe and North America that occurred constantly between late 1940's and late 1980's make important points in the paper.

For the specific ambitions of the article, I use two spatial metaphors - dwelling and crossing - which account for a great deal of everyday practices at the border. They form narratives through which people evaluate their lives, retrospectively and prospectively. Using the two notions, the article will illustrate the constitutive relations between subjects and the everyday politics at the border materialized in the changing landscape. It argues that present and absent landscapes, and mediating experiences of dwelling and crossing produce political subjects at the border. Most of the ethnographic fieldnotes and interviews used in this essay have been collected between early October 2009 and late August 2010 in Drobeta Turnu Severin and Orșova.

Building a dam on the Danube: the brief story of remaking a border

Before the WWII, even in the absence of a built infrastructure over the river, crossing at the Romania-Serbia border has been present in different forms: village fairs on each side, tourism and kin visits, smuggling etc. Tobacco, salt, or live animals were constantly carried by boats across the Danube in a context in which the border had been almost uncontrolled. The war came with huge contraband trade and the first massive restrictions on trade and movement with Yugoslavia which was dominated by Titoist insurgents. With the escalation of even more restrictive border regimes in the early Romanian party Stalinism, crossing became very difficult. The illegal flights outwards Romania were nonetheless widespread (Armanca 2011). The border had been consistently militarized and sealed for decades. In the early post-war period, scenarios of war and other conspiracies had permanently set the border as a dangerous place due to a Stalinist propaganda fighting against the revisionist Tito. A border fence was in place for years after Stalin's death. Part of this context was the 1951 deportation of more than 40,000 people from the border localities into the far Eastern area of the country (Cernicova-Dinca 2003). Blamed as potential enemies of the communist party state and conspirers with the Yugoslav power, the deported were dispossessed and used as labor force in

the collectivization of agriculture and industrialization in the Southeastern plains (Marineasa, Vighi 1994; Bercea, Ianasi 2010; Sarafolean 2001; Milin, Stepanov 2003).

The context in which crossing became permissible to borderlanders twenty-five years later is of crucial relevance here as it prompted not only changes in the border regime of crossing, but also massive transformations in the landscape of the frontier. In the mid-1960's, as the relations between the Yugoslavian Federation and Romania cooled down, a joint economic project started at the Danube – the construction of the Iron Gates dam and hydropower cascade. The Danube was turned into a huge construction site that attracted considerable legitimacy for the Ceausescu's regime, as well as massive labor force from all over the country (Grasu 2002; Rusu no date; Roman 1980; Copcea 2002; Copcea 1985). People from a number of localities, including the old Orșova, Vârciorova etc. were relocated (Juan-Petroi 2006; Rogobete 2006) into already existing towns and villages, or newly built ones. Islands on the Danube, including the Turkish-inhabited Ada-Kaleh, were flooded as a consequence of the growing water basin. The river was widened, while a new border crossing infrastructure was built – the dam and bridge were opened in 1972. Since then, the Iron Gates worked as one of the major border posts (Armanca 2011).

No bridge over the Romania-Yugoslavia river-border existed before. After opening the bridge, a bilateral agreement that allowed borderlanders to cross was signed by the two countries. The Yugoslav citizens started to come massively to Romania, to trade in products so unavailable for the common Romanian citizens. Borderpeople from the Romanian side crossed into Yugoslavia too, but their local authorities issued cautiously and selectively cross-border passes for them. Crossing and subsequent suitcase smuggling penetrated in this way the borderlanders' lives. Cross-border trade developed massively in the 1990's when the border opened and passports were liberalized (Gornoviceanu 1991), to decline gradually to the present day.

Borders, landscapes, and the political

In social sciences, borders are understood as marginal territories of the state, relatively fixed in space and continuous in time (Donnan, Wilson 1999; Wilson, Donnan 1998; Heyman 1994). Territory and sovereignty

claims are nonetheless insufficient to explain borders. In Eastern Europe, the Cold War, supposed to make hard, impenetrable frontiers, created border regimes that challenged fixity and continuity (Berdahl 1999; Green 2005). By reducing the cross-border mobility of their populations and to increase security and economic sustainability, Eastern European socialist states had actively engineered their border spaces. Interventions in the natural landscape of borders were an instrument for making subjects and border populations. An implicit argument here is that borderlanders cannot be reduced to stable cultural constructs as it abounds in the scholarly literature on borders. Another question raised is that large economic projects accompanied by transformations in border landscapes and cross-border mobility regimes had alternatively closed and opened borders, making them open-ended objects of control and surveillance, situated many times beyond the centrism of the state's security apparatuses.

This essay questions the border landscape and its transformations as both an instrument of control and a context of contestation, a space in which various subject positions to border crossing and dwelling are produced and contested. Although crossing is a critical lens through which social scientists look at borders, it has usually been seen an activity economically or culturally oriented, depending on how 'material' or 'immaterial' those borders appeared to their analysts. In addition, crossing was deterministically understood in relation to security apparatuses and border regimes. Unlike other approaches, this article considers crossing as a constitutive element of a political subjectivity which, along with dwelling, is in a constant and productive relation with the natural and built landscape. It is therefore an account on the ways in which the physical landscape fixes and substitutes border regimes, economic opportunities, creating both openings and closures.

Landscape is engaged with in the everyday practice. It is not just natural and static, but also mobile and transformable (Tilley 1994; Lefebvre 1991). By state intervention, landscape can be replaced by other landscapes and thus constitutes different practices and imaginations. Also, the landscape is not just something one looks at, but also something remade in everyday activity (De Certeau 1984; Massey 2005; Anderson 2008). Landscapes, as familiar spaces that catalyze one's existence, relations, emotions and actions continues to live in the one's own mind even if absent. This power to generate presence from absence brings the past into the present and makes landscapes as peculiar mediators between state and society, borderlanders and border regimes of dwelling and crossing.

As part of one's life and recurrent activity, landscape is embodied in a way in which it becomes a central part of one's own subjectivity (Ingold 2000): it is both inside and outside the subject and its body (Merleau-Ponty 2002; Atkins 2005; Heidegger 1971). Subjectivation through landscape is a particular kind of making the political subject, goes the idea of this article. Yet, subjectivation is both the subject's subordination to power and empowerment and agency (Butler 1997). The argument of this paper is that the landscape of the frontier is a medium for politics both from below and from above. The changing landscape of the border is the outcome of the human intervention into nature dictated by state politics, but it is also something that continuously enacts individual positions related to dwelling and crossing. It can thus be seen as a plurality of political projects characterized by both consensus and antagonism, involving states, people and other entities. Although built landscapes can be seen as naturalizations of state power aimed to promote uniformity of feelings, ideas and actions, my article points out the plurality of politics such naturalizations effect in their subjects which in turn transforms our very ontological assumptions on borders - the nature and actors of their transformation. The Romania-Serbia (Yugoslavia) border, mediated by dwelling and crossing practices engaged with the transformations in landscape appears as a flexible construct, with contested pasts and multiple possible futures.

Before the dam

This ethnographic chapter makes temporal references to the period 1947/48-1972/3, as recollected from the retrospective narratives by my respondents. The major themes played out refer to the harsh enforcement of the border in late 1940's, deportations, evacuation and displacement that preceded the dam, administrative regionalization - all in relation to various understandings of life at the border, and perceptions of place and landscape. The period discussed is not homogeneous. Quite the contrary: there are major differences between perceptions of life and nature at the border between the 1950's and 1960's. The ethnography sticks to a few border places on the Danube: Vârciorova, Orșova , the island of Ada-Kaleh, Turnu-Severin, and Balta Verde.

Ilie[2] is a man in his 50's living in Schela Noua, a district of Drobeta Turnu Severin. He was born in Vârciorova, a village which was flooded for the opening of the dam. His father worked at the National Railway Company,

but had also been heavily involved in agriculture and hunting. Before the dam, the landscape around their house had been a mountainous one, with forests and rocky cliffs which enabled residents to go fishing and hunting, rear animals and engage in some agricultural work. After working several years at a manufacturing shop on the Ada-Kaleh island, in the 1960's, his mother became a housewife woman caring of the four children and household. Ilie recalls with nostalgia that they had a large household with a lot of people and animals including pigs, goats, sheep, oxen. Like many others, their house and garden were very close to the Danube's shores, which made the cliff a very different landscape as compared to the one encountered today. The displacement of people in Vârciorova started in 1968. Two years before that, Ilie's parents had started to build a new house but they stopped in 1967 due to the rumours of displacement.

> '*In Vârciorova we reared our own animals and were not waiting to get food from others, or from the state. We had seven or eight sew all the time and we were often slaughtering piglets. We were not waiting to rear them for one year. The sew were free to go pasture wherever they wanted in the forests. In the evening they came back home. The same for the small piglets. Milk, cheese, home bread – we had it all. We also had our own brandy, and plenty of wood. Really, it was a different life then. We lived much better in Vârciorova and everyone here from those displaced would tell you the same. But now the places we remember are just water*'.*

It is important to understand that, while remembering the idyllic Vârciorova, Ilie speaks of present, future, and past altogether. In the context in which occupational prospects, interactions with the border and the opportunities it offers, and my respondents' lives, in general, are marked by dissatisfaction, the past is generally interpreted in its idyllic form.

> '*Even at my age I have a special sentiment for those places. I was born in those places and I lived beautiful years at the Danube. And I loved so much those mountains and forests and the ways we were used to live*'.*

Ilie has never really accommodated in Schela Noua, the district built in early 1970's for the displaced persons from Vârciorova. As he worked several years in Germany after 1989, his sentiment of longing for home was invariably linked to Vârciorova. He often goes fishing at the Danube and sits in the waterfront close to where Vârciorova was 40 years ago.

'*If I stop on the viaduct I can throw down a pebble right in my housegarden – and this is a good thing*'. If Ilie drives or stops on the viaduct he recalls his childhood. '*My childhood is there under the water and I think this is something I will think of even in my time of dying*'. The landscape was very different then, wild and beautiful, and it was something closely associated with the river in its naturalness. In contrast, Ilie told me that the Danube is very different now, a dirty industrial site, consisting of stagnant and unclear water resembling a lake. The transformation of the landscape corresponded, for Ilie and his family, to a radical change in life. Peaceful and abundant subsistence was transformed into a precarious life, as they moved into modular residences and were incorporated within the party-ruled mode of production, which excluded the previous way of life. Scarcity and centrally-organised distribution of goods and resources brought by the dam and displacement generated a particular perception regarding the border and its landscape, a feeling of dispossession which gave way to contestations of the massive building and its political patronage. Different spatio-temporalities were at work in Ilie and others' narratives in relation to the dam. In precise terms: life had been different not only before and after 1989, but also, and most importantly, before and after the construction of the dam.

Ada-Kaleh, the island that faced Vârciorova, is also a strong memory for Ilie. It was so peculiar as the Turkish inhabitants were experts in home-made or industrial products uncommon for the mainland: candies, ice-cream, marmalade and preserves, tobacco and cigarettes, clothes for the army etc. Turkish children from the island were coming to school in Vârciorova and Ilie made friends with them. Also, between Vârciorova and Ada-Kaleh there were numerous economic exchanges: islanders were in need of wood, live animals, cheese, meat, and agricultural products, while the others were interested in fruit and home-made Turkish products. Their relations were continuous and constant. As his mother worked there, Ilie paid five visits to the island. Besides these apparently peaceful relations, Ilie recalls that Ada-Kaleh was strictly defended and militarised, even more so than the mainland. Every 50 meters there were military posts.

Between the two world wars, Ada-Kaleh was renowned for its 'duty-free' transactions. Also, islanders had crossed freely to Serbia to retail their products. This history of small monopolies on various products and commodities, and their free circulation across the river had changed after the World War II. Adnan, a Turkish man in his 70's, recollected that change had been harshly imposed by a 3-meter rod fence erected to

restrict the view of the Yugoslavian river bank. The same fence had been erected along the Romanian mainland and it stayed there until mid-1950's.

Son to an important islander, Adnan and his numerous family were about to be forcedly deported into Bărăgan in 1951. However, they were well connected to the new authorities and learned that they were shortlisted for mandatory residence in Bărăgan just in time to leave the island and change their place for Caransebeş, far away from the border, where they could not pass as suspects for deportation. Half the number of families had been deported from the island. Not only rich families were forced to move into the Eastern part of the country, but also poor anglers or boatmen suspected of smuggling and connections to the other side. His father and older brother found employment in local factories in Caransebeş. In the mid-1950's, when deported persons were allowed to go back, they returned to the island. In Ada-Kaleh, Adnan opened a small restaurant, as entrepreneurial activity was allowed for a period. There were plenty of ships mooring at the island – numerous tourists and customers for the restaurant. Life on the island had been marked by two aspects. First, it was a quiet harmony that the islanders maintained even after deportations. On the other hand, even if the Romanian-Yugoslavian relations were improving, there were still controls and military all over the place.

When I asked Adnan to describe the landscape of the island, he told me that the island was '*fortress, trees, and houses.*' '*It was a different life then, on the island: we drank water from the Danube, were surrounded by waters, we all knew each other…*' In this way, Adnan's memories connected me to a construction of a good balance they had between natural and built landscape, and the apparently perfect symbiosis and lack of differentiation between human and natural. The rumours about displacement and relocations for the dam's construction came in 1964. First, they were offered the option of moving to the Şimian island that faces Turnu Severin. Yet, the locals turned this option down. Adnan, along with many others, also had the option to move to Turkey. He stayed a short period in Turkey but returned to Schela, which is also his current residence, as they could not adapt there. Other islanders moved to Turkey permanently. Many moved to Constanţa, Mangalia, Bucharest – all over the country where Turkish communities were in place. State support with the operations of moving was poor, and the compensations almost non-existent as authorities had no resources to set into motion such a large process of displacement. In effect, islanders and many other displaced from

other localities had to manage themselves. In order to build a new house in Schela on a plot of land they had to buy from the state, Adnan brought construction materials from their old place in Ada-Kaleh, transported by boat. In the long period while the island was slowly flooded, Adnan visited Ada-Kaleh regularly for his brick transports. Ironically, on a visit, he met two Turkish families who were there to flee to Yugoslavia. They succeeded. By 1973, the island was completely under water.

Esin, a 70-year man, is another Turk from Ada-Kaleh. He reminds his big surprise at the news about the prospective flooding. The flood was planned while the island was flourishing. They had recently renovated roads and a developing infrastructure for incoming tourists. The peak was between 1965 and 1968. For Esin, it was a period that resembled the good inter-war period his parents and older brothers had told him about. Just as he talked about his good life on the island, Esin mentioned that the 1950's were deeply traumatic for the whole border population. Related to the 1950's, Esin's childhood memories are linked to a permanent feeling of isolation materialised in the wire fence put all over the island's limits, and the strict ID controls which adults were exposed to every day. In the 1950's, border guards and local authorities were the real governors and absolute masters of the island, uncommon for the people of Ada-Kaleh, who were so used to be in control of their destinies in the past. After 1947, the authorities had a constant concern with illegal flights across the river, which, in spite of all restrictions, kept occurring, both on the part of the islanders and of visitors.

'*We were permanently told that the Yugoslavian border guards would shoot us from the other side. We had no real freedom of walking the streets of the island, and we were forced to go to sleep at 10 o'clock in the evening*'.

Yet, when it comes to the things Esin and his wife miss after so many years from their relocation to Orșova, it is the island itself and the peace of the landscape. Their current nostalgic recollections of the absent island contrast with the moment when they were forced to move to Orșova – a moment of hope for a better future, although very difficult. The relocation to Orșova was invested with expectations by islanders as authorities promised them modernising their lives, offering basic facilities – electricity, running water, roads etc. – that were largely absent on Ada-Kaleh. Yet, the state did not accomplish their expectations.

'*They did not give us any place to live, I had a little child, and I lived one year with my parents. And they did not keep their promises regarding the dam – free electricity and all the rest. It was very hard.*'

In addition, the beauty of the island's natural landscape had been replaced in that period by huge and chaotic construction sites. '*Imagine – everything was a site. A very ugly one.*' Above all, because of in-migrating labour force from all over the place, the population of Orșova increased dramatically, making the town rather unsafe, according to Esin. After all those rapid changes, the materiality of the island was only indicated by the water whirls on the river.

'*They did not manage to demolish everything, and, after the flood, the undemolished buildings on the island were underneath the waters but still made the water's surface curl. And we knew that was where the island was, because of the curling.*'

Although starting a new life in 'modern' conditions (in the newly built blocks of flats of new Orșova), Ada-Kaleh takes precedence in the islanders' imaginations of the border. More precisely, the island activates, or produces a nostalgia of legitimate and peaceful dwelling opposed to the border places as they were after transformations operated in landscape. Former dwellers of the places affected by floods developed strong positions and contestations against the new dwelling areas, while at the same time, they retrospectively idealised the lost ones. This dissatisfaction has been poorly compensated through other facilities provided with the building of the dam (such as crossing). In some cases, as we will see later more clearly, the immateriality (and disappearance) of the places was itself an object of contestations, Ada-Kaleh, the old Orșova and other localities taken away by water being regularly present in dreams, conscious memories, material testimonies such as books, photographs etc., and often asserted as essential to one's own life and social relations.

Interesting present evaluations of the good life in place before the dam also came from Nelu, a 70-year man born in Balta Verde, a Southern village at the Danube, to a rich peasant family. Before the World War II, there had been an intense 'contraband' trade and economic exchange between Romanians and the Serbs across the Danube – a completely uncontrolled commercial activity. Nelu's father had also been involved in it. He was buying salt and lamp petroleum from Drobeta Turnu Severin for his Serbian

Vlach customers and he was receiving golden coins in exchange. There were frequent marriages between people from different sides of the river.

> '*So, there was no border then. They were coming to us by boat, and we were going to them, also by boat. We were visiting each other at weddings, they were coming with the fiddlers here. It was very beautiful.*'

According to Nelu, the existence of a conventional river-border until 1947 had no effect on the 'natural' life carried at the Danube, except during the war. Nelu points out to the invisibility of the border as remembered from his childhood, but he emphasises a lot of material practices that were carried out across the border, between Romanians and Serbian Vlachs[3]. In this context of invisibility - as a practical, effective delineation, the border appeared as an empowering effect in the borderlanders' lives. The advent of border guards marked a brutal enforcement of the frontier which affected directly the peaceful relations between Serbian Vlachs and Romanians. As Tito and Yugoslavia turned their back to Stalin, an aggressive anti-Titoist campaign started in 1949 on the Romanian side. The material effects were the ploughed strip at the Danube's shore to indicate a place that once had been accessible, but was now suddenly forbidden to everyone. Then, the border guards installed military units for their brigades, and they erected a high barbed-wire fence. '*From good friends, the Serbians became our worst enemies. And it was interesting that many people actually started to speak badly of the Serbs.*' The advent of a border visible for everyone was accompanied by restrictions: they were no longer allowed to angle, or to swim in the river. Local peasants were affected economically by the harsh enforcement of the border. Until 1949, the locals had hunted sheatfish with spears and had absolute freedom to bring their animals to pasture at the Danube. After the border guards arrived, the peaceful dwelling practices suddenly ended.

The presence of border guards at the Danube had been followed by a long process of collectivisation of private property, including large areas of agricultural land. In relation to this aspect and the whole situation of emergency at the border, the massive deportations came in 1951. Serbians, Macedonians, Germans, rich landlords, local administrative and political staff, smugglers, Bessarabians – all were deported as anxiety about collaboration with the regime of Tito, and counterrevolution, was growing. Nelu's family were also deported. Experience of deportation is recounted by almost everyone in terms of forced dispossession, slapping,

corporal punishment, violence carried by the military in cooperation with the local authorities. Around 40,000 people were thus transported to the far Eastern part of the country. As they were relocated, they built new settlements from nothing, on the land seized from other landlords who were forced to leave from there. The politics of mandatory residence which they had all been subjected to prohibited their travels farther than 15 kilometres from the imposed place of residence. For that reason, numerous children could not go to schools, while adults were employed in factories and farms in proximity.

The experience of the border's marking by the ploughed strip and wire fence was also a common place in the conversations I had with Petre, from Orşova. The strip of land had been all along the Danube's shore, 7-9 metres width and it replaced the old *corso*, the promenade walk at the river, making a forbidden area out of it. Border guards were brought from afar, they were junior military who, so Petre said, knew only that if they shoot or catch someone trying to flee, they would be rewarded. The border fence existed in Orşova between 1949 and 1956, and was still left in place along roads between localities long after 1956. The corso in old Orşova was given back to the locals in the 1960's. However, the oppressive presence of the military continued and became a constant of the everyday life at the border. Even from the beginnings of the militarisation of the border, 'groups of friends' were formed with border guards, in which propaganda representatives taught the locals how to divulge information on those who planned to flee. After 1956 excursions on the Danube were organised, and there were many people who used the opportunity to jump off boats and flee to Yugoslavia. For that reason authorities introduced high-speed ships where passengers were kept closed in a cabin. Armed border guards were always present on ships but there were still people who jumped.

Another transformation that overlapped the building of the dam was the administrative regionalisation of 1968. This materialised into a general disruption of the place, a massive numerical increase of the population, industrialisation and partial depopulation of rural areas. In the 1960's, Turnu Severin, as Nelu recollected, still was a patriarchal and conservative place. It all changed dramatically starting in 1968: from 35,000 dwellers, in a few years Severin had reached 120,000. On the building sites at the Iron Gates alone there were 12,000 workers. Regionalisation affected Orşova as well. Numerous institutions, including the Administration of the Iron Gates were moved to Turnu Severin. The old Orşova had been

perceived as a strong town before, especially because of its harbour. The dam and the new regionalisation changed the hierarchy of localities and created frustration as the development of some towns and villages was rather stagnant.

Political subjectivity emerges in interaction with the changing landscape, as well as more directly through specific actions of enforcement of the border in the post-war situation, due to particular feelings that such transformations might produce, from familiarity to non-familiarity, from attraction to repulsion, from compliance to resistance. These changes did often produce economic deprivation for the locals, deprivation that was coupled with numerous restrictions in personal liberties and rights that were largely seen as illegitimate, as they made a strong contrast with the borderlanders' lives as of the inter-war and pre-war periods. The dam that was just to get built was largely perceived as a different local landscape at the river-border, a landscape with wide and large ramifications in other processes that occurred there, such as regionalisation, industrialisation, expropriations and relocations. Also, the drowned landscapes at the Romania-Serbia border do sometimes live with the subjects and articulate various attachments to dwelling and crossing practices, with different spatiotemporal references. Evaluations of the past confronted with assessments of the present and expectations and hopes for the future offer a vast site in which political subjectivity takes form and navigates along the border itself.

After the dam

This section will continue developing narratives of my informants in relation to the construction of the dam and other adjacent processes.

Getting back to Ilie from Vârciorova and his experience of displacement, it is interesting how he evaluated the dam. His assessment of the situation is common to so many people who passed through the same experience of displacement, to whom familiar and easy dwelling was refused.

'I've only seen this dam negatively. It affected us in many ways. They took our houses, they took everything, they threw us in this neighbourhood, they gave us so little to build new houses. All in all, they changed our lives. In exchange, they promised we would never have to pay electricity. And there were a few other facilities. But nothing happened. On the contrary.

We've been here for 45 years. Look at the way we are living now. Look at the holes in the road. You won't see that even in Brezniţa, up on the mountain. There, they have concrete. Our neighbourhood is forgotten by authorities. And we pay high taxes. This is the uttermost outskirt. And, we, the folks in Severin, see ourselves lower than Brezniţa, which is 15 km away. And Severin used to be a powerful city: we had here a factory of industrial energy supplies, a chemical plant, wagons etc. Now, there's nothing.'

When Ilie refers to the power Severin had, he thinks of the post-1968 period, after the regionalisation, when the population of the city grew four times more in a few years. That was a period when re-industrialisation of the area and the intense crossing prompted by the Iron Gates bridge stimulated a sort of petty capitalism out of the suitcase smuggling carried out by both Serbians and Romanians. The municipality had also been receptive then to the new commercial opportunities and set up various places in the city for retail trade of goods from across the border. One such place was the so-called 'Serbian market'. Although many border crossers were industrial workers with good salaries who could afford going to Yugoslavia by car and purchasing goods from the market, there were many other opportunities open to those who were not crossing. Many people bought Yugoslavian goods to resell. Crossing stimulated a lot of 'entrepreneurial' activities in a socialist period while private room of manoeuvre had usually been very limited. '*Everybody in Severin used to love smuggling.*' Ilie recalls that there were a lot of young people who did not want to work. Rather, they tried to smuggle. There were a lot of people selling on the streets, even if they did not have something properly set up.

However, one makes sense of this satisfaction with life and the cross-border trade by contrasting it with the dissatisfaction with dislocations of population and other actions. While joy was connected to opportunities prompted by smuggling and crossing, at times deep dissatisfaction was connected to the living conditions. Dwelling was defined by my respondents as a fixed political situation at the border – a context in which people could not intervene much to improve their situations. The continuation, realisation, and 'mobilisation' of everyday politics were mediated by practices and imaginations of crossing. Crossing opened the eyes of borderlanders, and enabled contrasts and comparisons between the Romanian and Yugoslavian sides. Different generations had different concerns and lived in diverse border regimes, but the permanent

temptation of crossing the frontier cut across periods. Crossing and small trade increasingly fell beyond the party-state's control, as dissatisfaction with dwelling was directly stimulated through interactions between individuals and the coercive party-state. Subjectivity produced by practices of dwelling and crossing was a constant force of generating an everyday politics of contestation. An important spatiotemporal referent through which politics came to occupy the subject was the landscape and its transformations.

Ilie stated that he never belonged to Schela.

