

**AN ANALYSIS ON THE CONTRIBUTION OF EUROPEAN UNION FOREIGN
ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE ON KENYA'S GENERAL ELECTIONS INTEGRITY**

**BY
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DECLARATION

I declare ownership of this thesis research as my original work that has not been presented in any other University for examination. I take responsibility for the errors that may still be in it.

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DEDICATION

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ABSTRACT

In both the global North and South, electoral integrity serves as the bedrock of democratic societies, and is an idea used to mean ensuring the legitimacy of election outcomes and fostering peaceful transitions of power. Nonetheless, challenges in this realm persist, particularly in developing nations such as Kenya. The European Union (EU) has emerged as a significant player, providing electoral assistance in an attempt to address these challenges. This study analyzed the EU's contribution in enhancing Kenya's general elections integrity using three analytical objectives which are the main avenues through which EU supports Kenya's electoral democracy; civic education, technical and capacity building, and finally to examine key electoral stakeholder perceptions on EU's support. Informed by the Democratic Peace Theory, the study employed a mixed-methods approach to provide a comprehensive understanding of the EU's impact. Quantitative analysis involved a diverse sample of 384 individuals across nine strata, encompassing media, ORPP, JLAC, judiciary, political parties, IEBC, law enforcement, CSOs, and local observers. Qualitatively, 31 Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) provided in-depth insights while quantitative data were collected using semi-structured survey questionnaire. To ensure the rigor of findings, multiple data sources were employed and tools underwent pre-testing. Each objective was pursued through both quantitative and qualitative means. Questionnaire data were subjected to simple descriptive statistics, while KII data were analyzed thematically. Study found that EU's role in civic education, revealed that 68% of respondents considered EU interventions highly effective in promoting voter education. KII data corroborated this, with CSOs highlighting the EU's crucial contribution to enhancing civic and political consciousness; it also indicated that 53% of respondents perceived EU's capacity building and technical support as highly necessary with CSOs and the IEBC echoing this sentiment, emphasizing the positive impact of EU capacity-building and technical support initiatives. However, only 33% of the respondents supported the views that EU's interventions can lead to free, fair and credible elections through technical and capacity building; in-depth interviews further revealed that EU's electoral assistance is not enough but what matters in the extent of "political hygiene" within Kenya's body politick. Lastly, stakeholders' perceptions of EU contributions. While 66% of respondents believed that EU interventions significantly improved electoral integrity, KII insights provided a nuanced picture. CSOs and the IEBC displayed confidence in the EU's role, while political parties, ORPP, and law enforcement expressed skepticism. The findings shed light on the multifaceted dynamics of the EU's involvement in Kenya's elections. This study contributes to both academic discourse and policy debates. It deepens our understanding of the various dimensions of EU contributions and provides insights into Kenyan viewpoints, enriching debates surrounding the influence of external actors on democratic consolidation. However, the empirical findings also underscore the complexity of external interventions. While some stakeholders acknowledge the positive impact of EU assistance, divergent opinions among political parties and law enforcement reveal the intricate interplay between external assistance and domestic dynamics. This mirrors the Democratic Peace Theory's assertion that external actors' interests can shape domestic politics, though internal dynamics define the outcome of the interventions. The insights generated have far-reaching implications for theory, policy, and future research. They enhance our understanding of the interplay between external assistance and domestic context, informing policies that promote electoral integrity. Furthermore, the study provides a foundation for future research, urging scholars to delve deeper into the multifaceted dynamics of external actors' contributions to democratic consolidation.

TABLE OF CONTENT

DECLARATION	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	iii
DEDICATION	iv
ABSTRACT	v
TABLE OF CONTENT	vi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS.....	x
OPERATIONALIZATION OF KEY TERMS AND VARIABLES.....	xii
LIST OF TABLES	xiv
LIST OF FIGURES	xv
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Background to the Study.....	1
1.2 Problem Statement	8
1.3 Objectives of the Study.....	9
1.4 Research Questions	9
1.5 Significance of the Study	9
1.5.1 Academic Significance (Field of International Relations).....	10
1.5.2 Significance to the Kenyan Government	10
1.5.3 Significance to the European Union (EU)	10
1.5.4 Normative Contribution (Further Development of Electoral Assistance Regimes)	11
1.5.5 Policy Significance	11
1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study	12
1.6.1 Implications of the Limitations for Future Studies	14
1.7 The Theoretical Framework: Liberal Democratic Peace Theory.....	15
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW	17
2.1 Introduction.....	17
2.2 The Context of International Cooperation	18
2.3 Contextualizing European Union – Kenya Strategic Relations.....	20
2.4 European Union – Kenya Relations: The Political Perspective.....	23
2.5 Electoral Assistance: The Rationale	25
2.6 Technical Assistance and Capacity Building.....	28

2.7 Electoral Civic Education and Related Support.....	30
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	33
3.1 Introduction.....	33
3.2 Study Area	33
3.3 Research Design.....	33
3.4 Study Population.....	34
3.5 Sampling Procedure and Size	38
3.6 Data and Data Collection Techniques.....	41
3.6.1 Secondary Data	43
3.6.2 Primary Data	43
3.6.3 Questionnaires.....	44
3.6.4 Qualitative Methods.....	44
3.7 Reliability and Validity.....	45
3.8 Data Analysis and Presentation.....	46
3.9 Ethical Considerations	47
CHAPTER FOUR: EUROPEAN UNION INVOLVEMENT IN KENYAN ELECTIONS THROUGH ELECTORAL CIVIC EDUCATION IN THE POST-2010 GENERAL ELECTIONS	49
4.1 Introduction.....	49
4.2 Questionnaires and Interviews Return Rate.....	50
4.2.1 Questionnaire Return Rate.....	50
4.2.2 Key Informant Interviews Return Rate.....	52
4.3 Respondents Social and Demographic factors.....	54
4.4 Presentation, Discussion and Interpretation of Findings: Analysis of European Union’s Involvement through Civic and Electoral Education.....	63
4.4.1 Overarching Mechanisms of EU's Civic and Electoral Education Support.....	63
4.4.2 Implementers of European Union’s Electoral-Civic Education Programs	68
4.4.3 European Union’s relative Position as an External Electoral Assistant	70
4.4.4 Forms/Types of Funding for EU-Supported Programs.....	74
4.4.5 Implementation of Programs within the Electoral Cycle.....	76
4.4.6 Geographic Coverage of Programs	79

4.4.7 Demographic Coverage of Programs.....	80
4.4.8 Impact of EU's Programs on Participation of Various Voter Strata	83
4.4.9 Confidence in EU's Contribution to Electoral Integrity.....	85
4.4.10 Hindrances to EU-Supported Elections tailored Civic Education	88
4.4.11 Chapter Four Summary.....	89
CHAPTER FIVE: EUROPEAN UNION ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE THROUGH CAPACITY BUILDING IN POST-2010 KENYAN GENERAL ELECTIONS	91
5.1 Introduction.....	91
5.2 European Union Objectives and Concept of Capacity Building and Technical Support in Kenya	91
5.2.1 European Union’s Concept of Capacity Building and Technical	93
5.3 The Temporal Dimensions of European Union’s Technical and Capacity Building Support	95
5.4 European Union Mechanism for Electoral Support in Kenya: The Concept of the Basket Fund	100
5.4.1 Specific Avenues/Mechanisms through which European Union Technical and Capacity Building in Kenya.....	103
5.5 Stakeholders Rating on EU Technical Assistance role in enhancing Electoral Integrity in Kenya	107
5.5.1 Is the European Union Technical and Capacity Building Support Necessary in Kenya? .	107
5.5.2 Does European Union Capacity Building and Technical Support Lead to Free, Fair, and Credible Elections?	110
CHAPTER SIX: KEY STAKEHOLDERS’ PERCEPTION ON THE CONTRIBUTION OF EU ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE ON KENYA’S ELECTIONS INTEGRITY	115
6.1 Introduction.....	115
6.2 Forms of Engagement with the European Union during Elections	115
6.3 Tracking the Elections Stakeholders’ Perspectives on Temporal Dimensions of on European Union’s Electoral Assistance in Kenya since 2010	122
6.4 Stakeholders’ Perception of Mutual Benefits between Kenya and EU Engagements.....	126
6.5 Effectiveness of EU as an Avenue for Consolidating Electoral Democracy in Kenya	129
6.6 Summary of Findings and Analysis with Existing Literature.....	132

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS, SUMMARY, AND RECOMMENDATIONS	135
7.1 Introduction.....	135
7.2 Study Conclusions	135
7.3 Study Summary of Findings	136
7.4 Recommendations to Various Actors	139
7.4.1 Recommendations to the European Union	139
7.4.2 Recommendations to the Government of Kenya	140
7.4.3 Recommendations to Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)	141
7.4.4 Recommendations to the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission	141
7.4.5 Recommendations to Parliament and Political Class.....	141
7.5 Suggestions for Further Studies	142
REFERENCES.....	144
APPENDICES.....	155

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAEA	-	Association of African Election Authorities
AU	-	African Union
CIPEV	-	Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence
CSOs	-	Civil Society Organizations
EC	-	European Commission
ECES	-	European Centre for Electoral Support
ELGIA	-	Electoral Law and Governance Institute for Africa
EMB	-	Election Management Body
EKN	-	The Electoral Knowledge Network
ELOG	-	Elections Observation Group
EOMs	-	Election Observer Missions
ETAP	-	Elections Technical Assistance Providers
EU	-	European Union
FBOs	-	Faith Based Organizations
FGD	-	Focus Group Discussions
GoK	-	Government of Kenya
ICPCR	-	International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights
IDEA	-	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IEBC	-	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
IFES	-	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IJRISS	-	International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Sciences
IREC	-	Independent Review Committee of Inquiry
JLAC	-	Justice, Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee
KEAP	-	Kenya Electoral Assistance Program
KEDOF	-	Kenya Elections Domestic Observation Forum
KII	-	Key Informant Interviews
LDPT	-	Liberal Democratic Peace Theory
MUSERC	-	Maseno University Scientific and Ethics Review Committee
NACOSTI	-	National Commission of Science, Technology and Innovation
ORPP	-	Office of the Registrar of Political Parties

PEV	-	Post Election Violence
SDSS	-	School of Development and Strategic Studies
SGS	-	School of Graduate Studies
UDHR	-	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN	-	United Nations
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Program
USAID	-	United States Agency International for Development

OPERATIONALIZATION OF KEY TERMS AND VARIABLES

Electoral Assistance Basket Fund is a fund that provides financial assistance to countries to support their electoral processes. The fund is managed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and is supported by various donors and partners, including the European Union, Sweden, Canada, Ireland, and the United States. The fund has been used to support electoral projects in countries such as Liberia, Lebanon, Zimbabwe, Somalia, Malawi, Libya, Tunisia, Afghanistan, Bolivia, Central African Republic, and Zambia. The fund has also been used to support the participation of women and people living with disabilities in elections.

Elections: For this study elections as a concept will mean the entire cycle of electoral process that involves pre, election day and post-elections activities. Post-elections activities for this study will only be limited to the immediate post-election results announcement and whether there is peaceful transition, litigation or violent challenge of the results.

Electoral assistance: According to the UN electoral assistance principles, there are five types of electoral assistance namely: a) technical assistance; b) observation; c) expert panels; d) operational support to international observers; and e) support to creating a conducive environment. This study will narrow in on technical assistance. UN (2012, p. 4) defines electoral assistance as technical assistance can be defined as the legal, operational and logistics assistance as well as capacity building provided to develop or improve electoral laws, processes and institutions. It can cover all, or some, aspects of the electoral process. This definition will be adopted by this study.

Foreign electoral assistance: In this study foreign electoral assistance will mean European Union electoral assistance interventions out of the EU countries, namely, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.

European Union Contribution: In this study, the contribution of the European Union is measured in terms of key elections stakeholders perspectives on the work of EU along the lines of civic education support, and technical an capacity building. The contribution in this way may lead to electoral integrity or not, as other factors may come in.

Post-2010 elections: This study focusses on the post-2010 elections, that is, the elections of 2013, 2017, and 2022. This period witnessed the elections under the new Constitution 2010. Elections were held under the new elections body – Independent Elections and Boundaries Commission, as an autonomous body. The period was also marked by the formation of the Office of Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP), and new elections laws such as Elections Act, 2011 and elections are now held for contestants at two levels, national seats and county-level seats. Moreover, external actors have been more attracted to Kenyan elections in the post-2010 than before according to Cheeseman (2016).

Civic and voter Education: In this study civic and voter education will mean the act(s) by foreign actors' in assisting in educating Kenyans about their rights and processes of voting, the need to actively be involved in an electoral activity.

Technical Assistance and Capacity Building: In this study technical assistance and capacity building will mean the support given by foreign actors and the EU to various election concerned institutions in Kenya such the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP), Law Enforcement agencies, Parliamentary Commissions such as Justice, Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee (JLAC), entities from the Judiciary and the Civil Society Organizations (CSOs).

Integrity of elections: This study will adopt Kofi Annan Foundation (2012) "any election that is based on the democratic principles of universal suffrage and political equality as reflected in international standards and agreements, professional, impartial, and transparent in its preparation and administration throughout the electoral cycle." (Kofi Annan Foundation, 2012).

Elections concerned bodies: This includes various institutions whose multi-agency work is key to the implementation of electoral integrity in Kenya.

Stakeholder perception: In this study this will mean the nine cohorts' satisfaction assessment on the identified areas for improvement, understanding stakeholder attitudes and motivations and providing a superior brand experience across the board on contribution of the EU in supporting Kenyan electoral integrity in the post-2010 period.

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1: Sampling Design and Size for Qualitative Dimension of the Study.....	40
Table 3.2: Sampling Design and Size for Quantitative Dimension of the Study.....	41
Table 4.1: Questionnaire Return Rate.....	52
Table 4.2: Key Informant Interviews Return Rate.....	54
Table 4.3: Respondents Distribution Disability Status.....	61
Table 4.4: Respondents Distribution by Disability Type.....	62
Table 4.5: Respondents Distribution by Levels of Education.....	63
Table 4.6: Overarching Mechanisms of EU's Civic and Electoral Education.....	65
Table 4.7: Main Implementers of EU's Civic and Electoral Education.....	69
Table 4.8: Perception of EU as Main External Electoral Assistant.....	72
Table 4.9: Forms/Types of Funding for EU-Supported Programs.....	76
Table 4.10: Implementation of Programs within the Electoral Cycle.....	78
Table 4.11: Geographic Coverage of Programs.....	80
Table 4.12: Demographic Coverage of Programs.....	83
Table 4.13: Impact of EU's Programs on Participation of Various Voter Strata.....	85
Table 4.14: Confidence in EU's Contribution to Electoral Integrity.....	87
Table 4.15: Hindrances to EU-Supported Elections tailored Civic Education.....	89
Table 5.1: At what Part of the Elections Cycle Does the EU Technical Assistance Begin?.....	99
Table 5.2: Opinion on EU Assistance in Facilitating Electoral Integrity.....	108
Table 5.3: European Union Capacity Building and Technical Support Interventions and Free, Fair, and Credible Elections.....	111
Table 6.1: Forms of Engagement with the European Union during Elections.....	120
Table 6.2: Experience working with EU in electoral programming.....	124
Table 6.3: Stakeholders Perception of Mutual Benefits between Kenya and EU Engagements.....	129
Table 6.4: Stakeholders Perception of Effectiveness of EU as an Avenue for Consolidating Electoral Democracy in Kenya.....	130

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 4.1: Respondents distribution by Gender.....	55
Figure 4.2: Respondents Distribution by their Institution of Affiliation.....	57
Figure 4.3: Respondents Distribution by Years of Experience in Elections Programming.....	59
Figure 4.4: Distribution by Disability.....	60
Figure 4.5: Relative Rating of EU 2013 – 2022.....	74

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

The field of International Relations (IR) is exceptionally dynamic, continually evolving due to the emergence of new issues that shape inter-state relations. These emerging issues introduce novel practices, prompting the field to expand its analytical toolkit and conduct research to extract valuable lessons for improving practice. Against the backdrop of the United States' prevailing liberal democracy as the hegemonic ideology since the effective fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, democratic assistance has assumed a central role in North-South inter-state relations, with nearly all developed nations incorporating "democracy aid" into their foreign policies toward Global South countries (Joyner, 1999). Electoral assistance has emerged as a pivotal component of such aid, and post-2010, both the European Union through the European Centre for Electoral Support (ECES) and the United Nations, particularly through the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Electoral Technical Assistance Programme (ETAP) have established policy frameworks to standardize democratic assistance through the Basket Fund. Nevertheless, there remains a scarcity of focused empirical analysis regarding the dynamics of such assistance and its efficacy in promoting democratic consolidation in the developing world. This thesis attempted to address this knowledge gap by conducting a comprehensive investigation. This background section provides the framework for the present study, introducing its scope and the central research question.

In the year 1948, a pivotal moment in history unfolded when nations gathered to affirm their commitment to the principles of democracy and human rights through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in Paris, France. Within this historic declaration, one particular principle, as articulated in Article 21, stood out: "the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections by universal and equal suffrage that shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures."

At that time, it was a stark reality that fewer than half of the 195 member countries belonging to the United Nations actually practiced the selection of their leaders through democratic elections. This striking observation was noted by the International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) in 2014. However, as the years have passed and societies have evolved, the

global landscape has seen a profound transformation. Today, the vast majority of nations have embraced the principle of universal suffrage and hold elections that adhere to the principles of equality and universality. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights served as a catalyst, inspiring subsequent international frameworks and regimes to place a heightened emphasis on the significance of democratic elections. One of the most noteworthy developments in this regard was the creation of the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights (ICPCR). Building upon the foundation laid by the UDHR, the ICPCR significantly expanded the scope of politico-civil rights recognized within the United Nations.

Within the ICPCR, a comprehensive list of 53 political and civil rights was established. Among these fundamental rights were the right to equal universal suffrage, self-determination, freedoms of movement, association, and participation. These rights are inherently interconnected with the core principle of allowing citizens to actively participate in elections. Importantly, the ICPCR also imposed upon the member states the duty to ensure that the conditions necessary for the realization of these rights, including the right to participate in elections, are effectively in place. In essence, the progression from a world where democratic elections were far from universal to the present day, where they are widely practiced and deeply entrenched in international human rights frameworks, underscores the enduring commitment of nations to the ideals of democracy and the fundamental rights of individuals. This journey reflects the collective recognition of the pivotal role that elections play in upholding the principles of justice, representation, and the will of the people on a global scale (Carney, 2021; African Union, 2007; Meagher, 2007).

Over the course of history, it has become increasingly evident that even with the presence of international, regional and national frameworks delineating electoral rights and responsibilities, the successful execution of electoral processes leading to electoral integrity - genuinely free and fair elections - and the peaceful transition of power is far from guaranteed (Strachan, 2017; Joyner, 1999; Abbink, 2000; Boix & Stokes, 2003). This challenge has been particularly pronounced in low-resource, conflict prone, democratically emerging countries where the establishment of democracy and the rule of law has not yet become a firmly entrenched norm (Lowenthal & Bitar, 2015; Brownlee, 2007; Karl, 1990; Geddes, 1999).

One significant aspect contributing to the complexity of conducting elections in such contexts is the issue of resources. Many of these countries struggle to allocate adequate resources to cover the myriad critical components of an electoral cycle, spanning from the preparations before the elections to the evaluation of the process afterward, for learning and improvement in the following cycles (Turccinardi, 2014; Boix & Stokes, 2003; Carbone, 2009; Fallon Swiss & Viterna, 2012; Block, 2002). The shortage of resources can lead to logistical difficulties, inadequate training of election officials, and compromised infrastructure, all of which can negatively impact the overall integrity of the electoral process (Strachan, 2017; Joyner, 1999; NA, 2016; Rakner & de Walle, 2009; Shi & Svensson, 2006).

Furthermore, in the context of consolidating democracy and upholding the rule of law, certain challenges often arise. In these countries, electoral politics can be highly competitive, often featuring a winner-takes-all mentality as the prevailing practice (Kido, Petacchi, & Weber, 2012; Cunha, 2023; Kanyinga, 2019; Chukwu & Udem, 2023; Kirk-Greene, 1975; Mohammed, n.d; Ojo, 2012). This intense competition can drive candidates and political parties to employ a range of strategies aimed at manipulating and influencing established procedures, undermining designated institutions, delaying necessary legal amendments, making unrealistic promises to voters, engaging in vote-buying, and resorting to various other tactics in their quest to attain power (Samarasinghe, 1994; Pinkney, 2004; UN, 2019; Amy, 2002; D'Anselmi, 2011). The resulting post-elections environment in these countries has witnessed violence, and a highly ethically polarized society, which either leads to a reversed progression in democratic consolidation, or greatly threatens democratic development through a thoroughly destabilized political economy (Henry, 2023; Osaretin & Akov, 2013; Yusuf, 2015; Ezirim & Mbah, 2014).

In such an environment, argue a number of scholars (Kasera & Thomas, 2023; Pinkney, 2004; Ezirim & Mbah, 2014; 2019; Katsina, 2016), the task of holding elections that are truly free, fair, effective, and legitimate can seem exceedingly daunting. The convergence of resource constraints, highly competitive electoral dynamics, and a lack of institutional independence creates a complex landscape where the pursuit of democratic ideals face substantial challenges in most developing countries, and in all African countries (Reynolds, Reilly & Ellis, 2008; Beetham, Carvalho, Landman & Weir, 2008; Wolf, 2017).

Founded in 1996 the Association of African Election Authorities (AAEA), is an association with the objective of gathering, challenging, and supporting Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) in order for them to administer free and fair elections in their respective countries. It is in the backdrop of this worrying trend across Africa, like many other countries in the developing world, that external democracy assistance, which has increasingly been undertaken through foreign electoral assistance, has emerged as a core component of democratization in the developing countries, by and large, through the support of external international actors (Carbone, 2009; Rakner & de Walle, 2009; Carney, 2021) as emerged as an integral component of foreign relations between the countries of the North and those of the South (Piccollino, 2010). The realization that conducting successful elections, especially in resource-constrained environments with competitive electoral politics, tendencies toward electorally instigated violence and so on, is a formidable task that has underscored the need for continuous international support and assistance in strengthening democratic institutions, ensuring electoral transparency, and promoting the rule of law in these regions. This acknowledgment also highlights the ongoing effort required to overcome the hurdles that impede the path to genuine democratic governance in Africa like many other similar contexts (Piccolini, 2010; Katsina, 2016).

The focus of this study was examining the contribution of European electoral assistance to Kenya. The practice of electoral assistance as practiced by EU and other international actors has evolved over time. Before 2010, it was a norm implied in a number of regimes (Motsamai, 2012), but in 2010, the EU defined the boundaries of her electoral assistance which comprises an approach that sees elections observation and assistance as complementing activities (Olsen, 2023; Abdulahi, 2015). Within the United Nations System, electoral assistance refers to various forms of support, aid, and guidance provided by international organizations, governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other stakeholders to countries or regions in the process of organizing and conducting elections (Abdulahi, 2015). The primary objective of electoral assistance is to help ensure that elections are conducted in a free, fair, transparent, and credible manner, in accordance with international standards and best practices (Olsen, 2023;). Motsamai sets out the concept electoral assistance from the EU perspective. He argues that electoral assistance encompasses a wide range of support activities aimed at facilitating the electoral process. At its core, it involves the provision of technical expertise and material

resources to ensure that elections are conducted fairly and transparently. A common aspect of electoral assistance is the guidance and support offered to national election authorities, helping them effectively organize and manage elections. This can include advice on electoral laws and regulations, voter registration procedures, ballot design, and logistics planning. Additionally, electoral assistance can take a short-term focus, addressing the specific needs of a particular election event. This may involve supplying essential materials like ballot boxes and voter registration equipment, as well as logistical support to ensure the smooth operation of the election (Motsamai, 2012; Abdulahi, 2015).

A common way of understanding the EU work in democratization in the Third World, and external democracy assistance generally is through the lens of elections observation missions (EOMs) (Motsami, 2012; Centre for European Policy Studies [CEPS], 2008). The scholarly impact of this trend has led to a lack of clarity between the concepts of election assistance and EOMs, leading especially to a scarcity of works that delineate especially the contribution of external actors to the particular issues related to EOMs. By unpacking EU's contribution to Kenya's electoral integrity, this study aims to fill this lacuna. While election observation is a prominent and visible aspect of electoral assistance, it is just one component of a broader strategy. Election observers are deployed to assess the conduct of elections, identify irregularities, and provide valuable feedback for improvement. However, the true impact of electoral assistance extends beyond individual elections. Its long-term effectiveness hinges on accompanying programs that emphasize institution-building and democracy support (CEPS, 2008; IDEA, 2014). This entails strengthening democratic institutions, promoting the rule of law, and cultivating a culture of democratic governance. From the EU, perspective, electoral assistance is often integrated into a larger democracy support strategy, which may encompass initiatives aimed at bolstering civil society, upholding human rights, enhancing the capacity of political parties, and fostering media freedom. These comprehensive efforts collectively contribute to the overall health and stability of democratic systems in the countries receiving assistance, and are thought to be critical building blocks for electoral integrity (IDEA, 2014).

EU's electoral assistance takes various forms that can be seen as fitting into two major typologies for analysis. There is the technical assistance and capacity building on one hand, and activities that board on electoral civic education (see e.g., Abdulahi, 2015 for detailed application

of this scheme within the context of external assistance). These analytical lenses were employed to account for what the EU has been doing in Kenya since its entry during the immediate post-Cold Wave of democratization. Other than these analytical lenses that provided the framework for structuring investigation in this study, as first and second objectives, a third analytical lens relate to a critical perspective of the role of external electoral assistance including by the EU. The work that EU does across Africa has not been purely viewed the lens that it is needed to fill up the gaps as relates to developing countries electoral environments. Others have asked questions of other ulterior motive such as consequent foreign influence, and the possibility of EU to flex their financial muscles for political maneuvering (Motsamai, 2012; Abdulahi, 2015; Olsen, 2000). Motsamai (2012), writing for EU, through IDEA, reports that African EU itself needed to appreciate how its electoral assistance policies and activities are perceived in Africa in order to redeem its image in engaging in areas of her competencies. For a country-based analysis like this study, such approach to assessing EU's contribution is critical to guide local actors on the avenues for engaging with the EU for a more robust and helpful interventions that lead to electoral integrity. Motsamai's work does not undertake a focused country perspectives analysis, leaving a gap that this study attempted to reveal. His work gives us three important questions that this study employed in understanding Kenyan electoral stakeholders perspectives on EU's electoral assistance in the country: Does the EU's image have any peculiar features among the African public? Does the EU's actions relating to electoral assistance raise its profile as a critical player in democracy building? Does the EU's image have a major bearing on how electoral assistance is perceived and endorsed by the key stakeholder cohorts?

Rearticulating these questions to explore in-depth how EU's electoral assistance is perceived, the following questions will guide analysis in the third objective of the study: does the EU's image have any peculiar features among the Kenya's key electoral stakeholders? Do the EU's actions relating to electoral assistance raise its profile as a critical player in democracy building in Kenya? Does the EU's image have a major bearing on whether electoral assistance enhances integral integrity in Kenya?

Against the foregoing background, this study dealt into the European Union's (EU) role in bolstering Kenya's electoral democracy, with a particular focus on its contributions in the realms of technical assistance, capacity building, and electoral civic education. The central puzzle this

study sought to unravel revolves around the persistent shortcomings in Kenya's electoral processes, despite the EU's presence in the country since the early 1990s (Kasera & Thomas, 2023). Kenya's electoral history has been marked by instances of flawed elections, legal disputes contesting election results, and, in some unfortunate cases, post-election violence (PEV). For example, the 2022 general elections were deemed by the opposition as not reflecting the will of the Kenyan people, allegedly marred by significant rigging and an externally assisted manipulation of the technological infrastructure. This puzzle is further complicated by the observation that while the EU's involvement in electoral assistance has yielded positive outcomes in certain EU member states like Latvia, Slovakia, and Turkey (Schimmelfennig, Engert & Knobel, 2003), Kenya's presidential elections have raised concerns about external actors allegedly potentially exerting biased influence or providing superficial assistance (Kanyinga, 2018).

The specific context of Kenya's general elections serves as a compelling backdrop for analyzing the EU's role in foreign electoral assistance. Kenya's history of strategic partnerships with the EU and the world underscores the significance of this relationship. Notably, EU-Kenya trade witnessed a remarkable 27% increase from 2018 to 2022, with the EU emerging as Kenya's most critical trading partner, constituting 16% of Kenya's total exports, amounting to £1.2 billion in 2022, although trade remains asymmetrical, with EU exports to Kenya totaling £2.02 billion Euros. This underscores the strategic importance the EU accords to Kenya (European Commission, 2022). Further, Kenya is increasingly seen by the EU and other international actors as a regional anchor state capable of fostering regional institutionalism and conflict management (Horn Institute, 2022). The EU has openly declared Kenya as its most significant partner within the East African Community (European Commission, 2022). Finally, the study's analytical focus spans the post-2010 general elections for instance 2013, 2017, and 2022. The post-2010 period provides a pertinent context for this study, as it witnessed the introduction of elections in a new devolved system of governance, the establishment of new institutions like the Office of Registrar of Political Parties, and revisions to the elections Act, which introduced new requirements for inclusive competitive politics and affirmative action measures. Based on the highlights in this background section, the research gap investigated in this thesis can be stated as follows.

1.2 Problem Statement

International Relations (IR) has evolved significantly since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, with democratic assistance becoming a central aspect of global inter-state relations. Among these democratic assistance efforts, electoral assistance plays a critical role in promoting democratic consolidation, particularly in developing countries. Despite international policy frameworks established by entities like the European Union (EU) and the United Nations, there exists a pressing knowledge gap surrounding the dynamics and effectiveness of such assistance, particularly in the context of enhancing electoral integrity in the developing world. Kenya, a country marked by recurrent electoral outcome mistrust and budgetary deficiency, provides a compelling backdrop for examining the EU's contribution in electoral assistance. While the EU has been active in Kenya since the early 1990s, Kenya's electoral history continues to be shrouded in alleged irregularities, legal disputes, and instances of post-election violence (PEV). This persisting puzzle is further complicated by the observation that, while the EU's electoral assistance has yielded positive outcomes in certain regions, it has not consistently delivered the expected results in Kenya. This study aims at filling this research gap by conducting a comprehensive investigation into the EU's contribution to Kenya's electoral integrity through an analysis of its electoral technical assistance and capacity-building initiatives, electoral civic education programs, and an examination of stakeholder perspectives on the EU's role in enhancing Kenya's electoral integrity.

The research gap lies in the scarcity of focused empirical analysis regarding the dynamics and effectiveness of foreign electoral assistance, particularly in the Kenyan context. This study seeks to address this gap by adopting a multi-pronged approach. Firstly, it will delve into the EU's role in electoral civic education, examining the effectiveness of programs aimed at raising voter awareness and promoting civic engagement. Secondly, it aims at analyzing the impact of the EU's electoral technical assistance and capacity-building programs on Kenya's electoral processes. Lastly, the study will explore the perspectives of key electoral stakeholders in Kenya, shedding light on how the EU's involvement in electoral assistance is perceived and whether it contributes to enhancing Kenya's electoral integrity. The central puzzle is to understand why, despite the EU's presence and efforts in Kenya, electoral results integrity challenges persist. By scrutinizing the specific components of the EU's electoral assistance and assessing stakeholder perspectives, this study aims at providing insights into the complexities of foreign involvement

in electoral processes and its implications for democracy building in developing countries, with Kenya as a focal point of analysis. In doing so, it seeks to contribute valuable lessons that can inform more effective foreign electoral assistance practices and ultimately bolster democratic consolidation in Kenya and similar contexts all over the world.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The general research objective was to analyze the contribution of the EU foreign electoral assistance in Kenya's general elections integrity. The specific objectives were as follows:

- i. To understand the dynamics of European Union's support through electoral civic education in Kenya's general elections;
- ii. To assess the nature of contribution of the European Union's electoral capacity building in Kenya's general elections and;
- iii. To explore key stakeholders' perspectives on the contribution of EU electoral assistance on Kenya's elections integrity.

1.4 Research Questions

Main research question was: What is the contribution of the European Union foreign electoral assistance to Kenya's electoral integrity?

Specific questions were:

- i. What are the dynamics of European Union's foreign assistance to the electoral civic education in Kenya's general elections?
- ii. What is the nature of contribution of the European Union's electoral capacity building in Kenya's general elections?
- iii. How is the European Union's foreign electoral assistance perceived in Kenya in light of enhancement of electoral democracy consolidation by the key stakeholders ?

1.5 Significance of the Study

The value addition component of this study can be heightened under the following categories.

1.5.1 Academic Significance (Field of International Relations)

This study holds substantial academic significance within the field of International Relations (IR) by addressing a critical knowledge gap. The evolving landscape of international relations, particularly the practice of democratic assistance, necessitates rigorous academic exploration. By conducting a comprehensive investigation into the European Union's (EU) role in enhancing Kenya's electoral integrity, this study contributes empirical insights that can enrich the understanding of how external actors engage in democracy-building processes in developing countries. This analysis extends beyond mere observation and explores the effectiveness of specific components of electoral assistance, thereby advancing the theoretical and practical discourse within the field of IR. Furthermore, this research thesis can inform future studies on electoral assistance regimes, offering a template for assessing their impact, thereby bolstering the academic foundation of this essential aspect of international relations.

1.5.2 Significance to the Kenyan Government

The findings of this study have significant implications for the Kenyan government and its efforts to strengthen the country's democratic processes. Kenya has grappled with recurrent electoral challenges, and understanding the EU's role in electoral assistance is vital for improving the country's electoral integrity. By shedding light on the effectiveness of EU-led technical assistance, capacity-building programs, and electoral civic education initiatives, this research equips the Kenyan government with evidence-based insights to refine its electoral processes. This knowledge can help the government address the persistent issues that have marred previous elections, enhancing the credibility of future polls and fostering a more stable political environment. This research will assist the government of Kenya crystalize on critical policies addressing among others; government deficiency mitigation on elections, management of bilateral and multilateral expectations from external actors who assist during elections and most importantly, legislation formulation on the foreign electoral assistance.

1.5.3 Significance to the European Union (EU)

For the EU, this study offers valuable insights into the impact of its electoral assistance efforts in Kenya, which is a significant partner in the region. Understanding the nuances of how EU interventions are perceived and whether they contribute to improving electoral integrity is crucial for refining its policies and strategies. This research can inform the EU's approach to electoral

assistance in Kenya and other developing countries, helping the EU adapt its practices to align with local contexts and needs. Additionally, it can guide the EU in optimizing its diplomatic relationships and promoting more constructive engagements in democratic governance processes.

1.5.4 Normative Contribution (Further Development of Electoral Assistance Regimes)

Normatively, this study provides guidance for the further development of electoral assistance regimes. By conducting a rigorous analysis of the EU's electoral assistance in Kenya, lessons learnt can inform best practices for international actors involved in democracy-building endeavors. It highlights the importance of taking a multi-faceted approach to electoral assistance, encompassing technical support, capacity building, and civic education. Furthermore, the research underscores the significance of engaging with local stakeholders and addressing their perspectives and concerns. This normative contribution can aid in the evolution of electoral assistance regimes worldwide, emphasizing the need for tailored and context-specific approaches to enhance electoral integrity. The study appreciates the place of foreign electoral assistance besides the exposition of gaps and challenges that bedevil developing democracies. As such therefore, innovate was through which democracy can be nurtured independently or with bare minimum foreign input.