'*People have no work here. People live off day labour. Everybody runs off outside the country. Especially young people. Even me, before autumn comes, I'll be gone again. What can I do here?*'

When he looks at the disappointing neighbourhood, he immediately recalls, in contrast, of his good childhood and youth in his family house at the Danube, in Vârciorova. Ilie was never involved in constant crossing, neither before, nor after 1989. He tried it and found that there is a lot of jeopardy in it. Yet, Ilie made an interesting comment about crossing as it is carried out in the present.

'*People go to the border with cigarettes now, they take a chance, but it's not worth it, as far as I'm concerned. When people don't have anything to do, they need to do something.*'

This illustrates very well the place of crossing in a context with no proper job opportunities. On the other hand, crossing has clearly been stimulated by the dam, and it probably offered the only compensation for the loss of properties and the familiar in their lives. Ilie told me that the small cross-border trade was the only memorable good thing about the dam.

'*A lot of people here have led a good life (before and after 1989) just because of the small trade across the border. Some bought houses, cars etc.*'

According to Esin, Orșova is another disappointing place nowadays as many have no employment and look to leave. When it comes to thinking of the post-dam socialist period, Esin says that '*we were hopeful and in a*

way we achieved what we wanted: we got houses, flats, jobs.' But reciting the achievements soon reminds him of the lost place of Ada-Kaleh: '*If we had the island, I think it would have been full-blown by now,*' that is, they would have had a much better life on the island now. The good prospects they had upon relocation were also related to the growing liveliness of the place. During the construction of the new Orşova, the town was, like Severin, inhabited by colonists, workers from all over the country. The life they knew in Orşova then, although many times disruptive and dangerous for those familiar with the old town, is completely absent now, when Orşova appears very much as an abandoned place.

> '*Orşova was first abandoned by minorities, Germans in particular. They received money from Germany, so they were allowed to leave. The Hungarians also left, this happened in the 1980's. But others came after that from all over the country. Now Romanians leave the country as well. If you go around Orşova, you don't see too many young people. Everyone heads off outside the country.*'

If in socialism Esin and his wife did not go to Yugoslavia for the fashionable small commerce, they started to cross regularly after 1989. Esin's brother-in-law was a police officer and he continuously prevented him from getting a crossing pass before 1989. He was fearful and wanted to avoid any problems for his relative. This was the tendency amongst those with good authority positions in socialism – avoiding doing things openly as there could be risks for their positions. However, Esin crossed the border frequently after 1989. They used to buy cheap stuff from Orşova, go to the other side and sell it. '*As we had a few days off so we went. We made double profits.*' Although there was some freedom of movement to Yugoslavia from 1972, the cross-border passes were selectively issued. It was only after 1989 when the borderlanders could take full advantage of the dam. Constantin, a 50-year man from Orşova, reminds that

> '*only then we realised what low standard of life we had. We were free to move around. We realised that we kept everything bottled up inside and no one knew what we were feeling. Because we couldn't talk. We were afraid.*'

Until 1989, but even after that, though in different forms, sentiments and fantasies of permanent control and surveillance continued. Before 1989, to go to the Danube's Clisura[4], north of Orşova, one needed

permission by border guards and *Securitate*. The area was known for frequent attempts to flee. Towards the end of the 1980's, the number of successful flights was around 40-50,000 every year, recorded in the various locations where refugees from Eastern Europe were concentrated temporarily (Armanca 2011). Some people succeeded to flee for good while using their cross-border passes to Yugoslavia. This was one of the reasons why papers were so selectively approved and issued. From my conversations with a former policeman who worked at the Division of passports before 1989, the first passes were issued in 1962-63, just before the start of the works at the dam. However, many more passes were issued after the opening of the bridge, in the early 1970's. Issuing a crossing pass (valid 5 years with the possibility of a 5-year extension) was a laborious job for policemen who tried to find out as many things as possible about the applicant. These included their genealogy, details about family and household etc. in order to decide whether that person can be an eligible crosser or not. Applicants who received passes quicker were those who were married, employed (especially industrial workers – peasants received passes rarely) and those with no political involvement in the family's last generations.

Let me get back to Constantin, from Orșova. He never went to Yugoslavia before 1989, but for apparently different reasons. Constantin occupied a leading position within the local party hierarchy. Although the construction of the dam and relocation to which he was subjected had subverted his loyalty to a considerable measure, he still uses a particular 'socialist' rationale against crossing. He says he has always been a real patriot so that he could not try to take advantage of small smuggling across the border. In addition, he has a lot of police and *Securitate* workers in the family. He associates the small trade with the factories being robbed and the transportation and selling of materials into Yugoslavia. As he reminds me, many border crossers have done that.

> '*Those who went into this lacked character. They made a fool out of us. Those who knew how to make real trade ended up real bosses today. That's where it all started.*'

Although he did not cross the border, he says he would have done it if the context would have been safer for him. In his fantasies of crossing no money was involved, but a drive to freedom, as he explained.

'*Freedom, that was dearly missed, the freedom to cross the Danube whenever I wanted. Orșova was a very beautiful tourist city, we could have tasted civilisation much better.*'

Crossing appears here not just as an individual achievement, but a collective emancipatory aspect refused to so many. Today, there are thousands of borderlanders dealing with small cigarette smuggling facilitated through bribes to border policemen and customs officers. In border towns and within the control institutions there is apparently complete understanding for this practice of crossing.

'*People do not do it to get rich, as they no longer get rich from that. People are desperate and when they are desperate they are allowed to do everything that can sustain survival*,' as Nelu from Turnu Severin told me.

Among the numerous small smugglers in cigarettes I met during my fieldwork there was a poor woman, Ana, living with her old mother in Turnu Severin. Her only income was from cigarettes. She got fined by the local police two times in 2010 because of her 'illegal' job. Many packs of cigarettes were also seized from her by the police. She had no cash to pay the fines and even if she would have had the money, she said, she would not have paid it. For five years now, small smuggling is her only stable occupation. Another woman, Mariana, a bar tender in Severin, sells cigarettes while she is at work. Her son, Marius, an unregistered unemployed young man, manages to get her cartons of cigarettes according to orders she receives from the bar's customers. Her business is for subsistence only, as she sells largely on credit and there are a lot of debts around her. Mili, owner of a bar where a similar small smuggler comes regularly to retail cigarettes, told me that the only motive of police and patrols' high visibility in town is the contraband cigarettes. The picture is much larger though – as there is a complicated relation between those who pass the cigarettes through customs, those who sell them in the city, in bars or other public spaces, border workers who let the cigarettes pass through the border checkpoint and local policemen who hunt petty traders dealing with the cigarettes in the city. Mili is right asking: '*Why on earth do they let the cigarettes come into town? What happens in the customs?*' Mili considers that only seizing cigarettes in the border post could make the work of patrols in town effective. Otherwise, the whole issue seems to be created and maintained by those who should stop it. However, in

the recent period, cigarette smuggling seems to decrease as the Schengen accession and austerity measures taken by the state as response to the debt and public expenses crisis dispossesses people gradually of their jobs and external controls become harsher with petty smugglers.

Let us return to Constantin and his self-assessed honest dwelling without crossing. His rejection of crossing is apparently explained by the theft and suspect morality involved in cross border trading. Yet, the dam was deemed as an additional referent in this, which, on the other hand, did not prevent him from fantasising about 'freedom'. In relation to the dam, Constantin has also some open complaints.

'*When electricity in our flats was shut down, it was the most awful time of my life. After so much suffering with the power plant and the dam, after we were promised free and permanent electricity… And power was cut in the factories as well. It was a paradox. They said we would have it all. Nothing. Lies. Betrayal. And they used to take us for voluntary agricultural work. They promised us stuff but they did not deliver anything.*'

Similar evaluations come from Petre, also from Orșova.

'*From 1980 to 1989 I did not sense the dam. Ironically, on the Romanian side of the border, the powerplant itself was cut from electricity* [specifically meaning that it was not supplied with electricity during the night]. *While driving along the river, there was complete darkness during the night. We had no facilities as they promised; the power was shut down every day.*'

This statement is of crucial importance as it comes from a person who had been actively involved in the propaganda for the dam. In addition, Petre and his family were subject to relocation, forced to leave their house in old Orșova for a smaller flat in the new town. In spite of these events that could affect his relation to the party state, Petre became one of the important local people of the apparatus – responsible for organising cultural activities supportive of the party. During the construction of the dam, and even before, Petre had been one of the key persons in town, whose task was to educate population for the coming of the dam through conferences aimed at explaining the advantages of electricity, radios, fridges, TVs etc. Constantin and Petre from Orșova are illustrative for the deep transformations of subjectivity. Their ideological convictions have been subverted and even turned upside down in the context in which

they evaluated their harsher conditions of dwelling that contradicted the promises that accompanied the controversial construction of the dam and plans for displacement. Their statements can be supplemented by many others coming from some border guards, for example, who, in the mid-1980's, when external debts caused serious shortages in Romania, were slightly more permissive with regard to attempts to illegal crossings. In their retrospective narratives, all these persons set themselves in contrasting positions: defenders of the system and victims of their own design, in different periods until 1989. Whilst favourable to the party and its actions in some matters, which were sometimes related to the official criminalisation of crossing and trade across the border, these people remained ardent critics of their everyday dwelling marked by deep consumer shortages and the presence of the dam, especially in the 1980's. However, the state is not necessarily perceived as responsible for the borderlanders' disillusionment with dwelling. The dam, its construction and direct consequences in the everyday life is somewhat dissociated from the party state. Many respondents did literally refer to the dam as a centre of intentionality and action that significantly affected their lives.

An interesting case of subverted and transformed political subjectivity came from a former and actual border guard from Turnu Severin, Ciprian, who told me about an interesting encounter he had before 1989 with a person he caught when trying to cross the Danube. The intriguing aspect about the encounter was the reflexivity into which Ciprian was forced. During the investigation, the 'offender,' a medical practitioner from Sibiu, did not answer properly, but only asked questions. The officer realised that, as a representative of the state, he should have been able to answer the man's questions. Actually, he realised that he himself had a lot of questions and contestations to address. Many of the contestations were similar to those of the illegal crosser he managed to catch. '*When were you last time in a hospital to see the conditions there? What did you see then?*' '*When were you last time at a play? Do you remember, really?*' '*Have you ever listened to Europa Liberă? What did you learn then?*' '*Is there any book you managed to buy from a bookshop recently?*' These were counterquestions the offender posed in order to make the border guard realise the motives for his decision to leave the country that way. '*There was a spiritual connection between us, on the limit of betrayal*', Ciprian told me. A strange communion was established between the two: the man of control/border guard and the 'illegal' border-crosser. Ciprian tried to help 'the illegal' crosser to avoid imprisonment. In practical terms,

he advised him to write his declaration this way: '*when I approached the Danube, I saw the water's turmoil and width and I decided not to flee, so I changed my mind*'. Ciprian's case of symbolic betrayal is not isolated. Luca, a border guard in his 50's, has also reported me that towards the end of 1980's he became increasingly aware that the 'frontierists' were right to plan their escapes.

The examples above show cases of antagonism and difference within the state apparatus itself. The anti-dam and shortage-related narratives produce repositioning of subjects and threaten the stability of the border as an intended clear-cut entity.

Dwelling and crossing

An important aspect that needs to be mentioned here in relation to the dam is that, until 1989, it politicised the everyday life at the border to a degree precedented only by deportations and the coming of border guards in the late 1940's, and it accentuated the negative effects of the 1980's consumer shortage as people were promised all sorts of facilities associated with the dam which were in fact not delivered. One medium of this politicisation was the landscape. The landscape people perceived changed dramatically in interaction with building sites, large numbers of colonists, and demolished, abandoned, or rebuilt parts of the river, towns and villages. This politicisation through multiplying the spaces for social relations was well illustrated in an account by Nelu from Turnu Severin.

The dam was presented as a grandiose feat, and a whole journalistic and literary movement started to promote the dam and the new world to emerge through it (Copcea 1985, 2002; Grasu 2002; Roman 1980; Rusu no date). Nelu was part of that movement, as a journalist for an important party's gazette. He wrote about the dam in terms of a '*citadel of light,*' a '*bridge of light*' – a great accomplishment by the state, socialist economy and society. This was not just a reproduction of the official creed but, as he suggested, it was also his sincere expectation for the future.

> '*We were happy because the gigantic construction was being built. A cult of work was flourishing here, construction workers were highly respected at some point. I was bewildered by the transformations that were happening around me.*'

The multitude of construction sites was astonishing and dynamic. Every day brought something new, everything was transforming quickly. Every day new equipment would show up, and something went missing – maybe a hill, maybe a mountain. The Danube itself was drained and the shores of the river were quickly changing.

> '*At some point I got lost on the construction site even though I was there from the beginning. It was a hundred hectares long, including the living spaces. It was like seeing the genesis of another world, the genesis of light, as the water was turning into light. An earthly tectonic controlled by man who could have seen himself as a demiurge.*'

The Iron Gates site was an immense conglomerate, as there were many construction sites, actually – an entire universe. People used to work 10-12 hours a day. Also, there were people who died there in work accidents. For example, when they were drilling a mountain to build a tunnel, 30 people died as they were working underneath the rocks and a huge cliff fell on top of them. But, as Nelu, continued,

> '*nothing can last without sacrifice. And, as you asked me about Ada-Kaleh, the island with the backward Turks living there was a necessary sacrifice too.*'

Though not easily representable, the new world came up as a deep antagonist force against the backward and simple life to which people were used at the border.

> '*A while back, fishermen used to fish among the weeds, on the water, but then we saw the 24-tone turbines with hundreds of pieces being assembled.*'

In addition to this techno scientific spectacle of transformation of nature, the party set into motion a large plan of employment for the rural labour force. They offered well-paid work to thousands of people from villages. A common worker at the dam made roughly three times the wage of a high-school teacher. The administration of the Iron Gates used to send recruiters in villages. The recruited were unskilled workers who received quick training on jobs. '*They were coming to the site wearing only a few clothes, they didn't even know what it meant to shower,*' Nelu made me aware. In addition, they received benefits such as clothes,

houses, bonuses etc. For Nelu, the construction of the dam was '*a huge step towards civilisation: from their straw mattress back home to a real bed and modern furniture.*' In this context, Turnu Severin grew fast and most of the people stayed.

The construction of the dam and the river's new landscape were glossed through stories of those who worked there – particularised as heroes of socialist construction. The dam lived very much through the people who worked at it, who had a unique opportunity to become founding characters of an impressive creation. They were often referred to as '*creators of landscape*,' '*artists of nature's transformation.*' '*They entered the mountain's entrails*,' as Nelu imagined them. The newspapers often made famous people out of apparently common workers. For example, this was the case of a blacksmith who worked on the entire metal structure of new Orșova. In turn, as Nelu recollects, people were proud that they did important work for the dam.

In contrast to this picture, there is a different subject position which still antagonises the transformations. The relations of the former dwellers of Ada-Kaleh with the island in the wake of the dam are illustrative. Adnan told me that:

> '*I always dream of it. When you know something disappears before your eyes, something you cannot see anymore, it is very tragic. Only people who went through this know the feeling. Some men wept because they knew they were never going to see the place again.*'

The dream of such people is to materialise their place, their familiar landscape. The desire to see the island, or other lost places, including old Orșova or Vârciorova, was expressed by many. When Adnan worked at a coffee house in Turnu Severin, after the opening of the dam, he often passed by with his car and he always looked for the island, but he could only see the plain waters of the river. He confessed that at times he imagines that the level of Danube will decrease and that he would thus be able to see the island. The island is 40 meters below the waters now. Adnan continues saying that '*the island was like my wife and child, or it was a parent to me, nothing can ever replace it.*' The same feeling is recounted by Esin. '*When I'm on the road, near the island, I always try to find it.*' It is not just his personal effort to rematerialise the island – media people often come and ask him questions for radio or TV reports.

> *'I'm a rarity, many have died, I am the only one left. On one of these reportages I went to the place where the island once was, on the water, to tell the story. The reporter phoned me on the same day my mother died years ago – she laid buried on the Șimian island. And she is still there as the cemetery was not based in Schela yet.'*

Esin considers that his sentiment about the island is a painful intimacy, and he told me he frequently declines participation in media reports.

> *'For a year, everything I dreamt of was myself on the island. I often dream of old friends from there. Situations in which I worked. For example, the minaret for which I did renovation work and they destroyed it with dynamite. They used a lot of dynamite to put it down. It was so strong. A lot of my friends died and I often dream of these persons.'*

In his intimate relationship with the island, we find something that refuses representations from the outside, official images of the island and its former dwellers. To a certain degree, the lost materiality of the island leaves its former dwellers with certain memories and representations of the island, but also with a large non-representable material. In relation to this, we need to mention that there are different practices of recollecting the island. For example, Adnan prefers to communicate rather official images and discourses about the island, including history, folklore, everyday life issues, all described in a romantic version transmitted through pictures, books, letters from his personal large collection. He does a form of dissemination with apparently little emotional investment. In contrast, Esin is not interested in these forms of communication. In addition, although both Esin and Adnan reactivate Ada-Kaleh through dreaming, Esin seems to take this issue more seriously. Dreaming the island is a way of remembering and reinventing the island in one's own, subjective terms, as much as it is used as a claim of an intimate relationship that is only fragmentally shared with the others. Esin ironically told me about an Austrian student who visited him. Technically speaking, the student wanted to learn more about the island, but he actually knew more details about it, as compared to Esin. It all culminated when the student showed Esin some photos from archives. In one of the photos there was Esin with his grandmother! – a picture that Esin did not have in his personal collection. Interestingly, he even told me that '*I am a quasi-illiterate about the island.*' There are many things about Ada-Kaleh which Esin asserts no interest in. Yet, his

attachment to the lost place is dramatically intense. Engaging with different forms of testimony, Adnan reinvents the island as a form of preponderant technical knowledge that provides easy visual representations of the lost landscape for him and others. On the other hand, Esin, in its reinvention of the lost place does primarily produce a non-representational form of knowledge about Ada-Kaleh. Much more than seeing it, Esin feels the island in the absence of material testimonies.

It is not just the island that is missed and fantasised about so much, but also the Danube itself – the river as a space of dwelling and crossing. The Danube is no longer the same river after the construction of the dam.

> '*The Danube was very clean before – I used to drink from it. Now it's a mess because of the dam. The river has grown wider and the water is rising. The Danube was more beautiful back then. The Danube was a flowing stream back then. Now, it is a dirty lake of accumulation, growing and flooding everything around, year by year, as it has not been cleared for more than 20 years.*'

From the friendly natural and built landscape as they knew it, the Danube is now seen as a threatening and uncontrollable presence. Esin is very nostalgic about that lost dwelling. '*I would have loved to keep on living where I was born. If the island wouldn't have been under water, I would have surely been living there today.*'

The same nostalgia exists with regard to another border place – the old Orșova. Constantin recollects that:

> '*It took us 5 years to move, and moving was a sort of collectivisation. They asked you if you wanted to move, but in fact they were forcing it on you. You had no choice. 'Get out of Orșova, at 12 o'clock everything will be flooded!' – they were screaming through megaphones. This was around 1971. And all my childhood got flooded, everything was under water in an hour tops. I simply couldn't believe it.*'

Constantin saw the water coming towards the town. He still remembers a church being flooded, the very same church he was baptised in as a child. Reflecting on the issue, Petre told me that nostalgia for the old town still lingers in all people living in Orșova except those who did not live there before the flooding. It is, however, a big puzzle and curiosity to the younger inhabitants.

'*People of old Orșova never dreamt of themselves in the new town. I often dreamt of myself in the old city, finding my old friends, old places, or seeing the water swell. I've been living in the new town over 40 years, but I still dream of the old one.*'

Petre suggested me that his dreams would have probably had a different object if living conditions had been different.

'*It was decent until the 1980's. Then – the decade when we did not have electricity in our flats, when we had no food, although we were told we had one of the most productive companies in Europe near our town.*'

It is again important to note here that my respondents speak to this ethnography retrospectively. Their present accounts on past emotions, actions, intentions are mediated by numerous external forces, but also by subjective engagements with their everyday life, past and present, including memory's selectivity and levels of distress. In some cases, dissatisfaction with the present (being unemployed, or about to get laid off, or being unhealthy) or accentuated emotional states such as nostalgia for friends and kin, lost places, social relations, leisure activities, or occupational opportunities influence their discourse on the past engineering into the border landscape, or other issues. In a way, articulating narratives in the present about past events do work as compensating and 'justice'-making opportunities for my respondents. Yet, this possible instrumentality of narratives does not preclude the validity of constructed discourses. On the contrary, it reveals that narratives provide different evaluations, intriguing articulations of political subjectivity and descriptions of processes from which they were generated.

From the stories about the construction of the dam, crossing and dwelling appear as different, yet related modes of subjectivation. They form a productive context of political self-becoming, a way to create border spaces and temporalities in the form of events and narratives on events that turn out to be evaluations of my respondents' own lives. Many accounts above refer explicitly to the border space once materialised as a familiar landscape, and then radically changed. Landscape has been complied with or resisted against by people, and formed both the conditions and outcome of border remaking. As my ethnography shows, this outcome is yet imprecise, contested and lived in different forms. Imagined rematerialisations of the old border landscape and the refusal

of representations from 'outside' (like in Esin's case of engaging with the lost island) are proofs that the border is an object of contested knowledge. Resulting diversity, multiplicity, lack of consensus and a significant deal of dissatisfaction and political contestation lead us to conclude the impossibility of constitution of the border into a clear-cut, stable entity.

The diversity of spatiotemporal referentialities internalized and used by my informants in their assessment of their relations and situations is intriguing. Forces that backed transformations, including the landscape and the interventions regarding it, often remained outside the control of my informants, and in this way became metaphors for the indeterminacy of life itself. Deep antagonisms in relation to the isolation and brutal defence of the border, deportations, dam construction, floods and relocations, regionalisation, produced a site of ongoing transformation and a productive context for everyday and official party politics. As this section shows, the ethnographic examination of narratives of lives at the border is crucial in understanding the border entity's complex dynamics and its incongruence with 'official' representations and discourses within the frames of strict territoriality, sovereignty, or fuzzy concepts such as 'culture'.

The formation of political subjectivities is paradoxical and fragmented though. As revealed in the ethnography, my respondents may refer and evaluate objects of their everyday life differently, according to the spatiotemporal context of relations. Esin mentions the enthusiasm he initially manifested in the perspective of their relocation from Ada-Kaleh. Life on the island had been tough, rudimentary, while relocations opened new perspectives and promises for a better life. Yet, his position in the present is completely different about the island – he wants it back, he would live there if possible, the dam construction had produced a long-term sentiment of disown, which was not compensated by the opening of the border and its intensive crossing, especially after 1989. The various spacetimes of his relations and life cannot be put together, their reconstitution seems impossible for Esin. His crossing and dwelling practices remain sequences of shifting subject positions that elaborate either manifest or quiet everyday politics.

In spite of the deep dissatisfaction with dwelling and dispossessions, controls and surveillance of all kinds, there were people who engaged actively in supporting the authorities and the border guards in identifying potential flights to Serbia. One of my respondents who had connections with such people is Petre. '*There were many informers. Even I myself was constantly visited by a man from Securitate who was asking me to report on*

friends and acquaintances.' Petre also recalls that the informers were part of the local population. Some were people subjected to many restrictions; some were 'friends with border guards.' In particular, as Petre told me, there was a young man from Orșova, a mentally disabled person, who thought himself a border guard. The soldiers fed and clothed him. Their service meant a lot to him and he offered a lot of information on suspects.

Another good example of how persons became paradoxical (acting and reacting) subjects in relation to the frontier is Nelu. His family, as mentioned above, were deported to Bărăgan in 1951, where they spent four years and six months. They came back, but their houses in Balta Verde, their village of origin were occupied by the local collective farm, as a result of the local collectivisation of agricultural properties. So they moved to Turnu Severin, where Nelu went to high-school. If he had ever mentioned that he had manadatory residence in Bărăgan, he would never have gotten into high school, as selection was very politically oriented. But his father was a good worker at his new job and occupied a mechanic's vacancy at the local public transportation company. Therefore, Nelu had a good and credible certificate. Still, his application to university in Timișoara was rejected, even though he handled the written examination quite well. By mistake, he filled in his autobiography with real details, including the experience of deportation. By disguising his past, he managed to get into an institute for primary school teachers in Craiova. Then, he was assigned as a primary school teacher in a village, Jidoștița. Years later, he entered university in Bucharest. Because there were not many literarily talented people around, they made him a local party member and hired him at *Viitorul*, in Turnu Severin, a powerful newspaper run by the party. '*If I would have written bad things about some director, I could have removed that person from his good post in three days. It was a great power assigned to me.'* At some point, he was kicked out of the party organisation, on the allegation of immorality when he divorced and remarried an engineer. A friend helped him return to his old teacher's job.

> '*That's where the Revolution caught me. After 1989 they made me a high school teacher, then I was a member of the county's council, for 5 commissions at the time, under the Ecological Party and the Social Democrat Party. I, who was deported, hung around Iliescu, a bolshevik (laughing).'*

The above stories reveal a politicised border in which crossing and dwelling give different meanings to one's own life. Dwelling has generally been understood as peaceful grounding of one's existence, an autonomous and depoliticised category of subjectivity (Heidegger 1971; Ingold 2000). My case explores a different kind of dwelling though – one that does not elude struggle and contestation – a process of making a political subject. Dwelling, in this understanding, is not necessarily part of the individual spatiotemporal choices. Ilie, Nelu, Petre, Constantin, Adnan, Esin and all the others are persons who were transported in various spatiotemporal relational contexts to which they developed various narratives and counternarratives, resistance and compliance with powerful actors that aimed to transform their lives. In their dwelling at the Romania-Yugoslavia border they were accompanied by sentiments of insecurity. For some of them, crossing appears as a practice that did not necessarily compensate the bitter sense of dwelling. Further fantasising has then been produced, especially in the context in which crossing, as a practice or imagination, offered them an opportunity to critically consider 'concepts' of 'place' and 'dwelling' in relation to their personal situations.

As revealed in the narratives of my informants, there were processes that altered the sense of dwelling at the border. Among these, the border enforcements of the last decades, including harsh border regimes with selective crossing authorised at some point, or deportations linked to nationalisation of property in the 1940's and 1950's, and forced displacements and changes in landscapes were of primary influence. Illegal flights of people trying to escape into the West across the border, massive labour migration to Western Europe after 1989 and general urban abandonment in the area came to complement those processes and indicated the uneasy relations that individuals developed with the place. In addition, the Romania-Yugoslavia border has constantly been marked by unemployment and poor industrialisation, marginality and poverty of local populations, mainly involved in angling on the Danube. Dwelling has further been dramatised through the long history of crossing and relations between the Romanian and Serbian border populations that produced an antagonistic and anxious sense of living with the place. Therefore, dwelling is for many a hopeless condition of being left there, with no opportunity and little expectation for the future.

An aspect that struck me during fieldwork was this dissatisfaction with current lives. One of the few things that made many people happy were the 'escapes' to the Serbian town of Kladovo that faces Turnu Severin

from the other side. They went there with friends and family and spent afternoons at pubs and terraces, or on the local sand beach. These trips to Serbia were enjoyable, but also accentuated the bitter taste of dwelling in their town because of their perceptions of differences and asymmetries between Romania and Serbia since the opening of the dam in socialism. Their Serbian neighbours not only smuggled Western goods to them in times of shortage, but opened the horizons of their reflexivity. Until 1989, meeting Serbians at the marketplace in Severin, or going to Kladovo or Negotin, on the Serbian side, were occasions for reflection upon their own condition of subjects of an increasingly intrusive and aggressive state apparatus of control and surveillance. Through contrasts, they were offered opportunities to appreciate and envy the liberties and wealth of the Yugoslavian citizens authorised to travel and work in Western Europe since the 1950's.

Although this internalized asymmetry strengthened the sense of a disappointing dwelling, while spending time with petty cigarettes smugglers during my fieldwork, I noticed that those people did not complain much about their life in this place. Although involved in a risky activity which does not necessarily bring them considerable cash, under permanent attempts of regulation and surveillance in the border post as well as in the city, they seemed to be rather content with their mobile condition. Moreover, many of those who did not smuggle, would very much like to, having a fantasy of a better life through smuggling.

In sum, dwelling at the border is a mode of non-belonging and placelessness (Seamon, Sowers 2008) compensated through crossing and various contestations which make and politicise the subject and the border as a topographical and imagined space-time. The urban reconstruction of border towns and cities since socialism is also a practice that stimulates further (critical) reflexivity upon dwelling and subjectivation. For example, Sorin worked in the urban planning office at the municipality of Turnu Severin before 1989. He told me that the Danube was only selectively accessible for the common dwellers of the city. This was not only due to the guards who were permanently present at the river, but also due to the organisation of urban space. '*You do not feel the Danube in this town. I've been in Hârşova and I could feel it there, it was much closer to me. But it was not a border, as it is here.*' He told me about the inappropriateness of the civic center in Severin, about how its building created lack of access to the natural landscape and its entertaining potential. '*A city builds itself and this was not the case with our civic center.*' The civic center

had been reconstructed in a way that moved attention away from the river walk as a site for leisure to a place closer to the main road far away from the Danube. This distancing of the river from the senses and locals' leisure practices went along with the heavy industrialising of the place. In practical terms, long kilometers of the river walk were, after the war, occupied through setting up or extending industrial estates, including a navy building factory, a rail car factory, a military unit etc. The Danube, its landscape and enjoyments were thus transformed into a place refused to people, populated instead with factories and institutions of control, an ideological and material site of discipline and surveillance. The civic center rerouted the locals' walks of promenade, departing them from the river.

Crossing, in practice and fantasy

Cristi, one of my local friends, and I were in a bar in Turnu Severin, talking and waiting for a football match screened on TV. Cristi is a long-term unemployed young man and he started to challenge me with his disappointing views in relation to the local job market. He then told me about an offer he received recently – to be a lumberjack, a very demanding and low paid job. He told me he declined the job. In his personal style, he then shared with me a strong fantasy of what he would be doing in the near future. He told me about a job he was expecting as a worker at a local factory of tyre covers.

> '*I will get 1,000 lei plus vouchers every month. In addition, I will start going to Serbia again, for cigarettes. And I will make 5-600 lei every month from cigarettes and alcohol.*'

He added that he would not frequent bars anymore, because he would become a busy businessman. Moreover, in five years he would have saved a lot of money, more than he would ever expect, which he would buy an expensive car with, a Benz, to go abroad, settle there and work as a taxi driver. '*And I will never ever return to Severin.*'

Crossing appears here as a category of the border space-time, and a direct product of the disappointment with dwelling. Crossing enables the articulation of different subject positions in relation to life on the move, opposed to the boredom and hopelessness of dwelling in towns and villages with few occupational opportunities. Even if not always

an available practice, crossing lives intensely in fantasy and occupies the aspirations of many borderlanders. It existed in this way even more intensely during socialism, or immediately after World War II, in the time of absolute restrictions. The active fantasising about themselves involved in various forms of smuggling, quick enrichment, better life conditions, as well as perceptions of past, present, and future cross-border asymmetries between localities, people, living standards, ways to control the border, indicate their desire to become proper actors across the border and to refuse solace with the poor conditions of dwelling.

In Turnu Severin, as long as there were opportunities across the border and regulations relaxed, perceptions of the city and living standards were different from Cristi's and other respondents'. This was the case with the boom of incoming Serbians for shopping and marketing in the city, in the 1970's and 1980's, as well as with the embargo gas smuggling and massive flows of work and trade into Yugoslavia in the 1990's. Gigi, another respondent, told me that when Severin was invaded by Serbians, Albanians, Moldavians, the pleasure of life was much higher. '*It was real life, it was good then.*'

On one of our meetings, Petre from Orșova told me about a special moment which announced the building of the dam and the promise of crossing to borderlanders on both sides of the Danube. This moment had been used as a crossing opportunity – the first major one in two decades – by thousands of Yugoslavian citizens into Romania. In September 1964 the Romanian president Gheorghiu Dej visited the future site of the hydroelectric power plant and passed on a bridge of ships into Yugoslavia, where president Tito was waiting him with anthems and cannons. The whole convoy then passed into Romania, across this bridge. Romanians could not cross into Yugoslavia as they were not yet allowed then. Petre recalls that the Serbians coming to the Romanian side in large numbers were very enthusiastic, and they kept saying things like: '*we want to go to Romania, because we have brothers, friends there. We're going with you, Tito!*'.

> '*The Serbian legions came flooding, after almost 20 years of oppression. Some were coming from agricultural work, barefoot, everybody came how they could.*'

In the evening they were supposed to go back. Their return took actually three days. As the bridge of ships was dismantled, they were going to harbour in Turnu Severin saying:

'Hey, I'm Serbian and I've come here with Tito.' 'Yes, but Tito returned a week ago'. So many Serbians came then. Romanians were not allowed to go to Yugoslavia then.'

Petre's crossings to Yugoslavia are also very relevant episodes.

'When I first went into Serbia, something very emotional happened. My grandma told me to go find a woman in Kladovo, somebody she knew from her youth. I passed with a little bag of food, but I noticed that other people were passing with lots of things – smuggling had already begun. So I went there and found that woman. I visited the Kladovo fortress, I met some young people who were on their way to Sweden to study and I also met a pretty young but shy girl. I went to meet my colleagues at the museum there. On other trips I wanted to sell and buy like the others, but it wasn't my main purpose. Once I was on the bus with my mother. Besides me there was a Gypsy guy with two full buckets. He told me: 'Hey boy, aren't you carrying anything? No? Well you're kind of strange then'. He gave me a bucket to take across, so I wouldn't go empty-handed. Some people were specialists in small cross-border trade. I felt some sort of freedom doing these trips, something special. This small trade degenerated soon into pure smuggling. In the 90's it was already a mass phenomenon.'

All these stories indicate a very intense experience and enthusiasm with crossing the border, even in persons who were not strongly committed to make a permanent life style of that. Petre, Constantin and other respondents had little personal commitment to smuggling, but they were very attached, in different periods of their lives, to the imagination of crossing the border. Sorin, the former urban planner from Turnu Severin, also provides a case in point. He is a typical example of disappointed dweller, basically a non-crosser. "*Although I lived at the frontier for most of the time, I have never had an experience of crossing it*". He told me that he would have been able to clandestinely make it to Yugoslavia at some point, but he could not explain why he had no temptation of this kind, neither before 1989, nor after.

Daniel, a 50-year old man from Breznița, a village just outside Turnu Severin, recounted to me the intense presence of the border guards since his childhood. They were coming almost daily into Breznița to ask about suspects who want to cross the Danube clandestinely. They were also permanently inquiring about fellow villagers with crossing passes who carried merchandise into Yugoslavia, what they were carrying there, how

long and where they stayed. He could not remember a period in his life without controls and checks, in town, in his village, in local factories in which he worked etc. Beyond this permanent surveillance and control, he crossed the border many times to buy and resell various goods at marketplaces around, all coming from Serbia, Hungary or Bulgaria. His wife had always been even more involved in this itinerant business. As he worked at the rail car factory in Turnu Severin, he carried pieces produced there to Serbia, selling them for good cash. For regular border-crossers like Daniel and his wife, dwelling was accomplished as a joyful experience through crossing. This would have not been possible without the intense relatedness established with the border guards and customs officers. Before 1989 he had a job at the car service shop in Gura Văii, just next to the Iron Gates dam. That was an ideal location to relate to the persons of control. He is still very proud of his pre-1989 relationships with the customs 'bosses.' He repaired their cars and that was the beginning of their friendship for purposes of crossing with all the necessary items without checks and harsh treatment. He also worked a period at Hidroconstruct[5] where he often had visits to Serbian partners across the Danube – another occasion to get to know customs officers and border guards. Funnily enough, there was a time when the customs officers were begging him insistently to order a cross-border pass for himself.

The direct experience with the control and its people, through mutual knowledge outside their workplace and negotiation of mutual benefits was a major source of subjectivation, personally invested with positive or negative meaning, impacting individuals, households and their economic strategies, life styles, joys with crossing and dwelling in general. At some point, due to his close ongoing friendship to key border guards and customs officers, Daniel gained the impression that the border did not exist. '*As far as I went there so easily, for every need or purpose, in my mind there was no border.*' This invisibility of the border is, again, a peculiar frontier effect (Donnan, Wilson 2010) connected to crossing practices, an effect which appears now in the absence of constraining factors, but in the presence of facilitating actors.

Similar to dwelling, crossing accounts for a great deal of imaginations and practices in my respondents' narratives. However, it appears in different forms. For some, such as Daniel, it constitutes a resource they constantly exploited at the border. This approach to crossing produces the illusion that the border does not exist as delineation, as regular border crossers develop strong relations to the state workers at the border in order

to facilitate their trips and make their business predictable in long term. For others, crossing is a lost resource. This is the case of so many people that made cash of contraband trade in the exceptional context of the embargoes upon Yugoslavia in the 1990's. As this practice ended more than 12 years ago, some of them continued to make profit from cigarette smuggling, although it was not that profitable as before. Others stayed at home and experienced the disillusionment of life at the border, as regular non-crossers. Still for others, crossing was never a practice to engage with. This is the Constantin's case, for example. For these people, crossing has always been invested with either fantasy and desire, or fear and anxiety in relation to control and persecution (especially before 1989). Cristi is an interesting case of romantic fantasising and hope about crossing. Occasional border crossers were also usual among my respondents. Petre is one of them. He tried small smuggling as well, but it did not work for him, as he had interests in different other things. Other forms of crossing which I regularly encountered during fieldwork were the illegal flights before 1989, or the regular seasonal labour in Serbia, which is still a way to subsist for many poor rural families at the border today.

As we see, there are several different approaches to crossing strongly connected to the ways in which these people experienced dwelling, including landscape and its transformations, in various periods at the border. It is interesting to see that crossing is generally a source of hope and excitement, and enables political subjectivities of contestation of the border object. Crossing, as a practice, creates innovation and new actors, sets of social relations and spatiotemporal connections across the border. It sets the border as a flexible, becoming entity.

Conclusion

This article showed that transforming landscapes are important processes that contribute to a flexible making of the border. As the ethnography shows, landscape offers premises for antagonistic options for borderlanders in areas of crossing and dwelling. From a material viewpoint, the changing landscape of the border is the outcome of the human intervention into nature, dictated by political and economic rationale, thus facilitating or constraining dwelling and crossing practices. The dam, as an all-present force behind the landscape transformation, does many times stand for the border itself, as an effect of constant shifting.

NOTES

1   This research paper is the outcome of a NECSOC Fellowship granted by New Europe College within the project DOCSOC, *Excellency, Innovation and Interdisciplinarity in doctoral and postdoctoral studies in sociology (contract POSDRU /21/1.5/G/27059)*, a project co-financed by the European Social Fund through the Operational Sectorial Program for the Development of Human Resources 2007 – 2013.

2   All the names of my respondents have been changed.

3   Romanian speaking population living on the Serbian side of the Danube, as well as other inland areas of Serbia. When my respondents referred to the Serbians, they largely spoke about Vlachs, with whom they always had excellent connections in all areas of life.

4   Narrow, montaineous sector of the Danube's flow between Orșova and Moldova Nouă.

5   Company responsible with the construction and maintenance of the Iron Gates hydropower plant.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ANDERSON, B., "For space (2005): Doreen Massey", in HUBARD, P., KITCHIN, R., VALENTINE, G. (eds.) *Key texts in human geography,* PP. 225-33, Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, Sage, 2008

ARMANCA, B., *Frontieriștii: istoria recentă în mass-media*, Ed. Curtea Veche, București, 2011

ATKINS, K., ed., *Self and subjectivity*, Malden, Victoria, Blackwell Publishing, 2005

BERCEA, R., IANAȘI, N., *Deportații. Via Dolorosa Bărăgan 18 iunie 1951*, Ed. Profin, Drobeta Turnu Severin, 2010

BERDAHL, D., *Where the world ended: re-unification and identity in the German borderland,* New York, London, University of California Press, 1999

BUTLER, J., *The psychic life of power: theories in subjection,* Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1997

CERNICOVA-DINCĂ, T.M., *Anno Domini 1951*, Ed. Mirton, Timișoara, 2003

COPCEA, F., *Drumul bărbaților*, Ed. Scrisul Românesc, Craiova, 1985

COPCEA, F., *Demiurgii*, Ed. Lumina, Drobeta Turnu Severin, 2002

DE CERTEAU, M., *The practice of everyday life,* Berkely, University of California Press, 1984

DONNAN, H., WILSON, T.M., *Borders: frontiers of identity, nation and state,* Oxford, Berg, 1999

DONNAN, H., WILSON, T.M., "Ethnography, Security and the 'Frontier Effect' in Borderlands", in DONNAN, H., WILSON, T.M. (eds.) *Borderlands: Ethnographic Approaches to Security, Power, and Identity*, pp. 1-20, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Plymouth, University Press of America, Inc., 2010

GORNOVICEANU, I., *Bișnițar în Yugoslavia*, Ed. Mondo-Ec, Timișoara, 1991

GRASU, I., *Porțile luminii*, Ed. Prier, Drobeta Turnu Severin, 2002

GREEN, S., *Notes from the Balkans: locating marginality and ambiguity on the Greek-Albanian border,* Princeton, NJ, Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2005

HEIDEGGER, M., "Building, dwelling, thinking", in HOFSTADTER, A. (trans.) *Poetry, language, thought,* pp. 143-62, New York, Harper Colophon Books, 1971

HEYMAN, J. MCC., "The Mexico-US border in anthropology: a critique and reformulation", in *Journal of Political Ecology,* 1, pp. 43-65, 1994

INGOLD, T., *The perception of the environment: essays on livelihood, dwelling and skill,* London, New York, Routledge, 2000

JUAN-PETROI, C., "Strămutarea orașului Orșova pe o nouă vatră (1966-1974). Valorificarea muzeală a moștenirii civilizației sale urbane (proiecte tematice)", in *Historia Urbana*, XIV/1, pp. 95-117, 2006

LEFEBVRE, H., *The production of space*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1991

MARINEASA, V., VIGHI, D., *Rusalii '51. Fragmente din deportarea în Bărăgan*, Ed. Marineasa, Timișoara, 1994

MASSEY, D., *For space*, Los Angeles, Sage, 2005

MERLEAU-PONTY, M., *Phenomenology of Perception*, New York, Humanities Press, 2002

MILIN, M., STEPANOV, L., *Sârbii din România în Golgota Bărăganului*, Uniunea Sârbilor din România, Asociația Foștilor Deportați în Bărăgan, Timișoara, 2003

ROGOBETE, A., *Eu, cântând, vă povestesc*, Comitetul parohial Eșelnița, 2006

ROMAN, I., *Vărsătorul de piatră*, Ed. Eminescu, București, 1980

RUSU, V., *Orșova , cetate a iubirii*, Ed. Eubeea, Timișoara

SARAFOLEAN, S., *Deportații în Bărăgan 1951-1956*, Ed. Mirton, Timișoara, 2001

SEAMON, D., SOWERS, J., "Place and placelessness (1976): Edward Relph", in HUBARD, P., KITCHIN, R., VALENTINE, G. (eds.) *Key texts in human geography,* pp. 43-52, Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, Sage Publications, 2008

TILLEY, C., *A phenomenology of landscape: places, paths and monuments,* Oxford/ Providence, Berg, 1994

WILSON, T.M., DONNAN, H., "Nation, state and identity at international borders", in WILSON, T.M., DONNAN, H., H. (eds.) *Border identities: nation and state at international frontiers*, pp. 11-35, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998

KONRAD SIEKIERSKI

Born in 1981, in Warsaw, Poland

Ph.D. candidate in the Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography, National Academy of Sciences of Armenia and in the Institute for Eastern Studies, Adam Mickiewicz University
Thesis: *Pilgrimage and Sacred Places in the Context of Modern Armenian Culture*

Several articles on present-day religious situation in Armenia and conference presentations

THE ARMENIAN DIASPORA IN ROMANIA: ROOTS, ROUTES, RE-CREATIONS

There are two kinds of Armenians in the world:
those who know it, and those who don't know it yet.

We have Armenians who are bigger Romanians than the Romanians,
we have Armenians who are bigger Hungarians than the Hungarians,
but we are short of Armenians who are good Armenians. This is our problem.

Introduction

This article describes the main organizational and socio-cultural features of the present-day Armenian diaspora in Romania, its relations with home and host countries, and its participation in the transnational Armenian diasporic network. It also offers a discussion of diasporic identity, showing its highly personalized, flexible and multi-layered character.

The analysis is based on a qualitative study conducted in Romania (March-July 2011), in Bucharest, Constanta, Cluj-Napoca, Dumbrăveni, Gherla and Miercurea-Ciuc. In a course of the fieldwork, thirty in-depth loosely structured interviews were recorded and backed by field notes from participation in a number of diaspora events and gatherings. Majority of conversations took place with Armenians actively involved in diasporic life, especially leaders of local communities. To balance these data, less engaged and selectively active persons, especially from a young generation were also interviewed. Another set of interviews was taken with activists of local NGOs specializing in ethnic and religious minorities in Romania, as well as with scholars from the Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities. Participation in Armenian events included the feast of Saint Gregory the Illuminator in Gherla, a number of Sunday liturgies (both of Armenian Catholic and Armenian Apostolic Churches), elections held by the Union of Armenians in Romania, and commemoration of the Armenian genocide. Data, gathered during ethnographic fieldwork were

complemented by an analysis of written sources, particularly Armenian press published in Romania (*Ararat* and *Nor Ghiank* journals).

Diaspora: Theoretical Considerations

The term "diaspora" has a great career nowadays. It is a key to many doors, even to too many, as its critics say.[1] Today one can hear about an almost incalculable number of diasporas, not only ethno-national or religious[2], but also "queer diaspora"[3], or "the sexual diaspora of older women".[4] As Paul Johnson puts it ironically "Suddenly, it appears, everyone is in diaspora."[5] Diaspora as a category of practice became highly evaluated; what earlier could be a stigma today is often not only proudly displayed, but also politically charged, and can serve as a trampoline to higher status, funds and positions. Meanwhile, as a descriptive-analytical term it carries today several interconnected meanings, including a migratory pattern, statistical ensemble of dispersed people, specific type of consciousness, and mode of cultural production.[6] Some scholars perceive the proliferation of the concept of diaspora as a sign of our times that reflects important transformations of the contemporary world,[7] such as a growing hybridity of identities and rising visibility of transnational networks. Others see, for better or worse, the diasporic order as an emerging alternative to a fading hegemony of the nation-state.[8]

One of the most discussed conceptualizations of diaspora has been formulated by William Safran, who has proposed that this term should be applied to

> expatriate minority communities, whose members share several of following characteristics: 1) they, or their ancestors, have been dispersed from a specific, original "center" to two or more "peripheral," or foreign, regions; 2) they retain a collective memory, vision or myth about their original homeland – its physical location, history, and achievements; 3) they believe that they are not – and perhaps cannot be – fully accepted by their host society and therefore feel partly alienated and insulated from it; 4) they regard their ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home and as the place to which they or their descendants would (or should) eventually return – when conditions are appropriate; 5) they believe that they should, collectively, be committed to the maintenance or restoration of their original homeland and to its safety and prosperity; 6) they continue to relate, personally or vicariously, to that homeland in one way or another,

and their ethnocommunal consciousness and solidarity are importantly defined by the existence of such a relationship.[9]

This definition of diaspora owes its popularity not only to the fact that it, arguably, underlines many important features of the discussed phenomenon, but also to the fact that it is a grist for the scholars' mill, as it allows to raise numerous questions, discussions and critiques. For example, Stephane Dufoix points out that Safrans's definition is a "vehicle for static thinking", which is characterized by: 1) "the illusion of essence" (the assumptions, according to which the name implies a real existence of thing); "the illusion of community" (the assumption that common characteristics of given people should result in common conscience); and "the illusion of continuity" (which obscures the possibility to examine the dynamic character of diaspora).[10]

In order to avoid Safran's "static thinking", Paul Johnson proposes to approach diaspora not as "a permanent state of being", but as "a series of interventions".[11] In his view, diasporic communities and cultures must be, at least in certain situations and on certain occasions, re-created ritually or discursively; and at least from time to time a given diasporic identity must be elevated over other possible affiliations.[12] The research on Armenian diaspora in Romania confirms that repetitive acts such as every-Sunday liturgy or every-year commemoration of the Armenian Genocide play a crucial role in the process of diaspora's re-creation. Furthermore, even expressing certain moods and intentions or planning something "for the sake of our community" or in order "to maintain our identity" can be as effective as real deeds. This observation is well illustrated by the fact that at the time of author's fieldwork it appeared as though "everything is just beginning" for the Romanian Armenian diaspora: new ideas regarding language courses and digitalization of archives were announced by the Armenian Union, while the Church just started the project on cataloguing old manuscripts and planned to organize the first summer school for Romanian Armenian youth. Furthermore, the idea of cyclical Armenian parties was initiated in Bucharest, the call for creating a community's "who is who" index was raised, and an opening of Romanian branch of the Hayastan All-Armenian Fund was announced.

Some scholars also point out that a more nuanced understanding of the character of the relationship between diaspora and homeland is needed: the one in which not only is the faraway center a source of meaning for the dispersed population, but equally important is the fact of separation.

James Clifford notes that even in the "classical" case of Jewish diaspora, the idea to come back to Israel is only a part of Jewish experience, which rivals with "principled ambivalence about physical return and attachment to land".[13] In more general terms, Johnson writes: "Diasporas are cultures that cross wide transmissive gaps and are also about such gaps. […] Being "in diaspora" is best understood as the active engagement with, and evocation of, such gaps as a source of meaning."[14] In other words, the perceived distance (both in space and in time), which separates "here" from "there" is as much a constitutive feature of the diaspora condition as the links, which connect the two parts. As a result, being in diaspora is not only about creating affiliations, but also about securing a certain separation and giving room to partial identifications and selective invocations.

The Armenian diaspora's notion(s) of homeland illustrate well a need for employing such a more nuanced approaches. Firstly, it includes not only an experience of (sometimes multiply) rediasporalization, but also an issue of where the "official homeland", i.e. the post-Soviet Republic of Armenia, is placed on the scale of longing and symbolizing the "center". Secondly, the "myth of return" has been challenged in last two decades by the very fact that actually almost no members of the Armenian diaspora worldwide decided to move to newly established country. As described later in this text, Armenia is invoked in many context by Armenians in Romania (see: Relations with Armenia and Armenian Diasporic Network), but very rarely the idea of permanent resettlement or even of obtaining second citizenship is considered as viable option.

Another concern may be raised regarding Safran's idea of the alienation of diaspora members from the host society. Data, collected during author's fieldwork, show that in general   Armenians in Romania do not perceive their Armenianness as a factor that obstructs their participation in Romanian society. Moreover, some of the most engaged activists of diasporic organizations play also a key role in the Romanian political and cultural life (see: Relations with Host State and Society). Actually, concerns regarding alienation from and tension with the Romanian majority were expressed only by those Armenians, who, although they live in Romania, identify their host society as Hungarian, and thus share Hungarians' feelings of segregation and discrimination.