1.5.5 Policy Significance

From a policy perspective, this study holds substantial importance. It offers actionable insights for policymakers within the EU and other international organizations engaged in electoral assistance efforts. The findings can inform the design and implementation of more effective electoral assistance programs, ensuring that these interventions align with local needs and foster genuine democratic consolidation. Additionally, the research can guide policymakers in shaping diplomatic relationships with partner countries like Kenya, emphasizing the importance of constructive and responsive engagement in democracy-building processes. Policy improvement on existing frameworks of engagement in regards to foreign electoral assistance at the EU and the host developing country. Assist. Ultimately, the policy significance of this study lies in its potential to enhance the impact and effectiveness of electoral assistance initiatives, contributing to more credible, transparent, and democratic electoral processes in Kenya and beyond.

1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study

Scope and Periodization: This study focuses exclusively on Kenya and examines the electoral assistance and engagements provided by the European Union (EU) during the period from the post-2010 constitution to the 2022 general elections. This time frame is particularly significant for several reasons. First, it encompasses the period when Kenya implemented its new constitution, leading to the reconstitution of key institutions involved in electoral processes. In particular, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) underwent significant changes and gained an independent mandate in accordance with Article 88 of the Kenyan Constitution. However, this transformation required substantial external assistance to address the budgetary and institutional needs necessary for conducting credible elections thus ensuring electoral integrity. Second, during this period, there was a separation of the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP) from the IEBC, further affecting the electoral landscape in Kenya. This also birthed the ORPP Act of 2011 where political parties were now funded from the exchequer for their operations.

Methodology: This study employs a qualitative case study design to provide a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of foreign electoral assistance dynamics in Kenya, with a specific focus on the EU's involvement. The choice of a case study approach allows for a detailed exploration of the intricacies and nuances of EU engagement in Kenya's electoral processes. The post-2010 elections were selected as the focal point of analysis due to their exceptional characteristics. These elections were closely contested and marked by intense electoral mobilization across the country, and funding both internally and externally increased tremendously (Kanyinga, 2018). Furthermore, the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic added a unique dimension to the electoral context, making it crucial to assess the role of foreign actors, particularly the EU, in mitigating the impact of these challenges. The study seeks to unravel what specific actions the EU took during this critical period and the underlying reasons for its engagement. Additionally, it aims to investigate how Kenyan key stakeholders perceived the EU's role in the context of the EU contribution vis a vis election results integrity. By delving into these complexities, the research intends to shed light on the puzzles surrounding EU electoral assistance in Kenya during this transformative period.

Limitations: The choice of a case study design, while offering in-depth insights, presents certain inherent limitations. One notable limitation is the presence of multiple foreign actors involved in Kenyan elections in each unique general election Kenya's elections often attract numerous international entities, each with its own set of objectives and interventions, these mainly include United States, through USAID, National Democratic Institute (NDI), Electoral Law and Governance Institute for Africa (ELGIA), International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), Netherland, Canada, Key EU Countries particularly UK, among others defined as the Electoral Technical Assistance Providers and domiciled under the UNDP's Basket Fund (UNDP, 2022). While this study primarily focuses on the EU's role, it acknowledges the complexity introduced by the presence of other foreign actors. This may pose challenges in distinguishing the distinct contributions and impacts of each actor, potentially leading to some overlap or ambiguity in delineating their roles. Nonetheless, the study focused the questioning strictly on EU's contributions. For example, while EU's greatest part of electoral support is through the basket fund, where all donors contribute and is managed through UNDP, the study only focused on EU's component.

Secondly, conducting key informant interviews with officials from electoral bodies, EU embassy, and bigger NGOs proved a little challenging due to the fluid nature of such positions. Further, the political dynamics and risks associated with electoral management led to frequent transfers or reluctance to engage with electoral management bodies. This limitation without proper mitigation measures could have affected the depth and breadth of insights gathered from electoral officials. Nevertheless, the study addressed this limitation by concentrating exploiting contacts the researcher have within the IEBC and broader electoral systems in Kenya to recruit stakeholders for interviews. Follow-up interviews and email-follow-up questions were also used in circumstances when the interviewees only offered a minimal time for interviews owing to their busy schedules especially the IEBC personnel and respondents from EU embassy.

Thirdly, related challenge that arose is the complex web of interactions and overlaps among various actors involved in Kenyan elections. Given the multitude of stakeholders, it was a little challenging to clearly demarcate the boundaries of one actor's involvement from another within the study objectives, such as technical, capacity building, and civic electoral assistance. To mitigate this challenge, the study maintains a focus on one actor at a time, aiming for an in-depth

case analysis rather than attempting to cover the entire spectrum of electoral actors comprehensively, and drawing boundaries between the objectives and the sub-themes it covered.

The last area of limitation was the unavoidable bias among partisan actors, political issue in Kenya being a largely emotive, ethnically-sensitive topic. The bias was most, particularly those from political parties' strata. To mitigate this bias, the study employed two key strategies. Firstly, it triangulates findings by comparing responses from multiple cohorts, including EU officials responsible for electoral assistance, political parties' registrar, and other relevant actors. This multi-cohort approach helps verify and cross-reference information, reducing the potential for bias.

Secondly, the study relied on authoritative documents from institutions such as the EU in Kenya, the Registrar of Political Parties, and the IEBC to contextualize and validate primary responses. This reliance on credible sources helps corroborate and situate primary data, ensuring that potential biases from partisan actors are balanced with authoritative information.

1.6.1 Implications of the Limitations for Future Studies

The limitations identified in this study, along with their mitigation strategies, can serve as valuable guidance for future researchers conducting similar studies in the field of international relations or related areas. Here are four ways in which these limitations and mitigation approaches can assist future researchers.

1. **Navigating Complex Case Studies:** The acknowledgment of challenges related to case study designs and the presence of multiple actors in a specific context can help future researchers anticipate such complexities. By understanding that their chosen case may involve various stakeholders, researchers can proactively plan to delineate and differentiate the roles and impacts of each actor. This awareness encourages a more precise and focused research design.
2. **Managing Interviews with Key Informants:** The recognition of potential difficulties in conducting key informant interviews, especially in politically sensitive or dynamic environments, offers insights for future researchers. They can prepare for the fluid nature of key informant positions by considering alternative data collection methods, such as document analysis or surveys. Additionally, establishing early contacts and securing

commitments from key informants can help mitigate issues related to availability and transfers.

3. **Balancing Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches:** Future researchers can learn from the methodological considerations of this study, particularly the use of mixed-methods. Understanding the trade-offs between qualitative richness and quantitative generalizability allows researchers to align their methodological choices with their research objectives. They can decide whether to prioritize in-depth qualitative insights or broad quantitative data based on the specific focus of their study.
4. **Resource and Time Management:** Recognizing operational limitations related to resources and time, future researchers can adopt proactive resource allocation and time management strategies. Developing realistic budgets, seeking external funding where necessary, and collaborating with experienced supervisors can enhance resource management. Flexibility in research timelines can accommodate the availability of respondents and ensure comprehensive data collection.

1.7 The Theoretical Framework: Liberal Democratic Peace Theory

The theoretical framework underpinning this study is the Liberal Democratic Peace Theory (LDPT), as developed by Professor Michael Doyle in 1986 and further advanced in 2005 (Doyle, 2005). LDPT is an offshoot of Liberalism Theory in International Relations and posits that democratic states tend not to engage in conflicts or wars with other democratic states. This theory offers a valuable lens through which to understand the dynamics of European Union (EU) electoral assistance in Kenya and its implications for electoral integrity as it provides a direct perspective on which to conceive the subject of electoral aid, justifying and studying why and how such aid has become a common practice in the developing countries of Africa. Unlike the mainstream theories in IR, such as Realism and Liberalism, the LDPT provides a focused way to study the relationship between developing and developed countries in the issues area of democratic aid, thus provides a leeway to open the black-box of the state and study the elements therein.

LDPT's key propositions, as outlined by Dunne (2011), provide a relevant foundation for this study. First, it suggests that liberal states exhibit a high degree of domestic peace due to their adherence to the rule of law, social cohesion, and respect for institutions. This domestic

tranquility reduces the likelihood of civil conflicts, fostering contentment among the population. Second, liberal democratic states actively seek international peace and security, often engaging in interventions aimed at promoting democratic values. Lastly, developed liberal democracies recognize the importance of ensuring peaceful political processes in developing countries and thus invest in supporting elections to enhance their credibility.

In the context of this study, LDPT helps explain the EU's involvement in Kenya's elections. According to Doyle's theory, when democratic states perceive that mechanisms for internal peace, such as elections, may be compromised in vulnerable states, they may internationalize the liberal ideal through interventions through democratic support, of elections. This study focuses on electoral assistance, wherein developed countries unilaterally or collectively provide technical and material support to address critical gaps in developing countries' electoral processes. The focus of this study was EU for a focused explication of theoretical application.

Specifically, this research examines the EU's role in Kenya's general elections, which have been disputed by the opposition, partially alleging external interference. By analyzing EU's involvement in electoral civic education and electoral capacity building, the study seeks to gain insights into how LDPT's assumptions about the promotion of peaceful democratic processes align with the EU's actions in Kenya. Additionally, the research explored Kenyan stakeholders' perspectives on EU electoral assistance, shedding light on how external electoral interventions are understood by those first line implementing key stakeholders (cohorts) directly impacted by them. Overall, the application of LDPT as the theoretical framework in this study offers a conceptual foundation for understanding the EU's involvement in Kenya's elections, its various forms of assistance, and the implications of these interventions for electoral integrity. It allows for a nuanced exploration of the motivations behind such interventions and the perceptions of key stakeholders involved in the electoral process.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a comprehensive review of relevant literature pertaining to the subject of this thesis. It encompasses a wide range of themes critical to the investigation, including the Kenya-European Union strategic partnership, democratization processes, elections, and electoral assistance in Africa with a focus on Kenya. The primary objective of this review is not only to identify gaps in the existing literature but also to establish the conceptual framework upon which this study is built.

The current body of literature concerning the involvement of foreign or international actors in electoral processes such as the Kenya Electoral Assistance Program (KEAP), Electoral Technical Assistance Providers (ETAP), the European Centre for Electoral Support (ECES) acknowledge the significant role played by external actors in assisting less developed countries with the resource-intensive and expertise-demanding aspects of elections (Abdulahi, 2015; Beetham, Ezirim & Mbah, 2014). However, a notable gap exists in the form of systematic country case studies that delve into the specifics of how this assistance operates in practice and how it is perceived by local actors. Much of the existing literature tends to treat Africa as a monolithic entity, making generalized judgments about electoral assistance, without addressing the nuances of individual country cases (Motsamai, 2012; Shi & Svensson, 2006; Henry, 2023).

Furthermore, technical electoral assistance is one facet of external electoral support, with other dimensions including electoral observation. The intricate processes through which such support is provided, encompassing material and technical assistance, civic education, and capacity building for electoral bodies and personnel, are often underexplored in International Relations studies. The continued involvement of foreign actors in elections in the developing world, as a means to foster civic engagement, demand for good governance, and democratic practices, highlights the need for more comprehensive analysis (Joyner, 1999; CEPS, 2008).

Importantly, the literature also reveals that foreign actors' involvement in electoral processes in the Third World is not universally perceived positively and can have contentious implications. However, this analysis often fails to shed light on the specifics of how these dynamics play out in

a given country and with a particular external actor. For instance, despite the European Union's substantial electoral assistance in Kenya since 1990s, there remains a dearth of studies that systematically assess its involvement in these elections and its contribution to the credibility of electoral results in Kenya (European Commission, 2022).

As a result, significant gaps persist in terms of studies that provide an in-depth exploration of a particular external actor's engagement in a specific election scenario within a particular country. Such studies are crucial for elucidating what these actors did, how they executed their initiatives, and, most importantly, how their actions were perceived by local stakeholders. This knowledge is essential for the effective consolidation of democracy and the facilitation of peaceful political transitions after elections, as feedback is integral to improvement. Furthermore, it is imperative for Kenyan foreign policy makers to gain insights into how to engage with their strategic partners in a mutually beneficial manner. This study addressed these critical questions in alignment with the specific objectives outlined.

2.2 The Context of International Cooperation

EU's democratic assistance, through electoral assistance is international cooperation in action. It is thus important to understand the IR perspective on such undertaking as a matter of building this thesis on the bigger picture as painted by the field of IR. To begin with, in the realm of international relations, cooperation between political entities is fundamentally rooted in self-interest, driven by the goal of maximizing benefits, whether they be economic or political in nature (Keohane 1984). In the pursuit of such cooperation, and more broadly, in the conduct of foreign policy, nation-states (or groups of states pursuing common goals) find themselves engaged in constant negotiations on two distinct levels: the international and the domestic (Putnam 1988). In democratic societies, governments are entrusted by their citizens to act as representatives in the arena of international relations, thereby being accountable to their constituents, albeit not always immediately. However, it's crucial to view governments as authorized negotiators, as any international agreement they negotiate ultimately necessitates domestic approval (Brown 2002, 180). This approval encompasses not only the endorsement of the electorate's mandate to conduct foreign policy but also the process of 'selling' international agreements to the domestic audience. In essence, any agreements and levels of cooperation undertaken must be acceptable both to international partners and domestic stakeholders, forming

an integral part of the intricate positioning process that nation-states undertake in their pursuit of foreign policy objectives.

Within the context of this intricate dance of international diplomacy and domestic accountability, the significance of achieving harmony between international and domestic interests cannot be overstated. It's imperative that nation-states strike a balance between satisfying their international counterparts and meeting the expectations and concerns of their domestic constituents (Kiamba & Batchman, 2015). This delicate equilibrium is a vital component of the broader positioning strategy employed by nation-states as they strive to navigate the complexities of the global political landscape. Through this process, nations aim to safeguard their own interests while ensuring that their actions align with the preferences and demands of their domestic audience. This dual-level negotiation underscores the intricate nature of international relations and the multifaceted challenges that governments face as they seek to pursue their foreign policy objectives (Brown 2002, p. 180).

In the context of political cooperation, Kenya as developing country stands at cross-roads, the fears about EU pushing its self-interest as she supports her elections, and the danger of missing out on the value of the technical, capacity building, and electoral civic education through filling resource gaps the country experiences. For example, towards 2022 general elections, the IEBC Chairperson, listed among the six main challenges the commission faced, high cost of elections, especially from the technical perspective of the IEBC. The presence of real gaps that EU can fill and the fears among a wide variety of quarters about EU's interference makes the Government of Kenya in between international diplomacy and accountability to the citizens. This context is key to appreciate as it unpacks in the analysis of this study findings.

Within the realm of political cooperation (electoral assistance), Kenya, a developing nation, finds itself at a critical juncture. On one hand, there are concerns about the European Union (EU) pursuing its self-interest while providing support during Kenyan general elections and also Kenya maintaining her good relations for continued benefiting from her bilateral and multilateral obligations with EU (more on this below). On the other hand, there is a risk of missing out on the valuable technical expertise, capacity building, and electoral civic education that the country desperately needs due to resource constraints. For instance, post 2010 Constitution in Kenya, the

subsequent chairpersons of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) and in did the public have decried the high cost of elections as one of the six major challenges the nation was grappling with, particularly from a technical perspective. This underscores the tangible gaps that the EU can potentially fill. However, these efforts raise apprehensions among various stakeholders about potential EU interference, placing the Kenyan government in a delicate balancing act between international diplomacy and being accountable to the citizenry.

This intricate context is crucial to understand when analyzing the findings of this study. It sheds light on the complex dynamics at play, where Kenya is faced with a dilemma. On one hand, there is a genuine need for the technical, capacity-building, and voter educational support that the EU can offer to enhance the electoral process and address resource shortages. On the other hand, there are legitimate concerns about the EU's intentions and the potential for its involvement to be seen as interference in Kenya's internal affairs. This balancing act places the government in a challenging position where it must navigate the fine line between international diplomacy and its obligations to its citizens. In essence, the study's analysis showcases this nuanced backdrop, which underscores the tension and challenges inherent in the relationship between Kenya and the EU in the context of elections and electoral integrity foreign assistance.

2.3 Contextualizing European Union – Kenya Strategic Relations

Understanding the value that Kenya derives from her relations with EU, and vice versa is critical to situating EU's continued presence in Kenya and can give us a basis upon which to unravel why this is so despite continued claims of EU interference in Kenya's elections, and lack of agreement among political class that post-2010 elections when such EU support have been most robust, can be termed as quality elections according to EOM reports over time.

Kenya and the European Union (EU), including its precursor, the European Community, share a long-standing history of diplomatic ties. This relationship dates back to 1976 when the European Delegation was established in Nairobi. Remarkably, in that very year, Kenya achieved the distinction of being the inaugural nation to enter into a cooperative agreement with the European Community through the Lomé Convention (Kiamba & Batchmann, 2015). In 2014, the Nairobi Delegation boasted one of the world's largest diplomatic staffs, comprising over 150 personnel. They held accreditation not only to Kenya but also to the United Nations Environment

Programme (UNEP) and the UN Centre for Human Settlement (UN-Habitat), both headquartered in Nairobi. While development cooperation has traditionally been a pivotal aspect of the Kenya-EU relationship, it's important to note that Kenya-EU relations extend far beyond this domain. This partnership encompasses various sectors, including economic and trade ties, political and diplomatic interactions, security collaboration, and humanitarian assistance. This comprehensive engagement reflects the diverse dimensions of their relationship, particularly considering that only 4% of Kenya's national budget relies on external financing (*Ibid*).

From an economic standpoint, Kenya's most significant trade partner is the European Union (EU), contributing to 17.2% of Kenya's total trade volume in 2011 (with China ranking second at 11.7%) (Kiamba & Batchmann, 2015), and 16% by 2022. However, on the political front, some analysts assert that relations have experienced a decline, particularly in the aftermath of the violence that erupted following the December 2007 presidential elections with EU taking an open opposing stance to the government formed after the bloodshed. Furthermore, the International Criminal Court (ICC) cases involving former President Uhuru Kenyatta and then Vice-President William Ruto, added strain to political ties (*Ibid*). Nonetheless, it's worth noting that Kenya-EU relations continue to be extensive and multifaceted, spanning various aspects and domains. With era of the famous Ocampo Six gone, and Kenya back on a fairly steady democratization, recent work have disagreed with Kiamba & Batchmann's (2015). Assessment showing that the EU, has actually become a critical player in the country's political and economic infrastructure (Miriam, Wanja, & Jairo, 2016; Musila, 2019).

In 2022, the European Union (EU) and Kenya successfully concluded negotiations on a significant trade agreement that aims at implementing the regional Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the EU and the Eastern African Community (EAC) (European Commission, 2022). This landmark agreement is poised to have a substantial impact on trade in goods, featuring robust development and cooperation components. Notably, it stands out as the first and most ambitious trade deal between the EU and a developing country, incorporating strong commitments to sustainability. It to highlight the mutual benefits Kenya and EU relations and the opportunities the new framework presents which implies continued EU presence in the country through development aid.

Kenya holds a special place in the EU's economic landscape, ranking as its second-largest trading partner and serving as a pivotal export market for Kenya. In 2022, the total trade volume between the EU and Kenya amounted to €3.3 billion, marking a remarkable 27% increase compared to 2018. Kenya's exports to the EU, valued at €1.2 billion, primarily consist of agricultural products such as vegetables, fruits, and flowers. On the other side, EU exports to Kenya totaled €2.02 billion and encompass mineral products, chemical products, and machinery. Importantly, the EU is Kenya's foremost export destination, absorbing 16% of the country's total exports in 2022, with Uganda (12%) and the USA (8%) following suit (EC, 2022).

This agreement is particularly noteworthy because it marks the first trade agreement with an East African Community (EAC) country to take effect. Although a regional EPA was negotiated in 2014 and signed by Kenya, Rwanda, and the EU in 2016, it could not be implemented as it necessitated signatures and ratifications from all EAC member countries. The EU-Kenya agreement will implement the provisions of the Economic Partnership Agreement between the EU and the EAC Partner States, following a decision by the East African Community Heads of State Summit in February 2021. Furthermore, the EU-Kenya Agreement will be open to accession by other EAC Partner States, making it a significant step towards enhancing regional trade and cooperation (EC, 2023).

The recently concluded agreement between the European Union (EU) and Kenya signifies a pivotal development in trade relations. One of its primary features is the provision of free access to the vast EU market for Kenyan exports of goods, with the notable exception of arms. This move effectively removes tariffs and quotas on Kenyan goods, opening up significant opportunities for trade expansion. However, the nature of trade liberalization in this agreement is asymmetrical. While Kenya will enjoy the benefits of tariff elimination in the EU market, it will reciprocate by gradually opening its market to imports from the EU. This measured approach takes into account the differing levels of development between the two parties and incorporates transitional periods and the exclusion of sensitive products from liberalization. These provisions are designed to strike a balance that supports Kenya's economic growth while ensuring fair and sustainable trade relations (EC, 2022).

Importantly, the agreement includes mechanisms to address unfair trade practices. It explicitly references and incorporates principles from the World Trade Organization (WTO) law, including measures to counteract dumping, where products are sold at unreasonably low prices in the other party's market. Moreover, the agreement incorporates safeguards that allow both the EU and Kenya to reintroduce duties if a surge in imports from the other side threatens to disrupt their economies. Special safeguard conditions have also been envisaged to protect Kenyan infant industries—those sectors that Kenya aims to develop further. Additionally, the agreement prohibits unjustified or discriminatory restrictions on imports and exports, ensuring that trade remains fair and nondiscriminatory (EC, 2022).

2.4 European Union – Kenya Relations: The Political Perspective

The European Union's (EU) active involvement in Kenya's electoral processes can be attributed to Kenya's vital position as a central regional player and a crucial anchor state for the EU within the complex and dynamic Horn of Africa region. This strategic partnership is multifaceted and rooted in several key factors that underscore Kenya's significance to the EU. Firstly, Kenya's substantial economic role in the Horn of Africa cannot be overstated. It stands as the second-largest economy in the region and holds the distinction of being the largest economy in East Africa. Kenya's commitment to economic liberalization, its impressive economic growth rates, and its rapidly growing digital infrastructure make it an attractive partner for the EU in terms of trade and investment (Songa & Shiferaw, 2022). Approximately 16% percent of Kenya's exports are directed toward the EU market, underlining the economic ties between the two entities (European Commission, 2022).

Secondly, Kenya plays a pivotal role in regional peace and security within the Horn of Africa. Together with Ethiopia, Kenya has actively contributed to facilitating the peace process in Somalia, dating back to the early 2000s, leading to the establishment of a transitional government in 2004. This involvement extends to Kenya's participation in the African Union-led mission in Somalia, where it collaborates with Somali national forces to provide essential security in the capital city, Mogadishu, and other significant urban centers (Songa & Shiferaw, 2022). Kenya's role as a peace and security actor enhances its strategic importance for the EU in maintaining stability in the region.

Furthermore, the EU has recognized Kenya's significance by initiating a Strategic Dialogue with the country. Launched in June 2020 and renewed in January 2022, this dialogue encompasses crucial areas such as peace and security, trade and investment, and sustainable development. It has facilitated regular high-level political and diplomatic exchanges between EU officials and their Kenyan counterparts, marking a significant advancement in the EU's partnership with Kenya (EU, 2022). This dialogue underscores Kenya's status as a valued strategic partner for the EU (European Commission, 2022).

In addition to its economic and political leverage in the East African Community (EAC), Kenya has taken the unique step of signing and ratifying an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the EU, a trade agreement aimed at promoting economic cooperation. EPAs are significant and often debated trade agreements, with the EU offering open and duty-free access to its market to partner countries while expecting reciprocal market openness over time. In the context of the EAC, where not all member states have engaged in EPA negotiations with the EU, Kenya's participation holds particular strategic significance (Songa & Shiferaw, 2022).

Kenya's stability is a matter of paramount concern for the entire East African region and the Horn of Africa, given its past experiences with election-related unrest. Disruptions in Kenya can have adverse effects on neighboring countries, such as Uganda and South Sudan, with critical supply chains being disrupted. In this context, Kenya's partners and neighbors are keen on ensuring a peaceful transition of power, which would reaffirm Kenya's democratic credentials and provide stability in a region grappling with significant security challenges, including the ongoing conflict in Ethiopia. Understanding the roles played by Kenya's partners and how these roles are perceived in the post-2010 elections is crucial for gaining insights into the dynamics of electoral assistance in Kenya (Songa & Shiferaw, 2022).

The Horn of Africa holds immense strategic importance for the EU due to migration and maritime security concerns. The Red Sea, one of the world's busiest maritime corridors, serves as a vital shipping route for Europe's trade with Asia. Ethiopia and Kenya, as two of the largest economies in the region, have played pivotal roles in regional counterterrorism efforts and have contributed to maintaining peace and security. However, Ethiopia's domestic challenges and conflicts have increased Kenya's value as a regional interlocutor. Kenya has consistently

advocated for peaceful solutions to conflicts and has served as an intermediary between Western nations and Ethiopia during the civil war. Kenya's mediation efforts and its role as a linchpin of security in the region contribute significantly to its strategic importance in the eyes of the EU (Songa & Shiferaw, 2022).

In conclusion, the EU's active involvement in Kenya's electoral processes is motivated by Kenya's indispensable role as a critical regional politico-strategic player and an anchor state in the Horn of Africa. This partnership is underpinned by Kenya's economic significance, its contributions to regional peace and security, its role in trade relations, and its stability. Kenya's partners and neighbors have deeply invested in ensuring peaceful transitions of both political and economic power, recognizing the ripple effects of instability in the region. Understanding these dynamics provides valuable insights into the EU's electoral assistance efforts in Kenya and its broader engagement in the Horn of Africa.

2.5 Electoral Assistance: The Rationale

According to the Electoral Knowledge Network (EKN) Project in 2023, the process of conducting elections is not only politically demanding but also technically complex. This is because electoral management bodies (EMBs) are under significant political and time pressure to ensure that elections are both credible and acceptable to all stakeholders (Musila, 2019; Abdulahi, 2015). EMBs must strike a delicate balance, ensuring that elections are not only technically legitimate but also politically acceptable. Any error in the electoral process can raise doubts in its integrity. Therefore, competent and professional election administrators are crucial for organizing successful elections. Unfortunately, the field of election administration is not universally recognized as a profession, and the professional development of electoral staff is often not given the priority it deserves, be it by governments, donors, electoral assistance providers, or election managers themselves (López-Pintor, 2000; James, Garnett., Loeber & Ham, 2019; Norris, 2019). The EKN Project emphasizes that the meticulous and accurate implementation of electoral procedures, along with well-trained staff, are essential components for conducting credible elections. All election officials, whether permanent staff or temporary workers, must receive proper training and possess the necessary skills to uphold high professional standards in their technical work. EMB members and staff should not only have the appropriate skills but also commit to the principles of electoral management, including integrity,

impartiality, independence, transparency, efficiency, and service-mindedness (James, Garnett-Loeber & Ham, 2019). However, in many African countries, elections officials are political appointed to serve interests of political class, and even worse are appointed toward elections. Kenya is not an exception. Kanyinga (2019) argues that the trend toward replacing IEBC officials toward or after every elections is a testament that these officers cannot be useful agents of electoral integrity. Therefore, the external support that EU gives, especially through technical assistance and capacity building of institutions such as IEBC plays a critical role and almost inevitable towards the integrity of electoral process and the ultimate results.

López-Pintor (2000) asserts that capacity building in the electoral context aims to build public trust that the electoral process is in competent hands. Visible professionalism within an EMB instills confidence in political parties, civil society, voters, the media, and other stakeholders that electoral managers can effectively carry out their tasks (Norris, 2019). Conversely, a lack of visible professionalism can lead to public suspicions of inaccuracies or fraud, making it easier for sprouting of election related litigations, whether valid or imagined. Additionally, professionalization of election administrators can enhance the autonomy of EMBs, making them less susceptible to political manipulation. The suspicions from a section of political parties on partiality of EMB officers, and their perceived past history of unfairness, is thus a key issue that invites external electoral assistance into Kenya. In the post Constitution 2010 general elections , the opposition have attempted to portray the IEBC as partisan, stating on many occasions that it had taken sides with the government of the day. This has continued to create grounds for intervention by such as EU's. How EU did intervene, and to what extent it did remain undocumented. Thus the current study explored this gap.

The challenge, however, lies in the fact that the advantages of training and professional development activities are not immediately tangible. EMBs often struggle to persuade governments and Ministry of Finance to allocate sufficient budgets for these activities. As a result, foreign electoral assistance providers, like the European Union, find an entry point to intervene and support the technical training of EMBs and their staff. In Africa, the European Union has played a significant role in electoral assistance, particularly in electoral observation and capacity building of electoral personnel. For instance, in 2017, the African Union (AU) and

EU formalized their electoral assistance partnership, which included a co-created methodology for EU assistance in technical domains and electoral observation (European Parliament, 2017).

Other than personnel capacity-related issues, resource deficiency is another ground for the EU and other external actors' electoral assistance. The less economically developed countries often face such issues due to resource constraints or limited experience (James, Garnett, Loeber & Ham, 2019). Electoral assistance programs are specifically tailored to address these election-related capacity deficiencies. Abdulahi (2015) writing about electoral assistance in Nigeria and Piccolino (2010) in his time series research of EU's work in Congo DRC, assert that typically, international organizations dispatch delegations to a country well in advance of an election to assess its readiness and engage in extensive consultations with national and local authorities to enhance electoral procedures. This form of assistance predominantly involves tangible and technical support. For instance, international organizations may engage in tasks like rectifying or establishing voter registries and instructing local authorities on their compilation and upkeep (Beetham, Carvalho, Landman & Weir, 2008).

The impact of such logistical assistance on the electoral process is readily discernible. Studies in Nigeria by Katsina (2016) showed that the provision of voter cards, for instance, not only reduces the potential for fraud but also facilitates voter participation. In cases where proper issuance of such cards may not have been ensured domestically, their provision by international actors assumes crucial importance. Additionally, logistical assistance can extend its influence beyond immediate and visible outcomes, potentially shaping the conduct of future elections as argues CEPS (2008). Furthermore, it can serve as an indicator of international support, altering the assessment of opposition parties regarding their prospects and motivating them to invest more in the electoral process (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010; Yusuf, 2015; Ojo, 2012).

Apart from logistical support, international actors contribute to mitigating inexperience by imparting training to administrative officials, poll workers, and voters, as well as organizing educational campaigns. Such direct involvement can serve to acquaint domestic actors with international electoral norms (Rakner & de Walle, 2009; Cunha, 2023). For instance, training for poll workers and voter education initiatives may instill knowledge about safeguarding the secrecy of the vote. This process of socialization may occur more readily in new multiparty

states, as novices tend to be more susceptible to external influences (Johnston, 2001). However, establishing empirical evidence for the occurrence of such learning and socialization, attributing it to external actors, presents challenges, especially considering that international actors are recurrently engaged in elections, and local actors may accumulate experience through repeated electoral processes (Motsamai, 2012).

The effectiveness of foreign electoral assistance efforts remain uncertain and unquantifiable thus, ample room for identifying the optimal conditions for providing such assistance within domestic contexts. As posited by Kelly (2012) and underscored by Manning & Malbrough (2010), Bunce & Wolchik (2010), and Finkel et al. (2007), these questions warrant further exploration, particularly through in-depth country case studies, as the existing literature predominantly lacks comprehensive analyses of specific country cases. In this context, focusing on the post-2010 Kenyan general elections and the role of the European Union in civic education and capacity building endeavors, this study seeks to enhance understanding of the EU's contributions in electoral assistance.

2.6 Technical Assistance and Capacity Building

Electoral assistance refers to various forms of support, aid, and guidance provided by international organizations, governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other stakeholders to countries or regions in the process of organizing and conducting elections (United Nations Focal Point for Electoral Assistance Matters, 2012). The primary objective of electoral assistance is to help ensure that elections are conducted in a free, fair, transparent, and credible manner, in accordance with international standards and best practices. The standards and practices have been set out in the United Nations *Policy, Principles and Types of Electoral Assistance* (UN, 2012).

Technical assistance encompasses a spectrum of support, including legal, operational, logistical aid, and capacity-building efforts aimed at the development or enhancement of electoral laws, procedures, and institutions (UN, 2012; CEPS, 2008). This assistance can span various facets of the electoral process and can be tailored to a specific election event or designed as a long-term initiative spanning multiple electoral occurrences (UN, 2012). In the UN perspective, the scope and duration of technical assistance are contingent on the mandate or request and the outcomes

of needs assessments. While the United Nations primarily directed toward election administration and related institutions, it may extend its support to various other stakeholders and entities. According to both EU and UN systems principles and practice of technical electoral assistance attempt to address also gender and human rights considerations across all dimensions of its implementation (UN, 2012; IDEA, 2014). Technical assistance encompass a number of activities and areas where advisories can be given by EU staff to Kenyan electoral institutions. These involve providing expertise, training, and resources to strengthen the technical aspects of the electoral process (Abdulahi, 2023).

Legal and Regulatory Support is a key component of technical assistance and capacity building. Legal and regulatory support can include support in the development or reform of electoral laws and regulations to ensure they align with democratic principles and international standards (Abbink, 2000; IDEA, 2014; AU, 2017). This may also involve helping countries establish independent electoral commissions or bodies, creating new duties and mandates, and creating new elections related bodies (CEPS, 2008; EU, 2022).

Capacity building is another key component of electoral assistance that is part and parcel of technical components of the assistance (Abdulahi, 2015; Motsamai, 2012). Capacity building programs aim to enhance the skills and capabilities of electoral management bodies, election officials, and civil society organizations involved in the electoral process (Abdulahi, 2015). Training may cover areas such as election administration, conflict resolution, and voter education (EU, 2022).

Elections Monitoring and Observation (EMOs) activities can stand alone as distinct set of electoral assistance (UN, 2014), but is usually unavoidable set of activities within the technical aspects of assistance (Abdulahi, 2015). EU often deploy election observers to assess the conduct of elections and ensure they meet international standards for fairness and transparency (IDEA, 2014). These observers provide valuable feedback and recommendations to improve future elections. Technically, these EMOs involve, in the technical manner, the identification and training and capacity building of members from CSOs, organizing them into powerful groups and financially and expertly supported them to undertake comprehensive elections monitoring from a CSOs perspective (IDEA, 2014). EU also provide support for political parties and

candidates in the technical sense. Motsamai (2012) reports that technically, EU identifies political parties, trains their members on responsible campaigns, on electoral laws, and provide technical materials to educate the publics through the parties during campaigns. Some electoral assistance programs aim to strengthen the capacity of political parties and candidates to participate effectively in elections, promoting a level playing field.

2.7 Electoral Civic Education and Related Support

Civic education encompasses a diverse array of activities and programs, as posited by Cohen (2009), who identifies four primary dimensions within this concept: political, community-oriented, individualistic behavior-oriented, and values-oriented. Specifically, within the realm of electoral civic education, as per Cohen's typology, it is categorized as a form of political civic education that involves various actors, activities, and programs (Ezechinyere, 2014). Both Cohen and Ezechinyere concur on the critical significance of civic education, particularly in economically disadvantaged countries where the assurance of peaceful transitions in the aftermath of elections is not guaranteed.

However, Ezechinyere (2014) highlights the multifaceted nature of civic education, emphasizing that different stakeholders may hold varying perspectives on its meaning. Nevertheless, Ezechinyere asserts that electoral civic education is not merely an activity necessitating the involvement of multiple actors; it is also a pivotal component of the electoral process. Ezechinyere further distinguishes between voter education and civic education, defining voter education as the dissemination of information and materials aimed at educating voters about the specifics and procedures of the voting process. This encompasses details such as voter eligibility, registration processes, election types, voting logistics, candidate information, and complaint filing.