Drawing on the above discussed approaches to studying diaspora, in next parts of this article selected characteristics of the Armenian presence in Romania will be discussed. Namely, (1) the location of the Armenian diaspora in the Romanian state and society, (2) its relations with Armenia

and with other Armenian diasporic communities, and (3) its self-image will be described. Firstly however, a short overview of historical and present-day Armenian life in diaspora should be given.

Armenia and Armenian Diaspora: an Overview

The Armenian history of migration and dispersion is one of the longest and most diverse, and Armenians are often listed among "classical" diaspora people together with Jews, Greeks, Chinese and Africans.[15]

Except for short periods, starting from the fifth century up until modern times, the power over the territory considered by Armenians their homeland[16] was exercised by Byzantine, Persian, Arab, Ottoman, and Russians Empires. During all this time Armenians migrated – forcefully or willingly – to locations scattered in different parts of the world, establishing the tradition of communal life in various culturally alien settings. Furthermore, the only long-lasting state Armenians were able to create during the last one and a half millennium was the "diasporic" Kingdom of Cilicia (1080-1375), situated on the shore of the Mediterranean Sea. Interestingly, it was there that the first written articulation of the notion of Armenian dispersion appeared in a twelve-century encyclical of catholicos[17] Nerses Shnorhali. He addressed his letter

> [t]o all the faithful of the Armenian nation, those in the east who inhabit our homeland Armenia, those who emigrated to the regions in the west, and those in the middle lands who were taken among foreign peoples, and who for our sins are scattered in cities, castles, villages, and farms in every corner of the earth.[18]

In the history of Armenian mobility, certain waves of migration and centers of settlement were especially important. In the eleventh century, Turkish conquests pushed a great number of Armenians to the north – firstly to Crimea, and from there to the Polish Kingdom and to Moldova. In the seventeenth century another part of Armenian population was forcefully settled in Persian capital city of Isfahan, from where some of them migrated later to India. Another important center of diasporic life – the Armenian Catholic Mekhitarist Brotherhood – was established at the beginning of the eighteenth century in Venice. During the same century numerous communities emerged in Russia, and in the nineteenth century

at that time the most important city of Caucasus – Tiflis (Tbilisi) – was mainly inhabited by Armenians. Meanwhile, Armenians were a minority in "their" lands and the present-day territory of the Republic of Armenia was gradually re-populated by them only after it went under the control of the Russian Empire in 1828, and was included into the Soviet Union 90-some years later.

A new chapter in the history of the Armenian diaspora started after 1915, when some half million Armenians, who survived mass killings in Ottoman Empire, were dispersed around the world, establishing or joining already existing communities on all the continents. Over a time, the survivors and their descendants created the vibrant, mobile, highly-politicized and nationally-oriented core of the modern Armenian diasporic network. The constant recollection of past atrocities and struggle against ongoing Turkish denial of the genocide became new pillars of Armenian identity.

Later, important relocations within the Armenian diaspora took place firstly in 1940s, when some 100 thousand people answered the Soviet call to "return home" and came to the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic; and then, mostly in the 1960s-1980s, when many Armenians from the Middle East migrated to the United States and other western countries. Finally, more than one million Armenians left Armenia since the 1970s; most of them after the Republic gained independence in 1991. Economic blockade, war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, and the earthquake which devastated the north-western part of the country caused labor migration headed mostly towards Russia, but also to North America and Europe. The most important "little Armenia" was established in the Los Angeles agglomeration, which started to be referred as the second largest Armenian city after Armenia's capital of Yerevan.[19]

As a result of these migration processes, out of some 8 million Armenians worldwide, no more than 3 million live today in Armenia, followed by more than one and a half million in Russia, one million in the USA, about 400 thousand in France, and 300 thousand in Georgia. Significant in number, Armenian diasporic communities are also present in Argentina, Australia, Canada, Iran, Lebanon, Syria and Ukraine, while smaller clusters can be found in dozens of other countries around the globe.[20]

History of the Armenian Diaspora in Romania

The history of Armenian settlement on the territory of modern Romania reflects an intricate character of Armenian migration and diasporic life, described in the previous chapter. Since medieval times until the nineteenth century Armenians in Romania were mostly merchants and craftsmen, often granted with special juridical, economical and religious status. From fourteenth-fifteenth century onward they dominated trade routes that ran through towns of Moldova and Bucovina. As Romanian historian Nicolae Iorga wrote: "The Principality of Moldavia was created through trade and the traders collaborated to the creation of state in Moldavia. In this way, the Armenians were, so to speak, founding fathers of Moldavia."[21] First Armenian churches on this territory were built in 14th century, and two centuries later one the rulers of Moldova – Ioan Vodă cel Cumplit – was also known as Ioan Armeanul (John the Armenian). In the towns of Wallachia, Armenians were present in a considerable number at least since the sixteenth century, and already in the seventeenth century an Armenian district existed in Bucharest.

In the seventeenth century a significant number of Armenians reached Transylvania, leaving Moldova devastated by continuous conflicts and turmoils. Over a time, they mostly concentrated in four locations – Gherla, Dumbrăveni, Gheorgheni and Frumoasa. This first town, known as Armenopolis, became a symbol of Armenian settlement to the region. As in Moldova, the Armenian presence in Transylvania was crucial for the local market. According to the words of a late-eighteenth – early-nineteenth century author, "[f]or the Transylvanian establishment the Greeks and Armenians are like pulse for the human body […]. You can read on their faces whether the state is healthy or afflicted by disease".[22] Soon after settling down in Transylvania, Armenian bishop Oxendius Verzerescu accepted the union with Rome and established the Armenian Catholic Church. The conversion to Catholicism accelerated the process of Magyarization of Transylvanian Armenians:[23] a number of them even became Hungarian national heroes of 1848's "Spring of the Peoples", and many migrated to Hungary after Transylvania became a part of the Kingdom of Romania in 1918. Contrary to what happened after 1915 in Wallachia, genocide survivors, with the exception of a few families, did not settle in Transylvania, and thus local communities did not experience an influx of fresh blood that gave a new character to Armenian communities in southern part of the country.

Meanwhile, in the late-nineteenth – early-twentieth century Armenians living in Bucharest and other Romanian cities gave many prominent figures to Romanian artistic, intellectual and political life, among them Spiru Haret, Theodor Aman, Garabet Ibrăileanu, and Grigore Trancu-Iași. In the same period, a number of Armenian associations were created, schools opened and journals published. As already mentioned, this part of the Armenian diaspora in Romania was greatly influenced by Armenian migrants that came to the country as a result of the genocide of 1915. Romania, the first state that officially offered asylum to Armenian refugees, also accepted so called Nansen passports.[24] As a result, depending on the estimations, during the 1930s some 12,000-40,000 Armenians lived in the country.[25] In 1919 the Union of Armenians in Romania was established to help the refugees.

Later, the vibrant community's life was strongly affected by the outburst of the Second World War and the establishment of the communist regime in 1945. Gradually all Armenian organizations, except the Armenian Apostolic and Armenian Catholic Churches,[26] were closed down and public diasporic life to a large degree ceased to exist. In 1946-48 some three thousand former refugees took part in a repatriation campaign to Soviet Armenia. During the following decades, especially in the 1960s most of the Romanian Armenians left the country and joined their compatriots in the US and other western countries. As a result, the 1972 census gives a number of only 2342 Armenians in Romania.[27]

Armenians in Romania Today

In last two decades official statistics show a continuous decrease in the number of people who declare Armenian nationality. According to the census of 1992 there were 1957 Armenians in Romania, ten years later this number dropped to 1708.[28] However, according to internal sources of the Union of Armenians in Romania, Armenian Apostolic Church and Armenian Catholic Church these numbers look quite different. For example, in the headquarters of the Union of Armenians in Bucharest they estimated in 2011 that there are some 1000 Armenians in Bucharest, 800 in Constanta, 300 in Gherla, 50 families in Iași, and 20 families in Pitești, Botoșani and Suceava. In turn, in some publications one can find a number of 7000 Armenians, according to the estimations delivered by the Union of Armenians.[29] The Armenian Apostolic priest from Bucharest

informed the author about 900 families in the capital, 200 families in Constanta, and 50-100 people in other towns under the jurisdiction of the Apostolic Church; while the priest representing the Armenian Catholic Church estimated the number of the followers of the Uniate rite as some 500 people. All these numbers, except for giving some orientation, and a lot of disorientation, highlight a crucial issue of who counts and who is counted. While results of official statistics restrict the choice to clear "either, or" options (only one ethnic/national affiliation can be declared), internal estimations reflect not only the very possible wish to "be more numerous", but also a more flexible approach in which "both, and" options are possible. A telling example of such fluid and relational character of self-ascription, resulting in incoherent data, was given to the author by the newly appointed (in 2011) head of the Armenian Apostolic Church in Romania. After his arrival to the country, he was told that the Armenian community in a town of Babadag (south-eastern Romania) had vanished and only one person was still left, but after his call a dozen or so families declared their Armenianness.

According to the official statistics, in terms of mother tongue Armenians are, after Jews, linguistically most assimilated minority in Romania. In the census of 2002 out of 1780 Armenians, 40% declared Armenian as their mother tongue.[30] This percentage would certainly drop, if one would check the knowledge of language among the people counted as Armenians in the above mentioned more inclusive estimations. In Transylvania, Armenian was lost as the language of everyday communication already several generations ago, and today supposedly only two people still can speak it, one of them being a descendant of genocide survivors. In other places, the language is gradually disappearing nowadays – while many representatives of older generation still can speak, in the middle generation this skill is partly lost, and among youth the author met only one person speaking fluently, and several with basic or intermediate knowledge. In the time of research, only three local communities – in Bucharest, Constanta and Gherla – offered classes of Armenian, but lessons took place at best once a week, and they offered no more than studying the alphabet and basic vocabulary. In families, losing of language skills can be speeded up or slowed down by such factors as in which generation mixed marriages started, and how much influence on the education of children their grandparents have had. What is usually lost first is written language, spoken follows. The story told by one of the interviewees shows this process well:

I learned Armenian only at home, my grandma, my father, everybody except for my mother, who was Romanian, spoke Armenian, so I learned it, but this is not the best Armenian. [...]. I have two daughters, and I've tried to teach them Armenian, but I wasn't able to do it, because I was starting the phrase in Armenian and was finishing in Romanian [...]. When I was a child everybody in the family, except my mother was speaking Armenian, now I am the only one who speaks Armenian in my family, and all the others speak Romanian. My wife is Romanian. It is only one generation, but the situation has changed entirely.

The language and alphabet are gradually relegated from the communicational sphere to the symbolic domain, where their existence in forms of key phrases, distinctive sounds or graphic motifs, not comprehensiveness, is valued. This shifting in the character of the Armenian language can be traced in the diasporic "public sphere". On the one hand, when community affairs are discussed the language which is used is Romanian and speeches delivered in Armenian by the ambassador and the bishop are translated for the audience. On the other hand, rituals of the Apostolic Church are conducted in the old Armenian language, incomprehensible for participants, with only a minor presence of the Romanian language. In turn, in the Armenian Catholic Church, where the liturgy is served mostly in modern Hungarian, the difference between the Armenian and Roman Catholic rite is marked by the presence of Armenian spiritual hymns sung by the choir. The more solemn ceremony is celebrated, the more the "Armenianness" of the liturgy is exposed.[31]

Small in number, Armenian diaspora in Romania is internally diverse. Traditionally three distinctive groups are counted:[32] (1) Moldovan Armenians, who were the first Armenian settlers on the territory of today's Romania, and whose sparse descendants live mostly in Botoșani, Bucharest, Iași, and Suceava; (2) Transylvanian Armenians, who are present in such cities and towns as Cluj-Napoca, Dumbrăveni, Gheorgheni, Gherla, Miercurea-Ciuc and Târgu Mureș; (3) post-genocidal Armenians who settled mostly in Southern and Eastern Romania (Bacău, Brăila, Bucharest, Constanta, Focșani, Galați, Iași, Pitești, etc.), and are today the dominant sub-group.

The most pronounced differentiation within these groups is built along the Romanian-Hungarian division. As already mentioned, Transylvanian Armenians were gradually Magyarized over last three centuries, but today the domination of Hungarian affiliations and sentiments is challenged by the growing presence of the Romanian population and, subsequently,

Romanian culture in the region. The role of an agent of Romanianness is also played, in a way, by the Union of Armenians. Armenians from Cluj-Napoca, Dumbrăveni and Gherla, where the Romanian population dominates, joined the Union and, despite still existing differences, have today closer ties with Bucharest than with Budapest. In turn, Armenians from Gheorgheni and Miercurea-Ciuc, who also today live in a predominantly Hungarian-speaking environment, have almost no connections with Romanian Armenians. Instead, they keep close ties with their Hungarian counterparts, especially with the organization that gathers their compatriots who migrate from Transylvania to Hungary. Interestingly, in this case Romanian-Hungarian divisions and animosities seem to prevail over common Armenian affiliation.

However, this is not the end of the story, as yet other subdivisions can be traced. Firstly, although a great wave of emigration from Armenia in the 1990s generally by-passed Romania, there are about 100-150 "Hayastantsi",[33] who settled down in the country in last twenty years, predominantly in Bucharest. They find occupation mostly in trade, and create a separate informal network based on extended families. They share with "old Armenians" the space of the church and adjacent Armenian club, but are not well integrated with the rest of community. Both groups keep a certain distance, usually explained by significant differences in mentality and cultural background. Secondly, somehow between these two groups a number of people are located, who came back to Romania in 1990s, after their families took part in the repatriation from Romania to Soviet Armenia some 50 years earlier. Finally, the Bucharest community was also joined in the last two decades by several Armenians who used to live in other diasporic settings. While their engagement in communal activities varies, the more active of them try to introduce some forms of diaspora activities they experienced in countries from where they arrived (for example singing or dancing "as Armenians do there").

As already mentioned, confessional organization of Armenians is divided into the Armenian Apostolic Church and the Armenian Catholic Church. The first of them has in Romania a separate bishopric (with its head residing in Bucharest) and ten parishes in southern and eastern part of the country (Botoșani, Brăila, Bucharest, Constanta, Galați, Fokșani, Iași, Pitești, Suceava, Târgu Ocna), served by four priests.

The Armenian Catholic Church is organized under the name of "Ordinariate for the Faithful of the Eastern Rite in Romania" and is administrated by the Catholic bishop of Alba Iulia. It is today in a rather

pitiful state: the last priest with Armenian roots and educated in the seminary of the Armenian Catholic Patriarchate in Lebanon left the priesthood several years ago, and today the whole Ordinariate is reduced to one priest of Hungarian origin. He resides in Gherla and except for serving the local community, he visits once a month Armenians in Cluj and about once a year in Dumbrăveni, Gheorgheni and Frumoasa.

The Church is, similarly to what is reported regarding the Armenian diaspora in other countries, a highly esteemed institution that plays a crucial role not so much because of its religious message, but rather as a symbol of national identity and a focal point of the community.[34] In Bucharest, many events are scheduled to take place just after the liturgy, and even if on a given Sunday no organized activities are to take place, community members gather after the service for a chat and coffee. Actually many of them even do not attend the liturgy, or enter the church only to light a candle when the service is just about to finish. As one of the interviewees said:

> I am not a religious man, but I think the Church plays important role in bringing the community together. A big part of us come to the Church not for religious reasons, but to get together, to talk. Probably if the Church did not exist we would not gather so often, but now there is a reason to come every week.

Sunday masses in which the author participated in Bucharest were attended by some fifty – one hundred fifty people, the last number being on Easter. In Constanta the liturgy was attended by twenty people, including the choir. Two Armenian Catholic masses, in Gherla and Cluj, were attended by, respectively, fifty and five people; the solemn liturgy on the feast of Saint Gregory the Illuminator gathered some three hundred participants.

The ecclesiastic calendar determines to a large extent the rhythm of community life and religious feasts give an occasion to experience, practice and publicly express Armenianness. As one Armenian Catholic from Gheorgheni puts it, "We are Hungarians during weekdays and Armenians on weekends, in the church."[35] The most important feasts mark the heights of diaspora activities and combine elements of religious service, community gathering, family event, and leisure. For the followers of the Armenian Apostolic Church the main annual gathering takes place in the middle of August in the sixteenth-century monastery of Hagigadar in Suceava on the occasion of the feast of the Assumption of the Holy

Mother of God. For Armenian Catholics the most important celebration is the feast of Saint Gregory the Illuminator in Gherla in the end of June – beginning of July.

Respectively, church buildings are the most important landmarks of Armenian presence in Romania, even if they are usually built in local architectural style, with only some secondary distinctive elements. The only exception from this rule is the cathedral in Bucharest, which clearly resembles the cathedral in Ejmiatsin (Armenia) – the spiritual center of the Armenian Apostolic Church. Temples create the geography of Armenian diaspora, marking the space of host land with meaningful places. As Paul Johnson shows, such places are created through three interconnected strategies of "hooking" (attaching familiar objects and practices into new space), "telescoping" (condensation of these objects and practices) and "additivity" (transformation of familiar objects and practices under the influence of the surrounding culture).[36]

Regarding social organizations that gather Armenians in Romania, the most extensive structure belongs to the Union of Armenians in Romania. Besides, several local Armenian cultural organizations and foundations operate in Transylvania.[37] The Union of Armenians continues the traditions of the pre-communist organization of the same name, and was established in 1991 in Bucharest. Today, it has also its branches in several locations: Bacău, Botoșani, Cluj-Napoca, Constanta, Dumbrăveni Galați, Gherla, Fokșani Iași, Pitești, and Suceava. In Bucharest, the Union runs a publishing house "Ararat"[38] and the "Mikasian-Kesisian" Sunday school, which has two teachers and two groups – of Western and Eastern Armenian. Two journals – "Ararat" and "Nor Ghiank" ("New Life") – are published, respectively, in Romanian and Armenian languages. Some years ago cyclical lectures were organized, and until recently a dancing group existed. The Union organizes annual commemorations of the Armenian genocide on 24 of April, as well as other communal events.

Relations with Host State and Society

As Denise Aghanian observes, Armenians living abroad "tend to be demographic ghosts".[39] The status of Armenians in Romania supports this reflection: they generally have a very good knowledge of the local language and culture, lack easy recognizable markers of ethno-religious belonging and are dispersed in urban settings.[40] Often, the only marks of

distinction are their names and surnames, especially for those Armenians who settled in Romania after the genocide and after the fall of the USSR. The representatives of earlier waves of migration are less recognizable in this respect, especially in Transylvania, where they carry Hungarian-like (although also distinctive) family names.

Many Armenians are today active members of Romanian political, cultural, and scientific life. The list of names is long, but probably the figure of Varuzhan Voskanian is the most telling example of the Armenian engagement in the host society, and, in more general terms, of the hybrid character of diasporic identity. The descendant of genocide survivors, he is both the president of the Union of Armenians in Romania and one of the prominent figures of the center-right National Liberal Party. In 2007-2008 he served as a Minister of Economy and Commerce and Minister of Economy and Finance. As a poet and novelist, he is a vice-president of the Writers' Union of Romania, and gained fame with his "Book of Whispers", an account of Armenians' painful fate in the twentieth century. As a leader of the Armenian community he criticized Romania's president for his statement that Nagorno-Karabakh should be returned to Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, as a Romanian politician he frequently puts forward nationalistic opinions, rejecting the independence of the Republic of Moldova, and describing himself as "incurable unionist".

In terms of relations with the state apparatus, Armenians are one of nineteen ethno-national minorities officially recognized by Romanian authorities and subjected to corresponding legal regulations. According to these regulations, the association representing a given minority, which obtains the highest number of votes during parliamentary elections, acquires one place in the lower house of the parliament.[41] The same organization receives also significant subsidies from the state budget, intended to cover the expenses of its activities.[42] In practice, such state policy generally supports the situation in which a given minority has one leading organization. In this respect the case of the Armenian diaspora in Romania is quite unique compared with Armenian diasporas in many other countries, where diasporic structures are more decentralized and fragmented.

The status of recognized minority also gives Armenians access to public media, as well as the right to run its own educational institutions. However, as one of the leaders of the Union admitted, they use these opportunities only to a small extent: education is limited to Sunday school and the only permanent Armenian broadcast is a weekly 20-minute program in the local radio station in Constanta.

The Armenian diaspora, small and well integrated into the host society, is not a target for any specific state or NGO initiatives, usually being included only into general programs directed towards all nineteen ethnic minorities. For example, information about the Armenian presence in the country was included in the textbook prepared for Romanian elementary schools by the Ethnocultural Diversity Resource Center. Representatives of the Armenian associations also participate regularly in the all-minorities' cultural events, such as ProEtnica Festival in the town of Sighisoara.

Relations with Armenia and Armenian Diasporic Network

For most Armenians in Romania, Armenia seems to be a rather distant land and their knowledge about its history and current situation is quite low. However, its picture can be evoked in number of affective and cognitive strategies. It may be seen as a source of "genuine culture", when "traditional Armenian costumes" are sewn and "traditional Armenian dances" staged; or of "genuine taste", when Armenian brandy or cold meat are praised. It may serve as a suitable and understandable point of reference for comparison with local experience, as for example in the case of one interviewee from Hungarian populated part of Transylvania who drew a parallel between the situation of Armenians in Nagorno Karabakh and Hungarians in Romania. It may be seen as a place where one can experience his Armenianness, and where traditions and customs, which differ from Romanian social norms, are commonly recognized and practiced. But it may also be perceived as a backward country with low standards of living, a comparison to which helps to appreciate one's own conditions and opportunities in the place of residence.

Interestingly, Armenia is also quite often associated with the history of repatriation of 1946-1948 and the great hardships that Armenians suffered after reaching their new Soviet "homeland". Tragicomic anecdotes about those days are still remembered and recalled as authentic accounts from a family's past:

> There were many brothers, sisters, and relatives in the family of my father and one of them said "I will go." They made a meeting of the whole family, with old members of the family and he was the only one who said "I will go there." The oldest person in the family said "Ok, you go, and send us a picture of yourself. If the situation is good you should be standing, and

we will go there too. If something is wrong, send a picture on which you are sitting on a chair." And after one year the letter came, all the family gathered together, they opened the envelope, took the picture out, and saw him lying down on the floor…

Although trips from Romania to Armenia are not frequent, and visiting historical Armenian lands in today's eastern Turkey is even more unusual, there is a growing number of programs targeted on Armenian youth that give an opportunity to travel to Armenia. Some of these programs, established by various Armenian pan-diasporic foundations as well as by the recently created Ministry of Diaspora of the Republic of Armenia, have purely touristic and educational goals, others offer longer stays and voluntary work. For example, in summer 2011 a group of twelve Armenian youngsters went to Armenia thanks to Ministry of Diaspora's initiative called "Ari Tun" (Come Home). The Union of Armenians, which controls and coordinates participation in such programs, has also good contacts with the Mekhitarist Brotherhood in Venice, where Armenian youth take part in language summer courses.

Interestingly, outside of the country two organizations of Romanian Armenians exist: one in Armenia, which gather 1946-1948 repatriates and their descendants; and the other one, called "Raffi", which was established in Los Angeles by Armenians who left Romania starting from the 1960s. While the connections between these organizations and their compatriots in Romania are scarce, some Armenians who migrated to the US occasionally pay visits to Romania, and recently a group of them sponsored the renovation of the Hagigadar monastery.

The transnational and nationwide organization par excellence, which connects, at least symbolically, Armenians in dozens of countries around the world is the Armenian Apostolic Church. Such a character of the Church is affirmed by its ritual uniformity and fidelity to the old Armenian language, as well as by invocations of the distant spiritual center and ecclesiastic hierarchy, made during every liturgy. The transnational character of the Apostolic Church is also represented today in Romania by activities of the bishop Datev Hagopian, who (being himself born in Iraq and serving previously the Armenian community in Holland) launched since 2011 a number of initiatives aimed to stretch beyond the borders of Romania and reach both Armenia and other Armenian diasporic communities.

The Self-Picture of the Armenian Diaspora

In addition to embedding themselves, in one or another way, in a common Armenian narration of the first Christian nation endowed with a rich culture, glorious past and unique linguistic tradition, but also tragically experienced by persecutions, culminating with the genocide of 1915[43], Armenians in Romania perceive the history of their community as an important contribution to Romanian or Hungarian culture. Their involvement in local affairs – be it thanks to trade networks and financial resources, artistic skills, scientific achievements or political activities – is proudly presented and constitutes one of the most important elements of diasporic identity. As one of the interviewees said: We have Armenians, who are bigger Romanians than the Romanians, we have Armenians, who are bigger Hungarians than the Hungarians…

However, he also adds: "…but we are short of Armenians who are good Armenians. This is our problem." By this last statement he expressed a view, shared by many local Armenians, that due to a progressive assimilation and insufficient engagement in diasporic life, Armenians are doomed to extinction in Romania. Such concerns are often pronounced despite of the fact that a certain revival of the community, sometimes referred to as "neo-Armenianism",[44] attracted in the last two decades a significant number of people, who "rediscovered their Armenian roots". Fears persist due to the fact that "neo-Armenianism" seems to be predominantly an experience of the older and middle generations who grew up in socialist times and who, after the fall of Ceausescu's regime, have been stimulated by the new freedom of expression, action and affiliation. The younger generation is often perceived as lacking an interest in the community's affairs and thus the problem of continuity and succession is expressed.

The fear of extinction prods some diaspora members to undertake initiatives aimed at preserving and passing down the memory about the Armenian heritage in Romania. A good example of such initiatives is the recently established "Museum Collection of Transylvanian Armenians" in Dumbrăveni. As its creator states:

> We have some forty-five people with Armenian roots here, and I know that over a time this community will be smaller and smaller, and it will be assimilated. So this museum was made in order not to forget who built this town. It was my intention when I started this project.

Interestingly, the leitmotiv of the exhibition in Dumbrăveni is a perfect example of how a theorization of diaspora can be applied in practice. Far from major present-day concerns of the community, the museum's flier articulates Armenian diasporic experience in Romania in a manner that seems to be directly taken from diaspora studies textbooks:

> The collection comprises memories and recollections symbolically gathered in the luggage that accompanied Armenians on their way to Transylvania. […] The display suggests the transitory state between "arrival" and "departure". Trunks in the three rooms evoke packing and unpacking, the stage between setting out and abandonment and exile.

Conclusions

Ways of feeling Armenian in Romania and of experiencing and expressing one's Armenianness can be very different. Some may be active members of the community, while others keep only loose contacts. For some it is a source of inspiration for their professional activities, as for example for the film-maker, architect and art historian, interviewed in the course of author's fieldwork. Others may collect Armenian artifacts, or just set up their smartphones to follow the weather in Yerevan. For some, their Armenianness is a "natural" consequence of their upbringing, however for many it is something which at a certain moment "came into their lives" and changed their identity.

All these point to the profoundly symbolic character of the Armenian diaspora in Romania, which lacks to a large extent most of the "objective" boundaries, for example distinct language of everyday communication, specific occupation, or common place of settlement.[45] Here, even such "obvious" criteria as ethnic belonging often require much conscious symbolization, especially when one has to (and most of author's interviewees have had to) deal with his or her mixed descent.

Finally, it can be said that dynamic and hybrid character of diasporic identity and culture, together with the limited size of the Armenian diaspora in Romania, allows one to grasp more easily what may be blurred in the case of more "static" social entities: that the social world is not something imposed on an individual, but it is a fabric, woven through individual and group strategies and commitments. Diasporas' fabrics are their roots and routes, which have to be bound anew time and again in order to re-create meaningful patterns and motifs.

Illustration 1: The Armenian Cathedral in Bucharest on the day of the commemoration of the Armenian Genocide.

Illustration 2: Car plate with the word "Hay", which in Armenian language means "Armenian".

Illustration 3: "The Museum Collection of Transylvanian Armenians" in Dumbraveni.

Illustration 4: The feast of Saint Gregory the Illuminator in Gherla.

Illustration 5: The pilgrimage to Hagigadar Monastery on the feast of the Assumption of the Holy Mother of God.

Illustration 6: The day before the pilgrimage to Hagigadar Armenians gather to prepare festive meal.

NOTES

1   S. Dufoix, *Diasporas*, University of California Press, 2008, p.33.
2   See for example: M. Ember, C. Ember, I. Skoggard (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Diasporas. Immigrant and Refugee Cultures around The World*. Volume I, Overviews and Topics, Springer, 2005.
3   See for example: C. Patton, B. Sanchez-Eppler (ed.), *Queer Diasporas*, Duke University Press, 2000; J. K. Puar "The Turban is Not a Hat" Queer Diaspora and Practices of Profiling", Sikh Formations, 4 (1) 2008, pp.47-91.
4   P. Ch. Johnson, *Diaspora Conversion. Black Carib Religion and the Recovery of Africa*, University of California Press, 2007, p.30.
5   P. Ch. Johnson, *Diaspora Conversion…*, p.30.
6   S. Dufoix, *Diasporas…*, p.54-55; S. Vertovec, "Three Meanings of "Diaspora", Exemplified among South Asian Religions", *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies*, 6 (3) 1997, p.277-299.
7   See for example: S. Dufoix, *Diasporas…*, p. 29.
8   "Budushevo nie sushestvuet. Sociolog i filosof Zigmunt Bauman o prevrashenii chelovechestva v arhipelag diaspor", *Ogoniok* 5178 (19) 2011, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1637429, entered 17.06.2011; J. Clifford, *Routes. Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century*, Harvard University Press, 1997, pp.273-277.
9   W. Safran, "Diaspora in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return", *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies*, 1 (1) 1991, p.83-84.
10 S. Dufoix, *Diasporas…*, p.55-56.
11 *Ibidem*, p.36-37.
12 *Ibidem*, p.38.
13 J. Clifford, *Routes…*, p.248.
14 P. Ch. Johnson, *Diaspora Conversion…*, p.35, 48.
15 S. Dufoix, *Diasporas...*; p.5-15, 38-53; W. Safran, *Diaspora in...*, p.84-90.
16 It counts about 180 thousand square kilometers, with its borders on the Pontus mountains in the north-west, the Kura river in the north-east, Lake Urmia in the south-east, Upper Mesopotamia in the south, and the upper Euphrates Valley in the west. The present-day Republic of Armenia, established in 1991 after the fall of the Soviet Union, and limited to 30 thousand square kilometers, is located in the north-eastern part of this territory (Kh. Toloyan, "Armenian Diaspora", in: M. Ember, C. Ember, I. Skoggard (ed.), *Encyclopedia of…*, p.36). Additionally, as a result of Armenian-Azerbaidjani war in 1991-1994, Armenian populated and controlled but internatioanlly unrecognized Republic of Nagorno Karabakh was established on the territory of 12 thousand square kilometers along south-eastern boarders of Armenia.
17 Catholicos is the Head of the Armenian Apostolic Church, an autocephalous church, one of the Oriental Orthodox churches.
18 *Ibidem*, p.37.

[19] More on historical and present developments of Armenian migration, see: D. Aghanian, *The Armenian Diaspora...*, p.73-120; V. Diatov, E. Melkonian, *Armianskaya Diaspora*: Ocherki Sociokulturnoy Tipologii, Caucasus Institute, 2009.; Kh. Toloyan, Armenian Diaspora…

[20] These numbers vary significantly, depending on sources. Estimations, which I give, are average numbers from following sources: V. Diatov, E. Melkonian, *Armianskaya Diaspora...*, p.36; S. Dufoix, *Diasporas…* p.53; Kh. Toloyan, *Armenian Diaspora...*, p.45.

[21] As quoted in: J. Pal, *Armenians in Transylvania*, Romanian Cultural Institute, 2005, p.88.

[22] As quoted in: *ibidem*, p.161.

[23] The history of the changing socio-demographical and political situation of Transylvania is too complicated to describe it here in detail. It should be sufficient to say that until this region became a part of Romania after the First World War, it was since the Middle Ages ruled (with different degrees of autonomy) by Hungarian authorities, and the Hungarian population enjoyed a privileged status. On the history of Transylvanian Armenian integration into the Hungarian society and culture see: J. Pal, "Armenian Image – Armenian Identity – Assimilation of the Transylvanian Armenians in the 18th and 19th Centuries", in: Agnieszka Barszczewska (ed.), *Integrating Minorities: Traditional Communities and Modernization*, Editura ISPMN, 2011, pp.13-32.

[24] Introduced in 1921 on the initiative of Fridtjof Nansen – Norwegian explorer, scientist and human rights activists – the Nansen passport was a document designed for refugees and stateless people.

[25] This first number is taken from I. Scurtu, I. Dordea (ed.), *Minoritățile Naționale din România 1925-1931*, Arhivele Naționale ale României, 1996, p. 465; the latter from L. Stacescu's article Armenians in Romania, http://www.personal.ceu.hu/students/02/Leon_Stacescu/rh.htm, entered 12.04.2011.

[26] However, the latter has been directly subordinated to the local Roman Catholic hierarchy in order to avoid the fate of Greek Catholic Church in Romania disbanded by the Communists.

[27] For a more detailed description of Armenian history in Romania see: J. Pal, *Armenians in....*; L. Stacescu, *Armenians in…*

[28] I. Veress, "Strategile de Reproducere Culturală ale Minorități Armene din România", *RIRNM Working Paper* no. 33, 2010, http://www.ispmn.gov.ro/uploads/ISPMN_33_x_to%20web.pdf, entered 05.06.2011.

[29] Third Report Submitted by Romania Pursuant to Article 25, Paragraph 1 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 2011 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/3_FCNMdocs/PDF_3rd_SR_Romania_en.pdf, entered 20.05.2011, p.23.

[30] I. Horváth, *Minorities, Minority Protection in Romania*, unpublished paper.

[31] During the celebration of the feast of Saint Gregory the Illuminator in Gherla even the Armenian anthem is incorporated into the liturgy.

[32] See for example: I. Veress, "Strategii de reproducere…"; Report Submitted by Romania Pursuant to Article 25, Paragraph 1 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 1999, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/3_FCNMdocs/PDF_1st_SR_Romania_en.pdf, entered 05.06. 2011.

[33] The term "Hayastantsi" denotes Armenians who live in Armenia (Hayastan) or who recently emigrated from the country.

[34] D. Aghanian, *The Armenian Diaspora: Cohesion and Fracture*, University Press of America, 2007 , p.152-158.

[35] K. Kali, "Vasárnapiörmények – valami a pozicionálisidentitásról", in: S. Őze, B. Kovács (ed.), *Örmény diaszpóra a Kárpát-medencében* II.Pázmány Péter Katolikus Egyetem, 2007.

[36] P. Ch. Johnson, *Diaspora Conversion...*, p.55.

[37] The list of Armenian organizations registered in Romania can be found on the website of the Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities: http://www.adatbank.ro/regio/ispmn/institutii/?oldal=orgMin|armeană, entered 22.05.2011.

[38] During last twenty years it published some 150 titles.

[39] D. Aghanian, *The Armenian Diaspora*…., p.4.

[40] Interestingly, a process of "metropolization" of Armenians in Romania can be observed, as they generally move from smaller towns to bigger urban centers – for example from the towns of Transylvania to Hungary's capital of Budapest, and within Transylvania from Frumoasa to Miercurea Ciuc (this process is already accomplished), and from Gherla to Cluj-Napoca; to Romania's capital city of Bucharest Armenians move from towns of southern and eastern provinces of the country.

[41] With the exception of the Hungarian party, which is able to pass the 5% threshold and thus receive a bigger number of seats.

[42] I. Horváth, "Facilitating Conflict Transformation: Implementation of the Recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities to Romania, 1993-2001", http://www.core-hamburg.de/documents/34_CORE_Working_Paper_8.pdf, entered 12.07.2011.

[43] D. Aghanian, *The Armenian…*; I. Veress, *Strategiile de Reproducere…*

[44] J. Pal, *Armenians in...*, p.158

[45] More on the issue of the symbolic character of the community, see: A. P. Cohen. *The Symbolic Construction of Community*, Routledge, 2007.

ANDREEA ŞTEFAN

Née en 1983, à Bucarest

Doctorante, École Doctorale d'Études Littéraires et Culturelles,
Faculté de Langues et Littératures Etrangères, Université de Bucarest
Thèse de troisième cycle : *Flavius Arrien et la Seconde Sophistique.
Étude de la vie intellectuelle des grecs sous le Haut Empire*

Bourse de recherche et formation postuniversitaire « Vasile Pârvan »,
Académie Roumaine à Rome, Italie, avec le projet : *Épictète, Diatribes,
traduction en roumain, commentaire* (2008 – 2010)

Participations à des colloques en Italie et Roumanie
Nombreux articles scientifiques

GRECS ET MACEDONIENS A L'EPOQUE IMPERIALE : LA STRATIFICATION DES SOURCES DANS *L'ANABASE D'ALEXANDRE*

Les narrations anciennes concernant le règne d'Alexandre le Grand sont toutes, sans aucune exception, beaucoup postérieures aux événements dont elles traitent. Par conséquent, l'un des aspects centraux de la recherche moderne concerne l'analyse des sources utilisées par les auteurs qui nous sont parvenus. Les efforts des chercheurs se sont concentrés notamment en deux directions d'étude. D'abord c'est l'approche, qu'on pourrait appeler positiviste, qui propose des reconstitutions des œuvres perdues à partir des références conservées dans des travaux postérieurs. Dans ce domaine, l'apport de Felix Jacoby[1], reste le travail philologique de majeure importance[2]. Lionel Pearson[3], Paul Pédech[4] et N. G. L. Hammond[5] ont apporté des contributions notables, déplaçant l'attention du côté philologique vers une valorisation plutôt historique des recherches.

Une autre démarche, qui jette une nouvelle lumière sur la décantation des voix successivement accumulées dans les ouvrages historiques et envisage l'interprétation des travaux conservés, est l'approche historiographique. Ce type de démarche[6], de date plus récente, prête plus d'attention à l'intentionnalité de l'auteur, à ses préférences de langage, style et matériel narratif, à la façon de citation.

Le problème qui nous occupe dans la présente étude se rattache à une problématique à plus vaste portée concernant la stratification des sources dans les ouvrages des historiens d'Alexandre le Grand. Plus précisément, nous nous proposons d'investiguer les passages reflétant la perception différente du rapport Grecs – Macédoniens.

Avant de passer à la recherche des provenances que les mentions des Grecs et des Macédoniens puissent avoir, voyons d'abord comment

se présente ce rapport du point de vue historique, au cours des périodes classique, hellénistique et romaine. Suivant la dynamique des rencontres entre Grecs et Macédoniens, nous allons nous concentrer, dans les pages suivantes, sur les jeux d'identité – altérité, et, en particulier, sur la construction de l'ethnicité[7]. Il nous serait nécessaire d'établir si, au niveau du discours, on peut percevoir des changements dans la description du rapport Grecs – Macédoniens et, le cas échant, identifier les éléments qui caractérisent chaque image.

1. Autour de l'identité grecque : Grecs et Macédoniens

Si l'on choisi d'évaluer la perception des Grecs et des Macédoniens à partir des sources écrites, il est préférable de connaître d'abord les limites qu'une telle approche comporte. Pour commencer, il faut préciser que la majorité des témoignages sont en langue grecque, avec quelques notables exceptions en latin. De plus, ces textes soit reflètent les moments culminants des rapports entre les deux entités (l'ascension du pouvoir macédonien dans l'espace grec sous Philip et Alexandre), soit se sont conservés aléatoirement, par hasard, grâce au goût d'un tel auteur ou d'un tel autre pour des types particuliers d'histoires. Ils sont donc loin d'offrir un *corpus* approprié à mener une pareille enquête. Mais, toutes les précautions prises, la situation n'est pas assez sombre. Si on concluait à partir de cette constatation qu'on a à disposition seulement l'avue d'une des parties concernées (les Grecs), et les opinions tardives d'une tierce partie (les Romans), on ne serait que partiellement sur le juste. En effet, si on regarde de plus proche le problème[8], on constate que, parsemées parmi les auteurs grecs, on retrouve, toujours en grec, des voix macédoniennes. Et, bien que la majorité de ces ouvrages soit disponible maintenant seulement en fragments, on doit supposer que parties de leurs messages ont été perpétuées par les sources conservées. En ce qui concerne l'usage du grec, la Macédoine, comme d'ailleurs autres peuples périphériques, dès qu'il y a eu le besoin d'archives écrites, a employé à ce propos la langue culturellement la plus influente. Quant à la situation fragmentaire et non nécessairement représentative des témoignages, nous devons nous résigner, comme d'ailleurs dans le cas de la plus grande partie des recherches concernant l'antiquité, à viser des conclusions partielles.

Les contacts entre Grecs et Macédoniens commencent à être plus abondamment documentés dans les sources littéraires à partir de la période

classique. Le tournant coïncide avec les guerres médiques qui, d'ailleurs, marquent le moment crucial[9] dans l'élaboration de l'identité grecque. Et on a au moins deux motifs de retenir cet intervalle comme le moment crucial. D'abord, car cette identité grecque, qui auparavant était définie de manière *agressive*[10], strictement autour de l'ascendance commune, commence à se diversifier, en multipliant les critères. Et nous retrouvons la plus claire expression de cette vision élargie chez Hérodote[11]. Dans sa définition[12] de *to hellenikon*, de la grécité, l'historien grec ajoute au critère ethnique, la communauté de langue, coutumes et rites religieux. Le second aspect à remarquer est la constante consolidation de l'idée de grécité par voie d'une systématique confrontation avec les autres, les non-Grecs, *hoi barbaroi*. Les deux prémisses sont interdépendantes. Etendre les critères d'identification du plan ethnique vers le plan culturel fait place à la comparaison. D'autre part, la confrontation militaire avec l'autre, différent par la langue et par bonne partie des manifestations culturelles, impose une perspective nouvelle sur ce qui devrait premièrement caractériser le soi. Grec devient tout ce qui n'est pas perse. Les Grecs ne sont plus les descendants d'Hellen, ou pas seulement, mais ils sont Grecs aussi tous ceux qui sont capables d'une compréhension mutuelle en parlant chacun son parler local, ceux qui vivent en *poleis*, sous la souveraineté de la loi, qui se réunissent pour célébrer en commun des fêtes, qui vénèrent les mêmes dieux principaux, partagent des rites religieux etc. La souveraineté arbitraire d'un roi, que les Grecs appelaient d'ailleurs tyrannie, le parler incompréhensible, le faste et l'opulence[13], l'incapacité de se gouverner eux-mêmes, tout cela est réservé à l'autre, et, en premiers, aux Perses.

On vient de remarquer que la fréquence des sources grecques sur les Macédoniens augmente précisément au temps des guerres médiques. Cette coïncidence, ou, si l'on veut mieux, cette synchronie, peut avoir laissé des traces dans la perception des Macédoniens. Pour investiguer le problème nous avons choisi parmi les témoignages du Ve siècle av. J.-C. les voix d'Hérodote et de Thucydide. La sélection se justifie par la prémisse qu'on a à faire à des personnalités influentes et, à la fois, représentatives pour leur époque. En plus, le caractère intégral des ouvrages facilite l'interprétation.

Hérodote, on l'a dit[14], nous a transmis sa réflexion sur ce qui veut dire être Grec. Ses *Histoires*, qui narrent des contacts entre Grecs et barbares, semblent offrir le terrain idéal pour une enquête anthropologique. De surcroît, il touche, on va le voir toute de suite, au problème des Macédoniens. A première vue, on dirait que son témoignage peut trancher de manière assez claire le problème. Il y a une définition de

l'identité grecque, des réflexions explicites sur celle macédonienne, et le tout se retrouve dans un ouvrage censé d'être particulièrement attentif aux particularités ethniques. Mais, même si elle est très séduisante, l'interprétation des *Histoires* comme un travail de proto-ethnographie doit être définitivement écartée. Un nombre d'études[15] montre qu'Hérodote, dans ses descriptions ethnographiques, ne prête guerre plus d'attention, il n'est pas plus précis, ni plus préoccupé par des réalités étrangères, qu'un touriste de nos jours. Par contre, ses narrations sont sujettes à la rhétorique et profondément transformées, inconsciemment ou de manière volontaire, par sa propre expérience de vie[16].

Dans les *Histoires*, les références à l'ethnicité des Macédoniens peuvent être classées selon deux critères. D'abord, du point de vue du style, les occurrences se trouvant dans la partie narrative, exprimées par la voix de l'auteur, on va les appeler des occurrences narratives. Les références se trouvant dans des discours seront nommées références rhétoriques. Si l'on considère le contenu[17], les renvois tombent dans trois catégories : ils réclament la grécité de la famille royale, du peuple dans son entier, ou ils affirment l'appartenance à l'hellénisme des Macédoniens grâce à l'ascendance commune avec les Lacédémoniens. Tous ces points doivent être pris en considération dans l'investigation de la perception qu'Hérodote avait des Macédoniens et de l'ethnicité en général.

Hérodote affirme, sans se jamais contredire, la grécité de la famille royale[18]. Les références à l'identité grecque des sujets sont, par contre, plus ambiguës. Je n'ai trouvé aucune déclaration qui range explicitement les Macédoniens parmi les barbares, et, malheureusement, le contraire n'est lui non plus valable : Hérodote ne soutient nulle part que les Macédoniens soient Grecs. Voyons donc ce que l'investigation des témoignages peut dire sur le rapport famille régnante – peuple gouverné.

En premier lieu, il faut noter que l'affirmation de la grécité de la famille royale se fait de manière indépendante des démarches utilisées pour les Macédoniens. Hérodote en son nom propre défend cette affiliation : αὐτός τε οὕτω τυγχάνω ἐπιστάμενος καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν τοῖσι ὄπισθε λόγοισι ἀποδέξω ὡς εἰσὶ Ἕλληνες[19]. L'affirmation est forte, marquée par l'emploi du pronom réfléchi et des verbes à la première personne de l'indicatif présent et futur. Dans deux autres instances[20], le flux narratif contient l'information 'neutre', faite par la voix de l'auteur-narrateur, selon laquelle le roi Alexandre, fils d'Amyntas, est Grec ; la seconde occurrence (8. 137-139), sur laquelle on reviendra[21], donne la généalogie de la famille. Finalement, Hérodote fait Alexandre I lui-même réclamer l'appartenance

au monde grec dans son discours prononcé devant les généraux des Athéniens, discours qui précède le début de la seconde guerre médique : γὰρ Ἕλλην γένος εἰμὶ τὠρχαῖον καὶ ἀντ᾽ ἐλευθέρης δεδουλωμένην οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοιμι ὀρᾶν τὴν Ἑλλάδα…[22] Si l'on peut se méfier de la validité d'une affirmation contenue dans un matériel rhétorique, dans notre cas un discours, les autres témoignages semblent exprimer de manière ferme sinon les convictions de l'auteur, au moins sa position à l'égard de l'appartenance ethnique des rois de la Macédoine.

Dans le cas des Macédoniens, Hérodote est beaucoup plus réservé en leurs reconnaissant l'appartenance ethnique au monde grec. On l'a déjà dit, des affirmations explicites concernant leur rapport ethnique avec les Grecs manquent. En leur absence, il nous reste les remarques implicites. D'abord, on peut noter que l'affirmation de la grécité des dynastes de la Macédoine se fait d'une certaine manière aux dépens de leurs sujets. Prenons par exemple l'énoncé suivant : ἀνὴρ Ἕλλην Μακεδόνων ὕπαρχος[23]. La syntaxe de la phrase crée une opposition entre les deux ethnonymes. Le fait de souligner la grécité du prince place à l'extérieur, exclue de la sphère du premier, l'autre ethnonyme. Par ce choix syntactique, les Macédoniens sont situés en dehors de la grécité. En procédant de la même manière, ailleurs[24], Hérodote semble compter les Macédoniens parmi les Grecs : dans la description de l'expédition de Darius I à l'ouest, visant, entre autres, les villes grecques, on retrouve les Macédoniens comptés parmi les Grecs échus sous la dominance perse. Le second cas retenu (7. 9) est très similaire. On a une affirmation générale visant les Grecs, suivie d'une énumération où la Macédoine et la ville d'Athènes sont coordonnées. Les deux toponymes, correspondant aux deux respectifs peuples[25], se retrouvent à la même place en rapport avec *tous andras toutous*, qui indique de manière générique les Grecs : ἐπειρήθην δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἤδη ἐπελαύνων ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας τούτους ὑπὸ πατρὸς τοῦ σοῦ κελευσθείς, καί μοι μέχρι Μακεδονίης ἐλάσαντι καὶ ὀλίγον ἀπολιπόντι ἐς αὐτὰς Ἀθήνας …[26]. Les deux passages sont tirés de types d'énonciations différentes, le premier faisant partie de la description narrative, l'autre d'un discours. Il faut souligner qu'Hérodote ne semble pas intéressé par l'utilisation de manière rhétorique de l'aspect ethnique, au moins en ce qui concerne les Macédoniens. Les affirmations[27] les plus concluantes concernant la grécité des Macédoniens les rangent, à côté des Doriens, comme descendants des *Makednoí*[28]. Or, l'origine commune avec les Doriens garantit aux Macédoniens l'appartenance au monde grec. Cette fois-ci, il faut observer que les dynastes et leur peuple

emploient des voies divergentes pour se légitimer. Si la famille régnante réclame une ascendance argienne[29], les Macédoniens résulteraient Grecs grâce à leur parenté avec les Doriens.

Un bref examen de la perception des Macédoniens et de leurs rois chez Hérodote montre qu'il y une absolue prévalence du critère ethnique dans l'attribution de l'ethnicité. C'est pourquoi il n'est pas dépourvu d'intérêt de revenir sur la définition en quatre points de *to hellenikon* du livre 8, paragraphe 144. Le passage provient d'un contexte fortement rhétorique qui reproduit les discours livrés à Athènes au lendemain de la seconde guerre médique, discours occasionné par la nécessité de former une alliance entre Grecs. En effet, la définition est assignée à l'orateur athénien et répond au besoin de convaincre les Lacédémoniens de l'engagement ferme d'Athènes de la part des valeurs helléniques. Mais, évaluer la relevance réelle que cette affirmation avait pour Hérodote, c'est une autre affaire. Seulement quelques paragraphes plus en arrière, au 8. 137-139, Hérodote s'est limité à livrer uniquement la généalogie du roi Alexandre I de Macédoine comme seule et suffisante preuve de sa grécité. Il n'a pas touché aux considérations de langue, institutions, coutumes ou religion. En plus, cette succincte généalogie sert d'introduction au discours que le roi prononce devant la même réunion. Toute remarquable qu'elle soit, la définition d'Hérodote doit être considérée avec prudence[30]. Elle semble appartenir plutôt au langage marqué de la rhétorique, qu'à la conception réelle de l'auteur.

A la lumière des passages analysés on peut dire qu'Hérodote et, avec lui, probablement aussi une partie de ses contemporaines, se rapportaient de manière ambiguë[31] aux Macédoniens. Il affirme explicitement la grécité des rois de Macédoine. En ce cas, il se fait porteur, de bonne ou de mauvaise foi, de la propagande royale[32]. De toute façon, cette prétention était une matière controversée pour les Grecs[33]. En ce qui concerne les Macédoniens, Hérodote ne semble pas les considérer des Grecs à plein titre. Il préfère reléguer dans le passé la parenté des Grecs avec ce peuple périphérique, différent mais pas complètement étranger.