On the other hand, civic education, according to Ezechinyere, encompasses a broader scope. It aims to convey knowledge about a country's political system and framework, including information regarding its system of governance, the nature and powers of offices to be filled through elections, significant economic, social, and political issues, the value of democracy, gender equality, and the importance of peace and national reconciliation. Rietbergen-McCracken (n.d.) concurs with Ezechinyere's perspective but further emphasizes that civic education can be

tailored to different demographics, scales, and contexts, whether targeting children or adults, developed or developing nations, and operating at local, national, or international levels. The overarching goal of civic education, as articulated by Rietbergen-McCracken, is to foster civic engagement by stimulating demand for participatory governance, encouraging citizens to make informed choices, and promoting the consolidation of democratic values.

Rietbergen-McCracken also delineates civic education into three essential elements: civic knowledge, civic skills, and civic disposition. Civic knowledge pertains to citizens' understanding of their political system, civic rights, and responsibilities. Civic skills encompass the ability to analyze, evaluate, and participate in civic and political processes. Civic disposition refers to the character traits necessary for a democracy, such as tolerance, public-spiritedness, civility, critical thinking, and a willingness to listen, negotiate, and compromise.

Additionally, Ezechinyere (2014) identifies four overarching themes that cut across various civic education strategies employed by different actors, including election-related conflicts and violence, gender equality and universal suffrage, personality-based politics, and the significance of voting as an expression of civic power and citizenship. In the context of electoral assistance, some critiques transcend the conventional resource-gap rationale. Motsamai (2012) notes that while the European Union's contributions to electoral democracy in Africa are generally welcomed, they are also perceived by some as partial and potentially motivated by interests beyond merely facilitating peaceful political transitions. It is essential to acknowledge that Motsamai's analysis is limited in its generalizability due to its reliance on desk research, its focus on a specific country case study, and the fact that it dates back to 2012. Therefore, a comprehensive study of foreign electoral assistance in developing countries should encompass both processes and stakeholders' perspectives, considering the impact on electoral outcomes. It's worth noting that civic education is not confined to developing countries alone. Delander and Millard (2014) argue that even in developed nations like the United States, extensive, long-term civic education programs persist to instill a culture that supports enduring electoral democracy. These programs, often initiated by Secretaries of State, aim to educate citizens about the political system, electoral processes, and civic responsibilities through various means, including curricular adjustments. The key differentiating factor between developing and developed countries is the resource gap faced by poorer nations like Kenya in effectively conducting

comprehensive electoral civic education (Motsamai, 2012; Turccinadi, 2014). In Kenya, civic education is taken seriously, with a dedicated curriculum outlining the legal and administrative aspects of elections, electoral systems, and election management. However, empirical studies, such as Kemei (2019), indicate that there are challenges in reaching all constituents with proper civic education. These studies suggest that civil society and other actors play a vital role in bridging the gap between the government's capacity to provide comprehensive voter and civic education and the actual needs of the population. This resource gap is one of the reasons foreign entities often step in to provide support.

To sum up, civic education encompasses various dimensions and is a vital component of electoral processes. While it plays a crucial role in enhancing civic knowledge, skills, and dispositions, its effectiveness can be constrained by resource gaps, especially in developing countries like Kenya. Foreign actors, such as the European Union, often provide assistance to bridge these gaps, although their involvement may raise questions about underlying motives. This study examined both the processes and the perceptions of stakeholders to assess the impact of foreign electoral assistance in developing countries and its influence on credible elections.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the research methodology of the thesis study is presented. It entails research design, study area, study population, sampling procedures and sampling size, scope and limitation, data collection methods, reliability and validity, data analysis and presentation and ethical considerations. The goal is to outline the methods used and the rationale behind their choices.

3.2 Study Area

This study was conducted in Kenya, a country where the European Union (EU) has been actively involved in providing electoral assistance since 1976 when the EU mission was established in Nairobi. Furthermore, the EU has evolved into a crucial and strategic economic partner for Kenya, emerging as the primary market destination for Kenyan products (Songa & Chiferaw, 2022; EU, 2022) with Kenyan exports totaling to 16% earning 1.2 billion Euros. EU also views Kenya as its most strategic partner in the region, and together they have established a partnership framework which is the first of its kind in the Horn of Africa in 2020, reviewed in 2022, covering strategic areas. This dual role of the EU in electoral assistance and economic partnership underscores Kenya's significance in the EU's African regional engagements. Kenya thus provides an important target to assess EU's electoral assistance. Moreover the fact that despite EU's presence in Kenya, all post 2010 elections have been thwarted by a section of Kenyans as not free, fair, and credible.

3.3 Research Design

This study will employ a mixed methods research design to go about data collection, analysis and interpretation and a case study design to allow for in-depth examination. Creswell (2003) asserts that mixed methods design has an added value than using just quantitative (QUANT) or qualitative (QUAL) designs, since it remedies shortcomings in either one of these designs. To the scholar, mixed-methods design enables integration of data from both approaches and finally a comprehensive analysis through triangulation of the data from different approaches, population cohorts and techniques.

In this study quantitative survey will help the researcher to gather data from the populace on their ratings of external actors and thus a survey research instrument will enable analysis of quantitative data and presentation of summaries of huge numerical findings in simple frequencies and formats. On the other hand, qualitative approach will aid the study to undertake key informant interviews (KII) among a select cohort constituting 31 representatives from each of the nine strata. This will help the researcher collect in-depth information and validate information concerning and electoral education and capacity building by EU and the perceptions of key stakeholders namely, the nine strata of population: media; office of registrar of political parties (ORPP); Parliamentary Justice, Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee (JLAC); members of the judiciary; political parties leadership; Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC); law enforcement; the civil society organizations (CSOs); and local observer groups. Qualitatively, study will involve 31 KIIs; however, the actual number will be defined by the point of data saturation, on these study objectives.

3.4 Study Population

The study's target population encompasses a broad and diverse range of individuals and institutions spread across various regions of Kenya. For instance, the study includes engagement with IEBC County Elections Managers (CEMs), who are situated in different counties across the country. This expansive approach ensures that the study's scope is not confined to a limited number of counties but encompasses a comprehensive view of Kenya's electoral landscape. A significant portion of the study's research activities is centered on engaging with key institutions that host the target population. These institutions represent a cross-section of the Kenyan political, electoral, civil society, and governmental landscape. They include EU officials and officials from the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), the offices of political parties such as the United Democratic Alliance (UDA) and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM)/Azimio Officers, as well as prominent Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) that collaborate with the EU. Moreover, the study also involves interactions with critical governmental entities like the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP), law enforcement agencies, Parliamentary Committees such as the Justice, Legal, and Constitutional Affairs Committee (JLAC), entities within the Judiciary, and various Civic Service Organizations. Additionally, the study encompasses engagements with think tanks and other

relevant stakeholders that may fall within the nine strata of the targeted population.

By conducting research and gathering insights from this diverse array of institutions and individuals, the study aims to provide a comprehensive and holistic understanding of the EU's involvement in Kenya's electoral processes, its impact, and the perceptions of the various stakeholders involved. This inclusive approach ensures that the study captures a nuanced and multifaceted view of the dynamics at play in Kenya's electoral landscape within the context of EU assistance and partnership.

The study population for this research project was divided into two distinct groups, with the aim of gathering both quantitative and qualitative data to comprehensively understand the subject matter. To determine the sample size for the quantitative segment, Fischer et al.'s (1998) formula is applied, resulting in a sample size of 384 individuals. These individuals were selected through a systematic random sampling approach from a range of state and non-state election-concerned institutions (ECIs), which are further stratified into nine distinct categories.

The first stratum comprises individuals associated with the media, including journalists, editors, and media executives. This group plays a vital role in shaping public discourse and disseminating information during elections, making their perspectives and experiences crucial to the study's objectives. The Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP) constitutes the second stratum, with participants who included officials and personnel responsible for regulating political parties in Kenya.

The Parliamentary Justice, Legal, and Constitutional Affairs Committee (JLAC) forms the third stratum and includes members and staff of this parliamentary committee responsible for legal and constitutional matters, including electoral legislation and oversight. Members of the Judiciary (MOJ) make up the fourth stratum, with potential participants such as judges, magistrates, and legal professionals involved in election-related matters. The fifth stratum consists of political party leadership, encompassing leaders and officials from various political parties in Kenya, from grassroots to national leadership from major political parties namely, Orange Democratic Republic (ODM), United Democratic Alliance (UDA), Amani National Congress (ANC) and Jubilee Party (JP). The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) comprises the sixth stratum, including IEBC commissioners, officers, and employees

directly responsible for organizing and overseeing elections in Kenya. The seventh stratum focuses on law enforcement, involving individuals from law enforcement agencies such as the police and other security personnel responsible for ensuring security and order during elections. The eighth stratum encompasses Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), with participants being representatives and members of civil society groups involved in electoral observation, advocacy, and civic education. The ninth and final stratum includes participants from local observer groups, which often play a critical watchdog role in monitoring elections at the grassroots level. By targeting these diverse institutional categories, the study aims to collect data from individuals who occupy key roles in Kenya's electoral processes, ensuring a comprehensive and multifaceted understanding of the subject matter. While the last included selected key informants from the EU mission to Kenya.

This inclusive approach acknowledges the interconnectedness of various stakeholders in the electoral landscape and recognizes their unique perspectives and contributions. The combination of quantitative data derived from this diverse range of participants, along with subsequent qualitative data collection, provided valuable insights into the dynamics of electoral assistance and partnership between Kenya and the European Union. Ultimately, this comprehensive approach contributed to a more holistic understanding of the subject under investigation.

There are over fifty TV broadcasting stations in Kenya (Tuko.news, Feb, 2018). These include both that broadcast in the two national languages of Kiswahili and English as well as those that do in Vernacular. At the same time, as of 2023, the Communications Authority of Kenya has assigned frequencies to 155 Commercial FM broadcasters and 37 community FM broadcasters countrywide (CAK, 2023).

Moreover, there are uncountable social media accounts of individual people using those social media platforms to inform, educate, and create public opinion. To understand the subject within the media fraternity, the researcher will target both vernacular and official language TVs, social media, and radio stations. The researcher aims to reach to people in this cohort that have had relevant experience with European Union. This is why the researcher will undertake a pre-test study to have practical knowledge on which specific media type have been somewhat involved in the EU funded elections programs in Kenya.

The Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP) plays a significant role in Kenya's political landscape and was an important institution for this study. Established through the Political Parties Act of 2011, as part of post elections report 2007/08, the ORPP has a core mandate to register and regulate political parties in Kenya and administer the Political Parties Fund. According to the ORPP Strategic Plan 2020-2025, the office is fundamental to the achievement of the Political Pillar of the Kenya Vision 2030. This vision aims to create a democratic political system that is issue-based, people-centered, result-oriented, and accountable to the public. The ORPP's mandate aligns with the promotion of democracy, as outlined in Articles 91 and 92 of the Constitution.

Given its role in regulating political parties and its involvement with various electoral actors, including the European Union (EU), the ORPP is a key actor for this study. The research gathered perspectives from employees at the ORPP to understand their views and insights regarding the EU's involvement in Kenya's democratization efforts. While the exact number of ORPP employees is not currently known, efforts were made to interview key individuals reached and interviewed to gain a better understanding of the EU's role in Kenya's electoral assistance, as perceived by the ORPP.

The Parliamentary Justice, Legal, and Constitutional Affairs Committee (JLAC) is another important institution for this study. JLAC is one of the parliamentary committees in Kenya and serves as a link between the Kenyan Parliament and various entities on constitutional affairs, with a particular focus on issues related to elections. According to Hassan (2023), the JLAC committee plays a crucial role in shaping the legal and constitutional aspects of elections in Kenya.

Given its significance in matters related to elections from a parliamentary perspective, this study targeted individuals from the JLAC committee. By doing so, the research aims to gain insights into the legal and constitutional backdrop of the EU's electoral interventions in Kenya, as perceived by members of the JLAC. Members of the Judiciary (MOJ) represent another key segment of this study's population. The EU, according to EU (2022), promotes electoral democracy by supporting the training and capacity-building of MOJ members on specific

electoral developments within the country. This support is intended to enhance their participation in elections as impartial actors.

To gain a comprehensive understanding of the EU's electoral assistance from the perspective of the MOJ, this study will seek to engage with individuals from the judiciary. Their insights into the role of the EU in Kenya's electoral processes will contribute to a multifaceted view of the subject matter. By involving these key institutional actors, the research aims to shed light on the EU's involvement in Kenya's elections and its impact on the country's democratization efforts.

3.5 Sampling Procedure and Size

The sampling procedures for the study included a combination of probability and non-probability sampling techniques. Non-probability sampling included purposive, snowballing, and convenience sampling, while probability sampling comprised simple random sampling along with convenience sampling.

Purposive sampling, primarily used in qualitative research, relied on the researcher's judgment to select individuals for interviews (Bryman, 2012). In this study, purposive sampling was employed to choose respondents for the qualitative aspects. To identify knowledgeable key informants related to the research objectives, the researcher used purposive sampling. Initially, self-administered questionnaires were used to assess the respondents' knowledge ability. Subsequently, at least 31 key informants who possessed substantial knowledge about the subject matter, specifically the EU's involvement in Kenyan elections as a foreign entity providing electoral assistance, were selected.

Snowballing provided flexibility by allowing referrals from the initially selected participants who were capable of addressing the qualitative questions as key informants. These referrals included former employees of relevant institutions or organizations and other individuals perceived to possess the required information. Snowballing was particularly valuable in this study as it sought to examine the role of the EU in Kenyan elections from 2010 to the present. Through snowballing, key actors who no longer worked in their previous organizations were traced and interviewed. Convenience sampling was employed when the researcher found that a

purposely selected participant was unavailable, but there was a potential substitute who could provide similar information.

Simple random sampling was used for questionnaire administration to select participants across the strata. This was combined with convenience sampling when the researcher and research assistants visited the field, specifically the institutions, which also served as the units of analysis. They randomly selected available individuals to respond to the questionnaire. However, prior to fieldwork, stakeholders mapping was conducted to understand the current availability of stakeholders. This involved collaborating with key personnel from each targeted stratum to establish contact lists of the target population, from which random selection and survey dates were arranged. This technique was helpful as the targeted population primarily consisted of busy professionals who were not readily available for surveys.

The study focused on individuals working in the targeted institutions rather than the general Kenyan population because they were likely to provide more valid information to address the research questions. These professionals had a better understanding of the electoral assistance provided by the EU, as opposed to the general population who may not easily distinguish between the contributions of the EU and other entities, such as the United States, for example.

The sample sizes varied between the qualitative and quantitative designs. The exact number of Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) was determined by the saturation point during data collection. For the qualitative part, CSOs had the largest representation with seven KIIs, while the other strata were equally represented with two KIIs each. The IEBC, being a core stratum in electoral matters, had eight KIIs. In the quantitative part, each of the other strata, excluding the IEBC and CSOs, received an equal number of questionnaires, representing 5.2% (20) for CSOs, 26.04% (100) for the core strata, and 37.5% (144) for the IEBC. (Refer to tables for details.)

Table 3.1: Sampling Design and Size for Qualitative Dimension of the Study

TECHNIQUE	TARGET POPULATION	SAMPLE SIZE
KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS	Media	2
	IEBC Officials	8
	Office of registrar of political parties (ORPP)	2
	Parliamentary Justice, Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee (JLAC)	2
	Civil Society Organizations Concerned	7
	Political parties leadership	2
	Law enforcement	2
	Members of the judiciary	2
	Local elections observer groups	2
	TOTAL KIIs	

For the quantitative survey, the study aimed at obtaining a sample size of 384, which would be distributed across the 9 population strata based on proportionate sampling. The sample size calculation was derived using Fischer et al.'s (1998) formula, which is appropriate when dealing with a population exceeding 10,000 and is considered finite.

In Fischer's formula, the sample size (n) is determined by the following parameters:

- z, representing the value at the chosen confidence level (1.96 for a 95% confidence interval).
- p, denoting the estimated population with attributes of interest (assumed to be 0.5 for an infinite population).
- q, which is the complement of p (1 - p).
- d, indicating the desired level of precision (set at 0.05).

Using these values, the formula for calculating the sample size is as follows: $n = (z^2 * p * q) / (d^2)$

Plugging in the values: $n = (1.96^2 * 0.5 * 0.5) / (0.05^2)$ n = 384.16

Therefore, the required sample size for the study is 384, which is considered representative enough for generalizing the findings. Fischer's formula was applicable in this study because the population of the two counties was assumed to be infinite, exceeding 10,000, as required by Fischer et al. (1998) for the formula's use. For instance, according to the 2019 Kenya Population and Housing Census, the total Kenyan population was reported to be 47.5 million (Kenya Bureau of Statistics, 2019). Given that the institutions targeted in this study were assumed to represent Kenyan citizens, it was logically justified to treat the total target population as finite and above 10,000. As a result, the calculated sample size of 384 was distributed across various population strata.

Table 3.2: Sampling Design and Size for Quantitative Dimension of the Study.

TECHNIQUE	POPULATION COHORT	SAMPLE SIZE
QUANTITATIVE SURVEY – SELF-ADMINISTERED	Media	20
	IEBC Officials	100
	Office of registrar of political parties (ORPP)	20
	Parliamentary Justice, Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee (JLAC)	20
	Civil Society Organizations Concerned	144
	Political parties leadership	20
	Law enforcement	20
	Members of the judiciary	20
	Local elections observer groups	20
TOTAL		384

3.6 Data and Data Collection Techniques

The study employed a mixed methods design hence data collection enjoyed techniques from both methods – QUANT and QUAL. The selection of a mixed-method research strategy, combining both qualitative and quantitative methods, was a carefully considered choice made for several compelling reasons. First and foremost, a mixed-method approach was deemed essential to attain a comprehensive understanding of the research topic, which centered on foreign electoral

assistance, particularly the EU's involvement in the Kenyan general elections. By incorporating both qualitative and quantitative data, the research could delve into various facets of the subject matter, offering a more holistic perspective – which could be summarized through numbers and discussed in text.

One of the key justifications for adopting a mixed-method approach lies in the concept of triangulation. Triangulation involves the use of multiple data sources and methods to validate and cross-verify findings. By employing qualitative methods such as key informant interviews, in-depth interviews, and focus group discussions alongside quantitative surveys, the research aimed to enhance the credibility and reliability of the results. This approach allowed for a convergence of evidence from diverse angles, strengthening the overall validity of the study.

Furthermore, the choice of mixed methods enabled the research to capture a wide range of perspectives and insights. Qualitative methods, including interviews and focus groups, were instrumental in gathering narratives, experiences, and qualitative data. This qualitative data was crucial for understanding the nuances, motivations, and contextual factors surrounding the EU's electoral assistance. On the other hand, quantitative surveys facilitated the collection of structured data that could reveal patterns, trends, and statistical relationships, offering empirical evidence to complement the qualitative findings.

In addition to providing a holistic understanding, the mixed-method approach allowed for synergy between qualitative and quantitative data. Qualitative insights could elucidate or provide context for quantitative results, while quantitative data could quantify or validate qualitative findings. This interplay between methods enriched the depth and breadth of the research, ensuring that the study's objectives were addressed comprehensively. Moreover, the research recognized the importance of statistical analysis, which is facilitated by quantitative data. Quantitative methods, such as surveys, enabled the application of statistical tests, including regression and correlation analysis. These analyses were essential for examining relationships between variables, identifying trends, and testing hypotheses. They added an empirical dimension to the study, contributing to its scientific rigor.

3.6.1 Secondary Data

In the research process, the utilization of secondary data sources served a critical role in anchoring the study within the context of democratization and cooperation in international relations, and electoral assistance, elucidating essential concepts, and providing substantial context for addressing the research problem. The secondary data encompassed a diverse range of materials, including but not limited to relevant theses, policy and legal documents, analyses conducted by the United Nations (UN) and other international bodies, as well as independent assessments of the EU's role in electoral assistance. Additionally, the secondary data pool included national documents obtained from archives, pertinent journal articles, and institutional documentations sourced from national advocacy organizations, among other pertinent sources. The collection of secondary data was facilitated through a rigorous process of documentary analysis, allowing for the comprehensive exploration of existing information and insights on the subject matter.

3.6.2 Primary Data

The research design of this study incorporated a mixed-methods approach, which entailed the collection and analysis of both qualitative and quantitative primary data. This comprehensive data collection strategy aimed to provide a well-rounded perspective on the research topic. Qualitative data, essential for capturing nuanced insights and perspectives, were acquired through various techniques, including key informant interviews, in-depth interviews, and focus group discussions. These methods allowed for in-depth exploration and interpretation of the experiences and viewpoints of individuals directly involved in or impacted by EU involvement in Kenyan elections.

On the other hand, quantitative data, which are valuable for establishing patterns, trends, and statistical relationships, were gathered through the administration of individual survey questionnaires. This approach facilitated the systematic collection of data from a broader sample of participants, enabling statistical analysis and quantification of specific aspects related to EU electoral assistance in Kenya. The combined use of both qualitative and quantitative data collection methods enhanced the comprehensiveness and robustness of the study, ensuring a more holistic understanding of the research phenomenon.

3.6.3 Questionnaires

The primary data collection process for qualitative information involved the utilization of open-ended self-administered questionnaires. These questionnaires were designed to gather detailed qualitative insights from selected individuals within the institutions represented among the identified cohorts. To facilitate the administration of these questionnaires efficiently, the study enlisted the assistance of two trained research assistants. Prior to embarking on data collection, these research assistants underwent comprehensive training, spanning a period of three full days. This training encompassed several crucial aspects, including the fundamental objectives of the study, the ethical considerations associated with data collection, and strategies for addressing common issues that might arise during fieldwork. By equipping the research assistants with a clear understanding of the research goals and ethical guidelines, this training ensured that the data collection process would be conducted ethically and professionally.

The involvement of research assistants not only contributed to time and cost efficiency but also added an extra layer of quality control to the study. Through thorough training and ongoing supervision, the risk of errors such as incomplete questionnaires and challenges related to data storage were minimized, thereby enhancing the overall reliability and validity of the collected qualitative information.

3.6.4 Qualitative Methods

Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) represent a valuable method for collecting qualitative data and offer unique strengths in the research process. As outlined by Creswell (2003), KIIs facilitate the gathering of well-rounded perspectives from various stakeholders, including beneficiaries, policy makers, and implementers. This approach allows for a comprehensive and in-depth exploration of the research topic, providing rich insights and a nuanced understanding of the subject matter. In the context of this study, KIIs will be directed towards policy-level stakeholders, as indicated in the earlier table delineating the target population cohorts. A total of 31 KIIs will be conducted, distributed across the identified population cohorts as specified in the aforementioned table. However, it is worth noting that the final number of interviews conducted will be contingent upon reaching the point of data saturation during the fieldwork phase. Data saturation refers to the stage at which new interviews no longer yield substantially different or additional information, indicating that the research has gathered a comprehensive understanding of the

topic. As such, the decision on the precise number of KIIs conducted will be determined by the point at which data saturation is achieved, ensuring that the study captures a comprehensive range of insights and perspectives while optimizing research resources and time.

3.7 Reliability and Validity

The formulation of both the questionnaire and Key Informant (KI) interview guides benefited from the expertise of university-assigned supervisors, who themselves were experienced researchers. This collaborative effort ensured the development of pertinent and well-structured questions aimed at effectively addressing the research objectives. The research instruments were thoroughly refined and deemed suitable for the actual study.

Prior to the actual data collection, a crucial step involved conducting a pre-test of the questionnaire tool. This pre-test involved approximately 50 participants drawn from Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Kisumu and Nairobi, with 25 individuals from each location. The primary objectives of this pre-test were to evaluate the effectiveness of the questionnaires, gather feedback from participants regarding their experience, and identify any necessary adjustments or refinements. This iterative process was essential for refining the research instruments and enhancing their suitability for the actual study. Considerations of ecological issues, as elucidated by Bryman (2012) in social science research, were also vital. Ecological concerns pertained to the accessibility and ease of interacting with the target audience or administering questionnaires. Given the researcher's affiliation with the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), an organization central to this study, the researcher was well-positioned to navigate potential ecological challenges. Contacts within the IEBC, particularly in departments relevant to the study, facilitated access to key informants and the gathering of essential information.

To mitigate potential biases that could arise from these established networks, the researcher adopted a cautious approach. Direct interactions with key informants were avoided, and the assistance of qualified research assistants was enlisted to ensure impartiality and minimize potential influence. This approach maintained the integrity of the research process and ensured that data collection remained objective. Furthermore, data validity was rigorously upheld through a triangulation method. Data collected through various methods, including questionnaires, KI

interviews, and focus group discussions, were cross-referenced and compared to identify areas of agreement or divergence. This triangulation approach enhanced the credibility and trustworthiness of the research findings by corroborating information from multiple sources and allowing for a comprehensive understanding of the subject matter.

3.8 Data Analysis and Presentation

In the analysis phase of this study, distinct strategies were employed based on the type of data collected. Qualitative data underwent a comprehensive analysis process utilizing thematic content analysis. The initial step involved sorting and coding the collected data to identify patterns and similarities that could be grouped into categories. These categories were then subjected to further analysis, allowing for the extraction and generation of overarching themes. The resulting themes served as the foundation for presenting the study's results and findings in alignment with the predefined research objectives. To maintain transparency and authenticity, qualitative data was presented as verbatim quotes, accompanied by details such as location and dates to provide context and enhance the credibility of the findings.

Quantitative data, on the other hand, underwent a systematic analysis using the Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) version 26, a computer data processing program known for its efficacy in handling statistical data. This software facilitated the organization and analysis of quantitative data, allowing for the creation of frequency tables, graphs, pie charts, cross-tabs, and histograms. These visual representations were instrumental in presenting the quantitative findings in a clear and concise manner, enabling a comprehensive understanding of the data.

Crucially, both quantitative and qualitative data were subjected to a triangulation process during the analysis. This approach involved comparing and cross-referencing findings from both data sources to identify areas of convergence and divergence. Triangulation enhanced the robustness and reliability of the research outcomes by corroborating information obtained through different methods. By aligning with the core objective guiding this study, triangulation ensured a comprehensive and well-rounded discussion of the research findings.

3.9 Ethical Considerations

In addressing ethical considerations throughout the course of this study, several key principles and safeguards were diligently observed. These ethical principles are paramount in ensuring the integrity, safety, and well-being of the study's human participants. First and foremost, authorization played a pivotal role in upholding ethical standards. The study adhered to the necessary ethical protocols set forth by Maseno University, which encompassed the rigorous process of conceptualization, proposal defense at the School of Development and Strategic Studies (SDSS), submission to the School of Graduate Studies (SGS), and obtaining the SGS research permit. Further ethical approvals were sought from the Maseno University Ethics Review Committee (MUSERC) and the National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI). These steps ensured that the study met the required ethical standards and was duly authorized to engage with human subjects.

Informed consent emerged as another cornerstone of ethical research conduct. Participants in the study were approached with utmost transparency and respect for their autonomy. Prior informed consent was meticulously obtained, ensuring that participants fully comprehended the study's objectives and were comfortable with their involvement. This process involved presenting detailed information about the study through consent and information forms, allowing participants to make informed decisions about their participation. Voluntary participation was upheld as a fundamental ethical principle. The study actively refrained from coercing or enticing participants in any manner. Potential participants were provided with consent forms in advance, affording them ample time to consider their participation without external pressure. This approach upheld the voluntary nature of participation, contributing to the impartiality of the data collected.

The "do no harm" principle, emphasizing the avoidance of harm to participants, was conscientiously implemented. The educated and less susceptible nature of the study's target population, including leaders in civil society organizations (CSOs) and employees of institutions such as the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP) and the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), reduced the risk of manipulation. To further uphold this principle, strict measures were put in place to ensure that research data would be used exclusively for the study's purposes and not shared in a manner that could compromise the

security or well-being of respondents, thus avoiding possibility to do any individual or institutional harm through access of information through unauthorized hands.

Data management and security were vital ethical considerations. The study took precautions to safeguard collected data, both in terms of storage and access. Data, including hard copies of questionnaires, was securely stored in a lockable metallic box accessible only to the researcher. Audio recordings were stored in a password-protected hard drive, ensuring that unauthorized access or misuse was prevented. Furthermore, once the study was completed and no longer required, all data, in any form, was systematically destroyed.

Anonymity was maintained to safeguard participants' identities. The study coded all Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and refrained from making direct references to individuals or institutions, particularly when discussing sensitive or confidential themes. This approach ensured that no products resulting from the study would directly name or reference any specific individual.

Confidentiality was another ethical pillar, requiring the researcher to protect all shared information. Authorization from relevant bodies, including SGS, MUSERC, and NACOSTI, was sought to instill confidence in participants regarding the legitimacy of the study. Additionally, the researcher took steps to redact highly confidential information from the research report and presented less confidential information in a manner that prevented readers from linking it to any specific person or entity. Lastly, the study upheld the principle of freedom to withdraw from the survey or interview at any point. Participants were assured that their participation was entirely voluntary, and they retained the right to withdraw from the study at any time, without the need for explanations or concerns about social, cultural, economic, or political consequences. By meticulously adhering to these ethical considerations, the study ensured the ethical conduct of research while respecting the rights, autonomy, and well-being of its human participants.

CHAPTER FOUR

EUROPEAN UNION INVOLVEMENT IN KENYAN ELECTIONS THROUGH ELECTORAL CIVIC EDUCATION IN THE POST-2010 GENERAL ELECTIONS

4.1 Introduction

In this first chapter of the findings, a comprehensive analysis of socio-demographic variables was conducted, followed by a detailed presentation, discussion, and interpretation of the findings related to the first objective of this study. The primary focus of this chapter is to delve into the dynamics of the European Union's (EU) support for electoral civic education in the context of Kenya's general elections. The chapter encompasses nine critical areas that shed light on the subject of electoral civic education as it pertains to the EU's electoral support in Kenya. Firstly, the study explores the overarching framework that serves as the foundation for the EU's electoral civic support in Kenya. This framework provides a conceptual and strategic basis for understanding the EU's role in promoting civic education within the context of electoral processes. Secondly, the study examines the key implementers responsible for executing these civic education programs on behalf of the EU. Understanding the actors involved in the implementation process is essential for comprehending the mechanisms through which electoral civic education initiatives are carried out. Thirdly, the chapter investigates the specific position of the EU within the broader landscape of electoral support programs in Kenya. This entails an exploration of the EU's unique role and contributions in the realm of civic education as part of its overall electoral assistance efforts. Fourthly, the study scrutinizes the nature and type of funding provided by the EU to support these civic education programs. Financial resources play a pivotal role in the successful execution of such initiatives, and an examination of funding sources and mechanisms is crucial.

Fifthly, the chapter delves into the timing of these civic education programs within the electoral cycle. Understanding when these initiatives are implemented in relation to election events provides insights into their strategic relevance and impact. Sixthly, the geographical coverage of the EU's civic education programs is analyzed. This involves an assessment of the regions or areas within Kenya where these initiatives are carried out and the extent of their reach. Seventhly, the demographic coverage of these programs is explored to ascertain the target groups and populations that benefit from electoral civic education efforts.

The impact of these programs on critical aspects of the electoral process is a key focus of the chapter. This includes an evaluation of their influence on voter turnout, inclusivity, and the ability of voters to detect political manipulation, as well as their resilience in the face of issues such as hate speech. Finally, the chapter addresses the hindrances and challenges encountered in the realm of electoral civic education, shedding light on the obstacles and complexities that may impede the effectiveness of such initiatives. By thoroughly examining these six dimensions, the findings in this chapter provide a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics surrounding the EU's support for electoral civic education in Kenya's general elections. Each area contributes to a nuanced perspective on the role and impact of civic education initiatives in the context of electoral processes, facilitating a holistic interpretation of the study's first objective.

4.2 Questionnaires and Interviews Return Rate

The questionnaires were distributed to a predetermined sample of participants representing various strata within the study population. It is crucial to note that the initial design aimed for a specific population size to ensure statistical significance and enable generalization. The return rates for the questionnaires, reflecting the number of completed and returned surveys out of those distributed and the usable ones, were carefully monitored. These return rates serve as an indicator of participant engagement and the effectiveness of the data collection process.

Two primary techniques were employed to collect data: questionnaires and key informant interviews (KIIs). Before delving into the findings, it is essential to provide context by addressing several key aspects of the research design and data collection process. This includes evaluating whether the initial design in terms of population size and selection worked as intended, any modifications made during the research, their potential impact on the generalizability of findings, and how challenges related to participant engagement were addressed. Below, we discuss the return rates for questionnaires and KIIs:

4.2.1 Questionnaire Return Rate

The table presented below outlines the sample sizes initially planned for each of the population strata, as well as the actual sizes based on the returned questionnaires. This comparison provides valuable insights into the execution of the research design and the engagement of different

population cohorts in the data collection process. Here are some key observations and interpretations based on the table. The research design involved allocating sample sizes to each population stratum in a proportional manner. This approach aimed to ensure that the sample adequately represented each stratum, allowing for meaningful analyses and generalizability of findings. The table indicates that the JLAC cohort had the lowest return rate for the distributed questionnaires. This outcome was expected, considering that this cohort primarily comprised politicians who have busy schedules, especially during transitional periods. As a result, scheduling interviews or questionnaire completion with this group presented logistical challenges. Despite the lower return rate, it is important to note that the overall return rate for the questionnaires was 90.1%. The high overall return rate of 90.1% suggests that the findings of the study remained reliable (see, e.g., Mugenda & Mugenda, 2013). A return rate of this magnitude indicates that a substantial portion of the intended sample actively participated in the research. This level of participation enhances the robustness of the study's conclusions and supports the generalizability of findings to the broader population under investigation. The research design and the execution of data collection, including the proportional allocation of questionnaires, reflect a scientifically sound approach to sampling and data collection. The study adhered to established research methodologies, as demonstrated by the return rates and the reliability of findings.

In summary, while the JLAC cohort exhibited a lower return rate, the overall participation rate remained high, ensuring the reliability and generalizability of the study's conclusions. The proportional sampling approach and the execution of data collection activities aligned with established research practices. These findings affirm the scientific validity of the study and its ability to draw meaningful insights from the collected data.

Table 4.1: Questionnaire Return Rate

TECHNIQUE/TOOL	TARGET POPULATION TARGET	SAMPLE SIZE	RETURNED QUESTIONNAIRE	% OF ACTUAL RETURNED AND USABLE
QUESTIONNAIRE	Media	20	20	100
	IEBC Officials	100	87	87
	Office of registrar of political parties (ORPP)	20	17	85
	Parliamentary Justice, Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee (JLAC)	20	13	65
	Civil Society Organizations Concerned	144	134	94
	Political parties leadership	20	20	100
	Law enforcement	20	20	100
	Members of the judiciary	20	19	95
	Local elections observer groups	20	20	85
	TOTAL	384	350	AVR. = 90.1%

Source: Survey Data (2023)

4.2.2 Key Informant Interviews Return Rate

Key informant interviews, a qualitative data collection method, involved engaging with individuals from specific population cohorts identified in the research design. The selection of key informants was a critical aspect of the study, as it targeted individuals with specialized knowledge or insights related to the research objective, and the questions it contained.

Evaluating the participation rates and experiences of key informants in the interview process offers valuable insights into the qualitative data collection approach.