Thucydide semble témoigner de la même ambiguïté vis-à-vis la grécité des Macédoniens. Lui aussi, il reconnaît l'origine argienne de la famille régnante[34] et, implicitement, leur statut de Grecs. Ses affirmations devient interprétables quant elles concernent les Macédoniens. Il opère une première distinction en opposant les rois Macédoniens, d'origine grecque, au peuple quelques lignes plus en bas[35]. Ailleurs[36], il semble se livrer à une scission tripartite. Il classe séparément les Grecs, les

barbares et, en troisième lieu, il place les Macédoniens. Une hypothèse qui pourrait expliquer ce statut ni grec, ni barbare des Macédoniens, au moins pour cette situation, est que les Macédoniens sont mis à part à cause de la grécité reconnue de leur prince. En effet, c'est Perdikkas lui-même qui dirige les troupes de la Macédoine et qui, en cette qualité, ouvre la phrase présentant ses forces. Les Macédoniens sont rangés à côtés des Chalcidiens, des Grecs, sans aucune distinction supplémentaire. Ce qui est intéressant à noter est que, dans la partie suivante[37], le contexte changeant légèrement (on n'associe plus directement Perdikkas à ses sujets) on retrouve les Macédoniens à côtés du terme *hoi barbaroi*, de la même façon que, quelques lignes plus en avant, ils étaient joints au Grecs Chalcidiens. Un passage rhétorique, inséré dans le discours que le Péloponnésien Brasidas adresse à ses soldats confrontés avec la défection de leurs alliés, les Macédoniens, contient, par contre, une affirmation explicite : … βαρβάρους δὲ οὓς νῦν ἀπειρίᾳ δέδιτε μαθεῖν χρή, ἐξ ὧν τε προηγώνισθε τοῖς Μακεδόσιν αὐτῶν καὶ ἀφ' ὧν ἐγὼ εἰκάζω τε καὶ ἄλλων ἀκοῇ ἐπίσταμαι οὐ δεινοὺς ἐσομένους[38]. Les Macédoniens sont considérés barbares. Vu que cette affirmation est la seule à rejeter explicitement la grécité des Macédoniens, et qu'elle réponde évidemment à des exigences persuasives, on ne peut pas la considérer concluante.

S'il faut évaluer la position de Thucydide concernant l'appartenance des Macédoniens au monde grec, celle-ci serait : Thucydide crédit la revendication de la part des dynastes macédoniens de l'origine grecque. En ce qui concerne les Macédoniens eux-mêmes, il est plutôt réservé. On dirait qu'il préfère placer les Macédoniens dans une opposition tripartite, Grecs – Macédoniens – barbares. Sa position trahit la même ambiguïté qu'on retrouve chez Hérodote.

A partir des témoignages qu'Hérodote et Thucydide ont laissés sur l'ethnicité des Macédoniens, nous pouvons nous hasarder à tirer les suivantes conclusions. Les Grecs du Ve siècle av. J.-C. fondaient leurs idées courantes sur l'appartenance à la grécité premièrement sur des considérations de filiation. Pour être reconnu comme Grec, il fallait présenter premièrement une généalogie grecque, réelle ou contrefaite. Dans ce tableau, qui figurait au centre le critère ethnique, les Macédoniens occupaient une position ambiguë[39]. Partiellement acculturés par la proximité avec les Grecs, ils présentaient aux yeux de ceux derniers les traces d'une ancienne parenté[40]. Par contre, leurs rois, qui s'étaient forgés une origine distincte et grecque, avaient plus de chances d'être reconnus comme tels.

La perception des Macédoniens par les Grecs se présente de manière assez différente au IVe siècle. Pour commencer, leur place dans la politique extérieure des villes grecques du basin égéen s'était transformée du pouvoir local qui contribuait à maintenir l'équilibre au Nord (ce qui était la Macédoine au temps d'Alexandre I et de Perdikkas) en pouvoir hégémonique exercé sur la Grèce entière au temps de Philippe II et, finalement, en domination 'universelle' sous Alexandre III. Autrement dit, si au Ve siècle c'était surtout les politiciens et les historiens à se soucier des Macédoniens et donc, ils considéraient nécessaire de les juger en relation avec la grécité, vers la moitié du siècle successif l'intérêt des Grecs envers leur voisin nordique se généralise. A Athènes, et probablement ailleurs aussi, leur nom était au centre du débat politique.

Un autre élément qui intervient et contribue à modifier la perception des Macédoniens par les Grecs est un changement dans la pratique de ce qui veut dire être Grec. Si au temps d'Hérodote et Thucydide on jugeait la grécité d'après l'origine, l'enquête auprès des orateurs grecs d'Athènes du IVe siècle montre que l'importance accordée à la parenté s'est notablement réduite. Suzanne Said, dans une incitante étude[41] portant sur les orateurs du IVe siècle, attire l'attention sur le fait que l'emploi des termes nommant les principales tribus grecques, comme Ioniens, Doriens etc., ou de *phulon* « tribu, race » et ses dérivés est dérisoire dans les ouvrages de ceux derniers[42]. Si l'on rappelle que cette sphère lexicale était très bien représentée chez Hérodote et Thucydide, on doit constater ici aussi les traces d'un changement de perception. Par contre, ce qui semble préoccuper les orateurs est l'aspect culturel. On est maintenant proches du sens de la définition visant l'aspect culturel qu'Hérodote donne à *to hellenikon*, la grécité. Isocrate s'occupe de l'aspect linguistique et une fois le considère critère suffisant pour conserver l'appellation de Grecs, même en opposition avec la 'barbarisassions' des meures[43]. Isocrate et Démosthène[44] aussi parlent de l'importance des sanctuaires et des jeux communs pour les Grecs et du fait qu'ils doivent demeurer exclusivement réservés à eux. L'*ethos*, le caractère grec, et le *bios,* le train de vie, comptent aussi parmi les traits distinctifs des Grecs chez les orateurs attiques[45].

Les deux aspects, d'une côté la transformation de la Macédoine du pouvoir local en facteur décisif, voir dominant, dans les affaires des villes grecques, de l'autre le raffinement des réflexions sur l'identité grecque, ont imposé la clarification de l'ancienne ambiguïté vis-à-vis les Macédoniens. Effectivement, la perpétuation de l'ancien statut ne semble plus possible dans le contexte politique et culturel de la Grèce de la moitié du IVe

siècle[46]. Les Macédoniens ne correspondent plus à la nouvelle grille selon laquelle se juge la grécité. Une lointaine et ancienne parenté avec les Grecs ne suffit plus à les inclure dans le monde hellénique. De surcroît, sur le plan politique, ils sont le plus souvent perçus comme des adversaires potentiels. Il semble quand même que l'effort de l'élite macédonienne et, notamment celui de la famille royale de se voir acceptées comme Grecs n'a pas diminué. Philippe II affirme son appartenance à la grécité, en scandalisant Démosthène, quant il organise les jeux pythiques, des événements panhelléniques réservés aux Grecs seulement[47]. Isocrate l'appelle descendent d'Héraclès[48] en lui reconnaissant la généalogie argienne. De plus, l'orateur sépare, c'est vrai, les Grecs des Macédoniens, mais également il semble séparer ceux-ci des barbares : Φημὶ γὰρ χρῆναί σε τοὺς μὲν Ἕλληνας εὐεργετεῖν, Μακεδόνων δὲ βασιλεύειν, τῶν δὲ βαρβάρων ὡς πλείστων ἄρχειν[49]. Mais les contestations, elles aussi deviennent plus virulentes. Pour Démosthène, Philippe et ses sujets ne sont que des barbares. Du point de vue ethnique, Philippe est un *allophulos*[50], de race différente. Dans son troisième discours contre Philippe, Démosthène se fait encore plus explicite. En liant l'origine à l'héritage culturel, il jette en dehors de la Grèce, du point de vue culturel aussi, les Macédoniens en bloc, dynastes compris :

εἰ δέ γε δοῦλος ἢ ὑποβολιμαῖος τὰ μὴ προσήκοντ᾽ ἀπώλλυε καὶ ἐλυμαίνετο, Ἡράκλεις ὅσῳ μᾶλλον δεινὸν καὶ ὀργῆς ἄξιον πάντες ἂν ἔφησαν εἶναι. ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὑπὲρ Φιλίππου καὶ ὧν ἐκεῖνος πράττει νῦν, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχουσιν, οὐ μόνον οὐχ Ἕλληνος ὄντος οὐδὲ προσήκοντος οὐδὲν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ βαρβάρου ἐντεῦθεν ὅθεν καλὸν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ὀλέθρου Μακεδόνος, ὅθεν οὐδ᾽ ἀνδράποδον σπουδαῖον οὐδὲν ἦν πρότερον πρίασθαι[51].

Pour le IVe siècle, les plus riches témoignages sur la perception des Macédoniens, on l'a vu, sont les travaux rhétoriques. En conséquence, il est très difficile de discerner entre enjeu politique, persuasion rhétorique et opinions réelles des auteurs. On a accès seulement à ce qui s'offrait en quantité aux oreilles des Athéniens et, peut-être, d'autres Grecs. On ne sait ni même, et on ne le saura probablement jamais, comment ce tas de discours modelait la pensée et l'agir des Grecs. De côté des Macédoniens, on peut s'hasarder à formuler des hypothèses sur les intentions de leurs dynastes. Il est probablement vrai, par exemple, que Philippe, continuant la politique de ses ancêtres, essayait d'assumer une identité grecque. Mais,

il n'est pas moins crédible qu'Isocrate, à la fois son admirateur et l'un des plus connus promoteurs du panhellénisme, le voulait Grec. On ne sait rien sur ce que les Macédoniens eux-mêmes voulaient ou pensaient. On ne sait non plus si Philippe essayait de faire passer ses sujets pour des Grecs ou s'il gardait à cet égard la position traditionnelle de la dynastie des Argéades, de laquelle il faisait partie, c'est-à-dire, de poursuivre ses fins sans se soucier d'eux. Dès témoignages à notre disposition, il parait que Philippe n'a pas tenté de joindre les Macédoniens à sa quête de la grécité. Les deux voies, des rois et du peuple, dont on a déjà remarqué[52] l'existence au Ve siècle, semblent se maintenir distinctes l'une de l'autre.

Voyons maintenant ce qu'il est arrivé à l'ancienne ambiguïté concernant la grécité des Macédoniens. Elle semble avoir cédé place à une séparation nette du type : Grecs /barbares (Macédoniens). C'est ce que disent explicitement Démosthène et implicitement Isocrate. Sa distinction tripartite (*A Philippe*, 154) cache mal l'opposition binaire de Démosthène. On voit là la manifestation du bon sens d'Isocrate qui ne peut pas traiter de barbares les sujets du personnage la bienveillance duquel il essaie de capter.

Synthétisant, sur l'ethnicité des Macédoniens au cours de la période classique on a dans les sources grecques, les seules disponibles, une perception complexe. Au Ve siècle ils semblent manifester l'équivoque comportée par leur position géographiquement périphérique. Aux yeux des Grecs qui s'en occupent, ils ne sont ni Grecs, ni barbares, mais plutôt un ancien mélange de Grecs et barbares. La similitude du cas avec d'autres populations voisines des Grecs, trahit soit leur intention de se faire assimiler par les Grecs, soit le souhait de ceux derniers de reconnaître dans les peuplades proches spatialement, des êtres proches aussi par ascendance[53], soit les deux. Au même temps, les dynastes macédoniens se forgent une généalogie grecque et l'imposent avec succès aux Grecs. La moitié du IVe siècle apporte des changements qui aboutissent à l'expulsion en bloc, roi et sujets, du monde hellénique. Celle-ci est la situation à l'avènement d'Alexandre III au trône de la Macédoine.

Pour le règne d'Alexandre le Grand, à part Démosthène et le milieu rhétorique d'Athènes, qu'on vient d'examiner, les témoignages qui auraient pu clarifier la perception ethnique des Macédoniens, ne se sont pas conservés. Il s'agit ici notamment des histoires d'Alexandre et, c'est précisément le but de cette étude d'investiguer comment la perception des Macédoniens peut contribuer au déchiffrement du trajet que ces ouvrages ont suivi avant d'entrer à faire part des histoires connues aujourd'hui

de son règne. Voyons donc ce qu'on peut dire sur la perception des Macédoniens en époque, tout en laissant de côté, pour le moment, les historiens d'Alexandre.

D'abord, les villes grecques se retrouvèrent vite dans une situation similaire à celle du temps de Philippe II. Car Alexandre rétablit avec promptitude l'hégémonie macédonienne sur la Ligue de Corinthe. Rien de plus naturel donc que les Grecs soient assez désireux de se distancer de leurs oppresseurs. D'autre part, Alexandre présenta, dès le début, son expédition contre l'Empire Persan comme une sorte de 'croisade' avant la lettre destinée à venger les Grecs. Ce soin de sa part lui dut apporter l'adhésion d'une partie de l'opinion publique grecque, au moins ceux qui s'étaient opposés aux promoteurs de la résistance contre Philippe. On peut aussi imaginer que les Macédoniens, vainqueurs et déjà exclus du monde grec, souhaiteraient se détacher, à leur tour, des Grecs vaincus, et affirmer leur propre identité. Voilà comment semble se présenter le climat dans lequel furent écrites les histoires des contemporains d'Alexandre : ambiguë quand il concerne le niveau de la propagande, et plutôt favorable à une fusion des Grecs et des Macédoniens ; défavorable aux Macédoniens s'il reflétait le milieu athénien et, probablement, les sentiments d'une bonne partie des Grecs ; fièrement macédonien et hostile envers les Grecs, s'il était porteur des voix de ceux derniers. On se retrouve bien dans l'affirmation de Michele Faraguna : *the encounter between Alexander (and, before him, his father Philip II) and the Greek world can best be understood as the clash between two alien political traditions*[54]. Et, effectivement, en ce qui concerne la perception ethnique, l'idée d'opposition brutale, de collision entre deux groups hostiles, avec des perceptions de soi très différentes, a été démontrée de manière exhaustive pour le règne d'Alexandre et l'intervalle immédiatement successive, par Eugene N. Borza[55].

La période hellénistique, dominée par les royaumes fondés par les généraux d'Alexandre, et caractérisée par une fusion partiellement naturelle, partiellement contrôlée[56] des deux groupes ethniques en Orient, et d'une conservation – au moins au niveau du discours – de l'ancienne séparation en Grèce[57], est censée d'assister à une transformation dans la perception des Macédoniens. La source la plus ancienne conservée regardant ce sujet – après les orateurs attiques, bien entendu – est Polybe. Le saut de plus d'un siècle, de la fin du IVe siècle av. J.-C. au début du IIe siècle av. J.-C., dans la succession des témoignages est principalement du à la très précaire transmission des ouvrages datant des trois derniers siècles précédant l'ère chrétienne[58].

Sulochana R. Asirvatham remarque que : *Polybius' evaluation of the Macedonians is not about ethnic, cultural, or political 'Greekness' per se, but about a more intimate political 'genealogy' that links the Antigonids to a now-appreciated Argead past*[59]. Et, effectivement, le problème de la grécité des Macédoniens n'est plus d'actualité. Ce qui peut intéresser Polybe, dans son *Histoire*, où il présente la seconde et la troisième des guerres macédoniennes – des événements contemporains, comme conseillait et avait fait lui-même, Thucydide – à propos des Macédoniens, c'est précisément de récupérer leur individualité des temps glorieux de Philippe II et Alexandre III, pour en faire des dignes adversaires au profit des Romains. Car il oppose avec légèreté, comme s'il avait parlé des Grecs, les Macédoniens, par le toponyme la Macédoine, aux barbares :

Φίλιππος δὲ παραχειμάζων ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ κατέγραφε τὰς δυνάμεις πρὸς τὴν μέλλουσαν χρείαν ἐπιμελῶς, ἅμα δὲ τούτοις ἠσφαλίζετο τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ὑπερκειμένους τῆς Μακεδονίας βαρβάρους[60].

Le passage reconnaît implicitement, sans aucune marque supplémentaire, comme s'il s'agissait de la chose la plus naturelle, la grécité des Macédoniens, roi et peuple. C'est précisément grâce à cette valeur de fait généralement accepté que le témoignage de Polybe peut être admis comme preuve concluante pour la perception des Macédoniens au IIe siècle av. J.-C. Pour l'auteur et ses lecteurs, les Macédoniens de leurs jours, même s'ils portaient un nom différent et, plus important, même s'ils héritaient d'un passé connu de confrontations avec les Grecs, appartenaient désormais au monde grec.

Diodore de Sicile, actif dans la seconde moitié du Ier siècle av. J.-C., est le dernier auteur appartenant à la période hellénistique qu'on analyse ici. Son cas est particulier car, avec Diodore, on arrive à la première narration complète du règne d'Alexandre le Grand : le dix-septième livre de son *Bibliothèque Historique*. Parmi les historiens d'Alexandre, Diodore fait partie des *auteurs de la vulgate*, sources tertiaires qui, supposément, ont utilisé l'historien hellénistique perdu Clitharque comme source principale. Les autres auteurs de la *vulgate* sont Quintus Curtius, auteur de langue latine qui a écrit à un moment inconnu, du Ier au IIIe siècles ap. J.-C., et Iustinus, qui a épitomé, probablement au IVe siècle ap. J.-C., l'œuvre perdue de Trogue Pompée, historien du Ier siècle av. J.-C. écrivant en latin.

En ce qui concerne la perception des Macédoniens dans la période hellénistique, le témoignage de Diodore est difficile à gérer. Ses informations sur les Macédoniens sont empruntées à d'autres auteurs,

donc il est possible que l'attitude vis-à-vis les Macédoniens soit, elle aussi, empruntée. Ceci étant dit, on passe à un bref examen des instances textuelles qui font mention des Macédoniens. Dans l'œuvre de Diodore on ne retrouve aucune opposition Grec – Macédonien[61]. Les Macédoniens ne sont non plus liés explicitement aux barbares bien que leur mode d'agir puisse rappeler parfois le comportement des barbares, comme dans la description du pillage de Persépolis[62]. Quand même, Diodore ne confonde jamais les Macédoniens avec les diverses groups de grecs. Il n'emploie pas des formulations du type *hoi Makedones te kai alloi Hellenes* « Les Macédoniens et les autres Grecs ». Par contre, une énonciation comme *hoi Athenaioi te kai alloi Hellenes* n'est pas rare[63], fait qui enrichit de signification l'absence du premier syntagme. Les Macédoniens apparaissent dans des formules en coordination, similaires aux deux énoncées, ayant comme 'partenaires' exclusivement le terme générique *hoi Hellenes*, les Grecs[64]. Des occurrences examinées, il ne résulte pas que les Macédoniens étaient perçus comme des barbares. Cependant, on peut affirmer que Diodore (ou ses sources) était attentif à ne pas confondre les Macédoniens et les Grecs. L'attitude n'est pas fondamentalement différente de celle qu'on a vue chez Polybe[65]. Les Macédoniens ne sont plus ressentis des barbares et cela à notre avis caractérise de manière distinctive la période hellénistique.

Le mouvement culturel connu aux spécialistes de civilisation grecque sous le nom de *seconde sophistique* paraît avoir eu la plus notable influence sur les Grecs de l'Empire. Ses promoteurs ont développé les plus intéressantes idées sur la *paideia* grecque et sur la grécité. Le concept, *seconde sophistique,* a été défini et introduit dans le circuit scientifique par G. W. Bowersock[66] en 1969 et, successivement, il a été repris et raffiné par d'autres spécialistes[67]. Sur la seconde sophistique et ses réflexions sur l'identité grecque ont travaillé récemment Suzanne Said[68] – qui a examiné les cas de Dion Chrysostome et d'Aelius Aristide, Sulochana Asirvatham[69] – qui s'est occupée de l'image des Macédoniens dans la seconde sophistique, Simon Swain[70] – qui a étudié précisément le contenu du terme *to hellenikon* sous l'Empire, le facteur linguistique, les phénomènes qui ont fait nécessaire le fait de repenser l'identité grecque autour de la *paideia.*

La seconde sophistique emprunte son nom de l'ouvrage de Philostrate, sophiste grec du IIIᵉ siècle ap. J.-C., « Les vies des sophistes », *Bioi Sophistôn*, et recouvre un intervalle temporel qui va de la moitié du Iᵉʳ siècle ap. J.-C. au IIIᵉ siècle ap. J.-C. Cette dénomination recouvre une

multitude d'éléments culturels dont l'archaïsme, qu'en linguistique est connu comme atticisme, était la caractéristique dominante. Il conditionnait le choix des thèmes littéraires, des discours, des matières et des auteurs enseignés aux écoles, la conception du passe[71] etc.

L'image des Macédoniens ressurgit dans le contexte de la seconde sophistique associée à celle d'Alexandre. A la seconde sophistique appartient deux des plus appréciés historiens d'Alexandre : Arrien et Plutarque. D'Arrien nous nous occuperons dans la section suivante.

Nous allons brièvement esquisser maintenant la situation des Macédoniens dans l'ambiance rhétorique de la seconde sophistique. Pour commencer, l'ancienne opposition Grecs – barbares, qu'on a vu s'affaiblir au cours de la période hellénistique, s'est complètement érodée. Réduite à *topos*[72], elle perd sa place dans la définition de la grécité. L'enjeu politique de la grécité, la liberté, est un sujet soigneusement évité[73]. Aelius Aristide et Dion Chrysostome semblent d'accord à considérer la *paideia*, le bon commandement du déjà ancien grec attique, des repères dans l'identification comme Grec[74]. Dans les discours épidictiques de Plutarque, Asirvatham[75] constate l'immixtion du concept roman de *romanitas*, dans l'articulation de la signification de *to hellenikon*. Si l'on emploie l'opposition Grecs – barbares, celle-ci est devenue tripartite : Grecs – Romans – Barbares[76]. On reconnaît bien ici le schéma d'Isocrate : Grecs – Macédoniens – barbares. Et c'est sous l'Empire qu'on arrive à confondre Grecs et Macédoniens[77].

Finalement, la perception des Macédoniens au cours des siècles s'est notablement modifiée. De l'ambiguïté des premiers témoignages du Ve siècle av. J.-C. à la séparation nette des Grecs et à l'assimilation aux barbares du IVe siècle av. J.-C. Au cours des périodes hellénistique et impériale, sur le fond de l'effacement total des marques de la différence entre Grecs et Macédoniens, les auteurs ne ressentent plus le besoin de se rapporter aux Macédoniens autrement qu'aux Grecs. Mais on se garde bien de les confondre de manière explicite en employant un ethnonyme à la place de l'autre. L'histoire et la mémoire semblent demander ce petit tribut.

Voyons maintenant ce qui peut dire cette chronologie des changements dans le rapport Grecs – Macédoniens sur l'historien d'époque romaine Arrien de Nicomédie et sur sa manière d'utiliser les sources.

2. Grecs et Macédoniens dans l'*Anabase d'Alexandre*

Dès la première contribution de P. A. Brunt au problème de la perception des Macédoniens dans l'*Anabase d'Alexandre*, cette direction d'études a attirée l'attention des chercheurs les plus influents de l'époque d'Alexandre. Badian, Borza[78], Bosworth[79] s'en sont successivement occupés rejoignant des conclusions incitantes, portant surtout sur l'analyse du texte. Récemment, le problème a été repris dans le contexte de la seconde sophistique[80]. Mais, avec des nuancements, les opinions semblent rester cantonnées dans les conclusions de P. A. Brunt :

> Hence they [the Greeks] did not see that the Macedonians were of the same stock as themselves […] in Alexander's time they [the Macedonians] perhaps did not wish to be so regarded, for Arrian, following his main sources, who were Macedonians by birth (Ptolemy) or adoption (Aristobulus and Nearchus), is normally careful to distinguish and even to contrast Macedonians and Greeks[81].

L'affirmation implique nier tout prétention de la part des Macédoniens de se voir accepter comme Grecs et, aussi, nier tout reconnaissance de la part de ceux derniers d'une quelconque similitude entre eux et les Macédoniens. Cependant, les informations que nous tenons d'Hérodote et Thucydide, on l'a vu, parlent d'une situation bien plus complexe, dans certains cas, même opposée, pour la période classique : les Macédoniens, ou, au moins, leur élite, prétendaient être acceptés comme Grecs. Dans le cas de l'*Anabase d'Alexandre*, les conséquences de cette négation doivent être envisagées en plan synchronique (les sources primaires de la campagne d'Alexandre) aussi bien que diachronique (les élaborations ultérieures ou, dans certaines situations, antérieures utilisées directement ou indirectement par Arrien). Or, cette monochromie de perception nous semble quelque peu curieuse. C'est pourquoi nous nous proposons de reprendre, en essayant de sonder la stratigraphie interne de l'œuvre, les passages traitants des relations entre Grecs et Macédoniens. On souhaiterait surprendre, en premier lieu, dans la diachronie dont le texte d'Arrien est incontestablement porteur, les empreintes de la perception que l'auteur lui-même avait de la question macédonienne. En deuxième lieu, par cette enquête, nous espérons apporter une contribution méthodologique à l'analyse des sources dans l'*Anabase d'Alexandre*.

Il est incontestable qu'Arrien est en général très attentif tout au long des sept livres de l'*Anabase* à ne pas mélanger les Grecs aux Macédoniens. Mise dans cette perspective, l'affirmation de P. A. Brunt, qu'on vient de citer, est valide. On ne retrouve presque jamais dans L'*Anabase* le mot *hoi Hellenes* recouvrant de manière généralisée Grecs et Macédoniens. Mais Arrien semble moins vigilent quand il s'agit du deuxième ethnonyme. Car le contraire est, par contre, valable et la situation, d'ailleurs très fréquente, a été toujours ignorée. Il est un fait universellement accepté que dans l'armée dont s'est servi Alexandre dans la campagne d'Orient il y a eu en permanence des troupes grecques à côté de celles Macédoniennes. Pourtant, une rapide investigation statistique, montre qu'à un total de 259 mentions des Macédoniens, il corresponde un nombre de seulement 77 mentions des Grecs. Tout en tenant compte du fait qu'Alexandre a fait la campagne des Balkans avec seulement des soldats Macédoniens, et que quelques fois Arrien nomme expressément les Thessaliens[82], en se passant ainsi du mot *Hellenes*, la différence reste énorme. La seule explication possible est qu'Arrien emploie, et de manière répétée, le mot *hoi Makedones* comme synonyme des soldats (Macédoniens en principal, mais aussi d'autres origines et, notamment, des Grecs). Et, effectivement, on rencontre cette formule dans l'*Anabase*. Prenons un exemple pour mieux nous expliquer. Arrien oppose à l'armée perse (1. 14. 5), au commencement du récit de la bataille d'Issos, simplement le mot « les Macédoniens » : οἱ γὰρ Πέρσαι προσέμενον τοὺς Μακεδόνας…[83] Et ce type d'opposition armée ennemie – armée Macédonienne, se réalisant à l'aide des ethnonymes respectives, est usuel dans l'*Anabase*.

Voyons maintenant comment Arrien opère le contraste ou l'inclusion prenant comme point de référence les Grecs. En racontant le siège de Thèbes, Arrien situe les Thébains par rapport aux Grecs : Καὶ πάθος τοῦτο Ἑλληνικὸν μεγέθει τε τῆς ἁλούσης πόλεως καὶ ὀξύτητι τοῦ ἔργου, [...] οὐ μεῖόν τι τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας[84] et après quelques lignes : Ἐς δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας ὡς ἐξηγγέλθη τῶν Θηβαίων τὸ πάθος…[85] Des formes similaires sont utilisées pour les Lacédémoniens (2. 14. 6) : Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς τῶν Ἑλλήνων, « les Lacédémoniens et d'autres parmi les Grecs » et les Thessaliens (5. 27. 5) : Θετταλοὺς [...] τῶν δὲ ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων « les Thessaliens […] et les autres Grecs ». Arrien se sert de la structure : ethnonyme + *[te kai /de] hoi alloi Hellenes*, qui est une formule inclusive, où figure toujours le pronom démonstratif *allos* au sens de « le reste ; les autres », quasi-exclusivement, pour les diverses groups de Grecs. Par contre, quand Arrien met à côté les Macédoniens et les

420

Grecs, le rapport est de simple juxtaposition : τὰ μὲν κατὰ Μακεδονίαν τε καὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας Ἀντιπάτρῳ ἐπιτρέψας[86], ou : ἐς Μακεδονίαν τε καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα (2.1.1) « en Macédoine et en Grèce », Μακεδόνων τε καὶ Ἑλλήνων (5. 27. 4) « Macédoniens et Grecs », ὧν τά τε ὀνόματα καὶ τὰς σκευὰς τότε πρῶτον ὀφθῆναι πρὸς Ἑλλήνων τε καὶ Μακεδόνων (7.15. 4) « parmi ceux-ci, il y avait quelques-uns lesquels noms et costumes se voyaient pour la première fois chez les Grecs et les Macédoniens. » Il se sert seulement de la formule de juxtaposition *te kai*.

Des situations présentées, il résulterait qu'Arrien fait soigneusement la séparation des Grecs et Macédoniens, en employant un vocabulaire clair et sans équivoque. Et s'est sûrement le cas pour les exemples analysés. La similitude avec le type de démarcation qu'opérait Diodore[87], assez différente de celle qu'on a rencontrée chez Polybe, peut suggérer une datation antérieure à la période hellénistique. En ce cas, on devrait reléguer l'information aux histoires écrites dans la période des Diadoques, immédiatement après la mort d'Alexandre, c'est-à-dire aux sources primaires de son règne. Cette datation est confirmée par Bosworth, pour le passage de 1. 11. 3 – il l'attribue, sur des considérations de style, à Ptolémée[88] – et pour 2.1.1, celui aussi emprunté par Arrien[89] à Ptolémée. Pour le passage de 5. 27. 4, le contexte est difficile comme il est inclus dans un discours qu'Arrien fait prononcer au Macédonien Coenus. Prononcé à Ophis, le discours est un mélangé[90] de *topoi* de la rhétorique classique. Il est un bon exemple de production littéraire de la seconde sophistique : style atticiste, vision grecque sur les faits énoncés, situation étonnante dans un discours attribué à un Macédonien. Comment expliquer alors la même soigneuse distinction entre les deux ethnies qu'on a remarquée dans les précédents passages, si ce discours est le résultat des efforts d'Arrien lui-même ? Selon notre opinion, ce souci est un 'archaïsme', une distinction obsolète, empruntée par Arrien à la tradition littéraire, un autre exemple d'imitation du discours classique. Le passage de 7.15.4 qui reproduit l'épisode des ambassades reçues par Alexandre à Babylone en 323 av. J. –C., est, par contre, pris des travaux de Ptolémée ou Aristobule. On a là la certitude grâce à un commentaire qu'Arrien fait lui-même à la fin. Après avoir énuméré les ambassades qui sont censées avoir émerveillé à la fois Grecs et Macédoniens, Arrien reprend une anecdote sur l'ambassade des Romains et l'entretien des légats avec Alexandre, nomme les sources, et la rejette comme improbable. Il ajoute que l'ambassade des Romains ne figure ni dans la liste de Ptolémée, ni dans celle fournie par Aristobule, sources qu'il a évidemment consultées.

Nous avons laissé de côté une occurrence un peu particulière. Il ne s'agit pas d'opposer deux entités ethniques, comme dans les exemples qu'on a vus jusqu'ici. Les Macédoniens sont associés de manière inclusive au terme à valeur générique et distinctive *hoi xenoi* « les étrangers » : […] τὸ Μακεδονικὸν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων […][91]. Arrien marque par l'emploi du terme à valeur distinctive la nette opposition entre Macédoniens et les autres, les étrangers, qui sont, en effet, les Grecs. Il est d'autant plus intéressant de retenir que le mot *hoi xenoi*, les étrangers, – qui marque une perspective non-grecque – figure chez un auteur qui, on vient de le voir, présente dans une perspective grecque un discours auquel les Grecs sont censés ne pas avoir été présents. On peut donc affirmer que le texte qui contient le passage reprend une source. De plus, cette source ne semble pas être grecque, car un Grec aurait peut-être préféré l'usuelle formulation à termes ethnonymes, plutôt que se voir dénommé « étranger ». Cette source est à la fois très précise en séparant les Macédoniens des autres. Elle devrait alors être porteuse d'une vision macédonienne. En effet, nos hypothèses sont confirmées car Arrien cite Ptolémée[92] comme source pour le passage sur la mort de Parménion.

Un cas intéressant pour notre démarche est celui qu'Arrien présente à 2. 14. 4 où on lit : Οἱ ὑμέτεροι πρόγονοι ἐλθόντες εἰς Μακεδονίαν καὶ εἰς τὴν ἄλλην Ἑλλάδα[93]. Il s'agit d'un cas d'inclusion, similaire du point de vue de la structure aux cas qu'on a analysés plus en avant. Cependant, le sens est surprenant. Il fait présenter la Macédoine comme une partie de la Grèce. D'ailleurs, l'interprétation du passage a posé des problèmes. Borza[94] suggère d'interpréter le démonstratif *alle* comme signifiant *besides*, « en plus », « et aussi », au lieu de le lire comme dans tous les autres cas où l'on rencontre la même structure. Bosworth[95] remarque lui aussi la difficulté, mais rejette tout intervention sur la lecture. Il ne pense non plus que celui-ci soit un cas de redondance. Car le syntagme est suffisamment bien attesté dans cette forme, notamment chez Polybe[96], entre autres auteurs hellénistiques. Il essaye de trouver la solution dans l'interprétation contextuelle – une lettre qu'Alexandre aurait écrite à Darius – et considère que l'inclusion de la Macédoine dans une Grèce élargie est une manœuvre de propagande. Alexandre aurait voulu présenter comme légitime sa campagne contre les Perses. C'est pourquoi il aurait inclus la Macédoine comme partie de la Grèce. Mais l'explication de Bosworth ne nous semble pas convaincante. Si Alexandre avait vraiment voulu se présenter par ces mots en vengeur d'anciennes agressions, le passé de la Macédoine, ancienne vassale de l'Empire Persan, lui aurait

fourni un prétexte suffisant. Or, l'expression est courante chez Polybe, comme le note aussi Bosworth. Et on a déjà vu quelle est la perception des Macédoniens, et implicitement de la Macédoine, chez Polybe. Pour l'historien hellénistique, les Macédoniens sont implicitement des Grecs. De plus, le texte qu'Arrien 'cite' ici est une lettre. Et la correspondance d'Alexandre est une question très contestée. La plus grande partie des chercheurs[97] incline aujourd'hui à les considérer des faux, et, pas de tout surprenant, elles sont généralement datées à l'époque hellénistique[98]. Arrivés à ce point, notre hypothèse est la suivante : nous sommes confrontés ici à un anachronisme. Cet anachronisme, Arrien doit l'avoir emprunté à la source dont il fait mention, la lettre. Arrien reprend donc la formulation de sa source, une lettre de fabrication hellénistique, période pour laquelle le syntagme reflète la réalité quotidienne. Notre interprétation présente un double avantage. D'un côté, elle explique pourquoi Arrien assimile la Macédoine à la Grèce ici, sans que la confusion soit répétée ailleurs. D'autre part, on n'est plus forcé à imposer une interprétation particulière, forgée pour cette situation, du lexique, comme fait Borza, ou du contexte historique, comme Bosworth.

Mais Arrien ne se borne pas à l'emprunt mécanique des images et des modes de pensée désormais révolus, comme dans les cas analysés. En suivant la perception des Macédoniens dans l'œuvre d'Arrien, nous proposons l'examen de deux autres cas où Arrien, au nome propre ou par voie d'un discours, reprend des images liées à la perception des Macédoniens et, en particulier, à la famille régnante, datables en période classique. Bien entendu, la présence chez Arrien des thèmes classiques n'a rien de spectaculaire. En fin de comptes, Arrien est considéré l'un des représentants majeurs de la seconde sophistique non seulement pour la maîtrise du dialecte attique, mais aussi à cause de la prédilection pour des motifs antiquisants. Mais, il faut souligner que, tout en réutilisant des thèmes consacrés, Arrien créé un message nouveau, qui relève de son époque et non pas des périodes d'où il tire son matériel. Ainsi, il est possible, en suivant le sort d'un thème, à savoir la perception des Macédoniens, de faire une brèche dans la sédimentation d'un ouvrage et tenter, par cette voie, de dévoiler dans une certaine mesure l'ordre dans laquelle cette sédimentation s'est produite. Et, bien entendu, une fois récupérée la signification initiale, on parvient à une meilleure compréhension du texte même.

Le premier passage provient de la virulente intervention[99] moralisatrice d'Arrien, faite en première personne, et qui est causée par la torture,

la mutilation, suivies de l'exécution de Bessos de la part Alexandre. L'indignation face à la cruauté du geste du roi, détermine Arrien à lui évaluer les accomplissements, mais aussi son héritage culturel: ἐσθῆτά τε ὅτι Μηδικὴν ἀντὶ τῆς Μακεδονικῆς τε καὶ πατρίου Ἡρακλείδης ὢν μετέλαβεν[100]. Il est facile de reconnaître ici la généalogie argienne, qui descendait jusqu'à Héraclès, de la dynastie macédonienne, dont nous avons déjà parlé à propos de la période classique[101]. Elle est fréquemment véhiculée par les orateurs attiques, la créditant comme Isocrate, ou la repoussant, comme Démosthène. Cette généalogie présente néanmoins des particularités chez Arrien. Elle n'est plus utilisée pour fournir le 'passeport' Grec. Par contre, elle joue ici le rôle de relier Alexandre à son héritage macédonien. Nous constatons, par rapport à la période classique, une distorsion de perception, ou plutôt une perte de sens. La généalogie, qui avant servait à dissocier les rois du pays – la Macédoine – et du peuple – les Macédoniens – ici renforce la 'macédonicité' même. Nous sommes confrontés à une perception tout à fait différente où Macédoine et Grèce s'identifient l'une avec l'autre, et c'est précisément la perception d'époque romaine. En effet, dans ce passage, la généalogie est utilisée avec d'autres images courantes concernant Alexandre, comme l'adoption du faste perse. Le tout représente la variation d'Arrien sur un *topos*[102] – très populaire dans la rhétorique de son temps[103] – qui traite des vertus et des vices du Macédonien. On le connaît de Tite Live[104], de Dion Chrysostome[105], et surtout des deux ouvrages rhétoriques de Plutarque, *De Alexandri Magni Fortuna aut Virtute*. On voit donc, quand on compare la forme initiale de la généalogie avec celle qu'on retrouve chez Arrien, qu'il est impossible que le passage soit emprunté directement aux ouvrages de date classique. Il a connu l'intermédiaire du milieu rhétorique de la seconde sophistique. Arrien présente, à titre de réflexion personnelle, un *topos*, mais il faut noter, ce *topos* lui est contemporain et reflète son goût en matière de style et son adhésion aux réalités de son temps.

Le deuxième passage fait partie d'un discours. Il est attribué à Callisthène qui l'aurait prononcé au banquet où Alexandre a demandé de la part des participants la *proskunesis*, le salut par prosternation :

ἀλλὰ νόμῳ Μακεδόνων ἄρχοντες διετέλεσαν. οὔκουν οὐδὲ αὐτῷ τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ ζῶντι ἔτι θεῖαι τιμαὶ παρ΄ Ἑλλήνων ἐγένοντο, ἀλλ΄ οὐδὲ τελευτήσαντι πρόσθεν ἢ πρὸς τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἐπιθεσπισθῆναι ὡς θεὸν τιμᾶν Ἡρακλέα. εἰ δέ, ὅτι ἐν τῇ βαρβάρῳ γῇ οἱ λόγοι γίγνονται, βαρβαρικὰ χρὴ ἔχειν τὰ φρονήματα, καὶ ἐγὼ τῆς Ἑλλάδος μεμνῆσθαί σε

ἀξιῶ, ὦ Ἀλέξανδρε, ἧς ἕνεκα ὁ πᾶς στόλος σοι ἐγένετο, προσθεῖναι τὴν Ἀσίαν τῇ Ἑλλάδι. καὶ οὖν ἐνθυμήθητι, ἐκεῖσε ἐπανελθὼν ἆρά γε καὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας τοὺς ἐλευθερωτάτους προσαναγκάσεις ἐς τὴν προσκύνησιν, ἢ Ἑλλήνων μὲν ἀφέξῃ, Μακεδόσι δὲ προσθήσεις τήνδε τὴν ἀτιμίαν, ἢ διακεκριμένα ἔσται σοι αὐτῷ τὰ τῶν τιμῶν ἐς ἅπαν, ὡς πρὸς Ἑλλήνων μὲν καὶ Μακεδόνων ἀνθρωπίνως τε καὶ Ἑλληνικῶς τιμᾶσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τῶν βαρβάρων μόνων βαρβαρικῶς;[106]

Arrien reprend, cette fois-ci dans la bonne tradition classique, la généalogie du roi. Nous retrouvons aussi l'opposition Grecs – Macédoniens. Le passage rappelle Isocrate[107]. La gestion des rapports Grecs – Macédoniens mise à part, autres similitudes sont le gouvernement en roi légitime de la Macédoine et surtout la triple perception de l'altérité : Grecs – Macédoniens – barbares orientales. Il est vrai, la perception tripartite était courante au IIe siècle ap. J.-C. Nous l'avons déjà retrouvée chez Aelius Aristide[108], son contemporain, qui l'appliquait aux Romains. Mais la présence de la distinction entre Grecs et Macédoniens et, surtout, les réflexions sur l'attachement des Grecs à la liberté – ailleurs[109] Arrien manifeste un mépris mordant pour le présumé attachement des Thébains à la liberté – nous renforcent dans la conviction qu'Arrien a utilisé directement le milieu de la rhétorique attique du IVe siècle av. J.-C. pour élaborer le discours de Callisthène.

Les deux exemples, nous l'espérons, ont démontré de manière convaincante comment, en suivant en diachronie les rapports des Grecs et des Macédoniens, ceux-ci ont permis d'identifier – au moyen des diverses particularités dont cette diachronie est porteuse – le milieu culturel d'où Arrien a tiré son inspiration. Notre approche relève toute son importance si l'on considère qu'il a permis d'identifier l'origine de passages pour lesquels Arrien n'avait pas indiqué les sources utilisées.

Dans la présente étude nous nous sommes proposé de développer un moyen de sonder la sédimentation des sources dans les ouvrages historiques, accordant une attention spéciale à l'*Anabase d'Alexandre*. A cette fin nous avons choisi la dynamique du rapport Grecs – Macédoniens.

Premièrement, il a fallu identifier comment s'était construite la perception grecque des Macédoniens. Ensuite, nous avons essayé de surprendre les changements produits dans cette perception au cours des périodes classique, hellénistique et romaine. De notre analyse se dégagent les suivantes conclusions.

Les rapports entre les Grecs et les populations périphériques étaient, jusqu'à la première moitié du IVe siècle av. J.-C., ambigus. Les changements intervenus dans le climat politique de la Grèce pendant la deuxième moitié du IVe siècle av. J.-C., qui opposent les Grecs aux Macédoniens, radicalisent aussi le discours ethnique. Les adversaires Macédoniens deviennent irrémédiablement différents, voire barbares. Mais la collaboration, surtout en Orient, entre Grecs et Macédoniens dans le cadre fourni par les royaumes hellénistiques joue un rôle décisif dans l'estompage des différences. En effet, à l'époque romaine on ne peut plus parler de distinctions réelles entre Grecs et Macédoniens. Ceux derniers ont été complètement assimilés.

La seconde partie, conçue comme une étude de cas, applique à l'*Anabase* d'Arrien les informations recueillies dans la première partie afin de sonder à travers eux la stratification des sources. Grâce à cette méthode, nous sommes arrivés à identifier les sources utilisées là où Arrien n'en faisait pas mention. En plus, une juste identification des sources utilisées a permis une meilleure compréhension du texte même, comme dans le cas de la controverse issue autour du passage 2. 14. 4 de l'*Anabase d'Alexandre*.

NOTES

[1]   *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker (FGrH)*, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1876-1958.

[2]   La vitalité de la démarche est prouvée par la décision des éditions Brill de reprendre le projet et de publier une édition revue et augmentée des trois volumes, en 1999. Il faut aussi signaler le début, en 2007 (à conclure en 2013), du projet *Brill's New Jacoby* (éditeur en chef: Ian Worthington) qui actualise les leçons du texte et l'accompagne d'un nouveau commentaire philologique, ajoute la traduction en anglais, introduit des nouveaux auteurs etc.

[3]   *The Lost Histories of Alexander the Great*, New York, American Philological Association, 1960.

[4]   *Historiens compagnons d'Alexandre : Callisthène – Onésicrite – Néarque – Ptolémée – Aristobule*, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1984.

[5]   *Sources of Alexander the Great : An Analysis of Plutarch's Life and Arrian's Anabasis Alexandrou*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993 et *Three Historians of Alexander the Great: The So-Called Vulgate Authors, Diodorus, Justin and Curtius*, Cambridge, 1983 ; pour une bibliographie plus actualisée, voir Elizabeth Baynham, « The Ancient Evidence for Alexander the Great » in Joseph Roisman (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great…*, p. 3-30 et les renvoies bibliographiques.

[6]   Juste pour en faire quelques noms, nous rappelons ici : A.B. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander : Studies in Historical Interpretation*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988, et son excellent commentaire des cinq premiers livres de l'*Anabase* : *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980-1995, 2 vol. centrés sur Arrien ; J. E. Atkinson, *A Commentary on Q. Curtius Rufus' Historiae Alexandri Magni*, Amsterdam, J. C. Gieben, 2 vol. 1980–1994 ; Elizabeth Baynham, *Alexander the Great : The Unique History of Quintus Curtius*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1998, pour Quinte Curce ; pour Justin, le commentaire dans : J.C. Yardley ; Waldemar Heckel, *Iustinus Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997 ; en ce qui concerne la *Vie d'Alexandre*, le travail classique de Hamilton (1969), dans un nouveau tirage avec une introduction de P.A. Stadter, reste fondamental.

[7]   Voir : J. Hall, *Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, et du même auteur « Contested Ethnicities : Perceptions of Macedonia within Evolving Definitions of Greek Identity » in I. Malkin (ed.), *Ancient Perceptions of Greek Ethnicity…*, p. 159-186) ; Johannes Engels, « Macedonians and Greeks » in Joseph Roisman ; Ian Worthington, (eds.), *A Companion to Ancient Macedonia…*, 2010, p. 81.

[8]   Voir Eugene N. Borza, *In the Shadow of Olympus : The Emergence of Macedon*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 21 pour un compte-rendu des sources littéraires sur les Macédoniens. La situation

détaillée, avec références bibliographiques actualisées, se trouve dans P. J. Rhodes, « The Literary and Epigraphic Evidence to the Roman Conquest » in Joseph Roisman ; Ian Worthington (eds.), *A Companion to Ancient Macedonia* …, p. 23-40, notamment p. 24-32.

9   Bien que les termes *oi barbaroi* et son dérivé *to barbarikon* précèdent les guerres médiques (voir à ce propos la brève évaluation du *corpus* homérique en Simon Hornblower, « Greek Identity in the Archaic and Classical Periods » in Katerina Zacharia (ed.), *Hellenisms : Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity …*, p. 38) en témoignant de cette façon d'une plus ancienne prise de conscience des Grecs vis-à-vis leur appartenance ethnique, c'est la victoire obtenue suite à la deuxième guerre médique en 480 av. J.-C. qui a marqué le point culminant de la création de l'identité grecque ; voir aussi Stanley Burstein, « Greek Identity in the Hellenistic Period » in Katerina Zacharia (ed.), *Hellenisms : Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity…*, p. 60. On y trouve une bibliographie détaillée du problème.

10 Nous reprenons ici la terminologie de J. Hall : il reconnaît une *aggressive construction of Greekness* centrée sur l'aspect ethnique, qui caractérise la période archaïque, et une *oppositional construction of Greekness* qui s'affirme après les guerres médiques et en relation avec celles-ci. Le Ve siècle av. J.-C. marquerait le passage du critère strictement ethnique au critère culturel dans la définition de la grécité ; voir du même auteur : « The Role of Language in Greek Ethnicities » in *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*, 41 (1995), p. 91-96 ; pour une perspective différente, qui insiste sur une plus accentuée fluidité de l'identité grecque déjà perceptible dans le contexte de la colonisation, voir l'article de Simon Hornblower, cité à la note précédente.

11 Hérodote, *Histoires*, 8. 144.

12 Sur la place de la définition dans l'ensemble de l'œuvre d'Hérodote, voir plus en avant, p. 8 et successive.

13 Sur l'opulence comme marque de l'autre, du barbare voir : Zoe Petre, *Cetatea greacă între real și imaginar*, București, Nemira, 2000, l'étude : « Aurul în *Perşii* » p. 191-203 pour le cas des Perses. Le schéma qui associe la richesse excessive à la barbarie se retrouve aussi, un peu plus tard, au temps des *Philippiques* de Démosthène cette fois-ci visant les Macédoniens, voir : Sulochana R. Asirvatham, « Perspectives on the Macedonians from Greece, Rome, and Beyond » in Joseph Roisman ; Ian Worthington (eds.), *A Companion to Ancient Macedonia* …, p. 109. La permanence de la représentation, qui se transforme pour s'adapter à d'autres réalités, semble témoigner, une fois de plus, de la place majeure que les Perses ont tenu dans la création de l'identité grecque ; voir aussi Katerina Zacharia, « Herodotus' Four Markers of Greek Identity » in Katerina Zacharia (ed.), *Hellenisms : Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity…*, p. 30 et successives, sur le rôle de la

kinship diplomacy dans la gestion des relations avec les riches voisins des Grecs.

[14] Voir p. 4, n. 11.

[15] Voir Katerina Zacharia, *op. cit.*, p. 24 pour les renvois bibliographiques.

[16] Voir l'étude de François Hartog, *Le miroir d'Hérodote : Essai sur la représentation de l'autre*, Gallimard, Paris, 1980 où l'auteur rejoint la conclusion que l'image des Scythes a été construite en opposition avec celle des Athéniens.

[17] Voir la classification dans J. Hall, « Contested Ethnicities …, p. 173, n. 6.

[18] Hérodote, *Histoires*, 5. 20 ; 5. 22 ; 9. 45.

[19] *Ibidem*, 5. 22 « j'en [qu'ils sont Grecs] ai une connaissance certaine, et je le prouverai dans la suite de cette Histoire. »
Toutes les traductions suivent en ligne générale la version de P.-H. Larcher, avec des mineurs interventions qui nous appartiennent et qui seront insérées entre crochets dans le texte.

[20] *Ibidem*, 5. 20 ; 8. 137-139.

[21] Voir p. 9.

[22] Hérodote, *Histoires*, 9. 45 : « Je suis Grec ; mon origine tient aux temps les plus reculés, et je serais fâché de voir la Grèce devenir esclave…. »

[23] *Ibidem*, 5. 20 : « un Grec, [satrape des Macédoniens] ».