Table 4.2 provides an overview of the return rates for the key informant interviews (KIIs) conducted in the study. The table indicates that most population strata achieved a return rate of 100%, with the exception of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) officials, which missed their expected number by one, and the European Union (EU), which exceeded the anticipated number by four participants, resulting in a 400% return rate. The fact that most population strata achieved a 100% return rate for KIIs is a positive outcome. It signifies a high level of cooperation and willingness among the participants to engage in the interviews. This high return rate enhances the completeness and comprehensiveness of the data collected. The EU population stratum exceeded the anticipated number of participants by four individuals, resulting in a 400% return rate. This occurrence is noteworthy as it indicates a high level of engagement and interest among EU representatives in participating in the study as well as the application of social networks the researcher had to navigate the research ecological environments. These additional participants were found to be valuable contributors to the research, particularly in the context of the "basket fund" – the framework through which EUs finding works.

It's mentioned that the four additional participants from the EU were reached through snowballing. Snowball sampling is a technique that allows for the identification and inclusion of additional participants through referrals from existing participants. In this case, it proved to be an effective strategy for expanding the pool of key informants and capturing diverse perspectives. Lastly, the average return rate for KIIs across all population strata was 128%. This balanced return rate indicates that the study successfully engaged with a diverse set of key informants, ensuring that various perspectives and insights were gathered. This diversity contributes to the richness and depth of the study's findings.

Overall, the high return rates for KIIs, along with the inclusion of additional participants through snowballing, highlight the effectiveness of the study's approach to engaging with key informants. The balanced interview results and the willingness of participants to contribute to the research are positive indicators of the study's success in gathering comprehensive qualitative data.

Table 4.2: Key Informant Interviews Return Rate

TECHNIQUE	POPULATION TARGET	SAMPLE SIZE	ACTUAL INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED	% RETUR RATE
KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS	Media	2	2	100
	IEBC Officials	8		86
	Office of registrar of political parties (ORPP)	2	2	100
	Parliamentary Justice, Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee (JLAC)	2	2	100
	Civil Society Organizations Concerned	7	7	100
	Political parties leadership	2	2	100
	Law enforcement	2	2	100
	Members of the judiciary	2	2	100
	Local elections observer groups	2	2	100
	European Union	1	5	400
TOTAL KIIs		32	30	Avr. = 127

Source: Survey Data (2023)

4.3 Respondents Social and Demographic factors

The study considered eight socio-demographic variables to provide a comprehensive context for interpreting the findings. These variables included gender, institution of affiliation, years of experience at the current organization of work, years of experience in electoral programming, respondent's disability status, and respondents' level of education, and others as discussed in this sub-section.

Figure 4.1 below presents the distribution of respondents based on gender. The data shows that the study collected responses from 188 (53.7%) males and 162 (46.3%) females. This distribution indicates a relatively balanced representation of both genders in the study, with only a slight difference in the number of male and female respondents. Ensuring a balanced gender representation is essential in research, especially in a study related to electoral assistance, as it helps capture diverse perspectives and prevents gender bias in the findings. The European Union (EU) places a significant emphasis on gender participation in electoral assistance programs, making it crucial for this study to consider the perspectives of both male and female respondents. By achieving nearly equal participation from both genders, the study enhances the validity and comprehensiveness of its findings, ensuring that gender-related insights are adequately addressed in the analysis and conclusions. The study's approach to collecting responses from a balanced representation of male and female participants aligns with the EU's focus on gender participation in electoral assistance. This gender-inclusive approach contributes to a more well-rounded and gender-unbiased understanding of the subject matter, strengthening the study's credibility and relevance.




Figure 4.1: Respondents distribution by Gender

Source: Survey Data (2023)

As figure 4.2 below shows, the study drew its data from a wide array of institutions, each representing distinct segments of the population strata related to European Union (EU) support through civic education during Kenya's general elections. These institutions, being key actors in the electoral landscape, provided invaluable perspectives and insights into the dynamics of electoral assistance. This section offers an overview of the distribution of respondents across these institutions, underlining significant percentages and statistics that shed light on the study's composition.

The Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP) was one of the institutions included in the study, contributing 17 respondents (4.9%) to the sample. The ORPP's role in regulating political parties and its interactions with the EU in the context of electoral assistance added a regulatory dimension to the study's findings. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) played a substantial role in the study, with 134 respondents (38.3%) representing this category. Their substantial presence highlighted their active engagement in civic education initiatives and their collaborative efforts with the EU in fostering democracy and electoral participation.

The Justice and Legal Affairs Committee (JLAC) was represented by 13 respondents (3.7%), providing valuable insights into parliamentary oversight of constitutional and legal matters, including electoral affairs. Their perspectives contributed significantly to the study's understanding of legislative aspects related to electoral assistance. The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), a crucial electoral institution, constituted a notable portion of the sample with 87 respondents (24.9%). Their contributions were instrumental in comprehending EU support within the electoral cycle, covering areas such as voter registration, election management, and voter education.

The media, represented by 20 respondents (5.7%), shared their experiences in reporting on civic education initiatives and EU involvement in electoral processes. Their perspectives enriched the study by shedding light on the media's role in disseminating information related to electoral assistance. Local Elections Observers (LEO), comprising 20 respondents (5.7%), provided valuable insights into their roles as election observers, encompassing activities such as monitoring and reporting on various electoral aspects.

Law Enforcement Officers (LE), represented by 20 respondents (5.7%), offered their perspectives on the security and law enforcement dimensions of electoral processes. Their insights contributed to a better understanding of the challenges and successes in maintaining law and order during elections. The judiciary, with 19 respondents (5.4%), brought a legal perspective to the study by offering insights into the legal intricacies of electoral assistance, including the resolution of electoral disputes.

Political Parties, contributing 20 respondents (5.7%), shared their experiences and interactions with the EU, shedding light on the political dynamics surrounding civic education initiatives. The distribution of respondents across these diverse institutions exemplified a well-structured sampling approach aimed at capturing a wide range of perspectives and experiences within Kenya's electoral processes. Each institution added a unique layer to the study, addressing various facets of electoral assistance, such as implementation, funding, and impact. In summary, this diverse representation allowed for a holistic analysis of EU's support in electoral civic education during Kenya's general elections. The provided percentages and statistics offer a glimpse into the proportional distribution of respondents across distinct population strata, contributing to the study's comprehensive scope and depth of insights.




Figure 4.2: Respondents Distribution by their Institution of Affiliation

Source: Survey Data (2023)

Examining the years of experience in elections programming among the study's respondents reveals important insights into their professional backgrounds. This section presents a breakdown of the respondents based on their years of experience in electoral programming, shedding light on their qualifications to provide informed perspectives on the post-2010 electoral landscape in Kenya. The data, as summarized in Figure 3 below, highlights that a substantial majority of the respondents, specifically 257 individuals (73.4%), possessed extensive experience, having worked in the field for over 10 years. This category of respondents formed a significant portion of the study's sample, indicating their wealth of experience and long-standing involvement in electoral programming.

Another notable group consisted of 59 respondents (16.9%) who had accumulated 5-10 years of experience in elections programming. While not as extensive as the first group, their collective experience provided valuable insights into the developments and changes within the electoral landscape during the period of interest.

A smaller proportion of respondents, comprising 34 individuals (9.7%), had worked in elections programming for 1-5 years. Although representing the smallest category, this group's contributions were still valuable, particularly in offering fresh perspectives and insights that might reflect more recent developments in electoral processes. This distribution of respondents based on their years of experience underscores the study's emphasis on gathering informed opinions and experiences related to post-2010 elections in Kenya. The substantial presence of respondents with over a decade of experience suggests that the study engaged seasoned professionals with in-depth knowledge of electoral dynamics, while also considering the input of those with more recent exposure to the field. This balance of experience levels contributed to a comprehensive understanding of electoral assistance during the specified period.

Generally, the distribution of respondents across different experience categories demonstrates the study's commitment to engaging individuals with varying levels of expertise in elections programming. This diversity enriched the research findings by encompassing insights from both long-standing experts and those with more recent experiences, ultimately enhancing the study's capacity to address the complexities of electoral assistance in Kenya's evolving electoral landscape.




Figure 4.3: Respondents Distribution by Years of Experience in Elections Programming

Source: Survey Data (2023)

The study recognized the significance of disability mainstreaming in the context of electoral integrity, encompassing not only the participation of voters with disabilities but also the engagement of electoral stakeholders and actors in addressing these concerns. The findings shed light on the disability status of the respondents, offering valuable insights into the representation of persons with disabilities within the study sample.

According to the study's results (figure 4.4), it became evident that disability mainstreaming among electoral officials and actors remained relatively low, with only 12% of respondents identifying as individuals with disabilities. This revelation highlighted that the majority of respondents were able-bodied actors, indicating a significant gap in the representation of persons with disabilities in the electoral process. Such findings are particularly relevant considering that disability mainstreaming is a fundamental aspect of European Union (EU) electoral assistance efforts, with a specific focus on enhancing the participation of persons with disabilities, both as voters and potential political candidates.

In line with the EU's objectives and recognizing the importance of inclusivity in electoral processes (CEPS, 2008; Priestley, 2016), this study aimed to capture the perspectives of both persons with disabilities (PWDs) and able-bodied individuals. By doing so, the research sought to ensure a comprehensive understanding of electoral assistance dynamics, acknowledging the

multifaceted nature of electoral participation and representation. Inclusivity, in this context, goes beyond voter engagement to encompass the experiences and insights of all electoral stakeholders, regardless of their disability status (Elections Observation Group, 2023). The study's findings regarding the disability status of respondents underscore the need for heightened efforts in disability mainstreaming within the electoral sphere. While the representation of PWDs among electoral officials and actors appeared limited, the study's commitment to including diverse voices contributed to a more holistic examination of electoral assistance and civic education efforts, aligning with the principles of inclusivity and accessibility advocated by the EU and other electoral integrity organizations.




Figure 4.4: Distribution by Disability

Source: Survey Data (2023)

A more in-depth analysis of the disability variable, as explored through cross-tabulation (as depicted in Table 4.3), brought to light that the prevalence of disability was not consistent across the various strata within the study. The data revealed variations in the representation of individuals with disabilities among different population strata, challenging any assumptions of uniformity in this regard. Study highlights the distribution of persons with disabilities across the various strata. Surprisingly, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) emerged as the leading institution in terms of the number of individuals identifying as disable.

Following closely was the judiciary, followed by Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP), the Justice, Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee (JLAC), and, finally, political parties. This distribution indicates significant progress at the county level in terms of inclusivity and representation.

Furthermore, Table 4.4 provides insights into the types of disabilities reported by the respondents. The data indicated that there were primarily two types of disabilities reported: physical disabilities and visual impairments. Among these, visual impairment emerged as the more prevalent disability type.

These findings underscore the importance of conducting a nuanced analysis of disability representation within each stratum, as assumptions of uniformity may not hold true. The prominence of persons with disabilities in institutions such as the IEBC and the judiciary reflects positive strides in promoting inclusivity at these levels. Additionally, the predominance of visual impairment highlights the significance of accommodating individuals with visual disabilities in electoral processes, aligning with principles of accessibility and equitable participation advocated by electoral integrity organizations.

Table 4.3: Respondents Distribution Disability Status.

3. What is your Institution of Affiliation? * 6. Are you a person with disability?				
Cross-tabulation				
Count				
		6. Are you a person with disability?		Total
		Yes	No	
3. What is your Institution of Affiliation?	ORPP	4	13	17
	CSOs	7	127	134
	JLAC	4	9	13
	IEBC	11	76	87
	Media	0	20	20
	Local Elections Observers	0	20	20
	Law Enforcement	5	15	20
	The Judiciary	8	11	19
	Political Parties	3	17	20
Total		42	308	350

Source: Survey Data (2023)

Table 4.4: Respondents Distribution by Disability Type

7. If yes in 6, which type of Disability?					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Physical	2	.6	.6	.6
	Visual	40	11.4	11.4	12.0
	N/A	308	88.0	88.0	100.0
	Total	350	100.0	100.0	

Source: Survey Data (2023)

The study also delved into the educational backgrounds of the participants, aiming to gauge the levels of education among them. A frequency table (Table 6 below) illustrates the educational attainment of the respondents, shedding light on their diverse educational backgrounds. As the data indicates, all participants in the study had completed at least secondary education, with a small percentage (17 individuals or 4.9%) having halted their education at this level at the time of the fieldwork. The majority of respondents (151 individuals or 43.1%) had successfully attained university degrees, highlighting a well-educated segment within the study population. Close behind were those who had completed college diplomas (144 individuals or 41.1%), indicating a significant representation of individuals with practical and specialized training. A smaller but noteworthy percentage had achieved master's degrees (29 individuals or 8.3%), demonstrating a group with advanced knowledge and expertise in their respective fields. Lastly, the study observed the lowest proportion among respondents who had completed their PhD studies, reflecting the specialized nature of this academic achievement.

These findings provide valuable insights into the educational diversity within the study cohort. The prevalence of individuals with university degrees and college diplomas suggests a highly educated group, likely well-equipped to engage in discussions and assessments related to electoral civic education and the broader electoral landscape. Meanwhile, the presence of individuals with advanced degrees, including master's and PhD qualifications, underscores the potential depth of expertise and knowledge available among the study participants. This educational diversity enriches the perspectives and insights brought to the research, contributing to a more comprehensive understanding of the subject matter.

Table 4.5: Respondents Distribution by Levels of Education

8. What is your level of education?				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Secondary Completed	17	4.9	4.9	4.9
College Diploma	144	41.1	41.1	46.0
Valid University Degree	151	43.1	43.1	89.1
Masters	29	8.3	8.3	97.4
PhD	9	2.6	2.6	100.0
Total	350	100.0	100.0	

Source: Survey Data (2023)

4.4 Presentation, Discussion and Interpretation of Findings: Analysis of European Union’s Involvement through Civic and Electoral Education

The findings of the thesis as pertains to the first objective are presented, discussed and interpreted in the following sections.

4.4.1 Overarching Mechanisms of EU's Civic and Electoral Education Support

Table 4.6 provides a valuable insight into the relationship between the institution of affiliation and the overarching mechanisms through which the EU undertakes civic and electoral education support in Kenya. This cross-tabulation offers a comprehensive view of how different institutions are connected to the EU's support mechanisms, highlighting both overall trends and institution-specific variations.

Overall, when considering all institutions together, the table reveals that the majority of respondents (155 or 44%) perceive the EU's civic and electoral education support in Kenya to be channeled through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in consortia. This suggests a significant reliance on NGOs as key intermediaries in implementing these initiatives. On the other hand, a notable proportion of respondents (122 or 35%) believe that the EU supports civic and electoral education in Kenya through both government agencies and the NGO sector. This finding indicates a hybrid approach where the EU collaborates with government bodies and NGOs to achieve its objectives.

Institution-specific variations are also evident in the table. Notably, within the Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) cohort, a substantial number of respondents (94 or 70%) perceive the EU's support to be through NGOs in consortia. This suggests a strong partnership between CSOs and consortia of NGOs in the context of electoral education. For the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), a significant proportion of respondents (47 or 54%) believe that the EU's support is channeled through both government agencies and the NGO sector, highlighting a dual approach involving government collaboration and NGO engagement.

Among Local Elections Observers (LEO), the majority of respondents (19 or 95%) perceive the EU's support to be through NGOs as single entities, indicating a preference for standalone NGO involvement in electoral education efforts. In summary, the study underscores the diversity in how different institutions perceive the EU's mechanisms for civic and electoral education support in Kenya. While NGOs, either in consortia or as single entities, play a central role in this support, there are variations based on the nature of institutions and their specific partnerships with the EU. These findings provide valuable insights into the dynamics of EU electoral assistance in Kenya and the roles played by different stakeholders.

This table illustrates the overarching mechanisms through which the European Union undertakes civic and electoral education support in Kenya. The data is presented in a cross-tabulation format based on respondents' institution of affiliation. The table indicates that among the respondents from various institutions, the European Union's civic and electoral education support is primarily channeled through NGOs in consortia and both government and NGO sectors. A significant portion of CSOs and a substantial number of individuals from the IEBC reported that the EU's support involves collaborations between NGOs and government agencies. This finding suggests that the European Union recognizes the importance of collaboration between governmental and non-governmental entities for effective civic and electoral education. The EU's strategy of engaging both sectors can enhance the reach and impact of its programs.

According to LDPT, democratic states are more inclined to support interventions that foster peace and stability in other democratic states. In this context, the EU's preference for engaging through non-governmental organizations majorly, aligns with the theory's assertion that democracies favor civil society engagement to promote liberal norms and values due their added

advantage in reaching to the public. The choice to work through NGOs singly and as a Consortia mainly, reflects a belief in fostering domestic cohesion and promoting a democratic culture, key components of LDPT's idea that liberal states are pacific at the domestic level due to adherence to the rule of law and respect for institutions. However, EU finds it difficult to bypass Government Agencies especially the IEBC due to its critical role in Kenyan elections.

Table 4.6: Overarching Mechanisms of EU's Civic and Electoral Education

3. What is your Institution of Affiliation? * 9. What is the overarching mechanisms through which the EU undertakes her civic and electoral education support in Kenya? Cross-tabulation						
Count						
		9. What is the overarching mechanism through which the EU undertakes her civic and electoral education support in Kenya?				Total
		Through the Government of Kenya Agencies	Through NGOs in Consortia	Through NGOs as single entities	Through both government and NGO sector	
3. What is your Institution of Affiliation?	ORPP	0(0%)	17(100%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	17(100%)
	CSOs	8(6%)	94(70%)	31(23%)	1(1%)	134(100%)
	JLAC	0(0%)	13(100%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	13(100%)
	IEBC	34(39%)	6(7%)	0(0%)	47(54%)	87(100%)
	Media	0(0%)	20(100%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	20(100%)
	Local Elections Observers	0(0%)	1(5%)	0(0%)	19(95%)	20(100%)
	Law Enforcement	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	20(100%)	20(100%)
	The Judiciary	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	19(100%)	19(100%)
	Political Parties	0(0%)	4(20%)	0(0%)	16(80%)	20(100%)
Total		42(12%)	155(44%)	31(9%)	122(35%)	350(100%)

Source: Survey Data (2023)

Digging deeper into the mechanisms used by EU to reach out the Kenyan publics through electoral civic education, the study through KII unearthed the nuances of how EU prefers to deal

majorly with CSOs to reach the Kenyan publics through electric civic education programs. Thematic analysis revealed three main advantages for this mechanism of intervention. The European Union (EU) may prefer to deal with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to undertake electoral civic education rather than government bodies and think tank organizations for several reasons. First is independence and neutrality. EU perceives NGOs as more independent and neutral compared to government bodies or think tanks, which may have political affiliations or government agendas. The EU values the impartiality of NGOs in conducting civic education programs, as it helps ensure that the information provided is objective and free from political bias. This independence is crucial for building trust among the electorate and promoting credible electoral processes.

A second ground of reasoning is the view that NGOs offer a “grassroots reach and local expertise”. NGOs, especially those operating at the grassroots level, have a deep understanding of local communities, cultures, and dynamics. They are well-connected with the target populations and can effectively tailor civic education programs to address specific regional or community needs. This local expertise allows NGOs to reach marginalized or underserved populations, promoting inclusivity in electoral education efforts. Thirdly, was a theme related to “flexibility and innovation”. EU experts’ discussants made arguments which picture NGOs as more flexible and agile in designing and implementing civic education initiatives. One senior EU envoy asserted “they can quickly adapt to changing circumstances and emerging issues during electoral processes”. NGOs are also known for their innovative approaches, using creative methods and tools to engage with the public such their established networks which navigate gate-keeping and related issues. This adaptability and innovation make NGOs valuable partners for the EU, especially in dynamic electoral environments like Kenyan societies marked with poverty and political manipulation (Kanyinga, 2019). The EU's preference for working with NGOs in electoral civic education is driven by their perceived independence, grassroots reach, local expertise, flexibility, and innovative approaches. By collaborating with NGOs, the EU aims to ensure that civic education efforts are impartial, inclusive, and responsive to the specific needs of the electorate, ultimately contributing to the promotion of free and fair elections and the enhancement of democratic processes.

The European Union (EU) engages with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Kenya to enhance electoral integrity through electoral civic education assistance primarily through two main ways:

Other than the theme of *why*, the theme of *how* also emerged. Two ways were prominent as regards how EU engages with CSOs to undertake electoral civic education: funding and programmatically equipping CSOs and partnership and collaboration. The EU provides financial support to Kenyan NGOs involved in electoral civic education initiatives. Through Consortia which receives the funding and shares out to smaller grassroots NGOs. In addition to financial support, the EU often offers capacity-building opportunities to these NGOs, including training in program design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. By enhancing the capacity of local NGOs, the EU aims to ensure that electoral civic education programs are well-planned, based on international best practices, and effectively executed.

Secondly, The EU frequently collaborates with Kenyan NGOs on electoral civic education projects. These partnerships involve joint planning, implementation, and monitoring of initiatives aimed at promoting electoral integrity. NGOs bring valuable local expertise and grassroots connections to the table, while the EU provides funding, technical support, and access to international networks. Through these partnerships, NGOs and the EU can work together to reach a wider audience, share knowledge, and address specific challenges related to electoral integrity in Kenya. Such partnerships which have been in operation since 2013 was the EU-ELOG partnership. The ELOG – Elections Observation Group, is a local Consortia of NGOs which come together to undertake pre-elections activities and monitor elections in the elections year. This partnership ensures that EU and CSOs work harmoniously and robustly with high levels of effectiveness to achieve free, fair, credible elections.

These two main approaches, funding and capacity building, and partnerships and collaboration, allow the EU to leverage the strengths of local NGOs in Kenya to enhance electoral integrity through civic education. By working closely with these organizations, the EU contributes to building a more informed and engaged electorate, thereby supporting democratic processes and upholding electoral integrity in the country.

4.4.2 Implementers of European Union’s Electoral-Civic Education Programs

The table 4.7 below presents a cross-tabulation of responses from survey participants, shedding light on their perceptions of the main implementers of EU civic and electoral education in Kenya. This insightful analysis offers valuable insights into the dynamics of electoral education initiatives in Kenya, particularly in terms of the roles played by various institutions.

It is evident from the data that Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) stand out as the most frequently mentioned main implementers of EU civic and electoral education. A substantial 63% of the total respondents, spanning various affiliations, identified CSOs as the primary actors in this arena. This finding underscores the significant role that CSOs play in electoral education efforts and highlights their prominence as key drivers of civic engagement and electoral integrity in Kenya. On the other hand, respondents affiliated with government agencies, including the Office of Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP), the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), and the Judiciary, tend to emphasize the roles of their respective institutions in electoral education. Notably, 94% of ORPP-affiliated respondents and 89% of IEBC-affiliated respondents attributed the main implementer role to government agencies. This institutional perspective reflects the specific mandates and responsibilities of these bodies in overseeing electoral processes and underscores their commitment to fostering civic education.

While a minimal 1% of respondents mentioned external actors other than CSOs and government agencies as main implementers, a substantial portion (36%) recognized the collaborative nature of electoral education initiatives. This latter group of respondents highlighted that different actors implement various aspects of civic and electoral education, with coordination facilitated by the Basket Fund. This finding underscores the complexity and multifaceted nature of electoral education, with various stakeholders contributing their expertise and resources to achieve common goals. Notably, institution-specific variances in perceptions are evident in the responses. Respondents closely associated with CSOs consistently identified CSOs as the main implementers, aligning with the overall trend. Conversely, government-affiliated respondents often indicated their respective institutions as primary implementers, reflecting the inherent roles these agencies play in the electoral process.

The media sector stands out as a key partner of CSOs in electoral education, with 90% of media-affiliated respondents recognizing CSOs as main implementers. This strong partnership highlights the critical role of the media in disseminating information and fostering civic engagement. In summary, this the study reveals the intricate landscape of electoral education in Kenya, characterized by the prominent role of CSOs, the specific mandates of government agencies, and collaborative approaches that involve multiple stakeholders. These findings underscore the importance of strategic partnerships and coordination among institutions to enhance civic education and electoral integrity in Kenya's democratic processes.

Table 4.7: Main Implementers of EU's Civic and Electoral Education

3. What is your Institution of Affiliation? * 10. Who are the main implementers of EU civic and electoral education in Kenya? Cross-tabulation						
Count						
		10. Who are the main implementers of EU civic and electoral education in Kenya?				Total
		CSOs	Government Agencies	External Actors	Different actors implement different aspects coordinated by basket fund	
3. What is your Institution of Affiliation?	ORPP	0(0%)	16(94%)	1(6%)	0(0%)	17(100%)
	CSOs	84(63%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	50(37%)	134(100%)
	JLAC	5(38%)	8(62%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	13(100%)
	IEBC	0(0%)	10(11%)	0(0%)	77(89%)	87(100%)
	Media	18(90%)	2(10%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	20(100%)
	Local Elections Observers	4(20%)	16(80%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	20(100%)
	Law Enforcement	1(5%)	19(95%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	20(100%)
	The Judiciary	0(0%)	19(100%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	19(100%)
	Political Parties	4(20%)	16(80%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	20(100%)
Total		116(33%)	106(30)	1(0%)	127(36%)	350(100%)

Source: Survey Data (2023)

Interviews with European Union corroborated these insights. EU's perspective is to work both independently and through the like-minded donors through the basket fund to finance activities of all actors who have as part of the activities electoral civic education. A senior EU official to Kenya, asserted this that:

We are promoting good governance and this is in line with our core mandates and policies for Africa, and our partnership frameworks with Kenya. We work with all actors internal and external but for the issue of electoral civic education, we tend to prioritize CSOs of all corners, as they have a relevance and deep understanding of the grassroots they work in. We do this through partnership mechanisms and funding their programs structured through a Consortia of CSOs, such as ELOG – EU Senior Officer, June 2023.

Abdulahi (2015) makes similar observations though not focused on EU while studying Nigeria and electoral assistance. However, while studying EU in Democratic Republic of Congo, Piccolino (2010) finds that EU has been largely focused on institutional building than dealing with CSOs. This implies that the context of dealing could determine what possible stakeholder partnerships EU forges and to what extent it interprets such partnership to be capable to ensure the creation of an environment that can foster good governance through elections.

4.4.3 European Union's relative Position as an External Electoral Assistant

In Kenya, external actors are numerous, and support various programs usually tagged as governance programs. Musila (2019) aver that the strategic position of Kenya, the relative peace and stability it has experience save to 2007/08 PEV, and her emergence as an anchor state in the Horn of Africa, sets Kenya as special country for most external actors to undertake their so-called democracy assistance programs. Thus, to fathom EU's role, the study examined key stakeholders rating of her relative to the others.

The table 4.8 below illustrates respondents' perceptions regarding whether the European Union (EU) is the primary external electoral assistant for matters related to civic and electoral education, based on their experiences in electoral programs. The analysis of these responses offers valuable insights into how individuals from various institutions view the EU's role in electoral assistance.

A notable finding is that 41% of respondents from ORPP believe that the EU serves as the main external electoral assistant in civic and electoral education. This suggests a significant recognition of the EU's role in supporting electoral processes, which aligns with the EU's commitment to promoting democratic values and electoral integrity. However, 35% of respondents disagree, indicating a degree of diversity in opinions within this institution. The majority (67%) of respondents from CSOs perceive the EU as the primary external electoral

assistant in civic and electoral education. This high level of agreement suggests that CSOs generally acknowledge the EU's substantial involvement in supporting civic education efforts in Kenya's electoral processes. Only 1% expressed uncertainty, indicating a strong consensus within this group. Within JLAC, 38% of respondents believe that the EU is the main external electoral assistant. However, a larger proportion (62%) disagrees with this view. The significant disagreement within this institution raises questions about alternative actors or organizations that may be considered more prominent in the context of electoral assistance. Further investigations could shed light on these contrasting perspectives.

The findings within IEBC are striking, with 84% of respondents perceiving the EU as the primary external electoral assistant. This overwhelming agreement underscores the EU's substantial role in supporting civic and electoral education efforts in Kenya. These findings align with the EU's active involvement in promoting electoral integrity and participation, as witnessed in numerous election observation missions and capacity-building initiatives. Among media respondents, 60% believe that the EU plays the central role in civic and electoral education assistance. However, 25% are unsure, indicating a level of ambiguity in this sector. The media's uncertainty may reflect the need for more clarity regarding external actors' contributions to electoral education. LEOs exhibit a strong belief that the EU is the primary external electoral assistant, with 75% in agreement. This suggests that LEOs see the EU as a crucial partner in enhancing electoral processes. The absence of respondents expressing uncertainty further emphasizes this perspective.

In the Law Enforcement sector, 40% of respondents perceive the EU as the primary external electoral assistant. However, a substantial 55% are uncertain, indicating a lack of clarity or awareness within this institution regarding the EU's role. This uncertainty highlights an opportunity for the EU to engage more proactively with law enforcement agencies to strengthen their understanding of electoral assistance efforts. Within the Judiciary, 74% of respondents believe that the EU serves as the main external electoral assistant. However, 26% disagree with this view. While the majority agrees with the EU's role, the dissenting opinions warrant exploration to understand the basis for this disagreement within the institution. All respondents from Political Parties (100%) perceive the EU as the primary external electoral assistant. This

unanimous agreement indicates a strong consensus within this sector regarding the EU's role in supporting civic and electoral education.

These findings reveal varying perceptions across different institutions regarding the EU's role as the primary external electoral assistant. While there is consensus among some groups, such as CSOs and IEBC, that the EU plays this central role, other sectors, like Law Enforcement and JLAC, display more uncertainty and diverse opinions. These findings suggest a need for targeted engagement and awareness campaigns to ensure that all relevant stakeholders have a clear understanding of the EU's contributions to electoral education in Kenya. Additionally, addressing the sources of disagreement or uncertainty within specific institutions can help strengthen collaboration and coordination in electoral assistance efforts.

Table 4.8: Perception of EU as Main External Electoral Assistant

3. What is your Institution of Affiliation? * 11. Based on your electoral programs experience, can you say that EU is the main external electoral assistant on matters civic and electoral education? Cross-tabulation					
Count					
		11. Based on your electoral programs experience, can you say that EU is the main external electoral assistant on matters civic and electoral education?			Total
		Yes	No	Don't Know	
3. What is your Institution of Affiliation?	ORPP	7(41%)	6(35%)	4(24%)	17(100%)
	CSOs	90(67%)	43(32%)	1(1%)	134(100%)
	JLAC	5(38%)	8(62%)	0(0%)	13(100%)
	IEBC	73(84%)	14(16%)	0(0%)	87(100%)
	Media	12(60%)	3(15%)	5(25%)	20(100%)
	Local Elections Observers	15(75%)	5(25%)	0(0%)	20(100%)
	Law Enforcement	8(40%)	1(5%)	11(55%)	20(100%)
	The Judiciary	14(74%)	0(0%)	5(26%)	19(100%)
	Political Parties	20(100%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	20(100%)
Total	244(7%)	80(23%)	26(7%)	350(100%)	

Source: Survey Data (2023)

To further validate stakeholders' perceptions, they were asked to list top six external actors supporting civic and electoral education in Kenya from 2013, 2017, and 2022 elections, in terms of their funding, and timely support. The table 4.9 presents stakeholders' ratings of various

external actors' involved in providing electoral assistance in Kenya. These ratings offer insights into how different stakeholders perceive the effectiveness and impact of these external actors in supporting electoral processes. The EU's rating, in particular, holds significance as it reflects its standing among other electoral assistants.

The EU received the highest rating, with 30% of stakeholders considering it a crucial and effective electoral assistant in Kenya. This rating signifies a strong recognition of the EU's contributions to promoting electoral integrity, civic education, and electoral processes. Most key informant interviewees asserted that the EU's active engagement was visible through election observation missions, capacity-building programs, and support for civil society organizations likely contributes to this positive perception. The USA, through USAID, held the second-highest rating at 28%. This suggests that a significant portion of stakeholders acknowledges the role of the United States in electoral assistance. USAID has historically played a vital role in supporting democratic governance and electoral processes worldwide, and its involvement in Kenya aligns with these efforts.

The UK ranks third in stakeholders' ratings, with 25% viewing it as a valuable contributor to electoral assistance in Kenya. The UK has a history of supporting democratic governance and has been actively involved in initiatives aimed at strengthening electoral systems and processes. Germany receives an 8% rating, indicating a lower level of recognition among stakeholders as a key electoral assistant. While Germany may have engaged in electoral assistance activities in Kenya, its impact and visibility in this context may be relatively limited compared to other actors. The Netherlands garners a 4% rating, signifying a minor presence or impact as an electoral assistant in Kenya. Despite its commitment to democracy promotion globally, the Netherlands' specific role in Kenya's electoral processes may not be widely acknowledged by stakeholders. Canada holds the lowest rating at 3%, suggesting minimal recognition among stakeholders as a significant electoral assistant in Kenya. This rating may indicate that Canada's involvement in electoral assistance in Kenya is less prominent or less visible compared to other external actors. In summary, the table highlights the EU's leading position in stakeholders' perceptions of electoral assistance in Kenya, with the highest rating among the listed external actors. USA (USAID) and the UK also receive substantial recognition, reflecting their active roles in supporting electoral processes. The varying ratings indicate that stakeholders may have

different perspectives on the effectiveness and contributions of these external actors, underscoring the importance of continued engagement and cooperation to enhance electoral processes in Kenya. Moreover, a time series data plotted from 2013 to 2022 elections still show a trend whereby EU has kept her quest for Kenya’s electoral integrity, leading across the period of study as the graphs below shows.




Figure 4.5: Relative Rating of EU 2013 - 2022

Source: Survey Data (2023)

4.4.4 Forms/Types of Funding for EU-Supported Programs

The table 4.9 2ssds presents an insightful view of the types of funding provided by the European Union (EU) to different institutions involved in civic and electoral education in the last three elections, along with variations among these institutions. Firstly, it's notable that the majority of respondents from various institutions reported receiving mainly technical assistance from the EU, with varying percentages. Specifically, 94% of respondents from the Office of Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP), 85% from the Justice and Legal Affairs Committee (JLAC), 100% from the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), 25% from the media, 40% from Local Elections Observers, 100% from Law Enforcement, 58% from the Judiciary, and 100% from Political Parties indicated that they received mainly technical support. This suggests that technical assistance is a common form of support provided by the EU across a range of electoral education stakeholders.

Secondly, financial support from the EU was reported by respondents from some institutions, albeit in lower percentages. Notably, 22% of respondents from Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) reported receiving financial support, along with 15% of media representatives, 60% of Local Elections Observers, and 5% from the Judiciary. This indicates that while financial support is not as prevalent as technical assistance, it is still a relevant aspect of EU support for electoral education, particularly for CSOs, media, and Local Elections Observers. Thirdly, an interesting finding is that some respondents, particularly from CSOs (76%), reported receiving open-ended funding from the EU to cover relevant thematic areas. This flexibility in funding allows CSOs to adapt to specific needs and priorities in their electoral education initiatives. Additionally, 37% of respondents from the Judiciary mentioned open-ended funding, indicating that this approach may provide institutions with greater autonomy in designing and implementing civic and electoral education programs. This corresponds with LDPT's emphasis on peaceful political undertakings and promoting democratic norms. The provision of open-ended funding suggests that the EU is committed to addressing multiple dimensions of electoral integrity, reflecting the theory's assertion that liberal democratic states prioritize international peace and security by investing in interventions that improve democratic intentions. In sum, the EU's approach to funding for civic and electoral education varies among different institutions. While technical assistance is predominant across most institutions, financial support and open-ended funding are also present, depending on the specific needs and strategies of each institution. This diversity in funding approaches reflects the EU's commitment to supporting a range of electoral education stakeholders and addressing the unique requirements of each institution.

Table 4.9: Forms/Types of Funding for EU-Supported Programs

3. What is your Institution of Affiliation? * 12. What forms/types of funding did EU give to your organization toward civic and electoral education in the last three elections? Cross tabulation					
Count					
		12. What forms/types of funding did EU give to your organization toward civic and electoral education in the last three elections?			Total
		Mainly technical	Financial	Open-ended to cover relevant thematic areas	
3. What is your Institution of Affiliation?	ORPP	16(94%)	0(0%)	1(6%)	17(100%)
	CSOs	2(1%)	30(22%)	102(76%)	134(100%)
	JLAC	11(85%)	2(15%)	0(0%)	13(100%)
	IEBC	87(100%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	87(100%)
	Media	5(25%)	3(15%)	12(60%)	20(100%)
	Local Elections Observers	8(40%)	12(60%)	0(0%)	20(100%)
	Law Enforcement	20(100%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	20(100%)
	The Judiciary	11(58%)	1(5%)	7(37%)	19(100%)
	Political Parties	20(100%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	20(100%)
Total		180(51%)	48(14%)	122(35%)	350(100%)

Source: Survey Data (2023)

4.4.5 Implementation of Programs within the Electoral Cycle

The table 4.10 provides valuable insights into how different institutions implemented their civic and electoral education programs, with variations observed among the institutions. Firstly, it is evident that the Office of Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP) primarily implemented its programs during the elections year, with all 17 respondents (100%) indicating this approach. This suggests a concentrated effort by ORPP in the lead-up to elections, aiming to maximize the impact of their civic and electoral education initiatives in the run-up to voting.

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) employed a more diversified approach to program implementation. Nearly half of the CSO respondents (48%) reported implementing programs during the elections year, indicating a focused effort close to election periods. However, a substantial portion of CSOs (28%) indicated that they implemented programs irregularly, from

one election to another. Additionally, 25% of CSOs implemented programs throughout the elections cycle or over a span of five years. This variability in implementation approaches among CSOs reflects their adaptability to specific needs and contexts, potentially allowing them to address long-term civic education goals and respond to dynamic electoral environments. It signifies EU practice of the principle of electoral cycle whereby elections are supported not just during but across the cycle, before and after. CSOs, from EU's perspective based on interviews held, do community projects year in year out, and thus governance programming funding is floated across the five years with the aim of creating the need environment for attaining electoral integrity.

In contrast, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) mainly implemented its programs during the elections year, with 87% of respondents following this approach. This aligns with the IEBC's pivotal role in overseeing elections and voter education during election periods, emphasizing the need for targeted efforts in the lead-up to voting. The media institutions unanimously reported implementing their programs during the elections year (100%). Given the media's crucial role in disseminating information to the public, it is logical for them to intensify civic and electoral education efforts in the period preceding elections.

Local Elections Observers took a unique approach to program implementation, with all respondents (100%) indicating that they implemented programs irregularly, specifically from one election to another. This approach suggests that Local Elections Observers focus their efforts on monitoring and education during election seasons, aligning with their role as independent observers of electoral processes. Law Enforcement agencies reported diverse implementation strategies, with 60% indicating implementation during the elections year and 40% implementing irregularly from one election to another. This variation could reflect the dual role of law enforcement agencies in maintaining security during elections and contributing to civic education efforts. The Judiciary exhibited a balanced approach to program implementation, with 58% implementing during the elections year, 32% throughout the elections cycle, and 11% irregularly. This suggests the Judiciary's commitment to both short-term and long-term civic and electoral education goals. Political Parties demonstrated flexibility in their implementation approaches, with 35% implementing during the elections year, 40% throughout the elections cycle, and 25% irregularly. This adaptability allows political parties to engage in voter education

efforts as needed and according to their specific strategies. Summarily, institutions involved in civic and electoral education employ a range of implementation approaches, influenced by their roles, strategies, and the specific demands of their respective contexts. These variations highlight the importance of tailoring civic education efforts to meet the unique needs of each institution and the evolving electoral landscape. These findings match those made by Abdulahi (2015) who finds that international assistance for elections was mainly during elections, but there were evidence of pre-and-post elections support in Nigeria. Schimmelfennig, Engert & Knobel (2003), however, argue that the cost of elections is so high and maintaining programs may be difficult making most funders to only come during elections. Moreover, funders or donor support is based on their strategic interests in the countries of their interventions. For example, the EU Key Informants revealed that while most countries of the EU support EU's vision for a peaceful world, not all of them contributed to the Kenya's basket fund, stating that their interests keep changing from elections to elections based to the strategic partnership and the mutual perception EU and Kenya have toward each other (Kiamba & Batchmann, 2015) it explains why EU presence is near permanent from 1976 when it established her mission in Nairobi.

Table 4.10: Implementation of Programs within the Electoral Cycle

3. What is your Institution of Affiliation? * 13. How did you implement the programs?					
Cross-tabulation					
Count					
		13. How did you implement the programs?			Total
		During the elections year	Throughout the elections cycle/5 years	Irregular from elections to elections	
3. What is your Institution of Affiliation?	ORPP	17(100%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	17(100%)
	CSOs	64(48%)	33(2)	37(28%)	134(100%)
	JLAC	6(46%)	7(54%)	0(0%)	13(100)
	IEBC	76(87%)	11(13%)	0(0%)	87(100%)
	Media	20(100%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	20(100%)
	Local Elections Observers	0(0%)	0(0%)	20(100%)	20(100%)
	Law Enforcement	12(60%)	0(0%)	8(40%)	20(100%)
	The Judiciary	11(58%)	6(32%)	2(11%)	19(100%)
	Political Parties	7(35%)	8(40%)	5(25%)	20(100%)
Total		213(61%)	65(19%)	72(21%)	350(100%)

Source: Survey Data (2023)

4.4.6 Geographic Coverage of Programs

The table 4.11 below provides valuable insights into the geographic coverage of civic and electoral education programs among different institutions, revealing variations in their focus areas. Firstly, the Office of Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP) primarily confined its programs to the national level, with all 17 respondents (100%) indicating this approach. This suggests that ORPP's civic and electoral education efforts are intended to reach a broad national audience, emphasizing the importance of disseminating information and knowledge about elections across the entire country. They play this role through policy guidance, party funding and regulating political parties' activities, ensuring adherence to the Political Parties Act.

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) demonstrated a diverse approach to geographic coverage. While the majority of CSOs (97%) focused on community-based programs, a small percentage (1%) confined their efforts to the national level, and an equally small percentage (1%) adopted a county-confined approach. This diversity highlights CSOs' adaptability to different contexts and their commitment to engaging with communities at the grassroots level. Community-based programs enable CSOs to address specific regional needs and tailor their initiatives to local circumstances. The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) predominantly conducted national-wide programs, with 80% of respondents indicating this approach. Additionally, 17% of IEBC respondents reported county-confined programs, suggesting a dual strategy of national coverage while also considering regional variations in civic and electoral education needs. This approach aligns with IEBC's role as the national electoral management body responsible for ensuring voter education and participation across the country.

Media institutions overwhelmingly reported national-wide coverage, with 75% of respondents following this approach. This aligns with the media's broad reach and influence, allowing them to disseminate information and education on civic and electoral matters to a national audience effectively. Local Elections Observers exclusively adopted a national-wide coverage strategy, emphasizing their role as impartial observers of the entire electoral process in the country.

Law Enforcement agencies predominantly focused on county-confined programs, with 85% of respondents indicating this approach. This approach may reflect the importance of addressing specific regional needs related to security and law enforcement during elections. The Judiciary

primarily conducted national-wide programs, with 95% of respondents following this approach. This underscores the Judiciary's commitment to ensuring that citizens across the country have access to relevant civic and electoral education materials and information. Political Parties exclusively adopted a national-wide coverage strategy, aiming to engage with voters and stakeholders at the national level comprehensively. In summary, institutions involved in civic and electoral education employ various geographic coverage strategies, influenced by their roles, capacities, and the specific needs of their target audiences. These variations highlight the importance of tailoring civic education efforts to meet the diverse regional and national contexts in which they operate, ensuring that citizens receive relevant information and education to participate effectively in elections.

Table 4.11: Geographic Coverage of Programs

3. What is your Institution of Affiliation? * 14. What is the geographic coverage of your programs? Cross-tabulation					
Count					
		14. What is the geographic coverage of your programs?			Total
		County-confined	National-wide	Community-based	
3. What is your Institution of Affiliation?	ORPP	0(0%)	17(100%)	0(0%)	17(100%)
	CSOs	2(1%)	2(1%)	130(97%)	134(100%)
	JLAC	10(77%)	1(8%)	2(15%)	13(100%)
	IEBC	15(17%)	70(80%)	2(2%)	87(100%)
	Media	0(0%)	15(75%)	5(25%)	20(100%)
	Local Elections Observers	0(0%)	20(100%)	0(0%)	20(100%)
	Law Enforcement	17(85%)	3(15%)	0(0%)	20(100%)
	The Judiciary	1(5%)	18(95%)	0(0%)	19(100%)
	Political Parties	0(0%)	20(100%)	0(0%)	20(100%)
	Total	45(13%)	166(47%)	139(40%)	350(100%)

Source: Survey Data (2023)

4.4.7 Demographic Coverage of Programs

The table 4.12 provides insights into the demographic coverage of civic and electoral education programs across different institutions, revealing variations in their target demographics. Firstly,

the Office of Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP) primarily focused its programs on youth, with 65% of respondents indicating this demographic as the main target. This suggests ORPP's emphasis on engaging young voters and potential political leaders to ensure their active participation in electoral processes. However, it is important to note that ORPP's programs had limited coverage of other demographics, with no reported targeting of women and minimal engagement with people with disabilities. This could reflect a lack of focus of ORPP programs with political parties, with a gender-sensitive lens.

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) demonstrated a more balanced approach to demographic coverage, targeting multiple groups. The highest emphasis was on youth (44%), followed by engagement with women (20%) and people with disabilities (26%). This comprehensive approach aligns with the inclusive nature of CSOs' work, aiming to reach various segments of the population to promote civic and electoral education. Additionally, CSOs reported engaging with the general population (10%), indicating their efforts to provide education and information to a broad audience.

The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) primarily targeted the general population, with 90% of respondents indicating this demographic as their main focus. IEBC's mandate includes ensuring the active participation of all citizens in elections, which explains the extensive coverage of the general population. However, IEBC's programs had limited engagement with other demographics, such as youth (9%) and women (1%), suggesting opportunities for broader outreach. Media institutions primarily emphasized engaging with women (80%) as their main demographic target. This reflects the media's role in promoting gender equality and inclusivity in electoral processes. However, it is noteworthy that media programs had limited coverage of other demographics, including youth and people with disabilities.

Local Elections Observers adopted a balanced approach by targeting youth (50%) and the general population (45%) as their primary demographics. This strategy aligns with their role as impartial observers of elections, aiming to ensure that different segments of the population are well-informed about electoral processes. Law Enforcement agencies demonstrated a focus on engaging with youth (45%) and women (30%). This approach recognizes the importance of

addressing specific demographic groups to ensure the integrity and security of elections. The Judiciary primarily focused on youth (53%) and the general population (47%) in its programs. This aligns with the Judiciary's role in providing education and information to citizens to promote the rule of law and electoral justice.

Political Parties predominantly targeted youth (75%) as their main demographic. While youth engagement is crucial for political parties, it is essential to note that their programs had limited coverage of other demographics. In summary, institutions involved in civic and electoral education adopt diverse approaches to demographic coverage, reflecting their specific mandates, goals, and priorities. While some institutions concentrate on specific demographic groups, others aim for a more comprehensive and inclusive reach. These variations highlight the importance of tailored strategies to engage different segments of the population effectively and promote their active participation in electoral processes. These findings are consistent with findings in other contexts such as Germany (Gaiser & Rijke, 2008) and rest part of Africa and Asia (Roberts, 2015). Both studies revealed that the youth and women were the mostly targeted populations. In Germany, Gaiser & Rijke (2008) report that as the majority voters, the youth are particularly targeted with civic education programs in order that grounds possibility of political radicalization and manipulation are properly regressed. In Africa and Asia, similar arguments were pushed by Roberts (2015).

Table 4.12: Demographic Coverage of Programs

3. What is your Institution of Affiliation? * 15. What was the demographic coverage of your program? Cross-tabulation						
Count						
		15. What was the demographic coverage of your program?				Total
		Youth	Women	People with Disability	The general population	
3. What is your Institution of Affiliation?	ORPP	11(65%)	0(0%)	1(6%)	5(29%)	17(100%)
	CSOs	59(44%)	27(20%)	35(26%)	13(10%)	134(100%)
	JLAC	6(46%)	1(8%)	2(15%)	4(31%)	13(100%)
	IEBC	8(9%)	1(1%)	0(0%)	78(90%)	87(100%)
	Media	4(20%)	16(80%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	20(100%)
	Local Elections Observers	10(50%)	1(5%)	0(0%)	9(45%)	20(100%)
	Law Enforcement	9(45%)	6(30%)	0(0%)	5(25%)	20(100%)
	The Judiciary	10(53%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	9(47%)	19(100%)
	Political Parties	15(75%)	5(25%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	20(100%)
Total		132(38%)	57(16%)	38(11%)	123(35%)	350(100%)

Source: Survey Data (2023)

4.4.8 Impact of EU's Programs on Participation of Various Voter Strata

The table 4.13 provides insights into the perceived impact of the European Union's (EU) civic and electoral support programs in Kenya in terms of enhancing the participation of the targeted population. The responses from different institutions reveal varying degrees of impact. The Office of Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP) reported that EU's programs had a very impactful effect on enhancing the participation of the targeted population. This suggests that EU support played a significant role in promoting engagement in civic and electoral activities, particularly among those affiliated with ORPP. The 100% agreement on the "very impactful" option indicates a strong consensus within ORPP regarding the positive influence of EU programs.

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) also perceived the impact of EU's programs as highly positive, with 55% of respondents indicating that the programs were "very impactful." Additionally, 37% considered the impact as "somewhat impactful." This suggests that CSOs

found EU support to be instrumental in enhancing the participation of the targeted population. The majority of CSO respondents acknowledged the effectiveness of EU programs in promoting civic and electoral engagement. The Justice and Legal Affairs Committee (JLAC) reported that EU programs had a "very impactful" impact on enhancing participation, according to all 13 respondents. This unanimous agreement underscores the significant role played by EU support in bolstering civic and electoral engagement, as perceived by JLAC members.

The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) also viewed EU programs as highly impactful, with 71% of respondents indicating "very impactful." An additional 29% considered the impact as "somewhat impactful." IEBC, as a key electoral institution, recognized the substantial positive influence of EU support on increasing participation in electoral processes. Media institutions unanimously reported that EU programs had a "very impactful" impact on enhancing participation. This aligns with the media's role in disseminating information and educating the public on civic and electoral matters. The 100% agreement indicates a consensus among media respondents regarding the effectiveness of EU support.

Local Elections Observers perceived the impact of EU programs as positive, with 60% of respondents considering them "somewhat impactful" and 40% deeming them "very impactful." Local observers play a crucial role in monitoring and reporting on electoral processes, and their recognition of the impact of EU support suggests its significance in enhancing civic and electoral engagement. Law Enforcement agencies also acknowledged the positive impact of EU programs, with 70% of respondents considering them "very impactful" and 30% finding them "somewhat impactful." This recognition highlights the role of EU support in ensuring security and integrity during elections, which contributes to increased participation.

The Judiciary reported a significant impact, with 79% of respondents perceiving EU programs as "very impactful" and 21% as "somewhat impactful." The Judiciary's role in safeguarding electoral justice aligns with the perceived positive influence of EU support on participation. Political Parties, on the other hand, had a different perspective, with 60% of respondents indicating that EU programs had "no impact." This suggests that political parties did not perceive EU support as significantly enhancing participation. However, 40% considered the impact as "somewhat impactful." The table reveals varying perceptions of the impact of EU's civic and

electoral support programs in Kenya across different institutions. While some institutions, such as CSOs, JLAC, IEBC, media, and the Judiciary, overwhelmingly perceived EU support as highly impactful in enhancing participation, political parties had a more mixed response, with a significant proportion indicating "no impact." These varying perspectives may reflect the diverse roles and objectives of different institutions in the electoral process. The findings indicate that EU's civic and electoral education support programs have been understood as very impactful in enhancing the participation of the targeted population, particularly by CSOs (74%). The positive impact of these programs suggests that the EU's interventions align with the theory's principles of supporting peaceful political processes and stable democratic institutions (Doyle, 2005).

Table 4.13: Impact of EU's Programs on Participation of Various Voter Strata

3. What is your Institution of Affiliation? * 16. What is the impact of the EU's civic and electoral support programs in Kenya in terms of enhancement of the participation of the targeted population? Cross-tabulation					
Count					
		16. What is the impact of the EU's civic and electoral support programs in Kenya in terms of enhancement of the participation of the targeted population?			Total
		No impact	Somewhat impactful	Very impactful	
3. What is your Institution of Affiliation?	ORPP	0(0%)	0(0%)	17(100%)	17(100%)
	CSOs	11(8%)	49(37%)	74(55%)	134(100%)
	JLAC	0(0%)	0(0%)	13(100%)	13(100%)
	IEBC	0(0%)	25(29%)	62(71%)	87(100%)
	Media	0(0%)	0(0%)	20(100%)	20(100%)
	Local Elections Observers	0(0%)	12(60%)	8(40%)	20(100%)
	Law Enforcement	0(0%)	6(30%)	14(70%)	20(100%)
	The Judiciary	0(0%)	4(21%)	15(79%)	19(100%)
	Political Parties	12(60%)	8(40%)	0(0%)	20(100%)
Total		23(7%)	104(30%)	223(64%)	350(100%)

Source: Survey Data (2023)

4.4.9 Confidence in EU's Contribution to Electoral Integrity

The table 4.14 presents the perceptions of individuals from various institutions regarding the impact of the European Union's (EU) involvement in Kenya's elections through civic and electoral education on electoral integrity. The Office of Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP)

respondents showed a mixed perspective, with 59% indicating that they could confidently say that EU's involvement in Kenya's elections through civic and electoral education leads to electoral integrity. However, 41% were not as confident in making this assertion. This suggests that there is some level of uncertainty or nuance in ORPP's assessment of the relationship between EU involvement and electoral integrity.

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) exhibited a strong belief in the positive impact of EU involvement, with 76% expressing confidence that it leads to electoral integrity. In contrast, 24% of CSO respondents were less certain about this relationship. The high percentage of CSOs affirming the connection between EU support and electoral integrity indicates a prevailing positive sentiment within this institution.

The Justice and Legal Affairs Committee (JLAC) respondents were also predominantly confident in stating that EU's involvement leads to electoral integrity, with 62% in agreement. However, 38% of JLAC respondents were not as confident. This suggests that while a substantial portion of JLAC members perceived a positive impact, there was still some skepticism within the committee. The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) had a notably high level of confidence in the relationship between EU involvement and electoral integrity, with 90% of respondents affirming this connection. Only 10% expressed doubts about it. The overwhelming consensus within IEBC indicates a strong belief in the positive influence of EU support on electoral integrity.

Media respondents had a more balanced view, with 45% stating that they could confidently assert the link between EU involvement and electoral integrity, while 55% were not as sure. This indicates a level of uncertainty within the media institution regarding the impact of EU support on electoral integrity. Local Elections Observers expressed a high level of confidence, with 85% stating that EU's involvement leads to electoral integrity. Only 15% were not as confident. This suggests that local observers widely perceived a positive relationship between EU support and electoral integrity.

Law Enforcement agencies had a balanced perspective, with 50% expressing confidence in the connection between EU involvement and electoral integrity, while the remaining 50% were not

as certain. This suggests a division of opinion within law enforcement regarding the impact of EU support. The Judiciary exhibited a slightly higher level of confidence, with 58% stating that EU's involvement leads to electoral integrity, while 42% were not as confident. This indicates that while the majority of judiciary respondents believed in the positive impact, a significant portion remained cautious.

Political Parties, on the other hand, were critical of the EU's impact, confident, with only 20% of respondents stating that EU's involvement leads to electoral integrity, while 80% disagreed. This divided opinion highlights the perception among political parties that EU significantly do not support EU's contribution to electoral integrity. The study reveals varying degrees of confidence among respondents from different institutions regarding the impact of EU's involvement in Kenya's elections through civic and electoral education on electoral integrity. While some institutions, such as political parties and IEBC, exhibited high levels of confidence in the positive relationship, others, like the media and ORPP, had more mixed views, indicating the complexity of assessing this impact.

Table 4.14: Confidence in EU's Contribution to Electoral Integrity

3. What is your Institution of Affiliation? * 17. Can you say with confidence that EU's involvement in Kenya's elections through civic and electoral education leads to electoral integrity? Cross-tabulation				
Count				
		17. Can you say with confidence that EU's involvement in Kenya's elections through civic and electoral education leads to electoral integrity?		Total
		Yes	No	
3. What is your Institution of Affiliation?	ORPP	10(59%)	7(41%)	17(100%)
	CSOs	102(76%)	32(24%)	134(100%)
	JLAC	8(62%)	5(38%)	13(100%)
	IEBC	78(90%)	9(10%)	87(100%)
	Media	9(45%)	11(55%)	20(100%)
	Local Elections Observers	17(85%)	3(15%)	20(100%)
	Law Enforcement	10(50%)	10(50%)	20(100%)
	The Judiciary	11(58%)	8(42%)	19(100%)
	Political Parties	20(100%)	0(0%)	20(100%)
Total		265(76%)	85(24%)	350(100%)

Source: Survey Data (2023)

4.4.10 Hindrances to EU-Supported Elections tailored Civic Education

The table 4.15 provides insights into the hindrances that impede EU-supported elections civic education, as perceived by respondents from various institutions in Kenya. It categorizes these hindrances into three main factors: the local political environment, incomplete programming, and shifting focus to the national government as opposed to Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). Among respondents affiliated with the Office of Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP), 65% identified the local political environment as a hindrance to EU-supported elections civic education, while 35% did not mention it as a significant obstacle. This suggests that ORPP acknowledges the challenges posed by local politics in the context of civic education. Additionally, this was a cross-cutting hindrance. The hindrance of incomplete programming was not commonly cited among respondents. Only 13% of the total respondents identified incomplete programming as an obstacle to EU-supported elections civic education. Notably, none of the ORPP or CSO respondents mentioned incomplete programming as a major issue. This suggests that, from the perspectives of these respondents, EU-supported programs were generally well-structured and executed as intended.

A notable hindrance mentioned by respondents across various institutions was the shifting focus to the national government at the expense of CSOs. Among ORPP respondents, 93% expressed concerns about this shift in focus. This suggests that ORPP perceives a challenge in the redirection of attention and resources away from CSOs towards the national government. Similarly, 65% of Political Parties respondents identified this hindrance. However, respondents from institutions like the IEBC, Media, Local Elections Observers, Law Enforcement, and The Judiciary did not consider this factor to be a significant hindrance. These findings of the study illustrates that perceptions of hindrances to EU-supported elections civic education vary among different institutions in Kenya. While some factors, such as the local political environment and shifting focus to the national government, are identified as obstacles by specific institutions, incomplete programming is less commonly cited as a hindrance. These findings highlight the need for tailored approaches in addressing challenges related to civic education based on the perspectives and experiences of different stakeholders.

Table 4.15: Hindrances to EU-Supported Elections tailored Civic Education

3. What is your Institution of Affiliation? * 18. What hindrances impede EU-supported elections civic education? Cross-tabulation					
Count					
		18. What hindrances impede EU-supported elections civic education?			Total
		The environment of Local politics	Incomplete programming	Shifting focus to the national government as opposed to CSOs.	
3. What is your Institution of Affiliation?	ORPP	11(65%)	6(35%)	0(0%)	17(100%)
	CSOs	10(7%)	0(0%)	124(93%)	134(100%)
	JLAC	2(15%)	1(8%)	10(0%)	13(100%)
	IEBC	76(87%)	11(1%)	0(0%)	87(100%)
	Media	20(100%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	20(100%)
	Local Elections Observers	12(60%)	8(40%)	0(0%)	20(100%)
	Law Enforcement	16(80%)	1(5%)	3(15%)	20(100%)
	The Judiciary	9(47%)	10(53%)	0(0%)	19(100%)
	Political Parties	0(0%)	7(35%)	13(65%)	20(100%)
Total		156(45%)	44(13%)	150(43%)	350(100%)

Source: Survey Data (2023)

4.4.11 Chapter Four Summary

In conclusion, this chapter has provided a comprehensive analysis of the socio-demographic variables and key findings related to the European Union's support through electoral civic education in Kenya's general elections. The exploration of six critical areas within this study has shed light on the intricate dynamics of EU's electoral support and its implications for Kenya's electoral processes. The analysis revealed that the EU's framework for electoral civic support in Kenya exhibits variation across different institutions, highlighting the adaptability of their approach to the unique needs and capacities of various stakeholders. Notably, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) emerged as pivotal implementers of EU-supported civic and electoral education programs, signifying their critical role in driving electoral integrity in Kenya. The existence of multiple actors collaborating under a basket fund, as indicated by a substantial

proportion of respondents, underscores the complexity and coordinated efforts involved in electoral support.

The preference for engaging with NGOs over government bodies and think tank organizations by the EU underscores the practical advantages of flexibility, grassroots reach, and alignment with EU values. This preference reflects the EU's commitment to promoting inclusive and impartial electoral processes. The presence of the UNDP Basket Fund for Elections Assistance, which channels funding from various donors into electoral activities, showcases the collaborative nature of international support for Kenya's elections and highlights the significance of coordinated efforts in enhancing electoral integrity.

The geographic coverage of EU programs varies, with a mix of national and local-level engagement, reflecting the need for tailored approaches to address diverse regional needs. Similarly, the demographic coverage of EU-supported programs, including youth, women, people with disabilities, and the general population, underscores a commitment to inclusivity and participation. In summary, this chapter has provided a comprehensive understanding of the multifaceted nature of the EU's electoral civic education support in Kenya. These findings are instrumental in assessing the effectiveness of EU electoral support and its contribution to electoral integrity in Kenya, setting the stage for the subsequent chapters that delve deeper into specific aspects of electoral processes and their impact on Kenya's democracy.

CHAPTER FIVE

EUROPEAN UNION ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE THROUGH CAPACITY BUILDING IN POST-2010 KENYAN GENERAL ELECTIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents, discusses and interprets findings pertaining to EU's involvement in Kenya's elections through technical and capacity building. The chapter is structured along the themes that emerged during the interviews and which were further examined quantitatively. These themes included; the concept and objectives of EU's capacity building, and technical assistance in Kenya; the concept of time as applied in EU's technical and capacity building components if electoral assistance; the mechanisms through which technical and capacity building initiatives – funding and resources, electoral reforms, institutional strengthening, electoral observation missions; monitoring and evaluation, challenges and criticisms; and finally, institutional rating of EU's electoral assistance influence on Kenyan electoral integrity. These themes are discussed below, keeping in mind relevant extant literature where applicable and the theoretical model adopted in this study. These themes comprehensively examined the underlying research question guiding the analysis: what is the nature of contribution of the European Union's electoral capacity building in Kenya's general elections? Generally, the study reveals a number of issues regarding the nature of EU's technical assistance and capacity building, and it cannot be said this thesis dug into these areas in-depth/conclusively. Future studies are thus invited to explore the revealed specific areas to further this discourse. Nonetheless, the current study has unearthed the issues pertaining to the topic, and attempted to understand their linkages, revealing the dynamics of the subject in a developing country like Kenya through focused closed analysis. This goes a long way to add value to extant literature which has not given such a focused account of EU's work on the specific avenue of intervention of technical and capacity building.

5.2 European Union Objectives and Concept of Capacity Building and Technical Support in Kenya

An important context setting question that the researcher examined through the experts across the 10 cohorts (the nine plus EU) was an in-depth discussion of what EU's objectives revolve around as regards the particular issue of technical and capacity building. Five major issues arose

across the cohorts, and were corroborated by responses from EU senior officers, interviewed at the EU Mission Offices.

The most saliently discussed objective was *enhancing electoral administration capacity*. Electoral stakeholders averred that the European Union's foremost objective has been to strengthen the capacity of Kenya's electoral administration, particularly the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC). This involves providing technical expertise and resources to improve the efficiency and competence of electoral officials. The aim is to enhance the IEBC's ability to plan, manage, and oversee elections effectively, which is essential for the integrity of the electoral process.

The second technical objective unearthed in this study was the issue pertaining to improving *Voter Registration and Verification Systems*. A significant focus of the EU's technical support has been on enhancing voter registration and verification systems. This includes the implementation of modern technologies and data management tools to ensure accurate and up-to-date voter lists. By improving these systems, the EU aims to reduce voter disenfranchisement, prevent fraud, and enhance the credibility of voter registration processes.

The third most saliently occurring description of objectives, was the issues of *Capacity Building for Political Parties and Civil Society*. Through this avenue, the EU has aimed to build the technical and organizational capacity of political parties and civil society organizations involved in the electoral process. This objective involves providing training and resources to help these entities engage more effectively in electoral activities, including campaigning, voter education, and election monitoring. The idea behind such an aim, was succinctly captured by an EU ambassador who asserted that “strengthening these stakeholders' capacity contributes to a more robust and competitive electoral landscape” (EU Deputy Ambassador, June 2023).

The four key objective based on frequency of occurrence from word analytics, was *Enhancing Electoral Security and Conflict Management Skills*. The study found that most stakeholders across the study strata perceived EU's objective has included providing support for the development of electoral security and conflict management skills. This entails training (through local experts and think tanks like ELGIA and ELOG) security forces and election observers in

conflict prevention and resolution techniques to mitigate the risk of electoral violence. By doing so, the EU aims to create a secure and stable environment for elections.

Finally, the EU's technical and capacity building objective oscillates around *Promoting Transparency and Accountability through Technology*. The EU has supported the adoption of technology solutions to promote transparency and accountability in Kenya's elections. This includes the use of electronic voting systems, results transmission, and data management tools. The objective is to reduce human error, enhance data integrity, and increase the transparency of the electoral process, ultimately contributing to greater public trust in the outcomes. These objectives represent the major (based on word analytics of the key informant interviews) specific technical and capacity-building components of the European Union's efforts to support Kenya's electoral integrity. By focusing on these areas, the EU aims to address key challenges in Kenya's electoral system and contribute to more transparent, credible, and well-administered elections.

5.2.1 European Union's Concept of Capacity Building and Technical

Other than the objective, the other twin part of this first thematic area of analysis was the conceptualization of capacity building and technical assistance – which further build on and shed light on the objectives. In the context of EU's foreign electoral assistance, capacity building and technical components are two distinct but interconnected aspects of support provided to help Kenya conduct credible and effective elections.

In Kenya's case the study reveals a conceptualization and practice of Capacity Building that encompasses the process of strengthening the skills, knowledge, capabilities, and institutional capacities of electoral authorities, governmental bodies, civil society organizations, and other relevant stakeholders involved in the electoral process. While speaking to a senior officer at the EU embassy as a key informant, he empathized that key for EU is a whole-of-society approach in the conduct of her capacity building and technical support. He asserted that:

Our focus is on whole-of-society approach as this is the real pathway to effective elections in Kenya, like is case across the globe. We must engage both governmental and non-governmental institutions concerned with Kenya's elections. Capacity building with such broader scope helps us to understand needs and put in mechanisms to mitigate challenges and plan for the needs before and during elections (Informant 1EU, June 2023)

A second element to conceptualizing capacity building is to understand its focus relative to technical support. This study revealed that the primary **focus** of capacity building components of EU assistance is on *long-term development and sustainability*, and that this is underpinned in EU-Kenya/SSA's cooperation documents, and the broader EU's foreign policy toward Africa – instruments which also encompass the general objectives for electoral assistance but not as specific as was found in this focused examination of objectives as above. These documents, key to EU's engagement with Kenya, include the 'ACP framework for Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Africa-EU Joint Strategy for cooperation at continental level' (EP, 2017). Gorm Rhe Olsen and others corroborate this finding when he asserts that the very basis of EU's work in Africa – on 'democracy assistance' and other forms is predicated on EU's foreign policy in Africa (Olsen, 2000; Stavridis & Irrera, 2015; Crawford, 2005; Levitsky & Way, 2005). Therefore, if Olsen is right, it is the EU's Africa Policy that determines the extent of EU's involvement in Kenya. Indeed, an analysis of the 'ACP framework for Sub-Saharan Africa' reveals the critical items that matter for EU, key among which is democratization, and elections treated as the major way of attaining this in SSA.

Lastly, EU-based experts in Kenya, respondents from CSOs, political parties, IEBC and other government-based strata revealed that capacity building and technical support in Kenya is tailored to empower local entities to independently manage electoral processes and overcome challenges both during the elections year and in the future elections. Examples of Capacity building activities include training for election officials, voter education programming, institution-building efforts, and the review, and/or development of electoral legal frameworks prior to elections year. EP (2017) argue that the choice of the activities supported through capacity building depends on post-elections support reports especially through the EU EOMs which give recommendations on gaps needed to make elections more effective in the following electoral cycle. Experts from IEBC reinforced this this understanding by arguing as captured in the excerpt key informant interview below:

Researcher: How do you identify areas for capacity building that the EU comes in to support?

Respondent: There are several ways, we can recommend to them based on our

understanding of needs, especially for IEBC. But usually the main source of this information is the EU EOMs and other EOM reports which often come after elections.

Researcher: Thank you. But how do they understand the needs from without the governmental apparatuses concerned with elections?

Respondent: Alright, this is a good question. Usually as the EOMs give their recommendations they are disaggregated by sector. Moreover, and most importantly, there is this body called the ELOG – Elections Observer Group - which is basically a consortia of NGOs doing electoral programming which come up to observe elections and alongside state-based EOMs give their own reports. Their report is a key source of information about needs of media, NGOs and civil society organizations generally.

The second response reveals the role of CSOs in need-analysis for capacity. Indeed, as I write this chapter of the thesis, the ELOG has released their version of assessment report on 2022 election. The report reveals a raft of ideas on how to engage in both capacity building and technical support for the CSOs as well as the governmental actors, from a CSO actor perspective (ELOG, 2022).

On the other hand, Technical Components of EU's electoral assistance in Kenya encompasses the provision of tangible resources, tools, and expertise required for the practical execution of electoral activities, as well as *technical partnerships with governmental and non-governmental organizations*. In Kenya, it mostly involves the transfer of technology, equipment, and specialized knowledge. The key focus of the technical component tends to be more immediate and operationally-oriented and aims to address the logistical and procedural aspects of conducting elections effectively. Common examples of technical components in Kenya's post-2010 elections include the provision of ballot boxes, support directed at voter registration systems, biometric technology, printing and distribution of election materials, and IT infrastructure for data management.

5.3 The Temporal Dimensions of European Union's Technical and Capacity Building Support

To situate EU technical and capacity building support in Kenya, the study examined the essence of time. Understanding time the support is given, is a key step to an in-depth analysis of EU's

work in Kenya. According to EU's perspective, especially in the post-2010, elections is viewed as cycle, a process, rather than an event, thus the need to offer their support across the three stages in this cycle, namely – pre, during and after elections (EC, 2023; EP, 217; Motsami, 2012).