[24] *Ibidem*, 6. 44 ; 7. 9.

[25] Au Ve siècle av. J.-C. les toponymes noms de pays tiraient leur signification et leur dénomination du rapport constant avec les populations qui les occupaient, voir Francesco Prontera, « Sul concetto geografico di Hellas » in Francesco Prontera (ed.), *Geografia storica della Grecia antica : tradizioni e problemi*, Bari, Laterza, 1991, p. 78-105.

[26] Hérodote, *Histoires*, 7. 9 : « Je connais par moi-même les forces des Grecs ; j'en fis l'épreuve lorsque je marchai contre eux par ordre du roi, votre père. Je pénétrai en Macédoine; peu s'en fallut même que je n'allasse jusqu'à Athènes, … ».

[27] *Ibidem*, 1. 56 ; 8. 43.

[28] Sur la possible identification des Macédoniens avec les *Makednoi*, voir Leonid A. Gindin, « L'élément -δων, -δον dans les langues anciennes de la partie continentale de la péninsule balkanique » in *Ancient Macedonia III : Papers Read at the Third International Symposium Held in Thessaloniki, September 21-25, 1977*, Thessaloniki, Institute for Balkan Studies, 1983, p. 103-106.

[29] Hérodote, *Histoires*, 5. 22 ; 8. 137-139.

[30] Simon Hornblower, *op. cit.*, p. 55, en examinant d'autres témoignages, conseille lui aussi *not to take the four criteria [of Herodotus] too seriously*.

[31] Cette ambiguïté n'est pas tout à fait surprenante car les Grecs n'avaient pas une image homogène des barbares et le texte d'Hérodote offre un bon

exemple pour cette perception nuancée des non-Grecs. Pour une analyse critique, voir Paul Cartledge, *The Greeks : A Portrait of Self and Others*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 45 et successives.

[32] Il révèle lui-même au 5. 22 que l'information a été fourni par les rois macédoniens : κατά περ αὐτοὶ λέγουσι « comme ils le disent eux-mêmes ».

[33] Pour participer aux jeux olympiques, Alexandre I a dû prouver aux *hellenodikes* son origine grecque, voir Hérodote, *Histoires*, 5. 22.

[34] Thucydide, *Guerre du Péloponnèse*, 2. 99. 1.

[35] *Ibidem*, 2. 99. 1 : ἐκράτησαν δὲ [...] οἱ Μακεδόνες οὗτοι [...] καὶ Μακεδόνων αὐτῶν πολλήν. « Enfin ces Macédoniens ont établi leur pouvoir sur [...] une grande partie des Macédoniens eux-mêmes. » toutes les traductions de Thucydide sont de Jean Voilquin ; nos interventions seront placées entre crochets.

[36] *Ibidem*, 2. 80. 1 : οἱ μὲν Μακεδόνες καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν βαρβάρων εὐθὺς φοβηθέντες… « Les Macédoniens et la foule des Barbares furent saisis d'une de ces paniques … »

[37] *Ibidem*, 4. 125. 1.

[38] *Ibidem*, 4. 126. 3 : « Quant à ces Barbares, que votre inexpérience vous fait redouter, apprenez à les connaître. D'après les rencontres que vous avez eues avec les Macédoniens, d'après mes conjectures et mes informations, ils seront peu redoutables. »

[39] Les Macédoniens partagent d'ailleurs ce statut équivoque avec les Molosses, l'ancienne population de l'Epire, sur les Molosses voir Irad Malkin, « Greek Ambiguities : *Ancient Hellas* and Barbarian Epirus » in I. Malkin (ed.), *Ancient Perceptions of Greek Ethnicity*…, p. 187-212 ; ces revendications d'une origine grecque de la part des Macédoniens et Molosses correspondent à des prétentions similaires des populations périphériques du sud de l'Italie, et semblent caractériser les relations des Grecs avec leurs voisins au Ve et début du IVe siècles, voir Ernst Badian, « Greeks and Macedonians » in Beryl Barr-Sharrar ; Eugene N. Borza, (eds.), *Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times*, Washington, National Gallery of Art, 1982, p. 34-37.

[40] Des conclusions similaires rejoint aussi Johannes Engels, *op. cit.*, p. 84 : « Both historians [Herodotus and Thucydides] regard the Macedonians as northern Greeks (Hellenes), as barbarians, or as an intermediate group between pure Greeks and utter barbarians. »

[41] Suzanne Said, « The Discourse of Identity in Greek Rhetoric from Isocrates to Aristides » in I. Malkin (ed.), *Ancient Perceptions of Greek Ethnicity* …, notamment p. 276-286.

[42] *Ibidem*, p. 277 et successive.

[43] Isocrate, *Lettre à Archidamos*, 9, 8.

[44] Idem, *Panégyrique d'Athènes*, 180 ; *Eloge d'Evagoras*, 14-15 ; Démosthène, *Contre Philippe*, 3. 32.

[45] Démosthène, *Sur les symmories*, 32 ; *Sur la couronne*, 296-297.

[46] A la même conclusion semble arriver aussi Badian dans l'article déjà cité, voir p. 10, n. 39.

[47] Démosthène, *Contre Philippe*, 3. 32.

[48] Isocrate, *A Philippe*, 76, 79, 113, 115, 127.

[49] *Ibidem*, 154 : « Je dis donc que vous devez vous rendre le bienfaiteur de la Grèce, régner en roi, non en tyran sur la Macédoine, et vous assujettir un grand nombre de Barbares. » traduction par Clermont-Tonnerre.

[50] Démosthène, *Sur la couronne*, 185-186.

[51] Idem, *Contre Philippe*, 3. 31 : « Mais qu'un esclave, qu'un enfant supposé s'avise d'engloutir une succession étrangère, avec quel courroux, grands dieux ! Nous flétrirons tous un vol si affreux, si révoltant! Où est-il donc, notre courroux contre Philippe et ses attentats ! Philippe qui n'est pas Grec, qu'aucun lien n'unit aux Grecs, Philippe qui n'est pas même un Barbare d'illustre origine, misérable Macédonien né dans un pays où l'on ne put jamais acheter un bon esclave ! », traduction par J.-F. Stiévenart.

[52] Voir p. 6 et successives.

[53] C'est l'explication que Simon Hornblower offre pour la situation présente en *Graecia Magna*. Voir *op. cit.*, p. 39 et aussi Frank W. Walbank, *The Hellenistic World*, London, Fontana Press, 1992, p. 63 sur la même attitude pendant la période hellénistique.

[54] Michele Faraguna, « Alexander and the Greeks » in Joseph Roisman (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great …*, p. 99.

[55] Eugene N. Borza, « Greeks and Macedonians in the Age of Alexander. The Source Traditions » in Robert W. Wallace; Edward M. Harris (eds.), *Transitions to Empire: Essays in Greco-Roman History, 360-146 B.C. in honor of E. Badian,* Norman ; London, University of Oklahoma Press, 1996 ; voir aussi du même auteur « Ethnicity and Cultural Policy at Alexander's Court » in *The Ancient World*, 23. 1 (1992), p. 21-25 et l'étude classique d'Ernst Badian, déjà cité, p. 10, n. 39.

[56] Voir Stanley Burstein, *op. cit.*, p. 62, pour l'historiographie du problème.

[57] Polybe (Polybe, *Histoires*, 9. 28-31) raconte comme l'Etolien Chlaeneas intervint en 210 av. J.-C. auprès de Sparte pour la convaincre à appuyer Rome contre Philippe V, roi de Macédoine, accusant les Macédoniens d'avoir privé les Grecs de leur liberté.

[58] Voir Frank W. Walbank, « Sources for the Period » in Frank W. Walbank ; A.E. Astin ; Robert Maxwell Ogilvie ; M.W. Frederiksen (eds.), *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume 7, Part 1: The Hellenistic World*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008², p. 1-23 ; pour une discussion des causes de cette précarité, voir Simon Hornblower, *op. cit.*, p. 61-64.

[59] Sulochana R. Asirvatham, « Perspectives on the Macedonians …, p. 106 ; en ce qui concerne les opinions sur l'identité des Macédoniens, en lisant

différemment le texte de la note successive, nous arrivons à des conclusions opposées.

60 Polybe, *Histoires*, 4. 29 : « Pendant son hivernage en Macédoine, Philippe s'occupa activement d'enrôler des troupes pour la campagne prochaine et de protéger la Macédoine contre les barbares qui la menaçaient. » traduction par Pierre Waltz.

61 Eugene N. Borza, « Greeks and Macedonians in the Age of Alexander…, p. 127.

62 Diodore de Sicile, *Bibliothèque historique*, 17. 70. 3–5.

63 *Ibidem*, 17. 62. 7 ; 18. 18. 8 etc.

64 *Ibidem*, 17. 13. 5-7 ; 17. 113. 2 ; 18. 29. 4 - 32. 4 ; 18. 55. 1-4.

65 Denys d'Halicarnasse (fin du Ier siècle av. J.-C.) offre un témoignage plus intéressant. Quand il fait référence au passé des Macédoniens, il les range parmi les races « barbares » (Denys d'Halicarnasse, *Antiquités romaines*, 1. 2-3) ; dès qu'il passe à un sujet de date hellénistique, il les inclue parmi les Grecs (Denys d'Halicarnasse, *Antiquités romaines*, 20. 1. 3). Je développe le sujet dans ma thèse : *Flavius Arrianus et la seconde sophistique. Une perspective sur les intellectuels Grecs au IIe siècle ap. J.-C.* (section 5.2.6.2. « Diodore entre tradition historiographique et perception contemporaine »).

66 G.W. Bowersock, *Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1969.

67 La contribution indépendante mais convergente de P. B. Reardon, *Courants littéraires grecs des IIe et IIIe siècles après J.-C.*, Paris, Belles Lettres, 1971, constitue l'autre pilier des études sur la seconde sophistique ; voir aussi E. L. Bowie, « Greeks and Their Past in the Second Sophistic » in *Past and Present*, XLVI (1970), p. 3-41

68 Suzanne Said, *op. cit.*, p. 286-295

69 Sulochana R. Asirvatham, « Classicism and Romanitas in Plutarch's "De Alexandri Fortuna aut Virtute" » in *The American Journal of Philology*, 126 1 (2005), p. 107-125 ; « His Son's Father? Philip II in the Second Sophistic » in Elizabeth Carney ; Daniel Ogden (eds.), *Philip II and Alexander the Great : Father and Son, Lives and Afterlives*, New York ; Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 193-204.

70 Simon Swain, *Hellenism and Empire : Language, Classicism, and Power in the Greek World, A.D. 50-250*, Oxford ; New York, Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1996.

71 Voir E. L. Bowie, *op. cit.*, p. 3-4.

72 Suzanne Said, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

73 *Ibidem*, p. 290-291.

74 Voir Suzanne Said, *op. cit.*, p. 288.

75 Sulochana R. Asirvatham, « Classicism and Romanitas …, p. 111; 114.

76 Aelius Aristide, *Eloge de Rome*, 11, 14, 110.

[77] Plutarque, *Sur la fortune d'Alexandre*, 329 a-d.

[78] Voir p. 15, n. 55.

[79] Voir, par exemple A. B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary…*, vol. 1, p. 203 ; vol. 2, p. 84-85 ; *From Arrian to Alexander…*, p. 113, et successives.

[80] Voir p. 18, n. 68.

[81] P. A. Brunt, *Anabasis Alexandri / Arrian*, with an English translation by P. A. Brunt, Cambridge, Mass. ; London, Harvard University Press (The Loeb Classical Library), (1933) 1983-1989, vol. 1, p. XXXVII, n. 33.

[82] Mentionnés seulement 21 fois dans l'entier de l'œuvre.

[83] « Car les Perses attendaient les Macédoniens… », (n. trad.).

[84] Arrien, *L'Anabase d'Alexandre*, 1. 9. 1 « Ce désastre des Grecs, cette ruine d'une grande ville, […] n'épouvantèrent pas moins le reste de la Grèce… », traduction par François-Charles Liskenne et Jean-Baptiste Sauvan ; les traductions d'Arrien se trouvant dans les notes et non autrement indiquées, suivent cette version ; par contre, les traductions insérées dans le corps de l'étude, nous appartiennent.

[85] *Ibidem*, 1. 10. 1 « Aussitôt que la nouvelle de la ruine de Thèbes fut répandue dans la Grèce… »

[86] *Ibidem*, 1. 11. 3 « laissant le gouvernement de la Macédoine et des Grecs à Antipater » (n. trad.).

[87] Voir p. 17-18.

[88] Voir A. B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary…*, vol. 1, p. 98.

[89] *Ibidem*, vol. 1, p. 177.

[90] *Ibidem*, vol. 2, p. 352.

[91] Arrien, *L'Anabase d'Alexandre*, 3. 26. 4 « [Parménion] fut apprécié […] soit par les Macédoniens que parmi les étrangers » (n. trad.).

[92] Voir A. B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary…*, vol. 1, p. 159.

[93] Arrien, *L'anabase d'Alexandre*, 2.14.4 « Vôtres ancêtres qui ont attaqué la Macédoine et le reste de la Grèce … »

[94] Eugene N. Borza, « Greeks and Macedonians in the Age of Alexander… », p. 145.

[95] A. B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary…*, vol. 1, p. 231.

[96] Polybe, *Histoires*, 7. 9. 7.

[97] Voir P. A. Brunt, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 288-293.

[98] Lionel Pearson, « The Diary and the Letters of Alexander the Great » in *Historia*, 3 (1955), p. 429-455

[99] L'intervention semble répondre à des considérations de style, car elle intervient exactement au centre de l'ouvrage, résume les faites d'Alexandre jusqu'à ce point et préannonce les erreurs de *hubris* à suivre ; voir Philip A. Stadter, *Arrian of Nicomedia*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1980, p. 83.

[100]   Arrien, *L'Anabase d'Alexandre*, 4. 7. 4 : « [préférant] le costume des Mèdes à celui macédonien que son ancêtre Héraclès lui avait transmis » (n. trad.).

[101]   Voir p. 6 et successives.

[102]   A. B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary…*, vol. 2, p. 45.

[103]   Tim Whitmarsh, *The Second Sophistic*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 68 et successives

[104]   Tite-Live, *Histoire romaine*, 9. 17. 3-19. 17.

[105]   Cf. *Suidae Lexicon*, δ 1240.

[106]   Arrien, *L'Anabase d'Alexandre*, 4. 11. 6-8 : « […] mais au fils de Philippe, mais au descendant d'Hercule et d'Achille, mais à un prince dont les ancêtres, venus d'Argos dans la Macédoine, n'y ont point obtenu l'empire par la force et la violence, mais conformément à nos lois. Hercule ne reçut pas les honneurs divins pendant sa vie, et, même après sa mort, il ne les dut qu'à l'ordre d'un oracle. Que si, nous voyant en petit nombre au milieu des Barbares, tu veux en prendre les moeurs, Alexandre, souviens-toi de la Grèce. C'est pour soumettre l'Asie à la Grèce que cette expédition a été entreprise. Espères-tu à ton retour, forcer les plus libres des hommes, les Grecs à t'adorer ? ou, s'ils sont exempts de cette honte, est-ce aux Macédoniens seuls que tu la réserves ? ou bien ambitionnes-tu un double hommage, homme pour les Grecs et les Macédoniens, veux-tu être un Dieu pour les Barbares ? »

[107]   Voir p. 12 et n. 49.

[108]   Voir p. 19, n. 76.

[109]   Arrien, *L'Anabase d'Alexandre*, 1. 7. 2 : ἐλευθερίαν [...] παλαιὰ καὶ καλὰ ὀνόματα « liberté […] vétustes et beaux mots » (n. trad.).

BIBLIOGRAPHIE:

Sources :

*** *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker (FGrH)*, ed. Felix Jacoby, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1876-1958

(Publius Aelius) ARISTIDES, *Aristides*, ed. Wilhelm Dindorf, Lipsiae, Libraria Weidmannia, 1829, 3 vol.

(Flavius) ARRIANUS, *Flavii Arriani quae exstant omnia*, ed. A. G. Roos, Lipsiae, In Ædibus B. G. Teubneri, 1967, 2 vol.

DEMOSTHENES, *Orationes*, eds. S. H. Butcher; W. Rennie, Oxonii, e Typographeo Clarendoniano, 1949-1953, 4 vol.

DIODORUS SICULUS, *Bibliotheca historica*, eds. I. Bekker, L. Dindorf, Curt T. Fischer, Lipsiae, In Ædibus B. G. Teubneri, 1888-1906, 4 vol.

DIONYSIUS HALICARNASSENSIS, *Antiquitatum romanarum quae supersunt*, ed. Carl Jacoby, Lipsae, In Ædibus B. G. Teubneri, 1967², 4 vol.

HERODOTUS, *Histoires*, ed. Ph. E. Legrand, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1946-1956, 11 vol.

ISOCRATES, *Discours*, eds. George Mathieu; Emile Brémond, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1962, 4 vol.

(Titus) LIVIUS, *Livy*, ed. Benjamin Oliver Foster, London ; Heinemann, Cambridge, Mass. ; Harward University Press, 1926, 4 vol.

PLUTARCHUS, *Moralia*, eds., W. R. Paton, W. I. Wegehaupt, Lipsiae, In Ædibus B. G. Teubneri, 1925-1978, 7 vol.

POLYBIUS, *Historiae*, eds. Wilhelm Dindorf, Theodor Büttner-Wobst, Lipsiae, In Ædibus B. G. Teubneri, 1889-1905

SUIDAS, *Suidae Lexicon*, ed. Ada Adler, Lipsiae, In Ædibus B. G. Teubneri, 1928-1938, 5 vol.

THUCYDIDES, *Historiae*, ed. H. Stuart Jones, Oxonii, e Typographeo Clarendoniano, 1942, 2 vol.

Traductions :

(Flavius) ARRIANUS, « Les expéditions d'Alexandre » in *Essai sur la tactique des Grecs*, traduction par M. M. François-Charles Liskenne ; Jean-Baptiste Sauvan, [Paris], éd. Anselin, 1835

DEMOSTHENES, *Œuvres complètes de Démosthène et d'Eschine*, traduction par J.-F. Stièvenart, Paris, Firmin Didot, 1842

HERODOTUS, *Histoire d'Hérodote*, traduite du grec par P.-H. Larcher, Paris, Lefevre et Charpentier, 1842, 2 vol.

ISOCRATES, *Œuvres complètes d'Isocrate*, traduction par Aimé-Marie Gaspard de Clermont-Tonnerre, Paris, Firmin Didot, 1862

POLYBIUS, *Histoire de Polybe*, traduction par Pierre Waltz, Paris, Garnier, 1921

THUCYDIDES, *Histoire de la guerre du Péloponnèse*, traduction par Jean Voilquin, Paris, Librairie Garnier Frères, sans date

Ouvrages :

ASIRVATHAM, Sulochana R., « Classicism and Romanitas in Plutarch's "De Alexandri Fortuna aut Virtute" » in *The American Journal of Philology*, 126 1 (2005), p. 107-125

— « His Son's Father? Philip II in the Second Sophistic » in Elizabeth Carney ; Daniel Ogden (eds.), *Philip II and Alexander the Great : Father and Son, Lives and Afterlives*, New York ; Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 193-204

— « Perspectives on the Macedonians from Greece, Rome, and Beyond » in Joseph Roisman ; Ian Worthington (eds.), *A Companion to Ancient Macedonia…*, p. 99-124

ATKINSON, J. E, *A Commentary on Q. Curtius Rufus' Historiae Alexandri Magni*, Amsterdam, J. C. Gieben, 1980–1994, 2 vol.

BADIAN, Ernst, « Greeks and Macedonians » in Beryl Barr-Sharrar ; Eugene N. Borza, (eds.), *Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times*, Washington, National Gallery of Art, 1982, p. 33-51

BAYNHAM, Elizabeth, *Alexander the Great : The Unique History of Quintus Curtius*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1998

— « The Ancient Evidence for Alexander the Great » in Joseph Roisman (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great…*, p. 3-30

BORZA, Eugene N., « Ethnicity and Cultural Policy at Alexander's Court » in *The Ancient World*, 23 1 (1992), p. 21-25

— « Greeks and Macedonians in the Age of Alexander. The Source Traditions » in Robert W. Wallace ; Edward M. Harris (eds.), *Transitions to Empire: Essays in Greco-Roman History, 360-146 B.C. in honor of E. Badian,* Norman ; London, University of Oklahoma Press, 1996, p. 122-139

— *In the Shadow of Olympus the Emergence of Macedon*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992

BOSWORTH, A. B., *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980-1995, 2 vol.

— *From Arrian to Alexander : Studies in Historical Interpretation***,** Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988

BOWERSOCK, G. W., *Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1969

BOWIE, E. L. « Greeks and Their Past in the Second Sophistic » in *Past and Present*, 46 (1970), p. 3-41

BRUNT, P. A., *Anabasis Alexandri / Arrian*, Cambridge, Mass. ; London, Harvard University Press (The Loeb Classical Library), (1933) 1983-1989, 2 vol.

BURSTEIN, Stanley, « Greek Identity in the Hellenistic Period » in Katerina Zacharia (ed.), *Hellenisms : Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity…*, p. 59-77

CARTLEDGE, Paul, *The Greeks : A Portrait of Self and Others*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993

DANFORTH, Loring M., « Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Conflict » in Joseph Roisman (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great…*, p. 325-346

ENGELS, Johannes, « Macedonians and Greeks » in Joseph Roisman ; Ian Worthington (eds.), *A Companion to Ancient Macedonia…*, p. 81-98

FARAGUNA, Michele, « Alexander and the Greeks » in Joseph Roisman (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great…*, p.99-130

GINDIN, Leonid A., « L'élément -δων, -δον dans les langues anciennes de la partie continentale de la péninsule balkanique » in *Ancient Macedonia III : Papers Read at the Third International Symposium Held in Thessaloniki, September 21-25, 1977*, Thessaloniki, Institute for Balkan Studies, 1983, p. 103-106

HALL, J., « Contested Ethnicities: Perceptions of Macedonia within Evolving Definitions of Greek Identity » in I. Malkinm (ed.), *Ancient Perceptions of Greek Ethnicity…*, p. 159-186

— *Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997

— « The Role of Language in Greek Ethnicities » in *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society,* 41 (1995), p. 83-100

HAMILTON, J. R., *Plutarch : Alexander : A Commentary*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1969

HAMMOND, N. G. L., *Sources of Alexander the Great : An Analysis of Plutarch's Life and Arrian's Anabasis Alexandrou*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993

— *Three Historians of Alexander the Great: The So-Called Vulgate Authors, Diodorus, Justin and Curtius*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983

HARTOG, Francois, *Le miroir d'Herodote : Essai sur la représentation de l'autre*, Gallimard, Paris, 1980

HORNBLOWER, Simon, « Greek Identity in the Archaic and Classical Periods » in Katerina Zacharia (ed.), *Hellenisms : Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity …*, p. 37-58

MALKIN, I., « Greek Ambiguities : *Ancient Hellas* and *Barbarian Epirus* » in I. Malkin (ed.), *Ancient Perceptions of Greek Ethnicity…*, p. 187-212

— (ed.), *Ancient Perceptions of Greek Ethnicity*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2001

PEARSON, Lionel, « The Diary and the Letters of Alexander the Great » in *Historia*, 3 (1955), p. 429-455

— *The Lost Histories of Alexander the Great*, New York, American Philological Association, 1960

PÉDECH, Paul, *Historiens compagnons d'Alexandre : Callisthène – Onésicrite – Néarque – Ptolémée – Aristobule*, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1984

PETRE, Zoe, *Cetatea greacă între real și imaginar*, București, Nemira, 2000

PRONTERA, Francesco, « Sul concetto geografico di Hellas » in Francesco Prontera (ed.), *Geografia storica della Grecia antica: Tradizioni e problemi*, Bari, Laterza, 1991, p. 78-105

REARDON, B. P., *Courants littéraires grecs des IIe et IIIe siècles après J.-C.*, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1971

RHODES, P. J., « The Literary and Epigraphic Evidence to the Roman Conquest » in Joseph Roisman ; Ian Worthington (eds.), *A Companion to Ancient Macedonia…*, p. 23-40

ROISMAN, Joseph (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great*, Leiden, Brill, 2003

ROISMAN, Joseph ; Ian Worthington (eds.), *A Companion to Ancient Macedonia*, London, Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2010

SAID, Suzanne, « The Discourse of Identity in Greek Rhetoric from Isocrates to Aristides » in I. Malkin (ed.), *Ancient Perceptions of Greek Ethnicity…*, p. 275–299

STADTER, Philip A., *Arrian of Nicomedia*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1980

— *Introduction*, in Hamilton, J. R., *Plutarch : Alexander : A Commentary*, London, Bristol Classical, 1999²

SWAIN, Simon, *Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism, and Power in the Greek World, A.D. 50-250*, Oxford ; New York, Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1996

WALBANK, Frank W., *The Hellenistic World*, London, Fontana Press, 1992

— « Sources for the Period » in Walbank, Frank W. ; A. E. Astin ; Robert Maxwell Ogilvie ; M. W. Frederiksen (eds.), *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume 7, Part 1: The Hellenistic World*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008², p. 1-23

YARDLEY, J. C. ; Waldemar Heckel**,** *Iustinus Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus***,** Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997

WHITMARSH, Tim, *The Second Sophistic*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005

ZACHARIA, Katerina, « Herodotus' Four Markers of Greek Identity » in Katerina Zacharia (ed.), *Hellenisms : Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity…*, p. 21-36

— (ed.), *Hellenisms : Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, Burlington, Ashgate Publishing, 2008