Important in conceptualizing time in technical and capacity building therefore is the *Concept of an Elections Cycle*. In the context of foreign electoral assistance in Kenya, an "elections cycle" refers to the “entire process of organizing, conducting, and concluding an election, including all the key phases and activities involved” (IEBC Officer, May 2023). This cycle typically encompasses various stages, from pre-election preparations to post-election evaluation. The study revealed a breakdown of the election cycle and how electoral support is provided before, during, and after elections. Pre-election Phase covers the period leading up to the actual Election Day. It includes activities bordering on both technical and capacity building support such as voter registration, candidate nomination, campaign preparations, and the establishment of electoral institutions for voter registration, voter education materials, and support for legal and regulatory frameworks. These revelations are in line with IEBC (2023) presentation to the National Dialogue Committee, further, the study found that capacity building through foreign electoral assistance involves training election officials and stakeholders, such as political parties and civil society, to ensure they understand the electoral process and their roles. A key informant from IEBC argued that this capacity building support was key in three major ways, as captured verbatim below:

To IEBC pre-elections capacity building and technical support is critical for us...The Kenyan government tends to shift focus away from elections and elections-related activities only to do so during elections. Foreign support for capacity building has therefore been key in enabling us to undertake preparatory exercises particularly in the training of our officers on electoral good practices and new developments in technology-assisted elections (IEBC Officer, IEBC Premises, June 2023).

To the other governmental agencies, as well as CSOs expressed similar sentiments. CSOs particularly argued that their work as regards elections is at its peak in the pre-elections and therefore technical and capacity building support from EU was key at this stage. An Officer from ELOG asserted that:

The CSOs are very key players in elections and actually the integrity of elections in this country partly depends on the roles of CSOs particularly during the pre-elections times. Through EU support, we are able to undertake voter education programs, prepare our capacities for elections monitoring and evaluation, and enhance or create our legal and regulatory expertise (Informant 2-CSOs, July 2023)

is the pivotal day when eligible voters cast their ballots, and election procedures are executed. It's the culmination of the election cycle. The study revealed that at this phase, technical assistance come in *Election Day* terms of technical resources which is focused on providing ballot boxes, polling station supplies, and ensuring that the voting process runs smoothly. It also comes in terms of Election Observation, whereby EU supported international observers monitor polling stations to ensure that the elections are conducted transparently and according to established standards.

The Post-Election Phase is a key part of the elections cycle. Following the Election Day, there is a period of vote counting, tabulation, and the announcement of results. Post-election activities also involve addressing disputes, evaluating the election's fairness, and planning for future elections. EU electoral support after elections in Kenya involves dispute resolution encompassing help to establish mechanisms for addressing election-related disputes, including legal processes and reconciliation efforts. The second one is electoral evaluation, experts especially local NGO Consortia and International EU EOMs evaluate the election to assess its overall fairness and adherence to international standards. Recommendations for improvements are often provided, in Kenya, on averagely three six months after elections. Lastly, EU post-elections support, involves capacity building for future elections. Through this endeavor, assistance may continue to build the capacity of electoral authorities, civil society, and political actors for future elections. These revelations march EU's documented analysis (EP, 2017) which accounts for EU's electoral support 2010 -2017 highlighting key EU-sponsored studies. The analysis show that EU's focus is on supporting electoral the entire elections cycle. However, as the first chapter of findings have shown that as regards the support toward electoral civic education, the support was largely during the elections period, and very less before and even after. Thus, it appears (as the survey results below show) that technical and capacity building support like electoral civic education is prioritized mainly toward elections times and after in order to lay the framework for elections. In-depth discussions with stakeholder showed that this

is partly why technical support do have real impact. For example, IEBC respondents argued that most of technical support to the commission are robustly advanced a year to elections. They gave example of 2013 elections where such support came in 2012, for 2017 election in 2016, and for 2022 a little earlier in 2020 towards the end. These are areas for further analysis, to unpack the impact of time on electoral integrity from the point of view of technical and capacity building.

Overall, in Kenya, as in many other countries, foreign electoral assistance aims to strengthen the entire election cycle. This includes promoting transparency, inclusivity, and the integrity of the electoral process. It also involves enhancing the capacity of local institutions and stakeholders to manage elections independently and in accordance with international best practices. Electoral support before, during, and after elections is tailored to address the specific needs and challenges that arise at each phase of the election cycle, ultimately contributing to the credibility and legitimacy of the electoral process. However, reality (survey results below) shows that such interventions before election period in the cycle come late.

To build further understanding of the dynamics of EU electoral support in Kenya as regards time of such support, the study explored through survey the issue of time technical and capacity building is offered, in order to attain some quantitative picture. The findings from table 19 below shed light on the initiation of EU technical assistance across the cycle of an elections in Kenya. The study established that the EU appears, despite the principles that argue for treating elections as a process rather than an event, to treat interventions during elections as a strategic timing of their involvement. It is evident that the majority of respondents (73.4%) perceive the EU's technical and capacity building support to begin during the elections stage (with most arguing that such support came a year to one and half year before elections month). Among those who affirmed this trend, 100% of respondents affiliated with Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) acknowledged the EU's involvement during elections. This alignment highlights the strategic approach of EU capacity building efforts, focusing on critical phases of the electoral process, but also calls on further interrogation of what happens to other faces. Indeed, through qualitative investigations, 'during elections' to both governmental and CSOs did not simply imply on the elections day but at least the elections year, for example August 2021 – August 2022 (for the case of 2022 general elections). CSOs most particularly appreciated that their engagements with EU early before elections was key to their roles in ensuring electoral outcomes and processes are

free, fair and credible.

Table 5.1: At what Part of the Elections Cycle Does the EU Technical Assistance Begin?

At what part of the elections cycle does the EU technical assistance begin?	ORPP	CSOs	JLAC	IEBC	Media	Local Elections Observers	Law Enforcement	The Judiciary	Political Parties	Total
Pre-elections	0 (0%)	16 (12%)	0 (0%)	14 (16%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	30
Post-elections	2 (1%)	18 (13%)	1 (1%)	1 (1%)	3 (2%)	8 (6%)	0 (0%)	2 (1%)	2 (1%)	37
During elections	15 (11%)	100 (74%)	12 (9%)	68 (78%)	17 (12%)	0 (0%)	20 (15%)	7 (5%)	18 (13%)	257
Irregular and can come at different times in the cycle	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	4 (5%)	0 (0%)	12 (9%)	0 (0%)	10 (8%)	0 (0%)	26
Total	17 (5%)	134 (38%)	13 (4%)	87 (25%)	20 (6%)	20 (6%)	20 (6%)	19 (5%)	20 (6%)	350

Source: Survey Data (2023)

Additionally, the concept of elections cycle and the need for engagement with EU throughout the cycle is very important especially for Elections Management Bodies (EMBs) (Abdulahi, 2015; Olsen, 2000) whose work is only elections. This study agrees with Olsen as the table 19 reveals that for IEBC, all the stages are important from pre to post elections. It is also noteworthy that a minority of respondents (7.4%) from Law Enforcement suggested that the EU technical assistance begins after the elections, indicating a unique perspective within this group. A finding which could be attributed to the nature of Law Enforcement's involvement, which might require post-election assessment and observation to ascertain the effectiveness of the EU's contributions, just like IEBC owing to Kenya's special case of police –community counter engagements during post-elections violence or conflicts (See Kanyinga, 2017 for robust analysis of this argument). The Law Enforcement cohort is especially key because as Musila (2019) and Decker & Sonnicksen (2011) puts it, the police and other cohorts and sometimes the military finds their

relevance in Kenya's elections especially owing to the high tendency toward post-elections violence. As asserted by a security expert and part of the law enforcement community of practice, this trend necessitates EU engagement with this cohort in the immediate post-elections.

5.4 European Union Mechanism for Electoral Support in Kenya: The Concept of the Basket Fund

This theme emerged in two ways. The overarching mechanism and the benefits it offers to EU's quest for electoral integrity in Kenya; and the specific mechanism/means through which the capacity building and technical support is actually rendered by the EU.

To begin with, the established that the main mechanism through which the EU undertakes her electoral support in Kenya is through the basket fund. The concept of a "basket fund" in the context of European Union (EU) electoral support in developing countries refers to a financial mechanism used to pool funds from various donors into a single fund (EU, 2017; 2022). This fund is then managed and administered collectively to support electoral processes and related activities in a specific country or region. The basket fund approach is commonly employed to streamline and coordinate international assistance efforts, ensuring that resources are used efficiently and effectively. The basket fund concept relates to EU electoral support in Kenya in 6 major ways as emerged from discussions with key informants across various sectors concerned with elections.

In all the elections cases – 2013, 2017, 2018, multiple international donors, including the EU, provide financial assistance to support elections in Kenya. The study revealed that each donor has its own priorities and objectives. The basket fund allows these donors to pool their resources into a single fund. From the perspective of previous basket officers who were part of the interviewees of this study, this pooling of funds minimizes duplication of efforts, reduces administrative costs, and creates a more coherent approach to electoral support. From the perspective of the IEBC, however, the pooling of funds ensures accountability to a single actor, the fund manager, which for Kenya is the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).

As regards interests of donors, key informant interviews revealed that almost all countries present in Kenya through their embassies contribute at least a share to the basket fund, but this

varies from election to election. For example, EU member states did not support the controversial 2013 elections owing to the Ocampo Six situation (the six who were allegedly engaged in perpetuating 2007/08 post elections violence). On the other hand, a number supported the 2022 elections owing to the fairly issue based and the absence of any contradicting human rights issues at hand in the campaigns. However, these funds are given with strings attached and with particularly targeted support for a particular presidential candidate, often not publicly declared but sometimes publicly declared. For example, the Netherlands was reported to have publicly declared support for Mr Raila Odinga in the 2013 General elections and when their interests was not served they requested the UNDP to return their share of contribution into the basket fund.

Secondly, key informants from EU and governmental agencies both expressed that the concept of the basket fund promotes coordination and harmonization among donor countries and organizations. EU-based informants asserted that it enables donors to align their electoral assistance efforts with the priorities and needs of Kenya. They also asserted that this coordination ensures that resources are used strategically and that assistance programs are coherent and complementary, rather than fragmented or contradictory. Thus through basket fund, countries such as Italy, Netherlands, Canada, USA, Britain among others, agreed to undertake their electoral support in Kenya through a coordinated and harmonized way facilitated by the UNDP.

A third ground/theme that emerged from discussions around the basket fund as a mechanism it emphasizes the importance of recipient countries taking ownership of their electoral processes. Funds are typically disbursed in alignment with the recipient country's national development strategies and electoral priorities. Thus, EU-based informants expressed that this approach respects the sovereignty of the host country and promotes local ownership of electoral reforms. However, critical respondents especially within the CSO Consortia and former IEBC officers argued that EU support, like many foreign entities' is meant to promote an agenda and is often subject to EU's view of Kenya as a strategic partner in the region and through which of example it can manage such regional conflicts as in DRC Congo and Ethiopia. Horn Institute (2022) confirm this assertion when it argues that democracy assistance directed to Kenya from donor community is based on the understanding that Kenya is merging as an anchor state through

which such donors can access the Horn and manage conflicts while creating an environment favorable for their commercial and political interests.

The fourth theme that underpinned interview discussions about the basket fund was that transparency and accountability mechanisms are often built into the management of basket funds. Donors, recipient governments, and civil society organizations work together to establish clear rules and procedures for fund management, disbursement, and monitoring. Theoretically, this transparency should ensure that resources are used for their intended purposes and helps prevent corruption. In this regard, both former and current IEBC top officials expressed during the interviews that the EU expects the IEBC to utilize the post-elections reports analyses/evaluations to draw a framework of engagement including itemizing issues that require funding and specifying the timelines. After this exercise, the proposal is shared with EU, which then looks at it with a view of adopting as it is, redefining it, or beginning a collaborative process of having a common-ground sort of itemized issues for funding with their timelines, cutting across the electoral cycle. Thus, both respondents from IEBC and EU converged that transparency and accountability results from a basket fund electoral assistance mechanism. However, informants from the ORPP, political parties and CSOs did not agree that such a framework leads to transparency in funds management. Indeed, the study could not obtain any financial accounting reports on utility of the EU given funds, or the basket funds utility, which leaves the question of transparency and accountability as an open question.

Finally, basket funds are largely viewed to offer flexibility in responding to evolving electoral needs and challenges in Kenya's context. From donors (EU's) perspective, as electoral processes progress, the fund can be adapted to address emerging issues, such as voter education, conflict mitigation, or electoral dispute resolution. This flexibility allows for a more agile response to changing circumstances. As regards, holistic support, elections stakeholder agreed that basket funds can cover a wide range of electoral support activities, including voter registration, voter education, capacity building for electoral management bodies, election monitoring, and post-election activities. This comprehensive approach addresses various aspects of the electoral cycle and contributes to the overall integrity of the electoral process. The question of integrity of elections through such support, however, remains an open one. For example, IEBC top officials who participated in this study expressed that what matter for electoral integrity in Kenya whether

there is a political hygiene – a situation they defined using words such as ‘lack of cut-throat political competition’, ‘a situation where politicians lead the public in respecting legally created institutions’ among other connotations that show that the domestic political environment serves as the key hindrance to an impactful EU technical and capacity building support.

Generally, the basket fund concept is a collaborative and coordinated approach to providing electoral support in Kenya. It facilitates the pooling of resources, enhances coordination among donors, promotes country ownership, ensures transparency, and allows for flexibility in responding to electoral challenges. The EU, along with other international donors, often utilizes basket funds as a means of contributing to credible and democratic electoral processes in Kenya. However, various grounds/themes under which the basket fund was discussed in this study reveal a lack of consensus on that the approach is generally effective.

5.4.1 Specific Avenues/Mechanisms through which European Union Technical and Capacity Building in Kenya

The EU technical and capacity building involvement in Kenya is undertaken through a complex dynamics of avenues, and targeted to different stakeholders in a way that current studies (Musila, 2019; Kiamba & Bachmann, 2015) have not unearthed. These avenues oscillate around a major theme of funding and resources assistance. These are discussed in the succeeding below.

To begin with European Union supports capacity building and technical assistance through resources and funding to various institutions in Kenya, including the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Law Enforcement, Political Parties, Media, Local Elections Observations, and the Judicial and Legal Affairs Committee (JLAC). To the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), the European Union has played a crucial role in strengthening the IEBC's technical capacity and enhancing its ability to conduct transparent and credible elections. Financially, the EU has provided substantial funding for key activities, including voter registration and election administration. The EU Officials interviewed argued that looking at the trend of their funding from 2013 – 2022, this has been on an upward trajectory with the highest realized in 2022 totaling to “at least 100 million Euros (Kenya Shillings 13 billion) out of which 6 billion direct funding to IEBC. Additionally, the EU has offered technical assistance in the form of election

experts and advisors who work closely with the IEBC to improve electoral processes. This support has enabled the IEBC to modernize its operations, implement biometric voter registration systems, and enhance its ability to manage and monitor elections effectively. The study established that such expertise is critical for example, the EU experts helped IEBC to effectively represent themselves into the discussions and deliberations at the Basket Fund and the negotiation of the to-be funded programs during 2013 and 2017 elections.

Funding and resources are also offered Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). The EU recognizes the vital role played by CSOs in promoting democracy and electoral integrity. To support CSOs in Kenya, the EU has provided both financial resources and technical assistance. Financially, grants and funding opportunities have been made available to CSOs to implement projects related to voter education, election monitoring, and civic engagement. Moreover, the EU has offered technical support through training programs, workshops, and capacity-building initiatives. This support has empowered CSOs to effectively engage with electoral processes, conduct voter education campaigns, and monitor elections independently. From our survey 89% of the CSOs respondents asserted that EU's funding and resources/technical improved their capacities to undertake civic engagement.

This avenue of support is also directed to Law Enforcement sector. In terms of law enforcement agencies in Kenya, the EU's support has focused on enhancing their capacity to maintain security during elections in a manner that does not infringe on democratic principles of modern policing (Clark, 2005). Financially, the EU has provided funding for training programs and the procurement of necessary equipment for law enforcement agencies. Additionally, the EU has offered technical assistance in the form of expertise and guidance on election security planning and crisis management. Respondents from the Inspector and Police Spokesperson Office, asserted that this included both national training and planning meetings in 2013 and 2017 elections, but in 2022, there was a robust engagement at both national and county levels with security stakeholders. Most law enforcement officers argued that to a great extent, this support has contributed to improved coordination among law enforcement agencies and their ability to respond to electoral-related security challenges effectively.

Fourthly, the EU has recognized the importance of political parties in a democratic electoral system. Financially, the EU has supported capacity-building programs for political parties, including funding for leadership and campaign training. 2 out of 10 of every of our political parties respondents reported that the EU had engaged them in leadership and campaign strategies training. However, such training did not have much impact with most, especially women contenders arguing that improving the campaign environment required a complete overhaul of the political environment which is masculinist and based a patriarchal system. Moreover, the EU has provided technical assistance to political parties in areas such as internal party governance, policy development, and conflict resolution mechanisms. About 60% reported that such support has helped parties to become more organized, transparent, and accountable in their electoral activities, albeit the cut-throat political competition, renders EU support to political parties of less impact.

Fifthly, to bolster the role of the media in promoting transparency and accountability in elections, the EU has offered both financial support and technical assistance. Financially, the EU has provided grants and funding to media organizations for election reporting and voter education initiatives. All representatives from the media had experienced such support, directly, or indirectly. Additionally, the EU has facilitated training programs and workshops to enhance the technical skills of journalists and media professionals. This, the study unpacked was happening both at national and county levels. From the perspective of media respondents, this support has led to improved election reporting, better coverage of electoral events, and increased public access to information.

Sixthly, the EU has actively supported local election observation efforts in Kenya. Financially, the EU has funded local election observation missions, enabling civil society groups and independent observers to monitor elections at the grassroots level. In terms of technical assistance, the EU has provided training to observers on election monitoring methodologies, data collection, and reporting and also tools. The impact of such interventions, however, has not received a universal consensus of a positive impact. To some, this support has been support has resulted in more comprehensive and credible election observations, contributing to transparency and accountability in the electoral process. To some, EU support do not necessary help, especially in terms of elections monitoring first because such support comes late, secondly, the

funding is insufficient, and thirdly that the tools of assessment pre-and-post elections are usually redundant and unrevised, leading to lack of innovation and difference in the reports emerging from such evaluations.

Lastly, the EU has recognized the significance of legal oversight in electoral processes. Financially, the EU has allocated resources to support the activities of the Judicial Legal Affairs Committee (JLAC) and the Judiciary in Kenya. This funding has been used to facilitate legal reviews, electoral law reforms, and capacity-building initiatives within JLAC. In collaborating with JLAC and the Judiciary, the IEBC has been facilitated by the EU to engage and review and propose electoral law reforms. For example, toward 2013, 2017, 2022 elections JLAC and the Judiciary engaged with the Parliament of Kenya to discuss the following laws, wherein EU's support was critical:

- Draft Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (Amendment) (2020);
- Draft Election Campaign Financing (Amendment) Bill, 2020;
- Draft Election Campaign Financing Regulations, 2020;
- Draft Referendum Bill, 2020; and
- Rules of Procedure on Delimitation of Boundaries, 2021.
- Election (Voter Registration) (Amendment) Regulations, 2022
- Election (General) Regulations) (Amendment) Regulations, 2022;
- Election (Voter Education) (Amendment) Regulations, 2022;
- Elections (Party Primaries and Party Lists) Amendment) Regulations, 2022;
- Elections (Technology) (Amendment) Regulations, 2022.
- IEBC Act (2011)
- Elections Offences Act (2016)

Moreover, the EU has provided technical assistance through legal experts and advisors who work closely with JLAC members to strengthen their understanding of electoral laws and regulations. This support has contributed to more effective legal oversight of electoral processes and the resolution of electoral disputes. In conclusion, the European Union's support in Kenya extends beyond financial contributions to encompass technical assistance and capacity building. These

efforts have been tailored to the specific needs and roles of various institutions, ultimately enhancing their effectiveness in ensuring transparent, credible, and inclusive elections in Kenya.

5.5 Stakeholders Rating on EU Technical Assistance role in enhancing Electoral Integrity in Kenya

Having robustly unearthed the nature of technical and capacity building support of EU in Kenya, this final section examines the impact of EU's support in the foregoing sub-sections, this sub-section examined more explicitly whether EU's assistance in Kenya's elections enhances electoral integrity, based on perceptions of stakeholders. This was done in two ways, assessing stakeholders' perception on necessity of EU's support and secondly whether this support is perceived as important in the attainment of free, fair, and credible elections.

5.5.1 Is the European Union Technical and Capacity Building Support Necessary in Kenya?

The diverse opinions captured in table 20 provide insights into the perceived necessity of the EU's assistance in fostering electoral integrity. A significant number of respondents, particularly those affiliated with Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) (49%), expressed strong endorsement by categorizing the EU's assistance as "Very Necessary." This sentiment is however thwarted by 38% of Political Parties (PP) respondents who asserted a contrary the same view. The CSOs' strong support could be attributed to their close collaboration with the EU in capacity building efforts aimed at ensuring credible elections.

On the contrary, a notable proportion of respondents affiliated with Law Enforcement (40%) felt that the assistance was "Somewhat Unnecessary," indicating some reservations about the direct impact of technical and capacity building on their role in maintaining electoral integrity. Similarly, a minority of respondents from the LEO (4%), 35% of PP and the Media (6%) expressed skepticism. These diverse perspectives reveal the nuanced considerations that different institutions bring to the table when evaluating the EU's contributions.

Table 5.2: Opinion on EU Assistance in Facilitating Electoral Integrity

What do you think about the assistance in terms of facilitating electoral integrity in Kenya?	ORPP	CSOs	JLAC	IEBC	Media	Local Elections Observers	Law Enforcement	The Judiciary	Political Parties	Total
Very unnecessary	5 (29%)	0 (0%)	1 (8%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	5
Unnecessary	13 (24%)	21 (38%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (4%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	19 (35%)	55
Somewhat necessary	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	4 (8%)	0 (0%)	15 (30%)	15 (30%)	20 (40%)	1 (2%)	0 (0%)	55
Necessary	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	5 (100%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	5
Very Necessary	0 (0%)	113 (49%)	3 (1%)	87 (38%)	5 (2%)	3 (1%)	0 (0%)	18 (8%)	1 (0%)	230
Total	18 (5%)	134 (38%)	13 (4%)	87 (25%)	20 (6%)	20 (6%)	20 (6%)	19 (5%)	20 (6%)	350

Source: Survey Data (2023)

The analysis of this sub-section offers insights into the varying opinions about the perceived necessity of the EU's assistance in promoting electoral integrity. Among the respondents, a substantial number affiliated with Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) expressed strong endorsement, categorizing the EU's assistance as "Very Necessary." This is particularly significant, as CSOs often champion democratic values and transparent processes. This alignment reflects the theory's emphasis on liberal states investing in interventions to promote democratic ideals, including the facilitation of credible elections.

Exploring how the CSOs engage with EU through technical and capacity building through interviews, the study identifies three major avenues to this, with both technical and capacity building components. The first is Voter Education Programs. Technically this involves EU providing CSOs with technical resources, including funding, materials, and expertise, to develop and implement voter education campaigns. Practically, this involves creating informational materials, organizing workshops, and developing multimedia content to educate voters about the electoral process, their rights, and the importance of participation. Through capacity building

efforts EU focuses on training CSOs in effective communication strategies, outreach techniques, and methods for disseminating accurate and unbiased information to the public. CSOs are empowered to engage with voters, answer questions, and address concerns.

The second avenue for EU-CSOs engagement is through Election Monitoring and Observation (EMO). Technically, the study established that EU may equip CSOs with the necessary tools and technology for election monitoring and observation. Which takes the forms of GIS enabled phones, providing mobile apps, data collection devices, and access to election data. Capacity Building involves CSOs receiving training on how to conduct impartial and credible election monitoring. They learn to observe polling stations, track voter turnout, and report irregularities. Capacity-building efforts also cover data analysis and reporting to ensure that findings are accurate and useful for stakeholders. Narrating how this happens, a CSO respondent, whose organization is also part of ELOG, however expressed the limitations that hamper their effectiveness to undertake EMO. He argued:

In most cases, the tools we use to undertake EMO are basically the common tools previously developed. Again, there is proper training to the people who actually undertake monitoring (the assistants) and the training is usually undertaken at the tail end/towards the elections day (Informant 3-CSOs, May 2023).

The third and last category of areas of support that EU offer to CSOs is that related to Legal and Regulatory Expertise. In terms of technical support, EU assistance can involve hired local or external (especially through IFES and IDEA) legal experts who provide CSOs with guidance on election laws, regulations, and the general electoral framework. These experts help CSOs understand the legal aspects of the electoral process. In terms of capacity building, CSOs are trained in legal advocacy and how to engage with electoral authorities. This includes understanding the procedures for candidate registration, campaigning, and handling electoral disputes. CSOs may also receive support in drafting policy proposals or advocating for electoral reforms.

Overall, by combining technical support with capacity-building efforts, EU electoral assistance empowers CSOs to be effective watchdogs, advocates, and educators during the pre-election period. These initiatives strengthen civil society's ability to promote transparency, fairness, and inclusivity in the electoral process, ultimately the expectation is that this will contribute to more

credible and democratic elections in Kenya. However, while CSOs and IEBC feel the necessity of EU support, political parties expressed not so much support for this intervention. With most respondents from the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) arguing for a concerted interference by EU by influencing electoral results especially in 2022 and 2017. These contrasting opinions much with findings by Fioramonti (2009) who found that perceptions about EU's role in promoting democracy in Africa varies by cohort of stakeholder in elections, with more skepticism coming from political parties on the losing end as well as their supporters. The EP (2017) corroborates these notions on necessity of EU's support in Africa, when, by pointing at a number of EU commissioned studies argues that while the general public stands for pro-democratic support, political class and governments support and do not support EU's work depending on where they stand in terms of losers and gainers with gainers current and future more optimistic about EU's support and losers more skeptical and expressing possibilities of interference.

5.5.2 Does European Union Capacity Building and Technical Support Lead to Free, Fair, and Credible Elections?

The data presented in table 5.3 below encapsulate the varying opinions on the extent to which EU interventions through capacity building contribute to free, fair, and credible elections. Notably, a considerable number of respondents from Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) (38%) and the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) (57%) expressed confidence that such interventions indeed lead to improved electoral integrity. This viewpoint aligns with their roles as key actors in promoting transparent and credible elections, with IEBC being the lead on the government side and CSO playing the lead role on the society's side.

However, the perspectives are more divided among respondents from Political Parties (PP), Law Enforcement, and the Judiciary. None from the cohort of Political Parties (PP) respondents supported this view. On the same note, very few respondents from Law Enforcement (5%) could agree with the CSOs and IEBC. This variance could stem from the complex interactions and diverse functions of these institutions within the electoral landscape, influencing their perceptions of the direct impact of EU interventions on electoral integrity.

Table 5.3: European Union Capacity Building and Technical Support Interventions and Free, Fair, and Credible Elections

Does EU interventions through capacity and technical building lead to free, fair, and credible elections?	ORPP	CSOs	JLAC	IEBC	Media	Local Elections Observers	Law Enforcement	The Judiciary	Political Parties	Total
Yes	5 (4%)	11 (9%)	12 (9%)	50 (14%)	15 (4%)	10 (9%)	0 (0%)	13 (7%)	0 (0%)	116
No	13 (37%)	123 (35%)	1 (3%)	37 (11%)	5 (1%)	10 (3%)	20 (6%)	6 (2%)	20 (6%)	235
Total	18 (5%)	134 (38%)	13 (4%)	87 (25%)	20 (6%)	20 (6%)	20 (6%)	19 (5%)	20 (6%)	350

Source: Survey Data (2023)

When the study engaged in in-depth qualitative research through key informant interviewing, respondents reasserted that the EU, while it does its work through technical and capacity building, has no power to influence electoral outcomes. CSO-based respondents highlighted two reasons, why despite the support from EU, both fair, free and credible aspects of the elections may not be as a result. First was the issue of high rates of poverty levels obtaining in Kenya (see GoK, 2022 – Household Survey). Many CSO leaders with electoral programs in the villages of Kenya argued that poverty caused vulnerability on the part of voters hindering their ability to participate in election by choosing political leaders who hold their visions at heart, rather, they made their decisions based on the extent to which politicians bribed them, through what in Nyanza region was terms as *yuko jamna*. Secondly, CSOs leaders expressed that Kenya is experiencing political decay, as voter apathy has become a structural hindrance to voter participation. Statistics from European Parliament analysis of elections in Kenya show that there has been steady decline from 2013 to 2022. For example, in 2013 the turn up was 85.91%, in 2017 it was 79.51% and in 2022 it was only 64% marking a decline of 21.14%.

From the IEBC perspective, the study found that the main determinant of free, fair and credible elections in Kenya, is what has been discussed above as political hygiene. Without it, as it is now, based on widespread consensus among IEBC personnel no amount of EU support can lead

to electoral integrity. My discussion with a key officer of the IEBC (in June 2023 at Nairobi City) and who currently works at the interior ministry quite captures this notion.

Researcher: In your understanding, based on your expertise, what factors determine the EU's ability to undertake free, fair and credible elections?

Respondent: To answer your question directly, it will depend, some countries, the problem is EMB because an election is seen to be a referee.

Researcher: Zero in to Kenya, Sir.

Respondent: For example, in Kenyan contestation, the biggest problem is a hybrid of mistrust of the EMB and mistrust from the political party that think that IEBC is not credible and it cannot conduct genuine elections. The other problem in Kenya is the political class. We have a breed of politicians who believe it is their way or not their way. This is despite the fact that we have a very elaborate way of recruiting members of the EMB.

Researcher: This is still contested though?

Respondent: Yes but that is the best we can do really in the circumstances we are in. The situation we are in, the commissioners lose trust because of the politicians they are working for, and who Kenyans want to elect. It is a challenge of the EMB- whether it is professionally recruited, and the mistrust as to whether they are working for politicians for toward and free and credible elections. There is never a problem with financial support for the EMBs by the way. Because there is a budgetary allocation and elections must be done whether after 5 years or 4 or 7 like in other African countries.

Researcher: This is of particular interest in my study. The place of foreign assistance is something that is in contestation. Whether they enhance credibility of elections or not is actually what am investigating, narrowing into EU. For example, you remember there was a time when IFES was sent away from this country with feelings about its negative influence. I don't know where and when donors come in and where they stop. What is their contribution really, the donors?

Respondent: you are speaking to somebody who has worked with the development partners. I was a donor myself. I worked with German Development Cooperation (GIZ) and I was funding governance projects in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. There is always a misconception of really, what development partners do or not do. The development partners to the best of my understanding, try not to interfere with the democratic processes and the governance structure and the in-workings of the country. What they do is to come in and provide technical or financial assistance or both. For example, the EU [THOUGH IN THE RECENT PAST just like the GIZ has been moving away from electoral assistance to real development funding] has been providing assistance for a very long time. This support is justifiable because elections is a very expensive process. Entire electoral cycle, if not complemented by a donor, any given country (developing) may not be able to fund that elections fully

but even the development partners may not be able to fund the entire process – so others come in at the tail end, while others do small bits across the cycle. This is why development partners understand the elections as a process and will be in a country throughout the process. But elections is the real thing. We cannot have a country or leaders without elections, assistance towards election is an existence issue.

This conversation further corroborates findings and interpretations already made in previous sections. That the nature of politics plays out as the key hindrance to genuine elections. However, these views vary, because while CSOs and IEBC blame the political class and parties, political parties shift the blame to external actors (such as EU) and resort to possible conspiracy theories to explain possibility of IEBC-EU involvement to determine who wins beyond the persons chosen by the populace.

5.6 Chapter Five Summary

Chapter Five provides a comprehensive overview and analysis of the study's findings, shedding light on the multifaceted role of European Union (EU) electoral assistance through capacity building within the context of Kenya's general elections post-2010. The study is framed within the Liberal Democratic Peace Theory (LDPT), which posits that liberal democracies prioritize peace and intervene externally to promote peaceful democratic processes. This chapter critically examines various dimensions of EU interventions and their impact on Kenya's electoral landscape, incorporating the perspectives of different categories of institutions involved in the electoral process. The central objective of this chapter is to examine the nature of the role of the EU technical and capacity-building interventions, capturing the viewpoints of diverse institutional stakeholders. Chapter Five's analysis provides valuable insights into the role of EU electoral assistance through capacity building in Kenya's post-2010 general elections. The findings revealed the major objectives underlying EU's work through technical and capacity building and EU's (and Kenyan institutions) concept of these concepts, revealing that top objective of the EU was to enhance electoral administrative capacity. The study also found an emphasis on elections as a process concept which to some extent do not marry with practice on the ground, more often than not come not earlier than 20 years before elections. The study also found that the EU largely rendered her support through the basket fund approach which was managed by UNDP, and the contributions of each EU and other so-called Western countries (including Japan) depended on their interests which varied from election to election.

Additionally, the EU's support was dynamic and came through funding/financing and resources support tailored to the major sectors including media, CSOs, and governmental institutions. The perspectives of the institutions on the influence of such support on electoral integrity varied, with most supporting continuity as EU's support is a step toward maturing Kenya's democracy, albeit continued challenge owing to the nature of political system which is cut-throat in nature. Lastly, largely, the study finds that most institutions see EU support through technical and capacity building as necessary, though this varies from institution to institution with political parties and ORPP not appreciating the necessity of such support but CSOs and IEBC highly rating it as very necessary. Lastly, the study ended with a measure of deficiency of external electoral assistance through technical and capacity building alone. The study showed that majority of respondents (67%) argued that EU's support did not lead to electoral integrity singularly. In-depth interviews on this situation showed that while EU contributed immensely, it had no power to facilitate electoral integrity as this depended purely on the extent of what a former IEBC Commissioner and an election expert called domestic political hygiene – the level of maturity of the political class to let IEBC do its work, and the level of IEBC Commissioners to stand firm and reject political enticements through intensified voter education, communicating with clarity their processes and being transparent in their execution. Generally, the findings showed that the EU's work was critical in promoting electoral democracy in Kenya and is complex programmatically and sectorial, however for them to push a liberal agenda effectively, the political environment must be transformed first, and this requires long-term investments in democracy, and not during elections interventions as is mostly the current case.

CHAPTER SIX

KEY STAKEHOLDERS' PERCEPTION ON THE CONTRIBUTION OF EU ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE ON KENYA'S ELECTIONS INTEGRITY

6.1 Introduction

Chapter 6 marked the culmination of the end of the findings chapters of this study's analysis into the multifaceted realm of European Union (EU) electoral assistance in Kenya's post-2010 general elections. The chapter delved into the intricate landscape of stakeholders' perceptions, effectively scrutinizing their perceptions into EU's effectiveness, EU-Kenya mutual benefits through electoral assistance, and overall impact of the EU's engagement. As the guiding theoretical framework of the Liberal Democratic Peace Theory (LDPT) underscores the cooperative endeavors of liberal democracies to nurture democratic values and peace through international collaborations, this chapter endeavored to unravel the converging and diverging viewpoints among key Kenyan institutions. Through an analysis of varying opinions within different institutional contexts, this chapter enriches the understanding of the intricate interplay between external interventions and democratic consolidation. The data presented herein not only contributes to illuminating the multifaceted dynamics of EU assistance but also furthers the discourse on the practical implications of theoretical underpinnings in real-world electoral contexts.

6.2 Forms of Engagement with the European Union during Elections

To lay out the context upon which stakeholders assess their engagement with the EU, and thus EU's electoral assistance in Kenya, this section examines the nature of engagement that different elections stakeholders have with the European Union (EU) during elections. The results in Table 22 provide valuable insights into the direct and indirect interactions of various institutional categories with the EU as an elections stakeholder.

Direct Engagements

Notably, respondents from the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP) exclusively reported direct engagement with the EU during elections, accounting for 100% of their responses. This focused engagement aligns with the ORPP's regulatory role, which likely involves direct coordination and communication with external partners like the EU to ensure transparent and effective electoral processes, from the point of view of regulating political

parties. The in-depth interviews with ORPP staff revealed how critical EU has been in the last three elections, 2013, 2017, and 2022 to the institution toward the ORPP capacity to undertake its electoral mandates. These interviews explain why ORPP engages with EU purely directly. European Union (EU) provides various forms of electoral support, including capacity building and technical assistance, and capacity for civic engagement. These forms of support are aimed at enhancing the electoral processes, promoting transparency, and strengthening the capacities of key electoral stakeholders. The EU offers capacity-building workshops and training programs to the ORPP staff and officials. These workshops are designed to enhance their skills and knowledge in areas such as electoral laws, regulations, and procedures. Training may also cover topics related to political party registration, compliance monitoring, and campaign finance regulations. By equipping ORPP staff with the necessary expertise, the EU hopes to help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the office in regulating political parties and overseeing electoral processes. The core objective of such training, narrated the ORPP Registrar, is to share good practices and lessons from other countries as well as past elections in Kenya. To the ORPP respondents, the number of workshops tailored to them have been increasing from 2013, to 2017, to 2022, revealing an increase of EU's stake in supporting electoral democracy in Kenya.

Secondly, the EU provides technical assistance to the ORPP in the process of electoral legal reforms. This involves collaborating with the ORPP in reviewing and amending electoral laws and regulations to ensure they align with international best practices and democratic standards. The EU's legal experts may offer guidance on issues such as campaign financing, party registration criteria, and electoral dispute resolution mechanisms. Through this support, the ORPP is hoped to contribute to creating a more conducive legal framework for elections in Kenya. The laws that ORPP reports EU to have played a role in enhancing included mainly the Political Parties Act especially the sections that infuse inclusivity (Women, Youth and Persons with Disability [PWDs]). This particular progressive law, enables the ORPP to have a backdrop upon which to registrar or to call upon a registered party to adhere to the rules of the game.

The interviews revealed a third ground of EU-ORPP engagement. The EU extends its support to the ORPP in conducting voter education and civic engagement campaigns. This includes funding and technical assistance for programs aimed at educating citizens about their rights, the electoral

process, and the importance of political participation. These initiatives empower the ORPP to work with civil society organizations and other stakeholders in promoting informed and active civic engagement among the electorate. Aimed especially at fostering greater public awareness, the EU's support is hoped to contribute to a more inclusive and transparent elections. Fourthly, the study found that the EU also attempts (just to a small extent) to support ORPP through enhancement of monitoring and Compliance Mechanisms. The EU assists the ORPP in strengthening its monitoring and compliance mechanisms related to political parties. This support may involve the development of monitoring tools and software to track party activities, campaign expenditures, and adherence to electoral regulations. Additionally, the EU may offer technical expertise in conducting audits and investigations to ensure that political parties comply with legal requirements. By enhancing the ORPP's capacity to monitor and enforce electoral regulations, the EU's hope is to help maintain a level playing field for all political actors and ensures fair competition during elections. However, this type of support is sensitive, and both EU and ORPP have played only a marginal role in enforcing it. Professor Kanyinga (2019) informs us that political parties in Kenya are difficult to regulate than nearly all other institutions. In deed interviews reveal that on the part of the EU, compliance monitoring tools have not been properly advanced, and though ORPP has tried to call on parties to adhere to campaign regulations, things on the ground are different, and “the political class have proved hard to follow the law” as reports the ORPP Registrar herself.

Likewise to ORPP, respondents' from the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) reported exclusive direct engagement with the EU during elections. This reflects the nature of respective functions. The IEBC's role in overseeing and conducting elections necessitates direct interactions to ensure the integrity and transparency of the electoral process. The EU provides various forms of electoral support, to the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) in Kenya as appreciated in the last two chapters on technical and capacity building and civic electoral education. These forms of support are aimed at enhancing the integrity and effectiveness of the electoral process. The EU offers significant financial support to the IEBC to facilitate the planning and execution of electoral operations. This funding is crucial for conducting various electoral activities, such as voter registration, voter education campaigns, procurement of election materials, and the organization of polling stations.

The EU's financial assistance is critical as it fills gaps in government funding and ensures that the IEBC has the necessary resources to carry out its mandate effectively and conduct transparent and credible elections. The EU deploys electoral experts and advisors to work closely with the IEBC. These experts provide technical assistance and share best practices in election management. Top IEBC respondents (current and former Commissioners) argued that they assist the IEBC in areas such as “electoral administration, logistics, and the use of technology in elections”. Moreover, EU’s perspective emphasized that “the EU's technical support helps the IEBC modernize its operations, improve electoral processes, and enhance its capacity to manage and monitor elections”. For example, EU experts have contributed to the implementation of biometric voter registration systems and the development of electoral databases both through their experts and through financial support to facilitate the development and enhancement of the technology infrastructure.

The EU also assists the IEBC in strengthening mechanisms for electoral dispute resolution. This includes providing guidance on the establishment of effective and impartial dispute resolution bodies and procedures. For example, the IEBC has its in-built dispute resolution mechanism called the IEBC Dispute Resolution Committee (DRC), an infrastructure developed through the support of the EU and which helps in conflict resolution, and embedded in Elections Act 2011, chaired by the IEBC Chair. The EU's support helps ensure that electoral disputes are addressed promptly and fairly, reducing the potential for post-election conflicts. By enhancing the IEBC's capacity in this regard, the EU contributes to the overall credibility of the electoral process. Lastly, the EU supports the IEBC in conducting voter education and civic engagement initiatives. This includes funding public awareness campaigns aimed at educating citizens about their voting rights, the importance of participating in elections, and the electoral process itself. From the perspective of most IEBC officials, these initiatives empower the IEBC to work with civil society organizations, community leaders, and other stakeholders to promote informed and active civic engagement among the electorate. By fostering greater public awareness and participation, the EU's support contributes to the legitimacy and inclusivity of the electoral process.

Additionally, the political parties solely reported direct engagement with the EU during elections. This engagement could encompass a wide range of activities, including consultations,

capacity building, and exchange of information, aimed at promoting transparency and accountability within political processes. The analysis in this sub-section illustrates the varying ways in which elections stakeholders engage with the EU during elections. The direct and indirect nature of engagement reflects the distinct roles, functions, and priorities of different institutional categories within the electoral landscape. These findings underscore the complexity of interactions between external actors like the EU and diverse domestic stakeholders in pursuit of transparent and credible electoral processes.

Respondents from the Media both reported exclusive direct engagement with the EU during elections, which could reflect the nature of their respective functions. The Media's active role in information dissemination and coverage during elections could lead to direct engagement to facilitate accurate and balanced reporting.

Indirect and Mixed Forms of Engagements

Conversely, the study found that Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) exhibited a more diversified pattern of engagement, with 90% of them reporting indirect interactions with the EU. This aligns with the nature of CSOs' roles, which often involve advocating for electoral integrity, transparency, and accountability. Their indirect engagement was reported to encompass collaborations, capacity-building efforts, and the exchange of information, contributing to a broader democratic ecosystem¹.

Among Local Elections Observers (LEOs), all interactions with the EU were indirect. This was attributed to their role in independently observing the electoral process and providing impartial reports. The indirect nature of engagement involves receiving information, resources, or capacity-building support to enhance their monitoring activities through establishments within and without the government. Actually, LEO, are part and parcel of the elections basket fund managed directly by the EU and through which the platform gets its funding, rather than directly through EU.

Law Enforcement and The Judiciary exhibited varied engagement patterns. While only 5% of Law Enforcement respondents reported direct engagement with the EU, 95% noted indirect

¹ As was discussed in chapter four (2010).

interactions. This dual perspective underscores the complexity of Law Enforcement's role, which spans maintaining law and order during elections and cooperating with external actors to uphold electoral integrity. The Judiciary, on the other hand, reported a relatively balanced distribution between direct (47%) and indirect (52%) engagement. This duality potentially reflects the diverse interactions the Judiciary has with the EU, ranging from capacity building to legal cooperation. Table 6.1 below summarizes this discussion quantitatively.

Table 6.1: Forms of Engagement with the European Union during Elections

What is your Institution of Affiliation? / What forms of engagement do you have with the EU during elections as an elections stakeholder?	Direct	Indirect	Total
ORPP	17 (100%)	0 (0%)	17 (5%)
CSOs	14 (10%)	120 (90%)	134 (38%)
JLAC	13 (100%)	0 (0%)	13 (4%)
IEBC	87 (100%)	0 (0%)	87 (25%)
Media	20 (100%)	0 (0%)	20 (6%)
Local Elections Observers	0 (0%)	20 (100%)	20 (6%)
Law Enforcement	1 (5%)	19 (95%)	20 (6%)
The Judiciary	9 (47%)	10 (53%)	19 (5%)
Political Parties	20 (100%)	0 (0%)	20 (6%)
Total	181 (52%)	169 (48%)	350 (100%)

Source: Survey Data (2023)

The diverse perspectives of different institutional categories regarding their engagement with the European Union (EU) during elections offer valuable insights when analyzed through the lens of the Liberal Democratic Peace Theory (LDPT), which underpins this study's theoretical

framework. The LDPT posits that liberal democracies actively promote democratic norms and values both domestically and internationally, contributing to peaceful relations among states. Starting with the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP), their exclusive direct engagement with the EU during elections aligns with the LDPT's assumption that liberal democracies intervene to safeguard democratic processes and norms. The ORPP's role in overseeing political parties and ensuring transparent electoral processes resonates with the theory's emphasis on internal and external peace promotion. Their direct engagement signifies an alignment of interests between domestic regulatory bodies and external actors like the EU, working collaboratively to enhance electoral integrity.

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) showcase a nuanced perspective that challenges certain aspects of the LDPT. While the LDPT assumes a unilateral interest in promoting democratic peace, CSOs' predominant indirect engagement suggests a more complex interaction. Their preference for indirect interactions, characterized by collaborations and capacity-building, indicates that their engagement with the EU might also involve safeguarding the interests of civil society itself. This diverges from the theory's emphasis on liberal democracies solely pursuing broad democratic norms. CSOs' focus on accountability, transparency, and local priorities implies that their engagement could be driven by a mix of democratic values and specific organizational agendas. The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) and the Media both demonstrate an alignment of their roles with the LDPT's expectations. The IEBC's exclusive direct engagement underscores the theory's assumption that liberal democracies prioritize transparent electoral processes. The EU's direct interaction with the IEBC reinforces the democratic peace-building paradigm by ensuring the integrity of elections. The Media's direct engagement similarly resonates with the theory's premise that liberal states facilitate democratic processes through information dissemination and transparent reporting.

The perspectives of Local Elections Observers (LEOs) offer an intriguing perspective that challenges the LDPT's assumptions. Their exclusively indirect engagement could indicate that they view the EU as a capacity-building partner, suggesting that not all external interactions are directly related to promoting democratic peace. Instead, LEOs' engagement might focus on enhancing their monitoring capabilities, pointing to a pragmatic approach to addressing challenges in the electoral process rather than solely pursuing democratic ideals. Law

Enforcement and the Judiciary's perspectives reflect the complexity of their roles within the democratic framework. Law Enforcement's dual perspective - with a majority indicating indirect engagement - could be attributed to their responsibilities for maintaining law and order during elections. This nuanced engagement highlights the potential challenge of balancing democratic values with ensuring security and stability, which might lead to differing interpretations of external involvement. Similarly, The Judiciary's balanced engagement aligns with the theory's assumption of promoting democratic norms but also suggests their discerning evaluation of the scope and nature of EU interactions in the context of the legal system.

Political Parties' sole direct engagement with the EU presents a unique perspective that diverges from the LDPT's assumptions. While the theory anticipates liberal democracies promoting broad democratic norms, Political Parties' engagement could stem from concerns about external factors influencing domestic politics. This divergence underscores the theory's limitations in capturing the intricate dynamics of political actors' perceptions and motivations within a liberal democratic context. Therefore, analyzing the varying perspectives of institutional categories through the lens of the LDPT offers a multi-dimensional understanding of the interactions between external actors like the EU and domestic stakeholders. While certain perspectives align with the theory's assumptions, others challenge and nuance those assumptions, highlighting the intricate interplay of democratic values, organizational interests, and contextual complexities within the landscape of democratic peace-building.

6.3 Tracking the Elections Stakeholders' Perspectives on Temporal Dimensions of on European Union's Electoral Assistance in Kenya since 2010

The table 6.2 below helped in examining the duration of engagement between various institutions and the European Union (EU) in terms of elections programs. The data provides insights into the extent of involvement of different stakeholder categories over various election periods. The aim is to understand the depth and longevity of engagement, potentially revealing patterns and trends in EU collaboration.

Among the respondents affiliated with the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP), 23.5% reported engagement during the elections of 2017, while 76.5% reported engagement

throughout all post-2010 elections. This substantial engagement suggests a consistent partnership between the ORPP and the EU in elections-related programs.

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) displayed a diverse pattern of engagement. None reported involvement during the elections of 2017, whereas 5.2% indicated engagement during the Elections of 2022, and a significant 94.8% reported engagement in all post-2010 elections. This varied engagement pattern could be attributed to the dynamic nature of CSOs' roles and their alignment with different phases of electoral cycles. It also shows the reality of the 2022 elections which to many observers was the most hotly contested in Kenya's history (EU, 2022; Standard Newspaper, 2022). The Parliamentary Judicial and Legal Affairs Committee (JLAC) reported engagement of 23.1% during the elections of 2017, 30.8% during the Elections of 2022, and 46.2% across all post-2010 elections. The fluctuating engagement percentages suggest JLAC's evolving involvement with the EU in elections programs, potentially driven by changing constitutional implementation dynamics, and also a constant level of engagement throughout the elections examined; this shows the criticality of EU's electoral assistance to the judicial and legal affairs in the country.

For the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), engagement percentages stood at 13.8% during the elections of 2017, 20.7% during the Elections of 2022, and a significant 65.5% across all post-2010 elections. This substantial overall engagement reflects IEBC's central role in electoral processes and signifies a consistent partnership with the EU. It shows that EU has treated IEBC as a critical entry point and a major institution to attaining electoral integrity in the country. Media organizations reported 50% engagement during the elections of 2017, no engagement during the Elections of 2022, and 50% engagement across all post-2010 elections. This balanced engagement was reported to be influenced by media's role in covering elections and the EU's focus on information dissemination and transparency.

Local Elections Observers (LEO) demonstrated a pattern of 20% engagement during the Elections of 2022 and 80% engagement across all post-2010 elections. This consistent engagement highlights LEO's ongoing participation in EU-supported electoral programs. Law Enforcement reported full engagement (100%) across all post-2010 elections, potentially reflecting their involvement in maintaining law and order during election cycles.

The Judiciary and Political Parties displayed consistent patterns of full engagement (100%) across all post-2010 elections, indicating sustained collaboration with the EU in electoral programs. In summary, this section of the study provides insights into the duration of engagement between various stakeholder institutions and the EU in terms of elections programs. The diverse patterns of engagement highlight the dynamic roles of different institutions and their evolving partnerships with the EU, shedding light on the depth and nature of their involvement in enhancing Kenya's electoral processes.

Table 6.2: Experience working with EU in electoral programming

Institution of Affiliation	The elections of 2017	The Elections of 2022	All the post-2010 elections	Total
ORPP	4 (23.5%)	0 (0%)	13 (76.5%)	17 (100%)
CSOs	0 (0%)	7 (5.2%)	127 (94.8%)	134 (100%)
JLAC	3 (23.1%)	4 (30.8%)	6 (46.2%)	13 (100%)
IEBC	12 (13.8%)	18 (20.7%)	57 (65.5%)	87 (100%)
Media	10 (50%)	0 (0%)	10 (50%)	20 (100%)
Local Elections Observers	0 (0%)	4 (20%)	16 (80%)	20 (100%)
Law Enforcement	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	20 (100%)	20 (100%)
The Judiciary	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	19 (100%)	19 (100%)
Political Parties	0 (0%)	9 (45%)	11 (55%)	20 (100%)
Total	29 (8.3%)	42 (12%)	279 (79.7%)	350 (100%)

Source: Survey Data (2023)

The Theoretical Lens

The findings presented in this sub-section hold significance in light of the Liberal Democratic Peace Theory (LDPT), which guides the theoretical framework of this study. The LDPT suggests that liberal democracies prioritize both internal and external peace, leading them to intervene in fragile, vulnerable, states countries where democratic consolidation is yet to take root, to promote peaceful and democratic processes (See e.g., Kiamba & Bachmann, 2015). When interpreting these findings through the lens of the LDPT, several key insights and implications emerge. **Firstly**, the consistent and substantial engagement of government institutions like the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP), Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), Judiciary, and Political Parties across all post-2010 elections aligns with

the theory's premise. Liberal democracies, as proponents of democratic peace, tend to engage with and support institutions that are pivotal in ensuring transparent, credible, and peaceful elections. This engagement underscores the importance of fostering democratic practices to maintain peace and stability.

Second observation is the varying engagement patterns of CSOs and JLAC. The varying engagement patterns of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and the Joint Parliamentary Select Committee on Constitutional Implementation (JLAC) could be seen as a reflection of their evolving roles in democratic processes. The theory assumes that liberal democracies would collaborate with institutions that promote democratic values. The fluctuations in engagement may indicate a dynamic relationship based on the changing needs of these institutions in enhancing democratic practices which marches with the reality of evolving Kenya's democratic space and donor funding mechanism (see a robust discussion by EP, 2017; EC, 2023). Thirdly, the balanced engagement across different election periods reflects the theory's emphasis on information dissemination and transparency in liberal democracies. The media's role in covering elections aligns with the LDPT's expectation that open communication contributes to democratic stability.

The Law Enforcement's full engagement across all post-2010 elections points to their integral role in maintaining law and order during electoral cycles. This aligns with the theory's assumption that liberal states would support institutions contributing to internal peace and stability. However, the theory might not fully encompass the complex challenges that law enforcement agencies face, such as post-election assessment, which could explain their consistent engagement. Lastly, political parties' sustained partnership across various election periods reveals the dynamic interplay between external interventions and domestic political actors. While the LDPT suggests that liberal states would invest in interventions to enhance democratic processes, the dissenting perspectives from Political Parties in previous tables indicated suspicions about external influences. This sustained engagement prompts a nuanced analysis of the theory's assumption about liberal states' intentions.

Overall, the engagement patterns highlighted in this table reveal the complexities and nuances of applying the LDPT to the context of EU engagement in Kenya's electoral processes. While the

theory provides a valuable framework for understanding liberal democracies' interventions in support of democratic peace, these findings emphasize the need to critically assess how various institutions interpret and respond to external interventions, and how these interactions shape the broader democratic landscape.

6.4 Stakeholders' Perception of Mutual Benefits between Kenya and EU Engagements

The analysis of responses from various institutions in Table 24 below provides insights into their perceptions regarding the mutual benefits of engagements between Kenya and the European Union (EU). Each institution's viewpoint reflects its distinct role, functions, and interactions within the democratic framework which EU, and other stakeholders aim to create. These perceptions can be interpreted through the lens of the Liberal Democratic Peace Theory (LDPT), which emphasizes the cooperative (and also conflicting) nature of liberal democracies in promoting peace and democratic values through international interactions.

Among the respondents from the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP), none perceived the engagements as mutually beneficial. This observation might be attributed to the ORPP's primary focus on regulatory oversight of political parties, potentially causing them to prioritize domestic considerations over external collaborations. In contrast, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) displayed a significant consensus, with 91% expressing the belief in mutual benefits. This alignment resonates with the LDPT, as CSOs are often key actors in advocating for democratic values and transparency, aligning with the theory's premise of international cooperation to foster peaceful and democratic processes. Most importantly, CSOs while engaging with the EU and government institutions under EU funding framework, also push their agenda. CSOs require funding to meet their stated objectives, and the EU provides them with such an asset. It is clear that while they help in the pursuit of public civic engagement and ensure a political informed voter is created, thus helping meeting the EU goals, they also benefit from the funding which facilitates their coexistence. This view was widely held by both grassroots and national level Consortia of NGOs dealing in elections. Moreover, Most CSOs expressed a worry whereby the EU was slowly changing its funding model, prioritizing government institutions over CSOs, particularly after 2010 Constitution something that they thought would erode their engagement and mutually benefitting relationships with the EU. One respondent from a Kisumu-based Local NGO asserted:

For us, we our relationship with EU as symbiotic. They give us money to meet our stated objectives but we also help the organization in building a democratic Kenya. However, over time, the organization is changing its funding model whereby it is increasingly targeting government organizations and bigger scope (national) NGOs. This will limit the benefits we get from each other in the future (TEAMS Director, April 2023).

On their part, the Judiciary and Legal Affairs Committee (JLAC) exhibited a mixed perspective, with 62% perceiving mutual benefits and the remaining 38% holding a contrary view. This divergence reflects the varied roles and experiences within the legal framework, leading to different evaluations of external engagements' impacts. On their part, Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) respondents largely endorsed the mutual benefits perspective (84%), consistent with their role in ensuring transparent and credible elections. This echoes the LDPT's idea of liberal democracies collaborating to enhance democratic processes.

The media's responses (70%) indicating mutual benefits highlight the positive role of international collaborations in bolstering media coverage and public awareness. However, the remaining 30% of the media respondents who held a differing view might be considering challenges such as media freedom and independence in the context of external collaborations, and a lack of keen interest in the media-engagements especially with social media platforms, only until 2022 elections when such engagements were robust, especially funded under the “elections bila noma” slogan and pushed by local media, both broadcast, but largely targeted to youths through their social media platforms.

Local Elections Observers (LEO) displayed a nuanced perspective, with 25% affirming mutual benefits. Their role involves directly monitoring electoral processes, explaining their outlook influenced by the tangible impacts of external assistance on election integrity. The view within Law Enforcement was evenly split, with 55% supporting mutual benefits and 45% opposing. This divergence likely arises from the multifaceted nature of law enforcement's responsibilities, encompassing maintaining law and order, often distinct from electoral affairs. LE top officers reported mutual benefits accounting how the EU support through tailored workshop training and funding to revise electoral laws touching on law enforcement and other security dimensions of elections was critical in filling government gaps. However, the divided opinion on non-mutual benefits in the LE-EU engagement was largely posited by the low ranking officers who did not

note any administrative assistance from EU, and arguing that the benefits were to the country rather than to the law enforcement departments.

The perceptions within the Judiciary showcased a similar split (47% agreeing with mutual benefits and 53% disagreeing), reflecting the complexities of legal institutions where perceptions may be shaped by specific cases and considerations. A number of respondents from Judiciary argued that the EU's engagements with Judiciary were largely to the greater benefit of the country as whole, but that such engagements were very minimal. However, top level judiciary and related offices acknowledged the mutual relationships they have with EU, and the institutional benefits such relationships had. For example, an interviews with top Judiciary personnel showcased a number of EU-assisted sittings, workshops, trainings, and so on, for Judiciary alone or for Judiciary in collaboration with other organizations such as JLAC, law enforcement, and the political parties as well as representatives from political class contending elections. Most of the interviews revealed that such engagements were key to creating a favorable environment for achieving Judiciary's mandate in elections, thus not only helping the country but also the institution as an actor in elections.

Notably, Political Parties displayed skepticism, with only 15% agreeing with mutual benefits. This skepticism potentially stems from concerns about external actors' influence on domestic politics, challenging the LDPT's assumption of universal cooperation among liberal democracies. In sum, the analysis reveals the diverse considerations that institutions bring to their perceptions of mutual benefits from international engagements. While some align with the LDPT's cooperative premise, others exhibit skepticism rooted in their specific functions and contexts, underlining the intricate dynamics of international interactions within a democratic framework. Table below summarizes these discussions quantitatively.

Table 6.3: Stakeholders Perception of Mutual Benefits between Kenya and EU Engagements

Institution of Affiliation	Yes	No	Total
ORPP	0 (0%)	17 (100%)	17
CSOs	122 (91%)	12 (9%)	134
JLAC	8 (62%)	5 (38%)	13
IEBC	73 (84%)	14 (16%)	87
Media	14 (70%)	6 (30%)	20
Local Elections Observers	5 (25%)	15 (75%)	20
Law Enforcement	11 (55%)	9 (45%)	20
The Judiciary	9 (47%)	10 (53%)	19
Political Parties	3 (15%)	17 (85%)	20
Total	245 (70%)	105 (30%)	350

Source: Survey Data (2023)

6.5 Effectiveness of EU as an Avenue for Consolidating Electoral Democracy in Kenya

Table 25 presents the perceptions of different institutions on the effectiveness of the European Union (EU) as an avenue for consolidating electoral democracy in Kenya through its electoral assistance. The analysis of this data offers insights into how various stakeholders view the EU's impact on the consolidation of democratic processes. These perspectives can be examined through the lens of the Liberal Democratic Peace Theory (LDPT), which posits that liberal democracies actively promote democratic values and peace through international cooperation.

Considering the entire sample size, the study established that EU's electoral assistance is perceived as very effective in the consolidating of electoral democracy in Kenya. 66% (230) of the respondents rate the EU's work as "Very Effective"; 16% as moderately effective, 16% as "Ineffective" and only 1% as "Very Ineffective". This shows the indispensable role of EU's involvement in Kenya's electoral democracy. The results were further examined across the strata, and diverging perspectives were realized as discussed below.

Table 6.4: Stakeholders Perception of Effectiveness of EU as an Avenue for Consolidating Electoral Democracy in Kenya

Institution of Affiliation	Very Ineffective	Ineffective	Moderately Effective	Effective	Very Effective	Total
ORPP	4 (24%)	13 (76%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	17
CSOs	0 (0%)	21 (16%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	113 (84%)	134
JLAC	1 (8%)	0 (0%)	4 (31%)	5 (38%)	3 (23%)	13
IEBC	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	87 (100%)	87
Media	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	15 (75%)	0 (0%)	5 (25%)	20
Local Elections Observers	0 (0%)	2 (10%)	15 (75%)	0 (0%)	3 (15%)	20
Law Enforcement	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	20 (100%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	20
The Judiciary	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (5%)	0 (0%)	18 (95%)	19
Political Parties	0 (0%)	19 (95%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (5%)	20
Total	5 (1%)	55 (16%)	55 (16%)	5 (1%)	230 (66%)	350

Source: Survey Data (2023)

Among respondents from the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP), 76% rated the EU's electoral assistance as ineffective and very ineffective (24%). Exploring this rating further through interviews, the study found that this perception stem from the ORPP's regulatory role, where tangible impacts of external assistance on electoral democracy might not be as prominent in their day-to-day operations. Moreover, the critical component of ORPP's work, monitoring compliance of the political parties during campaigns, was reportedly a difficult component which the EU was yet to devise mechanism to support. Additionally, the ORPP respondents posited that their work was simple and direct that they did not necessarily need additional financing to undertake their roles.

Conversely, among Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), the majority (84%) categorized the EU's assistance as very effective. This strong endorsement from CSOs reflects their roles as advocates for transparency, accountability, and democratic values. Generally interviews with CSOs showcased a very positive perception of EU as promoters of democratization in Kenya, with most arguing that their work is largely as a result of EU's funding and technical support. Except for the recent worries that the donor funding for elections are moving steadily toward national.

Respondents from the Judicial and Legal Affairs Committee (JLAC) exhibited diverse perspectives. While 62% rated the EU's assistance as either moderately effective or effective, the remaining 38% rated it as ineffective or very ineffective. This variance was attributed to the varied experiences of JLAC members within the legal and electoral framework, leading to different evaluations of the EU's impact. Notably, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) respondents overwhelmingly rated the EU's assistance as very effective (100%). This alignment is in line with the LDPT's emphasis on collaborative efforts to enhance electoral integrity and consolidate democratic practices.

The media respondents predominantly rated the EU's assistance as moderately effective (75%), while a smaller proportion (25%) rated it as very effective. This divergence was reported to reflect the media's consideration of factors such as media freedom and autonomy when evaluating the impact of external assistance. Local Elections Observers (LEO) and Law Enforcement both displayed a consensus on the effectiveness of EU assistance. The majority of LEO respondents (75%) rated it as either moderately effective or effective, while Law Enforcement respondents (100%) regarded it as moderately effective. These perceptions might be shaped by the tangible impact of external assistance on electoral processes.

The perspectives within the Judiciary also displayed a consensus, with 95% rating the EU's assistance as either moderately effective or effective. This reflects the importance of legal institutions in upholding democratic processes and their alignment with the LDPT's cooperative premise. Political Parties respondents offered mixed perceptions, with 20% rating the EU's assistance as ineffective or very ineffective, and 5% as moderately effective. This skepticism potentially stems from concerns about external actors' influencing domestic politics, underscoring the complexities of international interventions in democratic processes.

In conclusion, the analysis in this section showcases the most elections stakeholders in Kenya support the notion of EU as effective in through the mechanism it use to promote electoral democracy, albeit, there are diverse perceptions on the effectiveness of the EU's role in consolidating electoral democracy in Kenya, leading to diverse perspectives on its effectiveness. While some institutions align with the LDPT's cooperative premise, others exhibit skepticism or

nuanced perspectives, reflecting the intricate dynamics of international interventions within a democratic framework.

6.6 Summary of Findings and Analysis with Existing Literature

This final chapter of the thesis findings presented, discussed, and interpreted, findings pertaining to assessment of key stakeholders' perceptions on EU's role in promoting Kenya's electoral democracy. In this vein, it examined the forms of E-Stakeholders engagements; temporal dimensions of EU-Stakeholders engagement – tracking EU's impact in 2013, 2017, and 2022 elections; stakeholders assessments of EU's role in terms of mutuality of its benefits; and finally to undertake an assessment of stakeholders perspectives in terms on EU's effectiveness in promoting electoral democracy in Kenya.

The first part delved into the various forms of engagement that Kenyan electoral stakeholders have with the European Union (EU) during elections. The analysis revealed a rich tapestry of engagement modes, ranging from direct to indirect interactions. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) emerged as key actors engaging indirectly through collaborations and capacity-building, which often align with their goals of safeguarding civil society interests. On the other hand, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), ORPP, and the media showcased direct engagements that harmonized with the EU's commitment to transparent electoral processes. Yet still JLAC, Judiciary, Law Enforcement exhibited a highbred type of engagement showing both direct and indirect, revealing that EU's approach could be tailored within a given institution. These findings underscored the nuanced nature of engagement, challenging the assumption of unilateral interest in promoting democratic peace and highlighting the interplay of democratic values and organizational agendas.

The second section provided insights into the duration and continuity of engagement between various institutions and the EU in electoral programs since 2010. The findings unveiled patterns and trends in EU collaboration with different stakeholder categories. Notably, institutions like the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP), the IEBC, and the Judiciary exhibited consistent and substantial engagement, reflecting the EU's pivotal role in supporting transparent, credible, and peaceful elections. Conversely, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) displayed varied engagement patterns, showcasing the dynamic nature of their roles and concerns over

shifting EU funding priorities. These findings illuminated the dynamic landscape of EU engagement in Kenya's electoral processes and its impact on various stakeholders.

The third section analyzed how different institutions perceive the mutual benefits arising from engagements between Kenya and the EU. The Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP) expressed minimal belief in mutual benefits, potentially due to their primary focus on domestic considerations and regulatory oversight. In contrast, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), and IEBC, overwhelmingly believed in mutual benefits, aligning with their role as advocates for democratic values and transparency. These findings emphasized the symbiotic relationship between CSOs, and IEBC and the EU, where funding supports their objectives while advancing democratic goals. The findings validate the fact that CSOs thus are the key stakeholders from the non-governmental framework while IEBC, the major stakeholder from the governmental framework. However, concerns emerged regarding a shift in EU funding priorities towards government institutions, potentially impacting CSOs' engagement, in the future.

The final section of this chapter examined stakeholders' perceptions of the EU's effectiveness as an avenue for consolidating electoral democracy in Kenya through electoral assistance. Overall, a majority of respondents considered the EU's work as "Very Effective" in this regard, underlining its indispensable role. However, diverse perspectives emerged among different institutions. While CSOs and the IEBC overwhelmingly supported the EU's effectiveness, the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP) expressed skepticism. The media's view was mixed, reflecting considerations of media freedom and autonomy. These diverse perceptions underscored the complex nature of international interventions in electoral democracy and the varying impacts on different stakeholders and institutions.

In conclusion, Chapter 6 presented a comprehensive analysis of Kenya's electoral stakeholders' perspectives on their engagement with the European Union (EU) during elections and the EU's impact following such engagements. The findings highlighted the multifaceted nature of this engagement, its temporal dimensions, perceived mutual benefits, and effectiveness in consolidating electoral democracy. These insights contribute to a nuanced understanding of the complex dynamics of external interventions within Kenya's democratic landscape, challenging

assumptions and emphasizing the importance of context-specific considerations in shaping perceptions and outcomes.

In terms of extant research, this chapter contributes new knowledge to current works on EU-Kenya relations as these works suffer a lack of focus. Firstly, existing literature have not examined stakeholders perceptions on EU, through an empirical assessment criteria adopted in this thesis chapter. For example, Musila (2019) undertake a time series assessment of the EU-Kenya relations, but the scope of analysis is political relations generally and fails to focus on electoral issues, and how Kenyan actors perceive EU's political aid. On the same note, Kiamba & Bachmann (2015) suffers from a lack of focus just as Musila's study thus do not provide analytic perspective into how Kenyans, through electoral concerned institutions perceive EU in the electoral democratic spaces. Additionally, the this chapter, building on previous chapters, unpacks to the forms of engagements EU have with institutions concerned with election in Kenya, expanding beyond statist analysis to include also CSOs, which play critical roles in undertaking civic engagements, through civic electoral education. Such focus is deficient in both EU analyses of its engagement in Africa and Kenya (see, EP, 2017) and scholarly works (Musila, 2019). Thirdly, the study has revealed the temporal dynamics of EU engagements, and the perceptions of stakeholders at different elections times, showing change and continuity; for example revealing the changing nature of EU funding and the continuity of engagements between EU and key stakeholders such as CSO and IEBC. While Musila undertakes a time series analysis, his study does not appreciate trends within electoral spaces, across multiple stakeholders concerned. Lastly the study have summarized the chapter with effectiveness analysis, revealing opportunities and skepticism, particularly from the political class, and the ORPP; further showing how assessments vary with level of engagement, whereby institutions which are heavily engaged with the EU in promoting electoral democracy have a rather very favorable assessment of her work, and institutions with limited role, portending skepticism.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSIONS, SUMMARY, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Introduction

In this concluding chapter, the study consolidates the key findings derived from the analysis of the European Union's (EU) contribution to Kenya's general elections integrity. The chapter draws overarching conclusions regarding the role of EU foreign electoral assistance in shaping the electoral landscape and addresses the research objectives laid out earlier. Additionally, this chapter presents a set of recommendations for enhancing electoral integrity in Kenya and identifies potential avenues for future research.

7.2 Study Conclusions

In conclusion, the study's findings emphasize the multifaceted nature of the EU's electoral civic education support in Kenya. While the EU's commitment to transparency, inclusivity, and regional diversity is evident, achieving electoral integrity in Kenya is not solely reliant on external support. It is contingent on the transformation of the political landscape and the maturity of the political class. The study suggests that the EU's work is critical in promoting electoral democracy in Kenya, but for it to be more effective, long-term investments in democracy and political reforms are necessary. The study provides valuable insights into the complexities of external interventions within Kenya's democratic landscape, challenging assumptions and highlighting the need for context-specific considerations in shaping perceptions and

The analysis presented in Objective One of the study (Chapter Four) emphasizes the dynamic and adaptive nature of the European Union's electoral civic education support in Kenya. It highlights the crucial role of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in driving electoral integrity and promoting democratic values. The preference for engaging with NGOs, the existence of collaborative funding mechanisms, and the focus on inclusivity and regional diversity underscore the EU's commitment to transparent and credible electoral processes in Kenya. However, it is important to acknowledge that the effectiveness of these interventions faces challenges in the context of Kenya's political environment. Achieving electoral integrity goes beyond external support; it hinges on the maturity of the political class and the ability of electoral institutions to resist political pressures. Therefore, while the EU's work is critical in promoting electoral democracy, a long-term transformation of the political landscape is essential for lasting progress.

Objective Two (Chapter Five) analysis provides valuable insights into the role of EU electoral assistance through capacity building in Kenya's post-2010 general elections. The EU's focus on enhancing electoral administrative capacity is commendable, but the timing of assistance raises questions about its long-term impact. The collaborative nature of international support, as exemplified by the UNDP Basket Fund, underscores the complexity of electoral assistance. However, the study reveals a somewhat gloomy picture regarding the ability of external assistance, including EU support, to ensure electoral integrity in Kenya. The influence of such support is constrained by the political environment and the maturity of the political class. Therefore, while the EU's work is critical in promoting electoral democracy, it must be complemented by broader political reforms to achieve lasting progress.

Chapter Six provides an in-depth analysis of Kenya's electoral stakeholders' perspectives on their engagement with the European Union during elections and the EU's impact on electoral democracy. It reveals a rich tapestry of engagement modes, ranging from direct to indirect interactions, and highlights the adaptability of the EU's approach within various institutions. The temporal analysis underscores the pivotal role of the EU in supporting transparent and credible elections in Kenya, with certain institutions benefiting consistently. However, the dynamic engagement patterns of CSOs and concerns over shifting funding priorities pose challenges. The study also emphasizes the symbiotic relationship between CSOs, the IEBC, and the EU, where mutual benefits are evident. Nevertheless, concerns arise about potential changes in funding priorities and their implications. Overall, while the majority of respondents consider the EU's work as effective in consolidating electoral democracy, varying perspectives among institutions highlight the intricate dynamics of international interventions and their impact on different stakeholders. This chapter contributes to a nuanced understanding of the complex dynamics of electoral assistance in Kenya's democratic landscape, emphasizing the importance of context-specific considerations in shaping perceptions and outcomes.

7.3 Study Summary of Findings

In chapter 4, the study explored the multifaceted nature of the European Union's electoral civic education support in Kenya, shedding light on several critical aspects. One of the key findings is the adaptability of the EU's approach to different institutions and stakeholders. This adaptability highlights the EU's commitment to tailoring its interventions to meet the unique needs and

capacities of various actors involved in Kenya's electoral processes. The pivotal role played by Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in implementing EU-supported civic and electoral education programs is a noteworthy observation. CSOs have emerged as crucial intermediaries, bridging the gap between international support and grassroots engagement. This role underscores the importance of civil society in promoting electoral integrity and democratic values in Kenya. However, it is essential to recognize the challenges and complexities that CSOs face, such as shifting funding priorities and changing political landscapes.

Furthermore, the preference for engaging with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) over government bodies and think tank organizations by the EU reflects a pragmatic choice. NGOs often exhibit greater flexibility, grassroots reach, and alignment with EU values, making them effective partners in electoral support initiatives. This preference aligns with the EU's commitment to promoting inclusive and impartial electoral processes. The existence of the UNDP Basket Fund for Elections Assistance, which channels funding from various donors into electoral activities, underscores the collaborative nature of international support for Kenya's elections. It highlights the significance of coordinated efforts among multiple actors in enhancing electoral integrity. This collaborative approach is essential for addressing the complex challenges faced by Kenya's electoral processes. The geographic and demographic coverage of EU-supported programs, including youth, women, people with disabilities, and the general population, reflects a commitment to inclusivity and participation. Tailoring approaches to address diverse regional needs is a practical strategy that recognizes the unique dynamics and challenges present in different parts of Kenya.

In Chapter Five delved into the role of European Union (EU) electoral assistance through capacity building within the context of Kenya's general elections post-2010. The findings presented here shed light on various dimensions of EU interventions and their impact on Kenya's electoral landscape. The study is framed within the Liberal Democratic Peace Theory (LDPT), which posits that liberal democracies prioritize peace and intervene externally to promote peaceful democratic processes. One of the key findings is the EU's major objective of enhancing electoral administrative capacity. This objective aligns with the EU's commitment to transparent and efficient electoral processes. However, there is a notable gap between the concept of

elections as a process and the practice on the ground. EU assistance often comes closer to elections, raising questions about its long-term impact on the electoral system.

The study also highlights the role of the UNDP Basket Fund for Elections Assistance in managing contributions from various donors, including the EU. This collaborative funding mechanism reflects the interconnected nature of international support for Kenya's elections. The EU's support comes in the form of funding, resources, and sector-specific assistance to media, CSOs, and governmental institutions. Perspectives on the influence of EU support on electoral integrity vary among different institutions. While some view it as a step toward maturing Kenya's democracy, challenges persist due to the cut-throat nature of the political system. Importantly, a significant proportion of respondents believe that EU support alone does not lead to electoral integrity. This finding underscores the limitations of external assistance in the absence of a conducive political environment.

In Chapter Six the study conducted an analysis of Kenya's electoral stakeholders' perspectives on their engagement with the European Union (EU) during elections and the EU's impact following such engagements. The chapter is structured to explore various facets, including the forms of engagement, temporal dimensions of EU-stakeholder engagement, assessments of mutual benefits, and an evaluation of the EU's effectiveness in promoting electoral democracy in Kenya.

One noteworthy observation is the diverse forms of engagement that Kenyan electoral stakeholders have with the EU during elections. These range from direct to indirect interactions, revealing a rich tapestry of engagement modes. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) emerge as key indirect actors, often collaborating and engaging in capacity-building efforts, aligning with their overarching goal of safeguarding civil society interests. Conversely, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP), and the media exhibit direct engagements, reflecting the EU's commitment to transparent electoral processes. The hybrid engagement observed in institutions like JLAC, Judiciary, and Law Enforcement further highlights the adaptable nature of EU's approach within different institutions.

The analysis also delved into the temporal dimensions of EU-stakeholder engagement, tracking EU's impact in the 2013, 2017, and 2022 elections. Patterns and trends emerge, particularly in collaboration with different stakeholder categories. Institutions like the ORPP, IEBC, and the Judiciary demonstrate consistent and substantial engagement, underscoring the EU's pivotal role in supporting transparent, credible, and peaceful elections. On the other hand, CSOs exhibit varied engagement patterns, mirroring the dynamic nature of their roles and concerns over shifting EU funding priorities.

An examination of how different institutions perceive the mutual benefits arising from engagements between Kenya and the EU revealed varying perspectives. While the ORPP expresses minimal belief in mutual benefits, potentially due to its primary focus on domestic considerations and regulatory oversight, CSOs and the IEBC overwhelmingly believe in mutual benefits. This alignment is rooted in the symbiotic relationship between these institutions and the EU, where funding supports their objectives while advancing democratic goals. However, concerns emerge regarding a potential shift in EU funding priorities toward government institutions, which could impact CSOs' engagement in the future.

The final section of this chapter scrutinized stakeholders' perceptions of the EU's effectiveness as an avenue for consolidating electoral democracy in Kenya through electoral assistance. Overall, a majority of respondents consider the EU's work as "Very Effective" in this regard, underlining its indispensable role. However, perspectives diverge among different institutions, with the ORPP expressing skepticism and the media's view being mixed, reflecting considerations of media freedom and autonomy. These varied perceptions underscore the complexity of international interventions in electoral democracy and their diverse impacts on different stakeholders and institutions.

7.4 Recommendations to Various Actors

7.4.1 Recommendations to the European Union

1. Maintain a flexible and adaptable approach in engaging with Kenyan stakeholders during electoral events to address their unique needs.
2. Monitor and evaluate changes in funding priorities to ensure that support remains aligned with democratic values and the needs of local actors.

3. Continue to support key institutions like the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), and the Judiciary in their efforts to promote transparent and credible elections in Kenya.
4. Engage constructively with Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and other stakeholders to address concerns and maintain effectiveness in promoting electoral democracy.
5. Consider the impact of the government-focused funding model to civic engagement

7.4.2 Recommendations to the Government of Kenya

1. Work towards creating a more mature and politically hygienic environment that allows electoral institutions like the IEBC to operate independently and conduct transparent elections.
2. **Strengthen Electoral Reforms and Political Hygiene:** The Kenyan government should prioritize comprehensive electoral reforms to enhance the integrity of the electoral process. This includes reviewing and updating electoral laws, regulations, and procedures to align them with international best practices. Additionally, political leaders should foster a culture of political hygiene by refraining from interference in electoral institutions and allowing them to operate independently and impartially.
3. **Enhance Collaboration with International Partners:** To ensure transparent, credible, and peaceful elections, the Kenyan government should proactively collaborate with international partners, including the European Union (EU). Establishing strong working relationships and open channels of communication with these partners will enable Kenya to leverage their expertise, technical assistance, and financial support effectively.
4. **Invest in Civic Education and Public Awareness:** The government should invest in civic education programs to raise awareness about the electoral process, the importance of democratic values, and the role of civil society in promoting electoral integrity. These programs should target diverse demographic groups, including youth, women, and people with disabilities, to ensure inclusivity and active participation in elections.
5. **Ensure Accountability and Transparency in Electoral Institutions:** Kenya should prioritize measures to enhance the accountability and transparency of electoral institutions, especially the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC). This includes strengthening mechanisms for monitoring and reporting on electoral

processes, ensuring fair and equal access to media for all political actors, and implementing robust systems for electoral results verification and transmission.

7.4.3 Recommendations to Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)

1. Adapt to shifting funding priorities while maintaining a strong focus on democratic values and electoral integrity.
2. Continue to play a pivotal role in promoting transparency, inclusivity, and accountability in Kenya's electoral processes.
3. Collaborate with international partners and governmental institutions to leverage their influence in advancing democratic goals.

7.4.4 Recommendations to the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission

1. The Parliament should enact a law that creates a consolidated fund for the IEBC to enhance its financial autonomy and political independence round the electoral cycle.
2. Loopholes for political interference during recruitment should be sealed through a professional merit-based and apolitical process.
3. Recognize the necessity of external support, including technical and capacity-building assistance, in enhancing electoral integrity and transparency.
4. Uphold principles of transparency, independence, and impartiality in the conduct of electoral processes.
5. Engage proactively with international partners, including the EU, to maximize the benefits of their support while safeguarding the integrity of electoral events.
6. Recommend to Parliament creation of IEBC Fund to facilitate the Commission unceasingly
7. Work with the Ministry of Education on how to curriculum Electoral expertise as a discipline to be studied for professional staffing.

7.4.5 Recommendations to Parliament and Political Class

1. Recruitment of the IEBC Staff professionally and competitively. With the complexity of elections, which is not an event, the secretariat of the Commission should be permanent with the Commissioners serving a staggered fixed term (IREC, 2009).

2. Legislate a legal framework on external actors foreign electoral assistance that would bridge the deficiency in order to promote democratic principles to ensure transparent, credible, and peaceful elections. Each election was found to come with its own framework on foreign electoral assistance.
3. Embrace the concept of "political hygiene" and demonstrate maturity during party nominations and trusting EMBs such as the IEBC to carry out their work independently and impartially.
4. Operationalize the IEBC Fund. This is an entire electoral cycle operational fund appropriated from Parliament not dependent on government.
5. Commit to long-term investments in democracy and reforms that foster a conducive political environment for electoral integrity in Kenya.

7.5 Suggestions for Further Studies

1. **Impact of EU Electoral Assistance on Regional Stability:** Analyze how EU electoral assistance in Kenya and other African countries contributes to regional stability and peace. Investigate whether EU support in one country affects neighboring countries' political dynamics and electoral processes.
2. **Comparative Analysis of EU Electoral Assistance:** Conduct a comparative study to assess the effectiveness of EU electoral assistance programs in different regions and countries. Explore variations in approaches, outcomes, and challenges, considering the diverse political contexts and needs of each country.
3. **The interplay between EU foreign electoral assistance and electoral insecurities in Africa:** Future studies can focus on the contestations between state sovereignty and democratic aid through electoral assistance. This would generate important insights into the conflicts between the discourse of electoral assistance and the need to maintain state sovereignty in resource-deficient countries in dire need of electoral assistance.
4. **The Role of CSOs in Promoting Democracy:** Investigate the evolving role of CSOs in promoting democracy and electoral integrity in the context of international assistance. Examine how CSOs navigate changing dynamics in EU funding and adapt their strategies to remain effective advocates for democratic values.

5. **EU's Influence on Electoral Reforms:** Examine the extent to which the EU's engagement in electoral processes influences domestic electoral reforms and legal frameworks in recipient countries. Assess whether EU support encourages countries to adopt more democratic electoral systems and practices.
6. **EU Electoral Assistance and Diplomatic Relations:** Analyze the impact of EU electoral assistance on diplomatic relations between the EU and recipient countries. Investigate how electoral support may influence broader diplomatic agendas and partnerships, considering both positive and negative consequences.
7. **Long-Term Effects of EU Support:** Conduct a longitudinal study to assess the long-term effects of EU electoral support on the political development of recipient countries. Analyze how the sustainability and continuity of EU assistance programs contribute to democratic consolidation and governance improvements.
8. **Changing Dynamics of EU Funding and Civic Engagement:** Explore the evolving landscape of EU funding for civic engagement initiatives by CSOs. Investigate how shifts in EU funding priorities and strategies impact the ability of CSOs to engage effectively in electoral education, monitoring, and advocacy.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: CONCENT FORM

I am seeking your consent to participate in a study entitled:

THE CONTRIBUTION OF EUROPEAN UNION FOREIGN ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE ON KENYA'S GENERAL ELECTIONS INTEGRITY

Investigators:

1. The Student: Ogutu Reuben Kennedy
2. Supervisors: Dr. Barack Calvince Omondi and Dr. Thomas Otieno Juma

Study location: Kenya

Purpose of the research: The general research objective will be to examine the contribution of the EU electoral assistance in Kenya's general elections integrity. The specific objectives will be as follows:

- 5.4.1. To investigate the European Union involvement in electoral civic education in the lead up to 2022 general elections in Kenya
- 5.4.2. To assess the role of the European Union electoral assistance through capacity building in Kenya's 2022 general elections and;
- 5.4.3. To explore key stakeholders' perception on the contribution of EU electoral assistance on Kenya's elections integrity.

ETHICAL ISSUES TO GOVERN THIS RESEARCH

Authorization: To be duly authorized to undertake a study involving human subjects is the first and most critical ethical requirement for social scientists (Babbie, 2008). For this study, the process up to this far has been developed within the ethical expectations of Maseno University. It has involved the development of concept note, defending of the concept note at School of Development and Strategic Studies (SDSS), submitting the proposal at School of Graduate Studies (SGS) and subsequently warrant of SGS research permit. Thereafter the researcher will see ethical approval from MUSERC, and later from National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI).

Informed Consent: In research, prior informed consent is required to ensure that participants only take part in the study when they understand the study objectives and feel safe and satisfied with the reasons for which the study is being carried out. To ensure this, the researcher will only administer the questionnaires and undertake key informant interviews upon the formal consenting of all participants after reading fully the information concerning the study as presented in consent and information form (Appendix 1).

Voluntary participation: Participation in a scientific study is required to be a voluntary as possible so that data collected becomes impartial. The researcher will not entice his target population in any way, and try as much as possible to email the consent form, upon successful prospecting of their phone and/or email details at least before actual data collection to give the potential participants a chance to decide to take part or not.

Do no harm principle: A scientific enquiry should not create any form of harm – physical, social, emotional, and so on to the participants (Kothari, 2004). For this study, the strength which helps to deal with possible ethical issues is that the kind of population targeted is an educated category and which cannot be easily manipulated. For example it is very difficult to manipulate leaders in the CSO sectors implementing elections projects, neither can one find it very easy to manipulate employees of the Kenyan offices such as ORPP, IEBC and other targeted. However, to ensure this principle is adhered to, the researcher will take ensure that information gathered during research is only used for the purposes of the study and not shared for any other reasons unless in processed forms such in publications. This is to take cognizance of the fact that elections is an emotive thing to others as it is characterized by deaths, corruption, and other vices that may emerge during research thus sharing such information in raw may jeopardize the security of certain respondents.

Data: Storage and Safety and Duration: Data management is a fundamental ethical issue for two main reasons according to (Bhattacharjee, 2012): Mishandling will lead to data loss, repercussions of which is economically and temporally inconveniencing. Miss-storage may lead to unauthorized access and misuse which may put the researcher in a difficult situation ethically speaking such as: breach of promises made to the participants. All data collected through survey will be kept in a metallic box bought specifically for the study. The box will be lockable and the keys will only be owned by the researcher. This will help avoid loss of data and also cases of unauthorized access to hard data/questionnaires. All audio records will be stored in a new hard-

drive whose password will only be known to the researcher. This measure will also ensure data is out of reach to unauthorized hands, and is safe for use wherever needed. At the end when the thesis has been approved for graduation and no more need for the data collected, every small bits of the data of any form collected will be destroyed.

Anonymity: According to Creswell (2003) anonymity applies in both qualitative and quantitative research and relates to the fact that what the researcher needs is the information upon which he/she studies trends and draws conclusions, rather than focusing on people who are the sources of the information. To avoid direct reference to the people who gave the data during the research is also important as it increases safety for the participants as the information, which may be confidential but traceable to a given institution and/or person within a given institution. To avoid this, the researcher will code all the KIIs done and will not make any direct reference to a person or an institution, especially on themes which are discussed in confidence. Therefore, no products out of the study will be directly name or make reference to an individual's name.

Confidentiality: According to Brymann & Bell (2007) confidentiality implies that the researcher takes all necessary steps to protect any information shared with him/her during the research process so as to avoid breaching any institutional codes of information sharing, and making unsafe the givers of such information. The researcher will take two important steps pertaining to this ethical issues: a) ensure that all due authorization is got before launching the study. This will involve SGS, MUSERC and NACOSTI authorization. This step will help the researcher ensure that target population develops confidence in the researcher and researcher as a result of legitimacy warranted by these authorizations. B) Upon winning the confidence of the participants/institutional representatives, the researcher will take a further step to buttress confidentiality by ensuring that highlight confidential information are removed from the research report, and that not very confidential information are presented in a way that no readers can relate them to any single person/individuals.

If you agree, the interview will take about 45 minutes to 1hour 30 minutes. I will really appreciate if you allow me (or my research assistant to fill in all the questions)

There are no risks to taking part, and we hope that it will help community members who are women by highlighting important issues that they face.

For accuracy of documentation and to help save the time taken to hand-write what you tell me one after another, I will ask you to allow me (my research assistant) to record the proceedings. I am requesting that you allow a videotaping but even audio will go a long way to help me meet this purpose.

You are free to refuse to take part in the research, or refuse to answer a question, and you can stop the interview at any time and ask us not to use the information you have given. This is your right and you will not be affected negatively if you refuse.

Contact

In case you have any queries kindly reach out to:

To Contact the supervisors: If you have questions or concerns about this research, please contact reach out to: Supervisor 1: Dr. Barack Calvince Omondi (barackcalvince@gmail.com),
MUSERC Secretary: 0722203411; Email address: MUSERC-secretariate@maseno.ac.ke.

CONSENT:

I have fully read the descriptions and purpose of the study and I agree to participate in this study
Signature: _____ Date: _____

Name of Respondent: _____

Signature:

Name-of-Research/Assistant

.....

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE: NOTE: QUESTIONS SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION, OBJECTIVE ONE AND TWO ARE FOR ALL COHORTS WHILE OBJECTIVE THREE WILL BE ADMINISTRED TO SPECIFIC COHORTS AS SPECIFIED

A) SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES

1. Name of respondent		
2. Gender of respondent	1. Male 2. Female 3. LBGTQI+	
4. Institution of Affiliation		
5. Number of Years' working with the current organization		
6. Number of Years' involved in electoral programming		
7. Are you a person with disability	1. Yes 2. No	
8. Which type of Disability	1. Physical 2. Hearing 3. Mental 4. Visual 5. Any other (specify)	
9. Employment status	1. Contractual 2. Permanent 3. Level of Effort (LoE)	
10. Level of education	1. Basic 2. Diploma 3. Graduate 4. Masters 5. PhD	
11. What is your county of residence?		
OBJECTIVE ONE: EU and Civic and electoral Education in Kenya		
12. What forms of civic and electoral education does the EU support in Kenya?		
13. Who are the main implementers of EU electoral education in Kenya?	1. CSOs 2. CBOs 3. Government institutions 4. External Non-state players	
14. Based on your electoral programs experience, can you say that EU is the main external electoral assistant	1. Yes 2. No	

on matters civic and electoral education?		
15. What forms/types of funding did EU give to your organization toward civic and electoral education in the last three elections?	1. Yes 2. No	
16. How did you implement the program?		
17. With whom did you implement the program?		
18. What was the geographic coverage of your programs?		
19. What was the demographic coverage of your program?		
20. Please rate the program in terms of how it enhanced electoral integrity through increasing participation of different formations of voters	1. No Impact 2. Least Impact 3. Somewhat impactful 4. It was impactful 5. Very impactful	
21. Kindly explain your choice above		
22. Can you say with confidence that EU's involvement in Kenya's elections through civic and electoral education leads to electoral integrity?	1. Yes 2. No	
23. What other factors are involved that facilitate EU's work?		
24. What other factors are involved that hinder EU's work?		
OBJECTIVE TWO: EU AND ELECTION-RELATED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE		
25. At what part of the elections cycle does the EU technical assistance begin?		
26. What forms of technical and logistical assistance does the EU give to ORPP?		
27. What forms of technical and logistical assistance does the EU give elections observers?		
28. What forms of technical and logistical assistance does the EU give CSOs?		

29. What forms of technical and logistical assistance does the EU give to JLAC?		
30. What forms of technical and logistical assistance does the EU give TO THE JUDICIARY?		
31. What forms of technical and logistical assistance does the EU give TO THE LOCAL THINK-TANK INSTITUTIONS?		
32. What forms of technical and logistical assistance does the EU give political parties?		
33. What forms of technical and logistical assistance does the EU give TO THE FOREIGN NON-STATE THINK-TANK INSTITUTIONS?		
34. What forms of technical and logistical assistance does the EU give to your organization?		
35. What do you think about the assistance in terms of facilitating electoral integrity on Kenya?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Unnecessary 2. Less necessary 3. Averagely Necessary 4. Necessary 5. Very necessary 	
36. Explain how the technical assistance happens at the following stages of the elections		
34.A. Pre-elections		
34.B. During elections		
35.C. After/Post-elections		
37. Does EU interventions through capacity and technical building lead to free, fair, and credible elections?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Yes 2. No 	
38. Kindly explain your response in 37 above		
39. What other factors contribute to building the capacity of elections-concerned actors?		
40. Explain your response in 37 above.		

41. What external/beyond EU factors contribute to building the capacity of elections-concerned actors?		
42. What external/beyond EU factors LIMIT building the capacity of elections-concerned actors to deliver electoral integrity in Kenya?		
OBJECTIVE THREE: PERSPECTIVES OF KEY STAKEHOLDERS ON THE ROLE OF EU IN ENHANCING ELECTORAL INTEGRITY IN KENYA		
1.POLITICAL PARTIES		
43. What forms of engagement do you have with the EU during elections?		
44. For how long have you been engaged with EU in terms of elections programs?		
45. Do you think these engagements are of mutual benefits?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Yes 2. No 3. Somehow 	
46. Rate the effectiveness of EU as AN AVENUE FOR CONSOLIDATING ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY IN KENYA.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Not effective at all (0%) 2. Least Effective (25%) 3. Moderately effective (50%) 4. Effective (75%) Very effective (100%) 	
47. Please explain your response above		
48. Which political party are you affiliated to?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. UDA 2. ODM 3. Any Other (specify) 	
2.CSOs		
49. What is your portfolio in the CSO arena?		
50. What is the name of your CSO?		
51. During which elections have you been engaged with EU in terms of elections programs?		
52. What forms of engagements have you had?		

53. Rate the effectiveness of EU as AN AVENUE FOR CONSOLIDATING ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY IN KENYA.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Not effective at all (0%) 2. Least Effective (25%) 3. Moderately effective (50%) 4. Effective (75%) 5. Very effective (100%) 	
3.ORPP		
54. What is your portfolio at the ORPP?		
55. During which elections have you been engaged with EU in terms of elections programs?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 2013 2. 2017 3. 2022 	
	4. ALL	
56. What forms of engagements have you had?		
57. Rate the effectiveness of EU as AN AVENUE FOR CONSOLIDATING ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY IN KENYA.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Not effective at all (0%) 2. Least Effective (25%) 3. Moderately effective (50%) 4. Effective (75%) 5. Very effective (100%) 	
4.JLAC		
58. What is your portfolio at JLAC?		
59. During which elections have you been engaged with EU in terms of elections programs?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 2013 2. 2017 3. 2022 4. ALL 	
60. What forms of engagements have you had AND WITHIN what frameworks?		
61. Rate the effectiveness of EU as AN AVENUE FOR CONSOLIDATING ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY IN KENYA.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Not effective at all (0%) 2. Least Effective (25%) 3. Moderately effective (50%) 4. Effective (75%) 5. Very effective (100%) 	
5.IEBC		
What is your portfolio at IEBC?	6.	

62. During which elections have you been engaged with EU in terms of elections programs?	63. 2013 64. 2017 65. 2022 7. ALL	
63. What forms of engagements have you had AND WITHIN what frameworks?		
64. Rate the effectiveness of EU as AN AVENUE FOR CONSOLIDATING ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY IN KENYA.	1. Not effective at all (0%) 2. Least Effective (25%) 3. Moderately effective (50%)	
	4. Effective (75%) 5. Very effective (100%)	
6.MEDIA		
65. What is your portfolio at the media fraternity?		
66. During which elections have you been engaged with EU in terms of elections programs?	1. 2013 2. 2017 3. 2022 4. ALL	
67. What forms of engagements have you had with EU AND WITHIN what frameworks?		
68. Rate the effectiveness of EU as AN AVENUE FOR CONSOLIDATING ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY IN KENYA.	1. Not effective at all (0%) 2. Least Effective (25%) 3. Moderately effective (50%) 4. Effective (75%) 5. Very effective (100%)	
7.LOCAL OBSERVER GROUPS		
69. Through which observers have you participated under the facilitation of EU?		
70. During which elections have you been engaged with EU in terms of elections programs?	1. 2013 2. 2017 3. 2022 4. ALL	

71. What forms of engagements have you had with EU AND WITHIN what frameworks?		
72. Rate the effectiveness of EU as AN AVENUE FOR CONSOLIDATING ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY IN KENYA.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Not effective at all (0%) 2. Least Effective (25%) 3. Moderately effective (50%) 4. Effective (75%) 5. Very effective (100%) 	
8.LAW ENFORCEMENT		
73. What is your portfolio within the law enforcement fraternity?		
74. During which elections have you been engaged with EU in terms of elections programs?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 2013 2. 2017 3. 2022 4. ALL 	
75. What forms of engagements have you had AND WITHIN what frameworks?		
76. Rate the effectiveness of EU as AN AVENUE FOR CONSOLIDATING ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY IN KENYA.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Not effective at all (0%) 2. Least Effective (25%) 3. Moderately effective (50%) 4. Effective (75%) 5. Very effective (100%) 	
9.THE JUDICIARY		
78. What is your portfolio at THE JUDICIARY?		
79. During which elections have you been engaged with EU in terms of elections programs?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 2013 2. 2017 3. 2022 4. ALL 	
79. What forms of engagements have you had AND WITHIN what frameworks?		

<p>80. Rate the effectiveness of EU as AN AVENUE FOR CONSOLIDATING ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY IN KENYA.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Not effective at all (0%) 2. Least Effective (25%) 3. Moderately effective (50%) 4. Effective (75%) 5. Very effective (100%) 	
<p>END. THANK YOU VERY MUCH</p>		

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS: FOR ALL COHORTS
OBJECTIVE ONE

Thematic areas of Concern:

- 5.4.3.1. Forms of electoral and civic education offered by EU
- 5.4.3.2. Actors involved to implement
- 5.4.3.3. Geographical coverage and rationale: conflict mapping
- 5.4.3.4. Demographic coverage and rationale: youth nihilism?
- 5.4.3.5. Strategies employed?
- 5.4.3.6. Notions about success and failure
- 5.4.3.7. Endogenous factors facilitating the role: Strengths?
- 5.4.3.8. Exogenous [factors beyond EU] factors facilitating this role: opportunities?
- 5.4.3.9. Exogenous factors hindering this

role: Threats? **OBJECTIVE TWO:
capacity building to concerned institutions**

Thematic areas of concern:

- 1. Forms of capacity building for elections offered by EU
- 2. Actors involved to implement
- 3. Geographical coverage and rationale: conflict mapping

4. Demographic coverage and rationale: youth nihilism?
5. Strategies employed?
6. Notions about success and failure
7. Endogenous factors facilitating the role: Strengths?
8. Exogenous [factors beyond EU] factors facilitating this role: opportunities?
9. Exogenous factors hindering this role: Threats?

OBJECTIVE THREE:

Thematic areas of concern:

Critical appraisal of EU's role (civic/electoral education and capacity building) by keystoneholders namely:

1. Political parties
2. JLAC
3. Judiciary
4. Media
5. Law enforcement
6. IEBC
7. Local elections observers
8. CSO

APPENDIX II: MUSERC PERMIT



MASENO UNIVERSITY SCIENTIFIC AND ETHICS REVIEW COMMITTEE

Tel: +254 057 351 622 Ext: 3050
Fax: +254 057 351 221

Private Bag – 40105, Maseno, Kenya
Email: muerc-secretariate@maseno.ac.ke

REF: MSU/DRPI/MUSERC/01230/23

Date: 18th May, 2023

TO: Ogotu Reuben Kennedy
MA/DS/00159/013
Department of International Relations and Diplomacy
School of Development and Strategic Studies
Maseno University
P. O. Box, Private Bag, Maseno, Kenya

Dear Sir,

RE: The Contribution of European Union Foreign Electoral Assistance on Kenya's General Elections Integrity

This is to inform you that **Maseno University Scientific and Ethics Review Committee (MUSERC)** has reviewed and approved your above research proposal. Your application approval number is MUSERC/01230/23. The approval period is 18th May, 2023 – 17th May, 2024.

This approval is subject to compliance with the following requirements;

- i. Only approved documents including (informed consents, study instruments, MTA) will be used.
- ii. All changes including (amendments, deviations, and violations) are submitted for review and approval by Maseno University Scientific and Ethics Review Committee (MUSERC).
- iii. Death and life threatening problems and serious adverse events or unexpected adverse events whether related or unrelated to the study must be reported to Maseno University Scientific and Ethics Review Committee (MUSERC) within 24 hours of notification.
- iv. Any changes, anticipated or otherwise that may increase the risks or affected safety or welfare of study participants and others or affect the integrity of the research must be reported to Maseno University Scientific and Ethics Review Committee (MUSERC) within 24 hours.
- v. Clearance for export of biological specimens must be obtained from relevant institutions.
- vi. Submission of a request for renewal of approval at least 60 days prior to expiry of the approval period. Attach a comprehensive progress report to support the renewal.
- vii. Submission of an executive summary report within 90 days upon completion of the study to Maseno University Scientific and Ethics Review Committee (MUSERC).

Prior to commencing your study, you will be expected to obtain a research license from National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) <https://oris.nacosti.go.ke> and also obtain other clearances needed.

Yours sincerely


Prof. Philip O. Owuor, PhD, FAAS, FKNAS
Chairman, MUSERC



MASENO UNIVERSITY IS ISO 9001-CERTIFIED



APPENDIX III : SGS PERMIT



**MASENO UNIVERSITY
OFFICE OF THE DEAN, SCHOOL OF DEVELOPMENT AND
STRATEGIC STUDIES**

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Email: cobarack@maseno.ac.ke

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Maseno, KENYA

Date: April 20, 2023


To Whom it May Concern,

Ref: Ogutu Reuben Kennedy - MA/DS/000159/2013

This is to introduce to you **Mr. Ogutu Reuben Kennedy of Admission Number MA/DS/000159/2013** as a student of Maseno University pursuing Masters of Arts in International Relations. Mr. Ogutu has successfully completed his coursework and is set to go to the field to collect data for his dissertation entitled: *"Contribution of Foreign Electoral Assistance in Africa: The Case of European Union Involvement in Kenya's General Elections Integrity"*. As a procedural issue in data collection, Mr. Ogutu is required to carry out a pre-test of his data collection tools in sharpening such tools for actual data collection. This letter is therefore to introduce to you Mr. Ogutu and to seek for your support in helping him pre-test his tools. Your support and cooperation is highly appreciated.

Thank you.

Yours Sincerely,



Dr. Calvin Omondi Barack, Ph.D.

Chair, School Post-Graduate Committee

APPENDIX V: PHOTO GALLERY

The listed photo gallery is not exhaustive for confidentiality policy. The listed Key Informants accepted publishing for the purpose of scholarly work support only.



Mr. Guy Harrison

Head of Political Affairs Division; EU Delegation to Kenya and Co-chair, Basket Fund – GE 2022

Interview held at Dunhill Towers offices in Nairobi on June 28th, 2023

**Mr. Issack Hassan Ahmed, EBS;
Former Chairman IIEC and IEBC**

Interview held at Garane and Somane Advocates offices at Pitman's House in Nairobi on June 29th, 2023



**Mr. Marjan Hussein Marjan, EBS
IEBC CEO**

Interview held at IEBC offices at Anniversary Towers 6th floor in Nairobi on June 29th, 2023



Photo Gallery



Mr. Clilfe Ochieng
*Monitoring and Evaluation
Coordinator*

*Transform, Empowerment for
Action Initiative – TEAM*


*Interview held at their Milimani
Office Behind Kisumu County
Assembly on May 24th, 2023*

Mr. Kakai Kissinger

*Resource Mobilization Advisor & Former
Deputy Registrar – Judiciary*

*Interview conducted at his office on the 11th
Floor, of Harambee House in Nairobi*

Mr. Jacktone Nyonje *Director,*



*Voter Education, Partnerships &
Communication*

*Interview held at IEBC offices at
Anniversary Towers 6th floor in Nairobi on
June 29th, 2023*



Dr. Sanmarc Okoth, PhD

*Director, Education, Youths, Sports
Gender and Social Services*

*Interview held at IEBC offices at
Anniversary Towers 6th floor in Nairobi
on June 29th, 2023*

Photo Gallery



Mrs. Ann Nderitu, EBS
Registrar of Political Parties /CEO - ORPP
Interview held in her ORPP offices 4th floor at The Lions Place in Nairobi on June 26th, 2023

Mr. Musau Mulle
National Coordinator ELOG
Interview held in his ELOG offices, Jumuia Place in Nairobi on July 21st, 2023



Hon Omboko Milemba, MP Emuhaya
SG Amani National Congress - ANC
Interview held at the NG-CDF Offices – Emuhaya on July 25th, 2023



Mr. Chrispine Owiye, OGW
Director, Legal Services – IEBC
Interview held at Acacia Hotel 2nd floor Kisumu on June 21st, 2023

